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Preface
This book attempts to get a true global overview of trends in urban inequality and
residential socio-economic segregation in a large number of cities all over the
world. It investigates the link between income inequality and socio-economic
residential segregation in 24 large urban regions in Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe,
North America and South America. In many ways the book is a sequel to the earlier
book “Socio-Economic Segregation in European Capital Cities” which focussed
solely on trends in Europe. Although that book was very well received, readers also
asked whether trends in Europe were representative for what is happening in the
rest of the world. This new book is a direct response to that question and aims to be
more globally representative.
The main outcome of this book is the proposal of a Global Segregation Thesis,
which combines ideas of rising levels of inequality, rising levels of socio-economic
segregation, and important changes in the social geography of cities. At the time of
writing this preface, the world is still grappling with the global outbreak of
COVID-19. Now the spread of the virus is slowing down in the Global North, the
Global South is hit very hard. In response to the spread of the virus, unprecedented
measures were taken, having a huge impact on the world economy. It is widely
expected that these measures will lead to a deep economic crisis, which will hit
those who are the most vulnerable hardest. Some of the chapters in this book
mention the COVID-19 crisis, and it is expected that this crisis will speed up the
increase in inequality, both globally and locally, leading to an accelerated growth in
socio-economic segregation in cities.
This book would not have been possible without the generous contributions
from author teams from all over the world. We are very grateful for their generosity
and their contributions. Much of the editorial time invested in this book was
covered by funding from the European Research Council under the European
v
Union’s Seventh Framework Program (FP/2007-2013)/ERC Grant Agreement n.
615159 (ERC Consolidator Grant DEPRIVEDHOODS, Socio-spatial inequality,
deprived neighbourhoods and neighbourhood effects); from the Estonian Research
Council (PUT PRG306, Infotechnological Mobility Laboratory, RITA-Ränne), and
from TU Delft where Tiit Tammaru was a visiting professor in 2018.
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Rising Inequalities and a Changing Social
Geography of Cities. An Introduction
to the Global Segregation Book
Maarten van Ham, Tiit Tammaru, Rūta Ubarevičienė, and Heleen Janssen
Abstract The book “Urban Socio-Economic Segregation and Income Inequality: a
Global Perspective” investigates the link between income inequality and residential
segregation between socio-economic groups in 24 large cities and their urban regions
in Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, and SouthAmerica. Author teams
with in-depth local knowledge provide an extensive analysis of each case study
city. Based on their findings, the main results of the book can be summarised as
follows.Rising inequalities lead to rising levels of socio-economic segregation almost
everywhere in the world. Levels of inequality and segregation are higher in cities
in lower income countries, but the growth in inequality and segregation is faster in
cities in high-income countries, which leads to a convergence of global trends. In
many cities the workforce is professionalising, with an increasing share of the top
socio-economic groups. In most cities the high-income workers are moving to the
centre or to attractive coastal areas, and low-income workers are moving to the edges
of the urban region. In some cities, mainly in lower income countries, high-income
workers are also concentrating in out-of-centre enclaves or gated communities. The
urban geography of inequality changes faster and is more pronounced than city-
wide single-number segregation indices reveal. Taken together, these findings have
resulted in the formulation of a Global Segregation Thesis.
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1.1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, globalisation, restructuring of labour markets, and liberalisation of
the economy, have led to rising income andwealth inequality across the globe (Piketty
2014; Alvaredo et al. 2018). These rising levels of inequality have consequences for
the social and spatial organisation of cities as inequality also has a spatial footprint
in the form of socio-economic segregation. When referring to socio-economic segre-
gation we mean an uneven distribution of different occupational or income groups
across residential neighbourhoods of a city or an urban region. Research has shown
that residential segregation between high-income and low-income groups in Euro-
pean cities has increased in recent decades (Kazepov 2005; Musterd and Ostendorf
1998; Fujita andMaloutas 2016; Tammaru et al. 2016;Musterd et al. 2017; Tammaru
et al. 2020). Thismeans that peoplewith high and low incomes are increasingly living
separated in different neighbourhoods. Segregation by income is largely driven by
the residential choices of higher income households as they have the financial means
to realise their housing and neighbourhood preferences (Harvey 1985; Hulchansky
2010; Tammaru et al. 2020). At the same time, lower income households are living
in those neighbourhoods where housing is cheap, often in the least desirable parts of
a city. Rising levels of segregation cause concern regarding the social sustainability
of cities and reduce the status of cities as places of opportunity with equal opportu-
nities for all. As a result, there is increasing attention for understanding intra-urban
inequalities and divided cities (see van Ham, Tammaru and Janssen 2018; EU/UN
Habitat 2016).
The relationship between income inequality and socio-economic segregation is
complex, as it partly depends on the local political, economic, and planning context
in cities (see also Tammaru et al. 2016; Musterd et al. 2017). However, there are
increasing indications that there is a causal relationship, and that it takes some time
before a rise in income inequality leads to higher levels of socio-economic segrega-
tion.With otherwords, there is a time lag between a change in income inequality and a
change in levels of segregation (Marcińczak et al. 2015;Musterd et al. 2017;Tammaru
et al. 2020; Wessel 2016). This time lag can be explained by the fact that the rela-
tionship between income inequality and segregation is a process. As inequality rises,
in situ processes will downgrade some neighbourhoods and upgrade others, and over
time this will translate into selective residential mobility flows between neighbour-
hoods, ultimately leading to changes in the level of segregation. However, because of
selectivemobility, levels of segregation can also drop after a rise in inequality, because
high-income groups move into low-income neighbourhoods as is characteristic to
gentrification. This drop in levels of segregation at times of growing inequality is
referred to as the segregation paradox (Sýkora 2009; Tammaru et al. 2020). As higher
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income groups move into centrally located and attractive lower income neighbour-
hoods, these neighbourhoods temporarily become more socio-economically mixed
and levels of segregation can drop. But as these gentrifying neighbourhoods become
unaffordable for lower income households, lower income households move out, and
levels of segregation go up. The fact that levels of income inequality have risen glob-
ally leads to the expectation that also levels of socio-economic segregation in cities
will go up globally.
Another important process in global cities, which is related to segregation, is the
changing occupational structure of theworkforce. In the 1990s, Sassen (1991) argued
that the occupational structure was polarising, with increasing shares of high-income
and low-incomeworkers, at the expense of themiddle-incomegroup.Hamnett (1994)
argued that the concept of social polarisation is ambiguous, and in hisworkonLondon
he found evidence of processes of professionalisation and socio-economic upgrading
(Butler et al. 2008). More recent work has also found evidence of other forms of
occupational changes since 2000 (Davidson and Wyly 2015; Manley and Johnston
2014). A very recent paper by van Ham and colleagues (2020) found clear trends of
professionalisation in New York, Tokyo, and London, evidenced by a rising share
of high-income occupations in all three cities. Professionalisation of the workforce
can lead to a dramatically changing social geography of cities without changes in
the levels of city-wide single-number measures of segregation. Over the last few
decades, high-income workers are increasingly revaluing city life, leading to a high
demand for inner city living. Van Ham and colleagues (2020) showed that over the
1981–2011 period levels of segregation in London remained relatively stable, but at
the same time the social geography of London turned inside out. Where in the 1980s
the rich lived on the edges of London and the poor in the centre, by 2011 this pattern
was reversed. A similar process can be seen for the city of Toronto (Hulchansky
2010).
Despite a wealth of knowledge on socio-economic segregation and the changing
geography of inequality, there is little internationally comparative research, andmany
regions of the world are still under researched. This book aims to fill this gap and
provides a comprehensive picture of socio-economic segregation in a large number
of large cities from all continents. Including cities from all over the globe enables
us to study segregation in a truly international context, where many previous studies
focussed on a much more limited set of case studies, including mainly Western
countries with a good data infrastructure. The main question of this book is: Are
there global trends in changes in inequality and segregation, or do cities in different
parts of the world show very distinctive patterns of socio-economic segregation?
Ultimately, the question is whether there is such a thing as a Global Segregation
Thesis?
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Fig. 1.1 Map of case study cities. Source The authors
The book includes the following case study cities1 (see Fig. 1.1): Cairo (Egypt),
Cape Town (SAR), Johannesburg (SAR), Hong Kong (Honk Kong), Jakarta
(Indonesia), Mumbai (India), Shanghai (China), Tel Aviv (Israel), Tokyo (Japan),
Melbourne (Australia), Berlin (Germany), Brussels (Belgium), Istanbul (Turkey),
London (UK), Paris (France), Chicago (USA), Los Angeles (USA), Mexico City
(Mexico), New York (USA), Bogotá (Colombia), Buenos Aires (Argentina), Lima
(Peru), Paramaribo (Suriname), and São Paulo (Brazil). Each of these cities repre-
sents global cities in their own context. For some of these cities very detailed data was
available for small geographies, while for other cities data was only available for very
large spatial units. In addition to chapters on each of these case study cities, the book
also includes a chapter which analyses data for 194 cities in 14 OECD countries.
This study uses only one year of data but offers the most rigorous comparison of
cities possible. The other empirical chapters use data for the 2000/2001-2010/2011
period, and earlier or later data if available and comparable.
Comparing case studies of 24 cities was a challenging task due to the richness of
the data and the importance of the local and national context of each city. Based on
the case studies we have formulated five main conclusions.
1We use “city” and “urban region” as synonyms in this introduction.
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(1) There is general trend of professionalisation of the occupational structure of
cities, with an increase in the share of high-income occupations, and a decrease
in the share of low-income occupations. As many high-income workers have a
preference for living in central cities, this explains the changing social geography
of urban inequality.
(2) Segregation asmeasured city-wide by theDissimilarity Index (DI) has increased
for most cities (except Cape Town, Johannesburg, Mexico, and Buenos Aires,
and excluding some citieswith problematic data). Based on our resultswe expect
levels of segregation to increase further in the future, as inequality is increasing,
and because in the last decade processes of gentrification have temporarily
caused central areas of cities to become more mixed in terms of income.
(3) The higher the level of inequality, the higher the level of segregation. This rela-
tionship becomes stronger when lagged inequality data is used. This is because
when inequality levels increase, it takes time for this to be reflected in the
geography of inequality.
(4) Generally speaking, middle-income countries combine high levels of inequality
with high levels of segregation, while high-income countries combine lower
levels of inequality with lower levels of segregation. Over time we see that
there is convergence between the higher and lower income countries; levels of
inequality and segregation in the higher income countries are going up and the
gap between the higher and lower income countries is decreasing.
(5) The geography of social inequality is changing faster than levels of segregation
measured by the Dissimilarity Index. In most cities the rich are moving to the
centre and attractive coastal regions, and the poor are being pushed to the edges
of the urban region. Where this does not happen, or sometimes in combination
with this trend, the rich also concentrate in enclaves and gated communities.
The remainder of this introduction is organised as follows. First, we present the
overall approach of the book; this section deals with the measures, geographies,
and definitions used, and it discusses some of the challenges of doing international
comparative work. Second, we present how income inequality leads to residential
segregation. Next, we discuss the main findings of the book in detail, including
summary tables and figures. Finally, this introductory chapter presents a discussion
and overall conclusions, with an outlook to the future. After the introduction, each
case study city is presented in a separate chapter, authored by expert local teams.
The only deviation is Chap. 2, which compares data for one year for a large number
of cities in selected OECD countries.
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1.2 Approach and Justification
This book provides a systematic comparison of changes in income inequality, occu-
pational change, and socio-economic segregation in large cities around the world
over the last decades. As previous studies focussed on either a small number of case
studies, or only on European cities, this study will provide a global coverage of cities
from all continents, and it includes 24 case study cities in Africa, Asia, Australia,
Europe, North America, and South America. Although we aimed for the largest
cities, and an even geographical coverage in each of the continents, the final set of
case studies was influenced by the availability of research teams and data.
A large-scale internationally comparative project raises many challenges. Not
surprisingly, these challenges mostly concern data availability and comparability of
case study cities. In the selection of case study cities, we complemented compara-
bility with an inclusive approach, which means that some chapters are not strictly
comparable to others. To maximise comparability of cases, the analysis of cities is
based on fairly basic and harmonised guidelines (see Appendix 1). The authors were
asked to use Functional Urban Areas as defined by the OECD (2013) or equiva-
lent; to create socio-economic groups by categorising occupations into Top, Middle,
and Bottom occupational status groups; to provide a city-level Gini index; and they
were asked to use the Dissimilarity Index to measure residential segregation between
occupations. To analyse the geography of segregation we asked authors to construct
a series of maps based on the smallest possible spatial units of analysis (preferably
census tracts of around 5000 inhabitants), and data from around 2000 and 2010.
Although for some cities more recent data is available (and also presented in their
chapters), for most cities 2011 is the year of the most recent census, and hence also
the most recent data point.
For only a few case study cities it was possible to closely follow the guidelines.
Most of the chapters had to deviate from the guidelines to a certain extent (see
Appendix 2 for a detailed overview of the data used per chapter). For example, most
chapters use data on occupational categories, but in cases where such data was not
available, data was used on education, income, or unemployment. The spatial units
of analysis ranged from as small as 800 inhabitants in Buenos Aires to as large as
750,000 inhabitants in Jakarta. The size of urban areas analysed also varies greatly:
from 0.4 million inhabitants in Paramaribo to 35.7 million in Tokyo.
The analyses for the cities Berlin, Bogotá, Jakarta, and Mumbai deviate the most
from the guidelines because of the lack of comparable data. For that reason, they are
not included in our comparative analysis in this introductory chapter. These cities
are still included in the book since they do provide very valuable insights on socio-
economic segregation on their own. Jakarta and Mumbai could not be included due
to the very large spatial units available for the analysis. Berlin could not be included
because of a different indicator available to measure the level of segregation. Bogotá
could not be included because only data for 2005 is available that does not allow to
study changes in socio-economic segregation.
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Central to this book is the link between income inequality and socio-economic
segregation. Ideally, the relationship between inequality (measured using the Gini
index) and segregation (measured using the Dissimilarity Index) would be measured
at the city-level. However, the Gini index is not available on the city-level for most
cities and, as a result, most chapters report inequality data at the country-level. For
consistency, country-level Gini data as provided by the World Bank is used in this
Introductory chapter. As a consequence, the relationship between inequality and
segregation is somewhat weaker compared to using city-level Gini Index. As shown
in previous studies, income inequality is almost always higher in large cities as
compared to the rest of the country.
All chapters (except Berlin) have used the Dissimilarity Index (DI) to measure
city-wide segregation. Although the Dissimilarity Index has certain disadvantages
over other measures, it is important to use a simple measure to increase the compara-
bility of cases. See Appendix 1 for more detail on the DI used. The index can range
from 0 to 100, and levels of segregation are often categorised as being low when
under 30, moderate when between 30 and 60, and high when above 60 (Massey and
Denton 1993). This categorisation was initially developed to characterise ethnic and
racial segregation in the US. However, this book focusses on socio-economic segre-
gation in an international context, and there are large differences between countries,
regions, and cities in the world with regard to what is considered a low or a high level
of segregation. While 50 would be very high in Europe (e.g., chapter on Brussels),
in Latin America (e.g., chapters on Paramaribo and Buenos Aires) it is considered
moderate. Therefore, we find that a strict classification in high and low is not very
useful in the context of this book.
Finally, in analysing the results from all the case study cities, it is useful to cate-
gorise cities. For this purpose, we have relied on a country classification by income
as provided by theWorld Bank (2020). According to this classification, countries are
divided into four income groups: low, lower middle, upper middle, and high. Income
is measured using gross national income (GNI) per capita. In 2020, low-income
countries are defined as those with a GNI per capita of $1,025 or less in 2018; lower
middle-income countries are thosewith aGNI per capita between $1,026 and $3,995;
upper middle-income countries are those with a GNI per capita between $3,996 and
$12,375; high-income countries are those with a GNI per capita of $12,376 or more.
The countries included in this book fall into the last three categories (see Appendix
2). No low-income country was included in this book due to a lack of data and
researchers available to contribute. However, for simplicity, in this introduction we
often refer to high-income countries and middle-income countries (pooling together
upper middle and lower middle-income countries).
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1.3 Income Inequality and Segregation
The level of residential segregation in a city is related to many factors, such as
the spatial distribution of housing types by tenure and price. But one of the most
important factors is the level of income inequality in society. According to Alverado
and colleagues (2018), levels of income inequality dropped globally until the 1980s,
and from that point onwards, levels of inequality started to increase again. As a
consequence, levels of income inequality are now the highest of the last 30–40 years
in most countries in the world. The increase in income inequality is largely related
to the increasingly unequal distribution of capital that has accompanied the mass
privatisation of public assets since the 1980s, directly affecting the functioning of
both labour and housing markets (Alvaredo et al. 2018). This unequal distribution
of resources is passed from one generation to another (Corak 2013). Housing is
an important element in producing and reproducing inequality, linking thus income
inequality and residential segregation to each other (Tammaru et al. 2020). Van Ham
et al. (2018) proposed the idea of a vicious circle of inequality and segregation to show
how inequality is transmitted from one generation to the next, through a complex
interplay of family, housing, education, and labour market factors.
There are different ways to measure inequality, for example, by focussing on the
distribution of income or wealth (Alverado et al. 2018). The most widely used and
readily available measure of income inequality is the Gini Index, ranging from 0
(perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequality). Of course, these extremes are never
reached in a society, but there is large variation between countries in Gini. The
formerly centrally planned countries in the East of Europe had very low values
of the Gini Index, and private housing property did not exist. In such a social
context, the individual motivation to be creative and to aspire to be economically
productive are low, thus restricting economic growth (Kornai 1992). Extremely high
levels of inequality are also thought to be harmful as they reduce intergenerational
social mobility (Krueger 2012), partly through the operation of the vicious circle of
inequality and segregation (van Ham et al. 2018). The negative effects of high levels
of income inequality could be seen in South Africa under Apartheid, or in many
countries in South America, and include political instability, high rates of poverty
and crime, and residential segregation with gated communities for the rich.
Using country-level Gini Index values as harmonised by the World Bank (2020),
we find South Africa to be the most unequal country among our case study countries,
with Gini Index values exceeding 60 (see Fig. 1.2). In most middle-income countries
among our case studies (often located in the Global South), Gini Index values exceed
40. In most high-income countries, Gini Index values are in the range of 30–40,
reflecting more extensive income redistribution. Levels of income inequality are
the lowest in Europe, with Belgium being the most equal country in our pool of
countries with a Gini Index value of 27. However, there are important exceptions,
for example, the level of income inequality is relatively high in the US, with a Gini
Index value of more than 40, while the opposite is true for India and Egypt, with Gini
Index values below 40. Not only the levels, but also change in inequality differs by















Fig. 1.2 Income inequality, 1990 and 2015. Source World bank. Note When the World Bank data
for 1990 and 2015 was not available, we took the closest available years. Instead of 1990 we used
data from 1989 for Paris, Mexico City, and Melbourne; 1991 for Berlin, Buenos Aires, Chicago,
New York, Los Angeles, and London; 1992 for Bogotá and Tel Aviv; 1993 for Cape Town and
Johannesburg; 1997 for Lima; average value between 1988 and 1992 was calculated for Brussels,
average value between 1987 and 1993 was calculated for Mumbai and average value between 1987
and 1994was calculated for Istanbul.WhenWorldBank datawas not available at all or incomparable
for two data points, we used author-based data, this applies to Hong Kong and Paramaribo
country. While global income inequality started to rise in the 1990s, there are some
exceptions such as South America where Gini Index values have decreased since
then. In several countries, the level of inequality increased only a little or remained
almost stable between 1990 and 2015 (most of Europe). Themost systematic increase
in income inequality is in Asia, with Hong Kong experiencing the most rapid growth
of inequality together with South Africa.
1.4 Main Results in Five Conclusions
Based on the detailed study of 24 cities across the world, we have formulated five
main conclusions on socio-economic segregation. Together these five conclusions
led us to formulate a Global Segregation Thesis, which we discuss further at the end
of this chapter. We will now provide a detailed overview of each of the conclusions
and present supporting data from the case studies.
Conclusion 1. The occupational structure of most cities is professionalising.
The first conclusion is that the occupational structure of many cities is professional-
ising. This is an important conclusion, as it has been suggested that the changing occu-
pational structure is strongly related to the changing social geography of cities (see
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van Ham et al. 2020). The book “The Global City” by Sasia Sassen (1991) provoked
a decades-long debate on whether the occupational structure of global cities is polar-
ising or professionalising (see also Hamnett 1994; van Ham et al. 2020). Although
there are some exceptions, generally speaking we observe an increase in the share of
the Top socio-economic groups, and a decrease (or stabilisation) in the share of the
Bottom socio-economic groups. This implies a general trend of professionalisation
of the occupational structures also in most of our case studies. The professionalisa-
tion of the occupational structure leads to increasing shares of high-income workers,
and many of these high-income workers have developed a preference for living in
central cities (cf. Hamnett 2009).
Although there are some similar trends, the case study cities vary greatly in their
occupational structure and are almost perfectly split into two groups coinciding with
the country classification by income (see Appendix 3). In high-income countries, the
Top socio-economic groupsmake up a significantly higher proportion of occupations,
compared to the middle-income countries. While the Top socio-economic groups
account for about 40% in Brussels, New York, and Melbourne, they do not exceed
15% in Jakarta, São Paulo, and Lima. Accordingly, the Bottom socio-economic
groups account for at least 40% in Shanghai, Cairo, São Paulo, and Jakarta, and
these groups form less than 15% in Los Angeles, Melbourne, and Paris. The highest
share of the middle socio-economic groups is found in Paramaribo, Paris, and Tel
Aviv (around 60%), while the lowest in Shanghai (14%). It has to be noted that the
definitions of the three groups differ between case study cities, so care should be
taken when comparing results. The definition of the Top socio-economic groups is
more consistent than the definition of the two other groups. All cities experienced an
increase in the share of Top occupations, except for Johannesburg, where the share
remained stable, and Brussels, where it dropped slightly, but remained to be one of
the highest among the case studies.
Conclusion 2. Segregation measured by the Dissimilarity Index has increased for
most cities.
Analysing data from the 20 comparable case studies2 reveals a large variety in segre-
gation levels between the Top and Bottom socio-economic groups, with DI values
ranging from 16 to 78 (see Fig. 1.3). In the year 2000/2001, only Brussels had a DI
value below 20. In our study there are ten cities out of 20 with comparable data that
have DI values higher than 40. Most South American and all three African cities
belong to this group of cities, with Buenos Aires being most segregated of all cities
included in the analysis. The only exception in South America is Mexico City, which
has one of the lowest levels of segregation in this study. However, it has to be kept in
mind that for Mexico City (and also for Buenos Aires) education was used instead
of occupational status. And since income-heterogeneity is larger among educational
groups compared to occupational groups, this might explain the relatively low-level
of segregation in Mexico City.
2As mentioned before, we have made a selection of comparable case studies for analysis in this
introductory chapter.




















Fig. 1.3 Residential segregation between top and bottom socio-economic groups, 2000/2001 and
2010/2011. Source Individual chapters in this book, see Appendix 4 for more details). Notes *Top
and bottom groups based on income; **Top and bottom groups based on educational attainment.
Data for Paramaribo 2004 and 2012, Paris 1999 and 2015, Cairo 1996 and 2016, Lima 1993 and
2007, New York 2000 and 2013-2017, Mexico City 1990 and 2010, Tel Aviv 1995 and 2008
Figure 1.3 clearly shows that European cities do not necessarily have low levels
of segregation as one might expect from their low levels of income inequality and
the high levels of income redistribution in Europe. In fact, Paris is one of the most
segregated cities in our study, with a level of segregation which is much higher than
the Anglo-American cities, and comparable to Johannesburg in South Africa. The
five cities with the lowest levels of segregation in this study are Tokyo, Tel Aviv,
Brussels, Mexico City, and Chicago, which is a regionally very mixed group of
cities. Interestingly, Hong Kong is one of the most segregated cities in this study, but
this city is a-typical for Asia with its recent colonial past. All Anglo-American cities
included into our study are modestly segregated.
While comparisons of levels of segregation between cities should be treated with
some caution due to limitations in the comparability of data, the comparison of
segregation levels over time within each city is more straightforward. Our results
show that levels of segregation between the Top and Bottom socio-economic groups
have increased (or remained stable in two cases) in most cities. However, these
increases have been small for most cities, with the exception of Brussels. Segrega-
tion levels have dropped somewhat in four cities: Buenos Aires, Cape Town, Johan-
nesburg, and Mexico City. Again, we should recall that the cases of Buenos Aires
and Mexico City differ from the other cities because education is used as a measure
of socio-economic status instead of occupation. Interestingly, in almost all cities in
high-income countries levels of segregation have increased, while the situation in
middle-income countries is a little more mixed.
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The low level of segregation in Tokyo is striking, especially because it is so
much lower than in many European cities. In many European cities there is a strong
overlap between ethnic and socio-economic segregation due to the on average low
incomes of migrants compared to natives (Andersson and Kährik 2016). The share of
international migrants in Tokyo is very small compared to other global cities, and at
the same time Tokyo is characterised by a low level of income inequality, and strong
public sector involvement in the economy, the housing market, and urban planning.
Tokyo is also a very densely populated compact city, providing few opportunities
for residential separation. In this context vertical segregation may be more important
than the sorting of different socio-economic groups into different neighbourhoods
(Hirayama 2017).
In addition to the case studies, Chap. 2 analyses income data from 194 cities in
14 OECD countries to provide an overview of residential segregation in a compara-
tive perspective. Not surprisingly, segregation levels between the Top and Bottom-
income groupswere found to bemuch higher compared to segregation levels between
Middle- andBottom-incomegroups. Themain contributionof this chapter to the book
is the comparison of segregation levels of multiple cities within the same country.
The results show that there is a lot of variation in levels of segregation between
cities within some countries. With other words, studying only one case study city
per country does not do justice to the variety of segregation levels within countries.
Although generally speaking the analyses ofOECDdata show a relationship between
levels of inequality and levels of income segregation, the results also suggest that
local circumstances can greatly affect how levels of inequality are translated into the
social geography of cities within a country. This needs to be taken into account when
comparing single city case studies between countries as these case studies are not
necessarily representative for the rest of the country.
Conclusion 3. The higher the level of inequality, the higher the level of segregation.
Previous studies have suggested that it takes time before a rise in income inequality
leads to higher levels of socio-economic segregation. Therefore, it is important to
take into account a time lag when studying the relationship (Marcińczak et al. 2015;
Musterd et al. 2017; Wessel 2016; Tammaru et al. 2020). The time needed for trans-
mitting changes in income inequality to changes in residential segregation varies
from city to city, because of other factors shaping segregation. For example, inmarket
dominated housing systems with little public interventions in housing, changes in
income inequality may translate quickly (within ten years’ time) into income-based
residential sorting. However, in a housing system with a high share of social or
public housing, andwith strong policy interventions, the time lag between a change in
income inequality and a change in residential segregation becomes longer, extending
well beyond ten years (Wessel 2016). It is also important to note that the relation-
ship tends to hold in both ways; an increase in income inequality is followed by an
increase in residential segregation later in time, and a decrease in income inequality is
followed by a decrease in residential segregation later in time (Tammaru et al. 2020).
Our analysis of the relationship between income inequality (measured by Gini and
lagged 10 years) and the level of socio-economic segregation has been summarised
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Fig. 1.4 Relationship between income inequality (lagged 10 years and) socio-economic residential
segregation between Top and Bottom socio-economic groups. Source Individual chapters in this
book and the World Bank
in Fig. 1.4. The graph on the left shows the relationship between the Gini Index
measured in 1990 and the Dissimilarity Index as measured in 2000/2001, and the
graph on the right shows the Gini Index measured in 2000 and the Dissimilarity
Index measured in 2010/2011. The results show that there is a positive correlation
between inequality and segregation and that this correlation is slightly weaker for
the year 2010/2011 (0.529) compared to 2000/2001 (0.583). Off course there are
outliers; Paris, for example, is much more segregated than expected based on the
relatively low level of inequality in France. On the other hand, Mexico City is much
less segregated thanwould be expected based on the inequality level inMexico. These
and other outliers show that the relationship between segregation and inequality is
complex, and influenced by local circumstances. The data in Fig. 1.4 lead to further
conclusions, which are discussed next.
Conclusion 4. There are large differences between high-income and middle-
income countries that converge with time.
Figure 1.4 reveals that in the relationship between segregation and inequality there are
separate clusters of high-income and middle-income countries. Generally speaking,
middle-income countries combine high levels of inequality with high levels of segre-
gation (particularly South American and South African cities), while high-income
countries combine lower levels of inequality with lower levels of segregation. Of
course, the pattern is not perfect, and again there are outliers. In 2010, the cities of
Cairo and Shanghai, both from middle-income group of countries, show relatively
low levels of inequality, and especially Shanghai also a low level of segregation.
Mexico City on the other hand, shows a high level of inequality, combined with a
very low level of segregation. And Paris, which is part of the high-income group of
countries, combines a low level of inequality with a high level of segregation.
When comparing two graphs, it can be seen that the high-income country cluster
moves upward because of a systematic increase in levels of inequality and segre-
gation. While the changes in both income inequality and residential segregation are
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more diverse for themiddle-income countries, this suggests convergence between the
high-income and middle-income countries. The trend towards convergence between
higher income and middle and low-income countries warrants some more attention.
Further increases in both income inequality and residential segregation are not very
likely in cities that are already highly unequal and highly segregated. The overall
modernisation of societies and professionalisation of the labour force tends to reduce
differences in incomes and residential sorting. However, the main reason for conver-
gence relates to changes taking place in cities located in high-income countries. It
is notable that increases in residential segregation in high-income countries tend
to be larger than predicted by their levels of income inequality. Paris is the most
outstanding case in this regard, where a very high level of residential segregation
between the Top and Bottom socio-economic groups is combined with a low level of
income inequality. InParis, a possible explanation is related tomigration,where lower
income migrant households tend to cluster in modernist housing estates (Lelévrier
and Melic 2018). In Paris, but also in other high-income cities, it may also be the
case that an increased emphasis on market forces in the housing market increas-
ingly sorts households with different financial means into different neighbourhoods,
despite overall low levels of income inequality.
Conclusion 5. The social geography of cities changes faster than levels of
segregation measured city-wide.
The data from this book shows an overall picture of increasing levels of socio-
economic segregation between 2000/2001 and 2010/2011, although segregation
levels remained stable in some cities, and even dropped in others. Segregation was
measured by using the Dissimilarity Index, and like many indices of segregation, it
does not take into account the social geography of cities. In theory it is possible that
over time the poor move to rich areas, and the rich to poor, while the overall measure
of segregation remains stable.
Based on the case studies we can conclude that social geography of inequality is
changing faster thanmeasures of city-wide socio-economic segregation, asmeasured
by the Dissimilarity Index. In many of the case study cities the Top socio-economic
groups are concentrating in the centre and attractive coastal regions, and the Bottom
socio-economic groups are concentrating on the edges of the urban region. In some
cases, they are also concentrating in enclaves and gated communities outside the
urban core. In all cases, the residential choices of the Top socio-economic groups
are driving changes in the geography of segregation.
Beyond those general trends there are also many differences between the cities
due to local circumstances, including historical, economic, and political factors, but
also the physical geography of cities. There are some examples of cities in which the
Top socio-economic groups concentrate in the central areas, and the Bottom socio-
economic groups in the periphery. In Shanghai, for example, the Top socio-economic
groups concentrate into the centre as well as into certain suburbs. Also in Tel Aviv,
London, Chicago, Buenos Aires, Melbourne, Paris, Mexico City, and New York
the Top socio-economic groups are concentrating in the central area of the urban
region. In all these cities they are more residentially concentrated than the Bottom
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socio-economic groups. We also observed in all these cities that the Bottom socio-
economic groups increasingly live in the urban periphery. For example, in Berlin it
was observed that child poverty is increasingly moving to the urban periphery, which
is likely to increase inequality due to a lack of opportunity for these children as they
grow up.
In Chicago, the city seems to be polarising geographically with an increasing resi-
dential division between the Top and Bottom socio-economic groups. In many other
cities there is an increase of socio-economically mixed areas due to gentrification.
This is the case in, for example, New York, Paris, and Mexico City. Los Angeles
has a more geographically dispersed pattern of residential inequality than the cities
mentioned above. This is due to the polycentric nature of the urban region, with
concentrations of Top socio-economic groups in various parts of the city, gentrifica-
tion in adjacent areas of rich enclaves, and a rise in the number of gated communities.
Cities like São Paulo, Istanbul, Lima, and Hong Kong are also characterised by a
concentration of the Top socio-economic groups in the central area of the city. At
the same time, also gated communities for the high-income groups can be found in
these urban regions.
Somecities, like Johannesburg,CapeTown, Paramaribo, andCairo, showanoppo-
site geography of residential inequality. In these cities the Bottom socio-economic
groups are concentrating into the city centre and the periphery, and the Top socio-
economic groups are concentrating in suburbs and gated communities. In Brussels
the central area of the city is quite deprived and the outskirts are more prosperous; the
Top socio-economic groups mainly concentrate in the peripheral areas (but also in
some pockets in the central area), and the Bottom socio-economic groups concentrate
in and around the centre in densely populated neighbourhoods. The cities of Tokyo,
Mumbai, and Bogotá all show very distinct patterns of segregation. In Tokyo, the Top
socio-economic groups live in the elevated areas in theWest, and in the harbour area,
and the Bottom socio-economic groups live in the lowlands in the East. In Mumbai
there is a clear North-South division, with the Top socio-economic groups living in
the South, and the Bottom socio-economic groups living in the North. And in Bogotá
the Top socio-economic groups live in the North, and the Bottom socio-economic
groups live in the South. For Jakarta, the spatial units were too large for an in-depth
analysis of the geographical patterns of inequality.
Many cases reveal that residential areas in the city centres are getting more socio-
economically mixed due to gentrification and expansion of the urban core. This is
the case in, for example, Hong Kong, Mumbai, London, Berlin, and Paris. The
fact that urban cores in these cities become more mixed might be a temporary
phenomenon as in the course of the process of gentrification these areas become
unaffordable for Bottom socio-economic groups, and become over-represented by
more andmore affluent households. Although this book predominantly studies socio-
economic segregation, many case studies also mention the link between ethnic segre-
gation and socio-economic segregation. The clear South-North division in Mumbai
is strongly related to ethnic and religious segregation in the city. Segregation in Tel
Aviv is also related to both ethnicity and religion. In London, Chicago, New York,
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and Paris, socio-economic segregation is also strongly related to patterns of racial
and ethnic segregation.
1.5 A Global Segregation Thesis
The central research question of this book was whether there is any evidence for
a Global Segregation Thesis, or whether cities in different parts of the world show
very distinctive patterns of socio-economic segregation? Taken together, the five
main conclusions of this book provide support for what we call the Global Segrega-
tion Thesis, which is characterised by a global trend of rising levels of segregation,
combined with a changing social geography of cities. Rising levels of segregation are
caused by rising levels of income inequality, and although the link between the two
is complex, it seems almost universal and globally applicable. At the same time the
social geography of cities is changing, where high-income households increasingly
live in city centres and other attractive areas, while lower income households move
to the fringes of the city. This changing social geography is related to the profession-
alisation of the urban workforce, which leads to more higher income households,
which have developed a preference for living in central parts of large cities. Levels
of segregation have not gone up as much as could be expected based on rising levels
of inequality, and this is possibly due to gentrification and the temporally socio-
economic mixing of central city neighbourhoods. Over time, processes of gentrifica-
tion will lead to further increases in levels of segregation. The combination of rising
levels of inequality and professionalisation of the workforce is expected to lead to a
further increase in segregation and more uneven landscapes of opportunity.
For most cities in this book, the most recent census data used was from 2010 or
2011, and data from the next (2020 or 2021) census will not be available for another
5 years. This means that the 2010/2011 census only started to capture the effects
of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. At the time of writing this introduction, the
world is facing a new economic crisis related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although
it is impossible to know how long and deep this crisis will be, there are signs that
the weakest in society will be hit the hardest. This is likely to lead to rising levels
of inequality, and ultimately more segregation in cities. At the same time there are
discussions on the future of cities and on the residential preferences of higher income
households. These households might decide to leave their relatively small dwellings
in densely populated areas and live in more spacious dwellings in suburban environ-
ments. Such a change might have dramatic effects on the social geography of cities
and spaces of opportunity. Densely populated areas might increasingly become the
domain low-income groups, while higher income groups once again suburbanise as
they did decades ago. In the short run it can be expected that levels of socio-economic
segregation continue to rise and that the social geography of cities continues to show
a pattern of rich centres, with poor suburbs. In the long run cities are in constant flux,
and the future of cities depends on many factors yet still unknown.
1 Rising Inequalities and a Changing Social Geography of Cities … 19
Future research on inequality and socio-economic segregation should focus on
better understanding local variation in the relationships between the two. And
most importantly, how different urban policies—area-based, people-based, and
connectivity-based—can make a difference? It is also important to improve our
understanding on how residential inequalities are produced and reproduced over
different life domains (home, family, education,work) and across generations.Under-
standing the vicious cycle of segregation and inequality can lead to more effective
policies aimed at improving access to opportunity. The professionalisation of the
urban workforce and increasing educational levels leads to a higher share of high-
income earners in cities, which initially leads to more social mix in many urban
neighbourhoods. But in the longer run these trends might lead to higher levels of
segregation as cities become more and more unaffordable for many people. It is
therefore crucial to take a multi-scale perspective on cities (Petrović et al. 2018),
studying large urban regions instead of cities. Finally, as global cities are increas-
ingly multi-ethnic, the overlap between income inequality and ethnicity and race in
many cities needs further attention. Themost severe and persistent inequalities appear
where different variables intersect, and these intersections require most attention.
Appendix 1: Guidelines for Authors, Data, and Methods
Each chapter should contain two parts: a compulsory part including an analysis of
changes in the occupational structure, income inequality, and residential segregation;
and a free part, which discusses the local context and other important factors related
to segregation in the specific country or city. To define urban regions, all authors
should use functional urban areas as defined by the OECD. Socio-economic groups
are preferably distinguished based on occupational status, and classified into Top,
Middle, and Bottom (or High, Middle, and Low for educational or income levels).
The main measure of segregation to be used is the Dissimilarity Index. Chapters
should preferably provide the city-level Gini index, and otherwise the national-level
Gini index. To analyse the geography of segregation authors were asked to construct
some standard maps using guidelines provided by the editors. For calculations of the
Dissimilarity Index and the construction of maps, authors were asked to use small
spatial units, preferably census tracts of around 5000 inhabitants. And authors were
asked to analyse data from at least the year 2000/2011 and 2010/2011, but a longer
period of analysis was welcome if data allowed.
A functional urban area consists of a city and its commuting zone (OECD 2013).
In this bookoccupational categories are used as a proxy for socio-economic status.
Occupational categories are derived from the International Standard Classification
of Occupations (ISCO) (ILO 2012) and they are directly comparable and available
in all countries conducting censuses. People with different occupations do not only
perform different tasks, but occupational attainment is also closely related to personal
work income. A typical example of this classification, which applies to many cities,
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is TOP: managers + professionals; MIDDLE: everything in between; BOTTOM:
elementary occupations + plant and machine operators and assemblers.
The Gini index is the most commonly used measurement of inequality. It is the
ratio of income distribution within a country or city, where 0 represents perfect
equality with no income differences between individuals and 100 represents perfect
inequality with one person earning all income.
Dissimilarity Index (DI) is used as the main measure of residential segregation
between socio-economic groups, reflecting their relative distributions across neigh-
bourhoods within the urban area. Value of DI varies between 0 and 100, which
indicates the proportion of a group that would need to move in order to create a
uniform distribution of population. 0 means that both groups are distributed in the
same proportions across all neighbourhoods and 100 means that the members of
two groups are located in different neighbourhoods—this is a total segregation. The











where ai is the population of group A in the ith area, e.g., census tract; A is the
total population in group A in the large geographic entity for which the index of
dissimilarity is being calculated; bi is the population of group B in the ith area; B is
the total population in group B in the large geographic entity for which the index of
dissimilarity is being calculated. The DI is the main measure of segregation in this
book, but additional measures were used by some chapters:
Interaction or Exposure Index (B)measures the degree of potential contact or the possibility
of interaction between the members of two groups within the neighbourhoods. The value of
this index varies between 0 and 100 and it is the highest when the two groups have equal
numbers and are spread evenly among neighbourhoods.
Entropy index (EI)measures the spatial distribution ofmultiple groups simultaneously. Value
of EI varies between 0 and 100. It is equal to 0 when the composition of all neighbourhoods
is the same, and it is equal to 100, when all neighbourhoods inhabit only one group.
In addition to the Dissimilarity Index between occupational categories, authors
were asked to provide maps. The main reason is that similar measures of segregation
can have completely different underlying geographies.Authorswere asked to provide
the following maps:
• Location quotient (LQ) maps for the Top and Bottom occupational status groups.
The LQ is a way of quantifying how concentrated a particular group is in each
neighbourhood compared to the average for the entire urban area. LQ greater
than 1 indicates that the neighbourhood has a higher than average concentration
of particular group.
• Classification of neighbourhoods by socio-economic composition based on the
typology provided by Marcińczak et al. (2015). Some chapters adopted a slightly
different approach and explained the modifications in their chapters.
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• Location of the Top socio-economic status groups,which shows howmany neigh-
bourhoods house 20% of the Top group. The fewer neighbourhoods are needed
to get to 20%, the more concentrated the Top group is. In theory, 20% of the
Top group can live in one neighbourhood, which means that the group is very
spatially concentrated. Even when the segregation index remains similar over
time, the spatial location of the Top group could have changed.































Brussels 2.5 2,834 2001–2011–2016 Income High income















Chicago 9.5 4,000 1990–2000–2010–2015 Occupational
groups
High income
Hong Kong 7.5 2,162 2001–2011–2016 Occupational
groups
High income








































London 9.0 1,400 2001–2011 Occupational
groups
High income
Los Angeles 18.8 4,000 1980–1990–2000–2010 Occupational
groups
High income
Melbourne 4.5 7,933 2001–2006–2011–2016 Occupational
groups
High income










New York 17.0 4,000 2000–2008/2012–2013/2017 Occupational
groups
High income





Paris 12.5 2,500 1990–1999–2015 Occupational
groups
High income










Tel Aviv 3.2 1,484 1995–2008 Income High income
Tokyo 35.7 3,000 2000–2005–2010–2015 Occupational
groups
High income
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Appendix 3: Occupational Structure of Comparable Case
Study Cities (Source Individual Chapters in This Book)
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Appendix 4: Dissimilarity Indices Between Top and Bottom
Socio-economic Status Groups, in All Years Provided
by the Authors (Source Individual Chapters in This Book)
City name 1990 2000 2005 2010 2015 Average
Buenos Aires 79 78 77 78.0
Cape town 67 55 61.0
Paramaribo 53 56 54.5
Hong Kong 55 57 50 54.0
São Paulo 48 50 49.0
Paris 47 49 49 48.3
Istanbul 49 51 44 48.0
Johannesburg 48 47 47.5
Cairo 43 42 43 42.7
Lima 42 42 42.0
Melbourne 38 39 39 38 38.5
Mexico City 34 45 31 36.7
New York 35 38 36.5
London 34 36 35.0
Los Angeles 31 34 36 33.7
Shanghai 32 33 32.5
Chicago 31 32 33 32.0
Tokyo 26 27 28 28 27.3
Tel Aviv 25 28 26.5
Mumbai 24 24 23 23.7
Brussels 16 28 22.0
Jakarta 13 9 11.0
Note The years provided in the table and chapters may vary slightly, e.g. Cairo chapter provides
data for 2016, not 2015
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Chapter 2
Residential Segregation Between Income
Groups in International Perspective
Andre Comandon and Paolo Veneri
Abstract This chapter analyzes income data from 194 cities in 14 countries to
provide an overview of residential segregation patterns in a comparative perspective.
We use the dissimilarity index to measure segregation between lower income house-
holds and middle-income and higher income households. The results expand results
consistent with existing research to a larger number of countries. Higher income
households segregation from lower incomehouseholds is significantly higher than for
middle-income households. High-inequality cities are more segregated, on average,
than low-inequality ones. It is in the deviation from these patterns, however, that
the analysis contributes to a comparative research agenda. It highlights cities and
countries that do not fit general trends and raises questions about the relative role
of national and local factors in influencing levels of segregation, questions the case
studies delve into in the rest of the volume.
Keywords Income inequality · Segregation · International comparison
2.1 Introduction
How do we make sense of income inequality and residential segregation in cities
as different as Houston, Hong Kong, and Johannesburg? Finding common ground
between cities in disparate national context has the potential to illuminate overlooked
factors that influence segregation and suggest new directions for study. For example,
Melbourne in Australia and Boston in the United States have much in common: near
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identical population size, large immigrant populations in primarily white regions,
sprawling suburbs, and similar levels of income inequality before redistribution. Yet,
our data show that Melbourne is less segregated than not only Boston, but also nearly
all American cities. Is Melbourne less segregated only because it is in Australia or
are there characteristics unique to Melbourne and other Australian cities that set
them apart? This chapter introduces the most comprehensive international database
on segregation by income to date as a tool that can help elucidate such questions.
We use a sample of 194 cities in 14 countries to show the extent of variation in
residential segregation by income (income segregation from hereafter) within and
between countries. We focus on this difference because it provides crucial insights
into the process of comparison. International comparisons compound the number of
relevant explanatory factors: the role of government in the housing sector, history
of discrimination, and economic structure are all likely to have significant influence
on the degree of segregation in cities. Case studies, like the ones in the following
chapters of this book, are ideal for analyzing how these factors intersect to shape
the socio-spatial structures of a city. However, case studies tend to focus on primate
cities and can never zoom out to measure systematic variation across borders. To
understand the role and magnitude of these factors, and identify useful comparative
cases, requires consistent data across countries. We take the first steps towards this
kind of analysis.
The chapter consists of two main parts. First, we provide an overview of the
theoretical and empirical literature on comparative segregation studies. The review
highlights trends in international research and the potential (and limitations) of this
kind of work. It also provides a foundation and scope for interpreting our empirical
results. The second part is a descriptive analysis of income segregation data. We
have been working on expanding the international coverage of comparable data to a
diverse set of countries so that thework of adding layers of analysis and understanding
can build upon it (Comandon et al. 2018). Figure 2.1 shows the location of cities
and countries included in the sample. In nine of these countries, we have spatially
small-scale data on income (or some close equivalent) for all large urban areas. In the
other five, there is either only one large urban area in the country or we had access to
data for a single city. We are still in the early stages of developing the international
database, which limits the scope of the analysis to income. However, the results show
the potential of these data and of expanding the database.
For each city, we calculate the dissimilarity index to summarize the metropolitan
level of segregation in an intuitive and easily comparable measure. We measure
residential segregation between the bottom and top income quintiles and between
the bottom and middle-income quintiles. We include both measures to emphasize
the dynamics of income inequality. Existing research shows that segregation of the
highest income residents tends to drive overall segregation, leading to the implication
that greater inequality will translate to greater segregation (Reardon and Bischoff
2011).
Consistentwith this trend,we find that segregation between themiddle and bottom
of the income distribution is lower for all cities within a country and, on average,
across countries. The national average segregation between the top and bottom is
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Fig. 2.1 Map showing the location of countries and cities included in the study
significantly higher in all countries except Mexico where it is near identical. We
also find that greater income inequality does not necessarily translate to greater
segregation, though cities of extreme disparities do fall into this pattern. Cities near
the average level of inequality, span the entire spectrum of segregation levels. We
concludewith a set of recommendation for future comparative research on residential
segregation.
2.2 Challenges of Comparing Segregation Across Borders
Two types of challenges undermine the systematic international comparison of resi-
dential segregation in urban areas. The first challenge relates to interpreting the data
that we have access to. Even though levels of segregation in two cities are similar,
can we truly compare how a working-class household in, for example, Houston and
Hong Kong, experiences spatial inequality in their city? The second challenge is
purely empirical. The data required for comparison is collected and made available
in different formats, with different coverage, and often there are no data available at
all.
These challenges make the comparison of cities contentious and difficult, but it
should not be abandoned. In this section, we review research relevant to the first
challenge to frame our empirical approach to international comparison. It highlights
the role of research this edited volume exemplifies as a path forward combining the
complexity that case studies allow with larger scale data analysis. It also becomes
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clear that large-scale data analyses lag in coverage and scope, issues relevant to the
second challenge. The rest of the chapter will focus on the state-of-the-art concerning
this challenge.
There is an astounding number of factors that make cities more distinct than,
for example, countries. Countries, with few exceptions, fit within a system of nation
states, have defined, stable borders and central governments. Cities, on the other hand,
often have no clear-cut borders. They includemunicipalities, which have boundaries,
and urbanized areas outside those boundaries. Municipal boundaries not only fluc-
tuate, they also matter little for many urban infrastructure and processes (e.g., work
commutes).1 Furthermore, cities are embedded within distinct polities (sometimes at
several governmental levels, as is the case in federal systems) that have authority over
them, multiply the number of historical paths to urbanization, and tend to change
more rapidly than other units of analysis.
This distinction of urban areas has spurred a flourishing theoretical debate about
the nature of cities and their comparison. Key questions at the core of this debates
include how we understand the relationship and ties between and within cities
(Jessop et al. 2008), how to balance individual, experience and generalizable anal-
ysis (Robinson 2011; Storper and Scott 2016), and how do we choose and develop
the methods for comparison (Abu-Lughod 2007; Dear 2005; Gough 2012; Robinson
2016). These strands have all grappled with the challenges of using the city as a unit
of analysis. Answers range from the poetic nomadism of Simone (2010) who suggest
bringing pieces of cities together to form a new, cohesive unit, to the data-driven use
of machine learning to map every urban settlement down to the last house (Esch et al.
2017).
These debates have seeped into the study of segregation. Greater emphasis on
the significance of spatial scale has given rise to re-assessment of the mechanisms
of segregation (Fowler 2016; Schafran 2018; Trounstine 2018) and methodolog-
ical innovation (Lloyd et al. 2014; Reardon et al. 2006; Petrović et al. 2018). The
growing diversity of cities has displaced dominant binary narratives to be replaced
with multifaceted analysis and greater scrutiny of the role of residential integration
(e.g., Clark et al. 2015; de la Roca et al. 2014; Goetz 2018; Musterd 2003). The
persistence of segregation and combination of forms of inequality has widened the
lens to include multiple domains (van Ham and Tammaru 2016), including schools
(e.g., Bischoff and Tach 2018), housing (e.g. Owens 2019), and infrastructure (e.g.,
Trounstine 2018). Here, too, answers tend towards the multiplication of methods
rather than a coherent framework to study spatial inequality.
This expansion of the study of segregation does not translate easily to an interna-
tional context. Ethnicity and race, for example, are critical dimensions of segregation
that cross borders. They have, however, different meanings and influences depending
on a country’s history of racial oppression (Abu-Lughod 1980; Massey and Denton
1The US Census Boundary and Annexation Survey, for example, reported over 96,000 municipal
boundary changes between 2001 and 2010, an average of three changes per municipality. Most of
the changes are small but can change the configuration of a city as they accumulate.
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1993; Telles 2006) and its colonial history (Nightingale 2012). As such, the interac-
tion of race and class will have different undertones in Canada, the United States,
and South Africa (e.g., Fong 1996; Johnston et al. 2007). In the multi-racial context
that defines many large metropolises today, interactions between groups, their status
within a nation (e.g., recent migrants), and the prevalent socioeconomic stratifica-
tion can further complicate the picture. Quillian (2012), for example, showed that the
interactions between three types of segregation—ethno-racial segregation, poverty
segregation within ethno-racial groups, and segregation of higher income groups—
contributed to the process of spatial concentration of poverty. Reproducing studies
of this complexity and scope in multiple countries not only requires much data, it
also requires an intimate understanding of how these factors interact in the local
context. This edited volume takes a significant step in that direction by balancing
local knowledge, geographical scope, and complexity.
Trounstine (2018) highlighted another dimension that needs systematic engage-
ment. While researchers often summarize segregation as a single index, segregation
operates within jurisdictionally defined units that have greater relevance for resi-
dents’ well-being. She showed that levels of neighborhood racial segregation are
going down in many regions of the United States, but is being reinforced at the
municipal level with far reaching implications for access to critical services (see also
Bischoff 2008; Fennell 2009). The chapters in Lloyd et al’s (2014) edited volume
make a similar point, though they emphasize how single-index summaries obscure
much of the variation that gives segregation meaning. As Hwang’s (2014) chapter
demonstrates, and in a reversal of our initial question, two cities can be very similar
in many respects, and yet have entirely different outcomes in terms of segregation.
Recent innovations in the field of segregation studies have advanced our under-
standing of spatial inequality in a small set of cities and countries. However, there
is a long way to go for large scale comparative work to catch up to these refine-
ments. Existing comparative studies tend to be regionally defined (e,g, Musterd et al.
2017; Tammaru et al. 2020 for Europe) or a wide-ranging selection of individual
case studies that emphasize the distinct features of each (Maloutas and Fujita 2012).
Some comparative approaches have focused on specific aspects, such as race (Fong
1996) or the role of different types of welfare states (Arbaci 2007). What is missing,
including from this review, is the systematic integration of knowledge that does not
derive from the hegemonic Anglo-Saxon framework of understanding. As access
to data expands to include countries from outside the Global North, more needs
to be done to interrogate the assumptions that decades of dominance by American
scholarship embedded in the methods and in the analytical lenses that we use.
2.3 Method and Data
What we generally understand as cities are more accurately described as urban
regions. Regions are the sum of urban areas that make up a relatively unified labor
and housing market (Storper et al. 2015). They are the appropriate scale of study
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for segregation because urban regions often represent regional housing markets. For
example, when someone gets a new job in the Sydney central business district, they
are not constrained to living in the city proper. They may elect or, in fact, only be
able to afford to live in a distant suburb. Residential segregation is the sum of this
process of sorting across administrative boundaries and should, therefore, be studied
at the scale that matches the process.
The first step in comparing cities, then, is to establish their boundaries. However,
even this step proves challenging. The norm is to use commuting patterns to estimate
the extent of the regional market (OECD 2012). Basically, a functional urban area is
the sum of all urban clusters where a substantial share (15%) of residents commute
to the largest cities in the region. The lack of such data in many countries has led
researchers to look for alternatives to achieve the consistency that is essential to
robust results (Bosker et al. 2018).
For this study, we use the OECD harmonized database of Functional Urban Areas
(FUA). The OECD database covers Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland,
Mexico, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For South
Africa, New Zealand, and Brazil, which are not in the database, we use an alternative
definition (based on administrative definition) closest to the scale of the region. We
limit the sample to FUA and regions with a population over 500,000 people to ensure
each city in the sample has sufficient data coverage in every country.2 This gives us
a sample of 194 urban regions in a total of 14 countries. In five countries, however,
the data include only one city either due to data availability (Japan) or because the
country has only one large FUA (Denmark, Hong Kong, Ireland, New Zealand).
For each of these countries, a further obstacle is the differences in data type,
spatial scale, and data collection methodology. Some differences are easily, although
not perfectly, remedied. For example, France collects income data as decile threshold
values. Each tract is assigned Euro denominated values that correspond to each 10%
of the population of the tract. For example, if the 10% of the population with the
lowest incomes have income below e8500, that is the value reported in the data.
The problem is that the values are not comparable across tract because the income
is not relative to a fixed point. In contrast, all other countries define a set of income
categories based on fixed ranges and report the number of households that fall within
that range. In Canada, for example, the first of 15 income categories ranges from
$0 to $5000. We address these differences through a mathematical transformation
that uses the information about decile values to estimate how many households fall
within income categories we defined.
More troublesome are the differences in the spatial scale of small spatial areas,
and their coverage. Ideally, we would have data reported at a consistent scale, with
full geographic coverage of the region, and based on the full census of the popula-
tion. Much of our work has been devoted to identifying the differences in data and
correcting themwhere possible. Throughout, we refer to the baseline geographic unit
as the tract. This is the neighborhood-scale unit the United States Census Bureau uses
2Some countries, such as France and Canada have restrictions on the minimum population within
a unit for it to be included in the publicly available database.
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and has an equivalent in most countries in our sample.We summarize the data format
in Table 2.1.
Some countries have rules about the minimum number of households that must
be in a tract before the data can be released (due to privacy concerns). This often
makes the coverage sparser outside the urban core of a region. In these cases (France,
Canada, and the Netherlands), we complement the tract data with the next smallest
administrative unit, which ends up being about the same size in terms of popula-
tion, though not geographically. Differences between countries are more difficult to
bypass. In some cases, a full range of spatial scales are available, and we can pick the
one most consistent with the average size of the tract in other countries. However,
we are sometimes stuck with a spatial unit that is either larger or smaller than the
tract. For example, the two smallest administrative units in Australia, SA1 and SA2,
straddle the tract size. SA1 is smaller, the equivalents of a few square blocks. SA2
works in some dense areas but is too large for the lower-density suburbs.
Differences in the spatial scale used to calculate segregation indexes will have
an impact on the calculated values. The difference in unit of analysis areas in our
sample is not so large that it would lead to the reinterpretation of the broad patterns
that we describe (Wong 2004; Manley et al. 2019). The countries for which the scale
of the geographic unit is of greatest concern are Brazil and South Africa. The two
countries have the highest levels of segregation and the small scale of their units may
bias the estimates upward. However, the results are consistent not only with other
methods that minimize the effect of scale (Comandon et al. 2018), the two countries
also have some of the highest levels of income inequality and, in the case of South
Africa, a history of violent segregation that substantiates the high observed levels.
Differences in the timing of the census add another concern. In cross-sectional
studies like this one, time is an issue only to the extent that levels of segregation have
likely changed in the intervening years (i.e., we do not integrate comparison between
years), thus undermining the comparison.Mexico, Japan, and the Netherlands are the
only country with data pre-dating 2010.Mexico, in particular, is problematic because
the country and cities have changed more rapidly than most other countries in our
sample. Results from countries where longitudinal data are available (e.g., United
States) confirm that even in countries with more stable urbanization rates, large
changes occur (Comandon et al. 2018). Cases like Mexico illustrate the limitation
of relying on census data which tends to evolve substantially over 10-year periods.
However, changes, on average, tend to not change overall interpretation, especially
for national trends (Monkkonen et al. 2018).
As part of the data summary, we include the income definition and the method
of data collection. Differences in income definition are relatively benign. The main
differences relate to whether total income is reported or after-tax income, and to
the composition of income. Generous income redistribution programs and higher
tax rates will alter the income distribution from pre-tax to after-tax. However, redis-
tributive programs should not shift the income distribution so much that the relative
position of households changes drastically (i.e., a household in the bottom quintile
of the pre-tax distribution is unlikely to end up in the middle quintile of post-tax
distribution). We therefore assume this difference is negligible for our purposes. As
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a verification, we use the Canadian data to calculate segregation indexes for both
total and after-tax income and find a near-perfect correlation.
Of greater consequence are the differences in cost of living of each region. The
comparison of households in the bottom income category in Buffalo, New York
with those of San Francisco, California is distorted by large differences in the cost of
living between these two cities. Themedian home, for example, costs 6 times asmuch
in San Francisco than in the Buffalo region. While we cannot entirely account for
these differences, we adjust the index in every city to calculate segregation between
local income quintiles rather than set income categories that remain the same in all
locations.
Income quintiles allow us to divide the population into meaningful categories. We
use three quintiles for comparison. The bottom quintile includes households who are
in the first 20% of the income distribution, meaning that 80% of the population has
higher household incomes than theydo.These are people that are severely constrained
in terms of where they can live within the urban region and have incomesmuch below
the regional median. The middle quintile are households between 40 and 60%. This
category includes themedian and represents themiddle-class. Finally, the top quintile
are those with income higher than 80% of the population and have the greatest choice
in where to live.
We use a relatively crude method to pick the quintile thresholds. We estimate the
income distribution for the entire region and pick the income categories closest to the
quintile threshold.3 For example, the first/bottom quintile of the income distribution
of New York is $23,200. It falls within the income category bounded by $20,000 and
$25,000; therefore, we use all households with income below $25,000 in every tract
as the bottom quintile; if the quintile value were to fall closer to the lower bound,
we would use all households in and below the $20,000 category. The results are
an approximation of income quintile, but one that, on average, is close enough to
separate the population into relevant categories.
The last cause of concern is the method of data collection. Census offices tend to
collect a comprehensive set of data on the full population and then collect a more
extensive survey on a subset of the population. Income data usually comes from
the more extensive survey (exceptions include Australia, which has comprehensive
coverage). Overall, the countries we include tend to have higher sampling rates,
making the United States the case of greatest concern. The use of samples to collect
this informationmeans that all reportednumbers are estimates that comewithmargins
of errors. In small tracts and in places with small total population, these margins of
errors can be large enough to completely undermine the reliability of segregation
indexes like theDissimilarity Index (DI) (Napierala andDenton2017). Issueswith the
sampling strategy and sample size can be corrected to some extent, using simulation
techniques, for example, but the type of data we use reduces such concerns.
3We use the binequality package in R to estimate the best parametric function to fit to the distribution
before estimating the quintile cut-off values and choosing the bin closest to the cut-off (von Hippel
et al. 2016).
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The concerns about margins of error tend to stem from the underrepresentation
of a group of interest. However, since we are interested in income classes, we can
expect a relatively even distribution throughout the region. Furthermore, our strategy
aggregates income groups to obtain quintiles, which further reduces the incidence
of tracts with little to no representation. As an additional attempt to put to rest some
of these concerns, we use a method Reardon et al (2018) developed to correct for
the bias in ordinal segregation indexes that comes from the sampling method. This
is not the same index, but the magnitude of the correction should parallel what we
would find for the DI. The correction for income data in the United States is up to
10% of the estimated value, but much smaller in Canada, which has a sampling rate
of 25% (in contrast to around 8% in the United States, see Table 2.1 for an overview
of sampling rates).
Like the rest of the book, we used the Dissimilarity Index (DI) as our measure of
segregation. We used the dissim function in the “seg” package in R to calculate the
index for every city in the sample (Hong et al. 2019). We ran the operation for the
bottom andmiddle quintile, and the bottom and top quintiles. The dissimilarity index
has many shortcomings (e.g., Napierala and Denton 2017; Reardon et al. 2006), but
remains useful as an intuitive indicator of a city’s spatial structure. In interpreting
the index, however, it is important to keep in mind that there is no such thing as no
segregation, nor is the absence of segregation desirable (Ellickson 2006). There is a
level of segregation that would always be present purely by virtue of the distribution
of the housing stock and the impossibility of restricting people’s residential choice
(Sander and Kucheva 2016). Massey and Denton (1993) have therefore proposed
a generally agreed upon rule of thumb for what constitutes low (0.2–0.3), medium
(0.3–0.5), and high levels (>0.5) of segregation. In our interpretation, however, we
rely more on relative levels than on the values themselves.
2.4 Results
The sets of DI values show that residential segregation between the top and bottom
income groups is much higher than between the bottom and the middle-income
group (henceforth, we compare other income groups with the bottom category as the
reference point, i.e., we refer only to top DI andmiddle DI to indicate how segregated
they are from the bottom group). The average middle DI is 0.26 compared to 0.48 for
the top. Figure 2.2 shows these differences in magnitude across and within countries.
Variation in top DI (excluding single city countries) across countries is also larger
than it is within any country. The difference between the highest and lowest national
median top DI is 0.42 which is much more than the countries with the largest range
of about 0.25. In contrast, variation between country medians for middle DI is 0.09
and the widest national range in Brazil at about 0.25, six countries with ranges above
0.09.
Individual cities highlight these differences. The lowest top DI is Tokyo at 0.2
compared to the high of 0.73 in Tshwane. The same comparison for middle DI
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Fig. 2.2 Box plots showing the variation in segregation levels between bottom and top income
quintile (left panel) and bottom and middle-income quintile (right panel). The light gray points
indicate the median DI for the other comparison group (i.e., in the left panel, they show the median
value of the country in the right panel)
between Copenhagen (0.1) and Santos (0.4) shows that overall smaller range of
variation. It should also be noted that the principal cities of many countries are
absent from the extremes. Large economic centers tend to concentrate extremes of
wealth and poverty (e.g., Paris) but, in most cases, the largest economic centers (e.g.,
Toronto, New York, Johannesburg, and London) are closer to the national median.
In comparing top and middle DI, we note that the relationship is unstable. Mexico
is the only country where the median top DI falls within the range of middle DI.
In other words, it is the only country without a significant shift between middle
and top DI. South Africa, by contrast, has the highest median top DI and one of
the lowest middle DI. The extremely skewed income distribution in South Africa
paired with a history of institutionalized racial segregation has created cities of large
wealthy enclaves surrounded by areas of relatively mixed middle and lower incomes
(Murray 2011).
The lack of correlation between national top and middle segregation levels is
replaced with greater stability in relative position of individual cities. The correlation
between cities’ top DI and middle DI segregation is 0.63. Figure 2.3 illustrates the
relationship between middle and top DI. The figure plots the rank of cities according
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Fig. 2.3 Plot of top and middle DI rank for every city. The cities are ranked from lowest DI (i.e.,
rank 1) value to highest (rank 196). Points on or near the 45-degree line are cities that have the same
rank for both types of segregation. Cities above the line have a higher top DI rank than middle DI
rank, cities below the line are the reverse. Each symbol represents a type of relationship between
individual city DI and national median, either staying higher/lower than the national median or
moving up or down relative to the other cities in the country
to their top andmiddleDI, giving an overviewof the stability of their relative position.
The 45-degree line represents no difference in rank. Many cities are close to this line,
indicating that cities with lowermiddle DI tend to also have lower topDI. In addition,
most (three quarter) cities remain either below or above the median national level,
as shown by the white symbols.
There is, however, substantial movement in a subset of cities. In Brazil, Flori-
anópolis is one of the least segregated cities between the lower and middle quintiles,
but one of the most segregated cities when comparing the top and bottom groups
(from rank 182 to 37). Norte/Nordeste Catarinense displays the opposite relationship,
its rank shifts down from third highest middle DI to 54 for top DI. Similar trends
are present in the United States and in the entire sample, which is split nearly in half
between cities moving up and down the ranks.
As noted in the case of South Africa, the level of inequality has the potential to
significantly affect segregation. Figure 2.4 shows the estimated city-level GINI as
well as the national level (the two are strongly correlated).4 The bivariate regression
4The estimation of the income distribution of every city allows us to also estimate the GINI coef-
ficient. We take advantage of the built-in function to extract this measure at the same time. We
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Fig. 2.4 Plot of top DI and GINI coefficient for all cities with income data (excludes UK, Ireland,
and the Netherlands). The symbols are the national GINI coefficient rounded to the closest multiple
of 5
line shows a positive relationship between the two. However, the cluster of high-
inequality cities (Brazil and South Africa) seem to drive the overall trend. For cities
and countries with GINI coefficients below 5, the relationship is more ambiguous.
Hong Kong and Tijuana have similar levels of income inequality but the top DI in
Hong Kong is nearly three times as high as that of Tijuana. There is also significant
national clustering. The dots above Tijuana are Mexican cities that display a similar
relationship of high-inequality and low segregation. Thismay be a result of the unique
dynamics of movement between central city and periphery in the Mexican context
(Monkkonen et al. 2018).
Finally, the data also shed light on how we understand cities in comparative
perspective. This data will gain greater meaning once paired with more detailed
contextual analysis. The high levels of segregation in Brazil may not come as a
surprise, but the method points to factors other than income inequality. How we
defined cities matters. In the Brazilian context, and in South Africa to a lesser extent,
the region encompasses and concentrate the extremes of the country. Some of the
regions, such as Manaus, Brazil, include great hinterland areas that have often been
marginalized in the process of rapid urbanization (Kanai 2014). This combines with
the landscape of urban inequality in the urban core to create a layering with no direct
parallel in the well-established cities of Europe and North America.
retrieved the national GINI coefficients from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/. We round the
values to create fewer categories than there are countries and avoid overwhelming the plot with
symbol levels.
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Now that we examined the data, we can come back to the questions we opened
with. Despite the lack of contextual data about individual cities and countries, there
is much we can infer from the observed patterns. We learn that income inequality,
certainly high-inequality, correlates with residential segregation between income
groups but leaves much variation unexplained. Many cities with similar levels of
income inequality, even within the same country, have segregation levels at the
opposite ends of the spectrum. While differences in segregation are not as large
within countries as they are between countries, our data suggest that both need to
be studied in conjunction. Therefore, it is not just a matter of understanding the
difference between Melbourne and Boston as cities within countries with different
political economy, it also matters that segregation levels in all Australian cities are
similar while in the United States they vary from Australian to Brazilian levels. This
relationship between inequality and segregation raises important substantive and
methodological questions for between-country and within-country comparisons.
The case of Mexico, for example, stands out on its own because of the prevalent
low levels of segregation by income but raises additional questions in comparison
to other middle-income, high-inequality countries such as South Africa and Brazil.
South Africa shares more with Mexico when limiting the comparison to middle-
income segregation when both countries have lower levels of segregation. It may be
that Mexico’s data limitation fails to capture the translation of high inequality into
spatial patterns of separation or that Mexican cities developed in such a way that the
isolation of wealthy households that defines South African cities has not taken hold
to the same extent.
Elucidating these questions has implications for policies aiming to reduce segrega-
tion. There is too little evidence to speculate as to the importance of national welfare
systems on explaining the differences in within-country variation. Some countries,
like France, have a more centralized system of urban governance and comprehen-
sive redistributive systems, yet, the range of income segregation levels resembles
more closely that of the Unites States than the Netherlands. This can be interpreted
as evidence that differences between cities are more important than national-level
differences. The lower average level of segregation in higher income equality coun-
triesmay point in the other direction. Here too, however, important deviations prevent
straightforward inference.
A key aspect of explaining deviations from general relationships is history. Single
country studies have revealed important processes that persistently shaped segrega-
tion. In the United States, for example, scholars have showed how the migration of
black people out of the South led to the creation of modern residential racial segre-
gation. Where the social hierarchy was institutionalized in the South under slavery
and Jim Crow laws, the rest of the country lacked such rules to establish white domi-
nance and relied instead on the systematic spatial separation of blackmigrants (Logan
2017). To this day, southern cities have lower levels of segregation than the rest of
the country. Nightingale (2012) showed that a similar process operated in South
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Africa where residential segregation was unnecessary until a large black labor force
developed in urban centers. The data we presented can serve to conceptualize histor-
ical processes more broadly to include the implications of different starting point of
urbanization, colonial relations, and changing economic relations (e.g., centered on
labor and property).
One promising area of study is the integration of economic geography into the
study of segregation. As cities take on different roles in relation to their international
peers and national competitors, the pressures on urban structures will be different. A
large-scale data analysis would allow for the modeling of urban system to consider
sub-national labor market trends and the accompanying migration patterns. It would
also open the possibility of studying the role of different historical trajectories of
cities. The period in which urbanization takes place, and the set of events that shapes
the life of a city matter, but studying such phenomena as cases studies can lead to
self-fulfilling analysis if one chooses cases based on the outcome one wishes to study
(Abu-Lughod 2007). The trends in urban research and segregation studies point to
fruitful complementarities between case studies and large-scale data analyses.
Many questions we have suggested point to the importance of data spanning
several time periods for future research. The only country for which we have access
to reliable data over time for the entire country is the United States. Even in that case,
issues of comparison over time are non-negligible (Reardon et al. 2018). Countries
are improving their data collection methods with every census and we hope that as
time passes, the scope of comparison will only increase.
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Status, and Residential Segregation
in Greater Cairo: 1986–2006
Abdelbaseer A. Mohamed and David Stanek
Abstract Greater Cairo is a primate, monocentric metropolis with significant
socio-economic disparities among its population and neighborhoods. This chapter
examines the relationship between income inequality, the welfare regime, central-
ized governance, settlement type, housing policies, occupational status, and socio-
economic segregation. Using data from the 1986, 1996, and 2006 censuses, we
report the dissimilarity index to demonstrate the distribution of residents in the
Greater Cairo Region by occupational status, we show patterns of socio-economic
segregation based on the distribution of the population by categories of occupations
across census tracts and employ the location quotient to compare the concentra-
tion of the top/bottom groups in each census tract relative to the city average. The
results show that growing economic inequality does not necessarily result in greater
socio-economic segregation. The results also suggest that social class contributes
to residential clustering. While the poorer strata of the Greater Cairo Region were
pushed to the periphery and the older urban core, affluent inhabitants were more
likely to settle voluntarily in segregated enclaves to isolate themselves from the
general population.
Keywords Greater Cairo · Socio-economic status · Residential segregation ·
Housing policies · Income inequality
3.1 Introduction
Urbanization and social inequality have been on the rise in Egypt since themid-1970s
when President Anwar Sadat (1970–1981) initiated a series of reforms beginning
with the 1974 infitah (open-door) policy to reduce state welfare spending and expand
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the private sector through state support and foreign direct investment (Ben Nefissa
2011: 180). In 1991, under President Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011), Egypt adopted
the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program with the support of the
World Bank, European Union, and African Development Bank (ADB 2000). These
neoliberal policies contributed to the urbanization of theGreater CairoRegion (GCR)
and increased social inequality in several ways. Reduced state welfare funding and
agricultural mechanization encouraged economic migrants to seek work in the GCR.
Some Egyptians emigrated to neighboring Gulf countries to work in the booming
oil sector. They sent remittances to their families who, in turn, invested in land and
construction to satisfy an increased housing demand (Sims 2010; El Kadi 2009). At
the same time, the state withdrew from social housing construction and engaged in
land speculation of its own, leaving a largely unregulated private market to provide
housing for the growing population of theGCR.Housing demand pushed speculators
to build on the urban periphery, turning large tracts of productive (and scarce) agri-
cultural land into densely built, informal housing settlements, which are now home
to poor and middle-income Cairenes alike (UNCHS 1993; Sims 2010). International
real estate investment concentrated in the GCR’s central business district and along
the Nile’s “Gold Coast”, as well as in a series of new satellite cities that catered to
mobile, urban elites.
In 1979, the government adopted a deliberate urban decentralization strategy to
relieve some of the congestion and pollution brought about by the urbanization of
GCR (Tadamun 2018). By 2008, the development of new urban communities, such as
the 6th of October City and Sheikh Zayed City, set apart from the urban fabric on the
desert plains, had transformed the GCR from a compact, monocentric metropolitan
region into a discontinuous, polycentric, dispersed urban structure (Taubenböck et al.
2009). This rapid expansion has provided opportunities for higher income Egyptians
to leave central Cairo. At the same time, poorer communities have concentrated in
undesirable, underserved, and often unsafe areas, also known as “poverty pockets,”
where chances of upward mobility and opportunities are limited (Tadamun 2018).
This chapter explores the factors that have influenced the socio-economic spatial divi-
sions in GCR. A city’s socio-spatial division is a function of many factors including
context, institutional power, welfare regimes (Arbaci 2007), ethnicity, commodifi-
cation of housing, and people’s residential preferences (Marcińczak et al. 2015).
Research from the United States and Western Europe has shown that economic
inequality can result in (socio)economic segregation, the uneven spatial distribution
of households based on income, occupation and/or educational attainment (Burgess
1925; Massey 1979b; Schteingart 2001). Singerman and Amar (2006) show that, in
addition to economic inequalities, social inequalities reinforce socio-spatial segre-
gation. Several authors including Gilbert (1992) have suggested that social class is
replacing ethnicity as the basis for the social urban geography. While many studies
have looked at poverty in Egypt (e.g., World Bank 1990; Korayem 1994; El-Laithy
1996; Sabry 2010), poverty in relation to spatial justice and unemployment in the
GCR (Shawkat 2013; Nassar and Biltagy 2016; Tadamun 2018), and the patterns of
low-income housing inGCR (Harris andWahba 2002), no rigorous research has been
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conducted on the intersection of economic inequality and residential segregation of
socio-professional groups in the GCR.
This work focuses on post-socialist Greater Cairo (1986–2006) as a monocentric
city and uses occupation as an indicator of social status to study the distribution of
socio-economic groups across the region. UsingMarcińczak’s et al. (2015) approach
with publicly available data, we answer the following questions: To what extent is
there residential segregation of occupational groups in theGCR?Can socio-economic
inequality explain residential segregation? Towhat extent can the welfare regime and
the characteristics of housing provision explain segregation trends in the GCR?
3.2 The Social Geography of GCR
With the exception of its recent history, the GCR had a compact, monocentric urban
structure that followed Burgess’s (1925) concentric zone model that theorizes how
economic and political forces influence the distribution of social groups within the
city. The model suggests that cities evolve in successive rings around the central
business district (CBD). The first ring, widely visible in the developing world, is
made up by deteriorating housing formerly occupied by higher income families
and is called the “zone of transition”, or what Stokes (1962) refers to as “slums
of despair.” This zone is followed by three successive rings of housing ranging
from high-density poor-quality working class housing, to lower density high-quality
housing for the elite. Change occurs in this model through the invasion-succession
process in which a group of people or type of land use arrives and comes to dominate
an area previously occupied by another group (Kendall 2013).
An important criticism of Burgess’s model is that many settlements on the
periphery of contemporary megacities are not higher class neighborhoods, but what
Stokes calls “slums of hope”1 which are problematic, but not as dire as the inner-city
“slums of despair”. While the differentiation between slums in the urban core and
those in fringe areas looks outdated and prejudiced, authors like Harris and Wahba
(2002) confirm its usefulness and validity for the GCR.
Rural–urban migration has been a dominant force in shaping the socio-spatial
structure of the GCR. The limited availability of publicly subsidized housing and
the high cost of formal market-rate housing forces lower income residents to live in
either older, affordable neighborhoods often with substandard housing or in informal
settlements2 built on illegally occupied land (Harris and Wahba 2002). Informal
housing is the only option for rural migrants of limited means, and low-income fami-
lies who have little, if any, education and support themselves through the informal
1In this instance, we apply Stokes’s use of the word “slum” to the informal settlements, or
ashwaiyaat, of Cairo although they are technically dissimilar. See footnote 2 below.
2Informal settlements or ashwaiyaat, which translates to ‘haphazard’, generally refer to unplanned
and unregulated communities. These also include typical slum areas of deep poverty, dilapidated
housing, and limited service availability.
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economy (Sabry 2010). The influx of migrants resulted in a fragmented pattern
of planned settlements, where government regulations and planning prevail, and
informal settlements, where land markets are unregulated (Sobreira 2003).
3.3 GCR as a Case in Point
Greater Cairo is Egypt’s primate city and it continues to grow rapidly (Jefferson
1989). With a population of over 20 million people as of 2016 (CAPMAS 2016), the
GCR accounts for 22% of Egypt’s 95.8 million people, 50% of Egypt’s commercial
activities, more than 40% of the country’s public investments, 43% of public-sector
jobs and 40% of private-sector jobs (UH-HABITAT 1993; Ben Nefissa 2011; Sims
2010). The population of theGCR increased by almost 7million people between 1986
and 2006 (see Table 3.1). Population densities of inner-city districts declined while
densities in peripheral districts increased, often in the formof unplanned urbanization
(El-Kadi 1987 in Fahmi and Sutton 2008). By 2006, 53% of residents owned their
homes and only 5.1% of the households lived in publicly built or financed dwellings
(Sims et al. 2008 in Sims 2010).
Informal settlements are a dominant typology in GCR’s housing landscape. Home
to low- and middle-income Cairenes alike, official estimates show that 43% of
housing in the GCR is in informal settlements (CAPMAS 2006), but this is likely
an underestimation (Sabry 2010). The slums of Cairo, the dilapidated, make-shift,
poorly serviced, and unsafe neighborhoods, house Cairo’s poorest residents and are
scatted throughout the city. El-Laithy (2001) estimates that the incidence of poverty
in the GCR was about 8.4% in 2000, a 2004 World Bank study estimates poverty
Table 3.1 Summary statistics for the GCR, 1986–2006
1986 1996 2006
Population 8,666,478 12,600,000 15,628,325
Residential buildings 1,108,250 1,387,388 1,751,742
Housing units* 3,432,070 4,923,790 7,107,363
Owned units (%) 35.3 49.1 52.7
Rented units (%) 44.6 44.5 41.4
Other (%) 16.0 6.0 6.0
Population of informal settlements (%) 49.0 43.2 43.1
Vacant residential buildings (%) 15.4 7.0** 10.1**
Share of managers and professionals (%) 21.1 25.8 25.0
Gini index NA 33.7 37.8
Source World Bank 2007, CAMPAS 1986, 1996 and 2006
* Housing units converted into workplaces are not included.
** As defined in the 1996 and 2006 censuses, “vacant” did not include vacant apartments within a
partially used block of apartments and is therefore severely undercounted.
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rates at 4.6%, but as with the extent of informal settlements, poverty rates are likely
to be underestimated (Sabry 2010).
Vacancies are another dominant feature of the GCR’s housing market. In 1986,
there was a 15% residential vacancy rate in the GCR in part due to the refusal of
owners to rent their apartments under rent-control laws (Raymond 2001). By 2006,
official figures show that 10.1% of the housing units in the GCR were vacant flats
(CAMPAS), but this number ismore due to a change in the definition of “vacant” than
improvements in the vacancy rate (see note to Table 3.1). Unofficial estimates put the
figure at more than 30% (Moussa 2007) as landlords, especially in the higher income
neighborhoods of the GCR, were unable to find renters who can afford “normal”
market rents (Fahmi and Sutton 2008).
Importantly, explaining the spatial distribution of residents has been approached
in various ways by different scholars. While some studies focus on individual pref-
erences (e.g., Lewis et al. 2011), others concentrate on one or more dominant
factors such as polarization of the social structure, institutional power, and economic
inequality (Marcińczak et al. 2015). In this study, we examine how income inequality,
welfare regime politics, the centralized system of urban governance, settlement type,
and housing policies contribute to the GCR’s socio-spatial division.
3.4 Factors Influencing Residential Segregation in GCR
As stated above, to explain geographies of socio-economic residential segregation in
Greater Cairo, this study employs amultifactor approach and takes conventional indi-
cators that have been frequently used in previous studies, such as income inequality
and socio-economic/occupational status (Darden et al. 2010; Marcińczak et al. 2015;
Massey 1979a), welfare regime politics (Arbaci 2007), centralized urban governance
(Brown and Chung 2008; van Kempen and Murie 2009), settlement type (Parham
2012), and housing policies (Reardon and Bischoff 2011).
3.4.1 Income Inequality
According toWorldBank studies, theGini coefficient of income forEgyptwas 30.1 in
1995 and rose to 31.8 by 2015. According to the 1997/98 UNDP report on Egypt, the
Gini index for Cairo governorate in 1995was 33.7 (Abu-Lughod 2004) and jumped to
40.0 by 2016 making the metropolis the most unequal area in the country (CAPMAS
2016). As compared with other cities in developing countries such as Johannesburg,
South Africa (Gini index of 72.4), Cairo’s Gini index is modest. However, one might
argue that Egyptians base their perceptions of inequality on the gap between their
expectations for the government and the government’s performance rather than on
the gap between their own income and the income of others.
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3.4.2 Welfare Regime Politics
It is argued that the type of welfare regime influences social segregation (Murie
and Musterd 1996 in Mustered and Ostendorf 1998). Differences in welfare state
arrangements mediate global economic pressures, thus contributing to significant
local differences (Musterd andOstendorf 1998). Using Fenger’s (2007) classification
of welfare states, Egypt falls into the post-socialist developing welfare type (Fenger
2007) with the highest expected levels of segregation (Arbaci 2007). According to
the World Bank estimates, Egypt has a high mortality rate, low life expectancy, high
inequality, high inflation, and low state social spending on health and education.
For example, the infant mortality rate was 19.4 per 1,000 births in 2016, while life
expectancy was 71.5 years. The unemployment rate and inflation rate were 21.4%
and 13.8%, respectively.
3.4.3 Centralized Urban Governance
Urban governance in Egypt is highly centralized (BenNefissa 2011; Tadamun 2018).
Officials appointed by the President at the governorate level allocate public money
and set priorities for urban planning, services, and development. The governance
structure allows for significant corruptionwhich encourages skilled persons to engage
in socially unproductive activities (i.e., extracting bribes) and reduces economic
output (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997, as cited in Ghalwash 2014). In other words, central-
ized governance implies that personal connections matter and service delivery and
the quality of neighborhoods are tied to those connections, thus reinforcing existing
spatial inequalities. It also leaves lower income households with little opportunity to
engage in the decision-making process about their communities, reinforcing spatial
inequalities among neighborhoods.
Further complicating the governance of the GCR is that it includes five
autonomous provincial governorates: Cairo, Giza, and Qalyubia, 6th October and
Helwan, forwhich there are noGCR level coordinating government bodies, hindering
the development of coordinated plans and policies for the urban agglomeration as
a whole (Ben Nefissa 2011), and this lack of coordination prevents the government
from addressing the spatial inequality of the GCR region in a meaningful way. This
poorly coordinated metropolitan planning leads to differences in opportunity struc-
tures (e.g., differences in housing segments in different parts of the GCR), thus
contributing to socio-spatial segregation (van Kempen and Murie 2009).
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3.4.4 Settlement Types: Formal and Informal
Perhaps the most influential factor of socio-economic segregation in GCR is settle-
ment type, where higher income groups are over-represented in planned areas and
middle- and lower income groups are over-represented in informal unplanned areas.
Cairo’s first planned area, the nineteenth-century CBD, is situated between the old
city, located about 2.5 km east of Nile, and the so-called “Gold Coast”, a narrow
strip of the most valuable real estate in the CBD that extends from Qasr El-Nil to
the south and Zamalek Island to the north. From the CBD, formal Greater Cairo
expanded along both sides of the Nile as well as along railroads that extended from
the Ramses Railroad Station in downtown north through Shubra El-Kheima, south to
Helwan, and east to Suez (UNCHS1993). In the early 1900s, several affluent, planned
suburbs were established including Zamalek Island west of downtown, Heliopolis,
10 km east of downtown, and Maadi, 12 km to the south. Over the early twentieth
century, the urban fabric of GCR filled in the gaps between downtown and these
suburban enclaves. The south-eastward development of the city was hindered by the
great cemetery of Cairo and the Muqattam Hills (see Fig. 3.1).
Beginning in the 1960s, the GCR experienced heavy urbanization as a result
of migration from rural areas driven by job opportunities. Newcomers were mostly
young singlemenwithmodest needs, which encouraged them to share rented units or
rooms in the older neighborhoods with a deteriorating housing stock, aka, the “slums
of despair.”After accruing considerable savings, somemigrants bought land and built
informal settlements well beyond the formal areas on the peripheral farmlands to the
north and west of the city where land was cheap (Fahmi and Sutton 2008; Kipper
Fig. 3.1 Urban evolution of Greater Cairo from before 1900 to 2000
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and Fischer 2009). Increased migration and urbanization during the 1980s and 1990s
stimulated further demand for housing—a demand which planned areas could not
accommodate—and informal settlement expansion pushed land prices on the urban
periphery incrementally higher (Kipper and Fischer 2009). Meanwhile, the govern-
ment exacerbated the housing crisis by encouraging both speculative land acquisition
and investing in large-scale, for-profit luxury housing (Salma and Shawkat 2017;
Tadamun 2018).
3.4.5 Housing Policies
National housing policy has had a significant influence on socio-economic segrega-
tion in the GCR. The vestiges of the socialist era policies reinforce historic disparities
in the urban fabric while present day policies create new ones. As can be seen in
Fig. 3.2, during the 1940s, the Egyptian government adopted rent-control legislation
to reduce rents for lower income families. Freezing rent prices discouraged private
investors to supply formal housing for rent. Furthermore, insufficient rent revenues
discouraged private owners to maintain existing housing units and this, in turn, led
to a deterioration of the housing stock. With the industrialization policy under the
state-sponsored socialism of the Nasser era, specifically in the 1950s, the govern-
ment reduced rents gave renters the right to complain aboutmaintenance and partially
provided subsidized housing to the poor. During the 1960s, the state vastly reduced
Fig. 3.2 NationalHousing Policies andTheir Influence on Spatial Segregation, 1941–2011 ( Source
authors based on The World Bank (2007); Fahmi and Sutton (2008))
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the construction of public housing and infrastructure gave tenants the right to inherit
rental units, and directed most of the national income to military purposes. This
policy widened the gap between supply and demand, further encouraged informal
development, and contributed to the deterioration of rental stock (World Bank 2007;
Fahmi and Sutton 2008).
In 1979, the government adopted a strategy to relieve central Cairo of congestion
and pollution by supporting the construction of car-dependent, planned “new urban
communities” in the desert, a policy that continues today (Hegazy and Moustafa
2013). In these formal areas, the government prohibited microeconomic activities
such as retail shops, workshops, and street kiosks which generate employment and
investment opportunities for lower income residents (Sims 2014). Low- and middle-
class families could neither afford the cost of housing nor the cost of commuting such
long distances, thereby ensuring that the satellite cities would be elite spaces within
the expanding region (Sims 2014; Salma and Shawka 2017; Tadamun 2018). The
government has tried to support subsidized social housing projects (Iskan Igtema’ey)
in the newurban communities for low- andmiddle-incomehouseholds, but because of
bureaucratic opacity (Sims 2014), and income requirements that exceed the average
incomes of even upper middle-class households (Salma and Shawkat 2017), this
program has contributed to further socio-economic segregation in the city (Tadamun
2018).
Given the high costs of subsidized housing and the exclusionary nature of the
new urban communities, low- and middle-income residents relied on the informal
private sector for housing and the only available land on which they could build
was the agricultural land that surrounds the city. Unfortunately, the informal private
sector was unable to satisfy the increasing housing demands of the population due to
rising construction costs, the incessant inflation of land prices (UN-HABITAT 1993),
and the large devaluation of the Egyptian pound over the period from 1989 to 1991
(Mohieldin and Kouchouk 2003). Ultimately, the informal private sector withdrew
from its key role as the main supplier of affordable housing for lower income groups
and focused on higher end housing (Salma and Shawkat 2017). As of 2016, GCR
had about 4.7 million vacant housing units, which is roughly equivalent to the total
number of housing units in 1996 (CAPMAS 1996, 2016).
3.5 Landscape of Residential Segregation in GCR,
1986–2006
This study relies on publicly available data from the General Office of Physical
Planning (GOPP) and the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics
(CAPMAS). As information aggregated to the tract level, we use census tracts to
define the shiyakha, or neighborhoods. Tract boundaries for the selected study periods
are nearly unchanged and do not require data harmonization for pre-2006 census
tracts.
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The urban agglomeration of the GCR is comprised of the whole governorate of
Cairo and, except for some scattered towns, urban Giza, and urban Qalyubia (Harris
andWahba 2002). In 1986 there were 486 tracts, with an average population of about
5,500 each. In 1996, the number of tracts increased to 509with an average population
of about 7,000, and in 2006, there were 553 tracts with a mean population of 8,250.
In order to control for differences in tract sizes and populations, we standardize the
data by transforming counts into rates/ratios. Z-scores are also used for normalizing
scores on the same scale.
We use occupational data from the 1986, 1996, and 2006 censuses to study socio-
economic segregation in the GCR. The 1996 and 2006 data include the nine occupa-
tional categories as defined by the International Standard Classification of Occupa-
tions (ISCO) and the 1986 census includes seven, where the lowest three elementary
occupations are merged into one category. To mirror socio-economic disparities at a
micro-scale, we adopt the aggregation method of Marcińczak et al. (2015) in which
the original ISCO classifications are grouped into three socio-spatial categories: top,
middle, and bottom. Managers (1) and professionals (2) comprise the top socio-
economic category. Associate professionals (3), clerks (4), and service and sales
workers (5) form the middle socio-economic category. Skilled agricultural, forestry,
and fishery workers (6); craft and related trades workers (7); plant and machine
operators and assemblers (8), and elementary occupations (9) fall into the bottom
socio-economic group (see also Azhdari et al. 2018). FollowingMarcińczak’s (2015)
method, we then find the percentage of employed residents in each tract that fall into
the high, middle and low group to classify the census tracts of GCR into six cate-
gories: high, middle-to-high, mixed, low-to-middle, low, and polarized (see Table
3.2).
While occupational status is a major indicator of income, prestige, educational
attainment, and health-related behaviors, it is an insufficient and sometimes unreli-
able indicator of socio-economic status (SES) on its own. A disadvantage is that job
status as well as skill and education requirements for certain types of employment
change over time. For example, a teacher may have had a higher social status in 1986
than in 2006.Moreover, income and lifestyle, as indicators of occupational status, are
Table 3.2 Tracts types according to shares of socio-spatial groups
Tract Occupational Status Category Top (%) Middle (%) Bottom (%)
High ≥50 <30 <30
Middle-to-high 25–49 25–49 <25
Middle <30 ≥50 <30
Mixed 25–49 25–49 25–49
Low-to-middle <25 25–49 25–49
Low <30 <30 ≥50
Polarized ≥30 <25 ≥30
Source adapted from Marcińczak et al. (2015)
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context-sensitive and subject to cultural preferences (Berkman and Macintyre 1997;
Marcińczak et al. 2015). Finally, SES indicators often exclude individuals engaged
exclusively in the informal economy as their activity is not captured in government
data sets (Krieger et al. 1997). This is particularly problematic in the GCR where
informality is widespread and undercounted (Sabry 2010). Taking this possible limi-
tation of the data into account, we use occupational composition statistics as they
are the most reliable available indicator of SES at the shiyakha level within publicly
available datasets.
We investigate patterns of socio-economic segregation at two stages. We use the
dissimilarity index (D) for all occupational groups to measure the overall evenness in
spatial distribution of each occupational group as compared to the rest of the popu-
lation. Because socio-economic segregation is commonly lower than ethnic segre-
gation, Marcińczak et al. (2015) consider values between 0.2 and 0.4 as moderate
and above 0.4 as high. In the second stage, location quotient (LQ) is employed to
compare relative concentrations of the top and bottom ISCO categories in a tract
against the metropolitan concentration.
3.6 Spatial Distribution of Occupational Groups
The composition of the workforce in the GCR has shifted modestly between 1986
and 2006. The bottom occupational category made up nearly half of the workforce in
1986 and fell to about 44% in 2006 while the top occupational group increased from
21 to 25% over the same time period. The middle occupational category remained
unchanged at 31%. Unskilled workers form the smallest share of jobs in the GCR,
whereas most of the economically active populations of the city are from the bottom
socio-economic group (CAPMAS1986, 1996 and 2006).Also, 25%and up to 30%of
residents are in the top and middle occupation categories, respectively. Furthermore,
the three broad categories of workers are unevenly distributed in the three censuses.
Overall, occupational structure between 1986 and 2006 implies that the bottom of the
labor market (i.e., low-skilled jobs) is relatively shrinking while the top and middle
are growing (Fig. 3.3 left).
Research on the occupational structures of mostly western cities has shown
tendencies of labor forces in advanced capitalist societies toward either social polar-
ization (Sassen 1991), where growth in both high-income and low-income occupa-
tions is accompanied by a decline in middle-income occupations or professionaliza-
tion, where significant growth in high-income and middle-income technical jobs and
professional jobs balance out a stagnation or decline of middle- and low-income,
semi- or unskilled jobs (Hamnett 1994, 1996). This data suggests that the GCR has
not experienced either social polarization or professionalization.
Looking at the individual occupational categories, the GCR has seen a signifi-
cant expansion of service and sales workers between 1986 and 2006, from 9.6 to
15.32%, due to the expansion of the tourism sector in Egypt (Richter and Steiner
2008). This was offset by the loss of skilled agricultural, forestry, and fishery jobs










































MAN PRO APR CLE SER SKI CRA MAC UNS
Fig. 3.3 Distribution of occupational groups and change over time
(9.3 to 3.3%) over the same period due to the expansion of informal settlements into
agricultural land. While the combined manager and professional categories grew
between 1986 and 2006 (21.1–25%), the supporting occupations—clerks and asso-
ciate professionals—declined from a combined 21.3–16.1%, contrary to what is
expected in the social polarization/professionalization literature (see Pratschke and
Morlicchio 2012). As expected with the liberalization of the economy, craftsmen
and trade workers have declined from 24 to 20.3% between 1996 and 2006, but
traditional industrial jobs and unskilled labor have increased (Fig. 3.3 right).
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 summarize dissimilarity indices for all original ISCO occu-
pational categories as well as between the Top, Middle, and Bottom groupings for
the years 1986, 1996, and 2006. Overall, the results of DIs indicate that the top
and bottom social categories are more spatially separated than the middle socio-
economic categories in GCR. Moreover, the DIs for managers and professionals
fluctuated slightly but in general remained steady, whereas the level of residential
separation of skilled workers rose sharply between 1996 and 2006. Furthermore,
those in middle and elementary occupations increased slightly in general.
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Table 3.3 Indices of dissimilarity (multiplied by 100) between occupational groups in GCR
MAN PRO APR CLE SER SKI CRA MAC UNS
14 21 22 26 73 35 35 33 MAN
24 26 28 35 75 43 43 41 PRO
20 42 9 16 70 23 22 30 APR
31 48 19 14 69 22 21 30 CLE
29 48 19 17 65 14 16 22 SER
56 69 52 49 45 66 61 63 SKI
15 24 CRA










28 31 18 18
77 78 74 76 74
42 45 28 31 25 65
41 44 25 29 25 62 12
34 36 23 24 20 65 18 18
20
06
MAN = managers; PRO = professionals; APR = associate professionals; CLE = clerks; SER =
sellers and service workers; SKI = skilled agricultural, forestry, and fishery workers; CRA = crafts
men; MAC = machine operators; UNS = unskilled workers
NOTE The last three lower ISCO categories in the census of 1986 are grouped in the CAPMAS
dataset
Table 3.4 Indices of dissimilarity (multiplied by 100) between top, middle and bottom groups in
GCR
1986 1996 2006
TOP - MID 26 27 24
TOP - BOT 43 42 43
MID - BOT 21 20 25
3.7 Neighborhoods’ Leading Specializations
In this research, we employ LQ data at the scale of the shiyakhat to understand each
tract’s demographic distinctiveness. LQ for managers and professionals ranged from
0.03 to 3.75, and those for the bottom group varied from 0.07 to 2.21 (Fig. 3.4).
LQs formanagers and professionalswere found in relatively similar proportions in
1986 and 2006. The easternmost neighborhoods, as well as tracts on thewestern bank
of the Nile River, had the highest values accounting for over twice the metropolitan
share of top social class employment. These are the areaswhere themost educated and
highly skilled people are located. On the other hand, bottom occupational groups are
largely concentrated in fringe areas in Giza andQalyubia. Specifically, they clustered
to the North, adjacent to the industrial area of Shubra El-Kheima, to the South, in the
industrial areas of Helwan and Tora, to the west, for example in Kerdasa and Markaz
Al-Giza, and to the east, in Mansheit Nasser over the Muqattam hills. Interestingly,
such areas are less urbanized and largely informal.
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Fig. 3.4 Location quotient maps for the Top and Bottom occupational groups in GCR
3.8 Patterns of Socio-Economic Intermixing
The classification of tracts by shares of different socio-economic groups shows a
geography of neighborhood socio-economic intermixing in the GCR (see Fig. 3.5
Fig. 3.5 Classification of neighborhoods by socio-economic composition in the GCR
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Table 3.5 Percentages of
population in tracts by
socio-economic composition
1986 2006 1986–2006 (change)
High 2.44 6.77 4.33
Middle-to-high 11.14 11.77 0.64
Middle 0.23 0.0 −0.23
Mixed 15.03 16.74 1.71
Low-to-middle 38.81 29.98 −8.83
Low 32.31 33.05 0.73
Polarized 0.05 1.70 1.65
and Table 3.5). The results of this analysis confirm that the spatial segregation of
the city is predominantly a result of formal/informal settlement patterns, policy, and
mobility. First, the number of exclusively high SES neighborhoods and low-SES
neighborhoods are increasing due to the expansion of the city into formal, newly
constructed settlements in the eastern desert (new high SES tracts) and into informal
settlements on the periphery of the urban fabric (new low-SES tracts). Second, the
percentage of the population in the low-to-middle category has declined significantly
between 1986 and 2006. Third, the polarized neighborhood type in which higher
class professionals intermingle with lower class professionals has appeared in newly
constructed areas.
Overall, low and low-to-middle SES tracts are the most common tract types,
housing more than 60% of the GCR’s residents. In both 1986 and 2006, low-SES
tracts were located on the urban fringe where land and housing are cheaper and
informal settlement patterns dominate. These are the areas where predominantly
poor rural migrants and newcomers working at the urban core settle. Low-to-middle
tracts were incrementally closer to the CBD than low tracts. There are also some
smaller pockets of low-SES tracts surrounding downtown that were more prominent
in 1986 but lessened by 2006.
In 1986, high and middle-to-high SES tracts were clustered around the CBD on
both sides of the Nile and along the northeastern rail line, and by 2006, dominated the
sprawling, low-density tracts of the eastern desert, including the new urban commu-
nities of Al-Rehab, Al-Shrouq, and NewCairo. These areas correspond to the GCR’s
formal parts.
Absent in 1986, polarized SES tracts appeared in 2006. Studies from North
America and Europe show that such neighborhoods are a consequence of growing
income inequality and an outcome of gentrification (Galster and Booza 2007 in
Marcińczak et al. 2015). This is not the case in the GCR. The polarized tracts are in
areas where lower income households may find affordable housing before services to
the region are improved and higher income households with access to private trans-
portation can take advantage of the suburban characteristics of the area. These areas
are also sites of newly constructed, poorly serviced housing for residents displaced by
construction projects in the deteriorated, inner portions of the city (Tadamun 2018).
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These results reinforce the above analysis that socio-economic segregation is
taking place in the GCR, where residents at opposite ends of the socio-economic
spectrum are occupying areas increasingly distant from one another. There are
higher concentrations of high and middle-to-high SES tracts downtown and along
the highways that stretch into the eastern desert. Low and low-to-middle tracts
dominate the informal periphery. Mixed and middle-to-high SES tracts are increas-
ingly concentrated around the urban core, suggesting some hints of early stages of
gentrification.
In order to further illuminate the spatial location of the top occupational group we
divide the total number of people in the top group in the whole GCR in five quintiles,
with a color scheme that goes from dark brown (for the first quintile) to light brown
(for the fifth quintile) (Fig. 3.6). The results show how many tracts we need to make
up the first 20% of the top group; and then to the next 20%, and so on. The fewer the
tracts we need to get to the top 20%, the more spatially concentrated the group is.
In this study, neighborhoods with higher numbers of the top group are almost
nonexistent over a period of several decades neither in older districts, slums of hope,
nor in the peri-urban areas; rather, the first 20% of the top group live in very few
neighborhoods nearby major urban centers and on the outer urban periphery, which
means that the group is very spatially concentrated.
For example, in 1986, the first 20% of the top group were concentrated in twelve
neighborhoods westwards and north-eastwards of central Cairo. In 2006, more clus-
ters of upscale districts have been highlighted in all directions, particularly eastward
in the desert land around the city, forming a donut shape with GCR’s lowest quintile
living in the older housing stock of the center, a pattern consistent with Burgess’s
monocentric model (1925). Today, these clusters have an ever-growing number of
upscale venues such as expensive shopping malls and supermarkets that target only
individuals with higher purchasing power.
Fig. 3.6 Location of the top occupational group in GCR
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3.9 Conclusions
This chapter examined the role of income inequality in explaining socio-economic
residential segregation in the GCR. Using occupational data from 1986, 1996, and
2006 censuses, we measured metropolitan and neighborhood segregation indexes
basedon shares ofSES.To study the dominant occupations in specificneighborhoods,
we computed LQs to top and low social classes. Results from our study lead to
several conclusions that are discussed in the light of the three questions that guided
the analysis.
The first question asked: to what extent is there residential segregation of occu-
pational groups in the GCR? While the overall scale of segregation under neolib-
eralization is on the low side, the profile of socio-economic intermixing reveals
that the poorest groups were more segregated from the wealthy minority than from
the middle-income residents. Specifically, the Dissimilarity Index between top and
bottom groups was 0.43 in 2006. This level is much higher than those found in North
American and Western European cities (mostly range between 0.1 and 0.35) (see,
e.g., White 1987; Marcińczak et al. 2015).
In addition, the local patterns of socio-economic intermixing also demonstrate
that GCR is highly segregated. The dominance of large clusters of low and high SES
tracts reveals a sharp socio-spatial division. Likewise, LQ values show that specific
occupational groups are strongly represented in some tracts than others. Overall, it
may be true, as Sims (2010: 3) has argued, that ostentatious wealth coexists “side by
side with extreme poverty”.
The answer to the second question—“Can socio-economic inequality explain
residential segregation?”—is that while socio-economic inequality is a prerequisite
for socio-economic segregation, the link between the two variables ismodest. In other
words, greater economic inequality does not necessarily result in clear-cut socio-
spatial divisions. Although this is in line with the results seen in Eastern European
cities, we acknowledge inherent limitations in our dataset in terms of selected study
periods and focusing exclusively on one single case.
Third, we asked: To what extent can the welfare regime and the characteristics
of housing provision determine segregation trends in the GCR? The answer is that
both the welfare regime and housing policies contribute in residential settlement
patterns. There is much evidence that the Egyptian government reduced expenditures
on education and social protection andonbuildingpublic housing.Neoliberal policies
aimed to optimize government revenues but steered residential segregation as well.
The chronic lack of adequate and affordable housing in many parts of the city has
resulted in the concentration of low-incomehouseholds in undesirable and sometimes
dangerous locations where land is cheap and jobs are scarce.
In spite of their bad conditions, the inner city housing stock, as well as informal
settlements at the urban fringe, contains about 40% of GCR population (CAPMAS
2006). Low-income households were in favor of these areas because of two reasons:
the advantages of affordability and geographic location nearby jobs. Put differently,
searching for a decent affordable price for all residents resulted in some intriguing
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trends in patterns of socio-economic segregation. However, we acknowledge the
contextual factor which makes GCR atypical of other cities in the global south.
Continued socio-economic polarization may threaten social cohesion, stability, and
security.
Finally, we acknowledge that occupational status may be insufficient and some-
times unreliable indicator of socio-economic status (SES) on its own. Additional
indicators such as educational level may well be added to explore the relationship
between social class and residential segregation further. We also hope to replicate
the analysis using the final 2016 census findings when CAPMAS releases them.
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Chapter 4
Social Inequality and Spatial Segregation
in Cape Town
Ivan Turok, Justin Visagie, and Andreas Scheba
Abstract Cape Town is widely considered to be South Africa’s most segregated
city. The chapter outlines the history of social stratification and spatial segregation,
including the coercion of colonial and apartheid governments to divide the popula-
tion by race. Since 1994, the democratic government has lacked the same resolve and
capacity to reverse this legacy and integrate the city. The chapter also analyses the
changing socio-economic and residential patterns between 2001 and 2011 in more
detail. It shows that the extent of segregation diminished between 2001 and 2011,
contrary to expectations. It appears that affluent neighbourhoods became slightly
more mixed and people in high-status occupations spread into surrounding areas.
Some low-income neighbourhoods also became slightly more mixed by accommo-
dating middle class residents. Further research is required to verify and explain these
findings.
Keywords Socio-economic segregation · Labour market inequalities · Social
mobility · Apartheid city · Residential desegregation
4.1 Introduction
Cape Town is South Africa’s (SA) oldest and second largest city. The municipal
area covers an extensive territory of 2,461 km2 with a population of 4.6 million in
2020. The population grew by 2.6% per annum between 2001 and 2011. This is
slower than Johannesburg, but faster than other cities in SA. The city’s population
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growth has been influenced by its economy. Between 2001 and 2011 jobs increased
more slowly than in Johannesburg, but faster than elsewhere, making Cape Town a
relatively attractive destination for migration (Turok and Borel-Saladin 2014). Cape
Town also has a different demographic make-up from the rest of the country, with
coloureds outnumbering black Africans.1 The population is slightly better educated
on average than the rest of SA.
Cape Town’s social composition and fractured spatial form bear the strong imprint
of its colonial and apartheid history. For three centuries the city was managed to
favour a privileged minority at the expense of the indigenous majority, based on the
colour of their skin. Between 1948–1994, racial discrimination was taken to extreme
as the apartheid regime forced different ethnic groups to live in separate places,
with different institutions and infrastructure. This was supposed to prevent inter-
racial contact under the pretext of ‘separate development’. National laws governing
the economy, society and built environment systematically favoured white house-
holds and disadvantaged blacks. The result was that race became synonymous
with socio-economic status (or ‘class’). Whites became increasingly better-off than
Indians/Asians, followed by coloureds and then black Africans (Statistics SA 2019).
These odious policies were abolished in 1994, but many scars remain. Gaping
urban inequalities continue to impact people’s well-being and life chances. The
subjugation of blacks was so far-reaching that efforts to undo the damage have had
muted effects (WorldBank 2018a). Economic growth and state-sponsored affirmative
action have done little to erase the social and spatial divides. Social class continues
to be intertwined with race, even if the relationship is less direct than it used to be.
Wide social and spatial gaps inhibit mutual understanding and trust, and undermine
policies to draw people together behind a common purpose, such as tackling the
coronavirus crisis. SA’s Gini coefficient is the world’s highest at 0.65, essentially
unchanged since 1994 (Statistics SA 2019).
This chapter analyses segregation between different socio-economic groups. It
differs from earlier studies focused on racial segregation (Christopher 2000; Parry
and van Eeden 2015). Socio-economic status offers a different lens on spatial differ-
entiation. Although the legal basis of racial segregation has been removed, many
tangible effects remain and are slow to change precisely because social stratifi-
cation is still bound up with race. Deep inequalities across both dimensions are
compounded by spatial divides to undermine economic inclusion, social progress
and racial integration.
Socio-economic status is intimately related to people’s occupation, income and
wealth (i.e. their labour market position). This drives residential outcomes today, as
households are distributed across the city according to their market power, or ability
to buy into neighbourhoodswith different attributes, infrastructure and housing types.
1We use the racial terminology common in SA in this chapter: blackAfrican, coloured, Indian/Asian
and white. The term black is used to refer to everyone excluded from the white group privileged
under apartheid. These terms, like any racial classifications, are problematic social constructs from
a particular era. They continue to be used to monitor progress since democracy. According to the
2011 census, the largest population group in Cape Town was coloured (42.4%), followed by black
Africans (38.6%), whites (15.7%) and Indians/Asians (1.4%).
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A steep property price gradient inhibitsmost people’s ability tomove intomore desir-
able areas. Residential patterns are also influenced by the activities of the state, both
in providing low-income housing and in selling public land. Individual lifestyle pref-
erences are relevant too, and affected by stage in the life cycle, family characteristics
and cultural backgrounds.
4.2 Determinants of Residential Patterns
The analysis begins with the powerful historic role of the apartheid state in shaping
the city’s structure. We then consider contemporary economic forces through the
property market, followed by the recent tendency of state-subsidised housing to
reproduce segregation.
4.2.1 Racial Segregation: 1950s–1980s
Cape Town is a famously divided city, with affluent, leafy suburbs offering excep-
tional amenities and picturesque mountain and coastal settings, juxtaposed against
austere and inhospitable dormitory settlements on the treeless sand-plains of the
Cape Flats. At the heart of the city is the vibrant City Bowl, a natural amphithe-
atre that concentrates enormous wealth, surrounded by the stunning slopes of Table
Mountain. A patchwork of intensely crowded informal settlements is barely tolerated
in various parts of the city. These unauthorised shanty-towns reflect poor people’s
efforts to access city opportunities without paying for formal accommodation.
Cape Town’s unusual topography and status as a biodiversity hotspot have other
consequences for access to housing and segregation. Special nature reserves intended
to restrict house-building cover more than 40% of the municipal area. The mountain
also shapes the road and rail networks, which have historically guided property
investment and acted as barriers between race-based neighbourhoods. The Atlantic
Seaboard attracts super-rich international homebuyers and tourists, which inflates
house prices throughout the market.
The city’s physical footprint expanded most in the second half of the twentieth
century, when the economy was booming and the southern and northern suburbs
became the preferred residential areas for the white middle and upper classes. Popu-
lation density declined by about 50% between the 1950s and the 1980s (City of
Cape Town 2018). This was when racial ideology was most pernicious and the state
directly shaped the city’s form. Previous growth was slower and segregation by race
was not all-pervasive. During the colonial era, the community was highly stratified
and unequal, and white settlers exploited indigenous groups and slaves brought in
fromAsia and elsewhere in Africa (van Rooyen and Lemanski 2020). Discrimination
and subjugation were widespread, but the city was not rigidly demarcated by race.
In the early twentieth century, public health concerns (infectious diseases) provided
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the pretext for dispossessing most black Africans of their prime land and housing in
the urban core and relocating them beyond the urban fringe. This laid the legal and
political foundations for intensified segregation policies after the second world war.
The National Party won the 1948 general election and launched a spate of laws to
entrench white supremacy using explicit spatial instruments, such as urban planning.
Peoplewere rigidly classified by race and physically separated through a combination
of controls and distinct institutions. The notorious Group Areas Act assigned people
to particular places kept apart by buffer strips. The racial hierarchywas entrenched by
allocating large central areas towhites, peripheral sites to blackAfricans and spaces in
between to coloureds. Implementation destroyed well-established coloured commu-
nities and forced the removal of approximately 150,000 people to townships on the
Cape Flats by the end of the 1960s. District Six in the City Bowl was most affected,
with 55,000 residents forcefully displaced (van Rooyen and Lemanski 2020).
The impact was compounded by separate local authorities created for different
areas, and separate schools, healthcare and public transport systems. This redis-
tributed resources from working-class communities to the well-endowed white
suburbs, and deepened the regressive effects of racial segregation (Mabin 2005).
For example, the education system for whites was vastly superior to that for blacks,
with better-equipped teachers, smaller classes and a more advanced curriculum. It is
hard to overestimate the lasting impact on contemporary society.
The Cape was declared a ‘coloured labour preference area’, which inhibited in-
migration by black Africans and explains the distinctive demographics today. Popu-
lation movements were strictly controlled by pass laws. By the early 1990s, Cape
Town was the most segregated city in the country, and less than 6% of the popu-
lation lived outside the areas designated for their race, such as domestic workers
(Christopher 2000).
Two immense districts on the Cape Flats—Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha—
demonstrate the force of the apartheid state. Mitchells Plain was created in the 1970s
as a coloured township for middle- and low-income families, 25–30 km from the
CBD. Many residents were victims of forced removals. It was laid out with neigh-
bourhood precincts, basic public facilities and wide arterial roads. There was no
effort to develop local industrial estates, employment centres or small business units,
let alone to restore the social fabric of dislocated communities. Many precincts soon
deteriorated with rising unemployment, gangsterism, drug abuse, physical decay and
shack housing. The current township population is around 300,000.
Khayelitsha was created during the 1980s for black Africans and envisaged as the
‘solution’ to two problems facing Cape Town: the rapid increase in rural migrants
from the Eastern Cape and overcrowding in other townships. Thousands of people
were forcefully relocated to inferior housing and open land, 30–35 km from theCBD.
There was even less effort to create local jobs, a commercial centre or public ameni-
ties, ensuring that this would become a major poverty trap. The current population is
well over 400,000, with high levels of food insecurity, hardship, crime and informal
housing. High transport costs and arduous journeys add to the burden people face in
accessing jobs elsewhere in the city.
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Fig. 4.1 Cape Town’s uneven development. Source David Daniels conference presentation, April
1993
The stark challenge facing the post-apartheid government was illustrated by a
map used by a senior planner from the city during a presentation in 1993 (Fig. 4.1).
It shows the skewed concentration of opportunities in the historic core, with over
80% of all the jobs in the city, despite housing only 37% of the population. The
Cape Flats is portrayed as a desert, with black communities locked out of job-rich
locations and suburbs with good schools and quality services. The four arrows are
poignantly unidirectional, indicating the imperative for the democratic government
to enable Cape Flats residents to access the resources in the core. There is no hint of
potential resistance from the suburbs to a more inclusive, integrated city. The other
telling feature is the label pointing to the priority investment needs of the Cape Flats
for economic and human development.
4.2.2 Market-Led Development: 1990s–2020
In practice, the post-apartheid government did not address the distorted form of SA
cities with much determination. Apartheid legislation was withdrawn and institu-
tions reorganised, but there wasn’t an equivalent commitment to push through a
new vision for integrated cities. One reason was the stagnant economy following
international sanctions and the turmoil of the transition. So the resources—public
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or private—weren’t readily available to invest in major public infrastructure and
catalytic projects for urban restructuring. The victorious political party was an
amalgam of ideologies, and the government—a compromise of different interests.
The general mood and leadership disposition were towards reconciliation rather than
retribution or restitution. Many progressive policies were approved, but not matched
by concrete action (Statistics SA 2019). Institutional practices were often conserva-
tive and poorly coordinated across government, and bureaucratic inertia prevailed
over calls for transformation.
The new generation of local political leaders lacked experience to formulate a
coherent response to their divided cities and towns, and to challenge vested interests.
There was an implicit political settlement with white middle- and upper-class house-
holds not to disrupt their lifestyles if they accepted democratic rule and continued to
pay their taxes. The end of apartheid also coincided with a broader global ideological
shift away from planning and state intervention towards the market and a lean state.
This further discredited the spatial planning profession (already tainted from its role
under apartheid) and creative thinking around urban compaction and integration.
Private investors and developers had a relatively free hand to do as they pleased.
They could deliver tangible products and jobs, so decision-makers supported almost
any kind of property development. Parliament passed the Development Facilitation
Act that streamlined regulatory procedures and enabled municipal objections to be
bypassed. Many conventional free-standing houses, shopping malls and business
complexes were built at low densities in the suburbs and beyond (Turok et al. 2019).
They were targeted at the (white and coloured) upper and middle classes, because
demand was strong from the increase in white-collar workers, managers, public
officials and professionals, supported by bank lending. Some took the form of gated
estates and elite enclaves with privatised security arrangements to restrict access to
ordinary citizens.
The private sector built about 10,000 housing units a year in Cape Town during
the late 1990s and 2000s. The economic slowdown from 2008 onwards reduced this
by a third. These suburban developments contradicted the new municipal spatial
plans that envisaged densification, infill development and mixed land-uses so as
to encourage urban integration, more efficient land use and better access to public
transport for workers from the townships (City of Cape Town 2018). But there was no
political appetite to negotiate concessions from developers, who naturally focused
on unencumbered greenfield sites: “there continues to be sprawling development
towards the edge of the city” (City of Cape Town 2018, p. 217). Key locations
included the northern suburbs, west coast, Kuils River and Mitchells Plain, with
smaller pockets in the southern suburbs and Somerset West. The public sector often
had to fund the infrastructure, even though developers profited from the uplift in land
values. The outward drift diverted public investment from upgrading and intensifying
underperforming industrial and residential areas surrounding the central city.
A distinctive feature of Cape Town is the strength of the CBD as the principal
economic node with approximately 200,000 jobs. Other SA cities have experienced
an exodus of property investors and occupiers to satellite centres in the suburbs (Turok
et al. 2019). Institutional property owners took early action in partnership with the
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municipality to prevent ‘crime and grime’ from causing business relocations. The
unique qualities of the City Bowl foster a mixture of diverse activities—tourism,
leisure, business and professional services, government functions and higher educa-
tion—that feed off each other to spur growth and investment. This has coincided with
a shift in fashionwithin the housingmarket towards apartments in well-located, well-
managed areas. The city’s historic core has been the biggest beneficiary. Figure 4.2
shows the concentration of apartments in and around the CBD, followed by the
main transport corridors in the southern and northern suburbs. The distribution of
free-standing houses is quite different.
Yet, the commercial success of the CBDhas inflated property prices and promoted
gentrification in surrounding working-class districts, causing the displacement of
poorer households. The shortage of affordable housing forces clerical and hospitality
workers, shop assistants, security staff and cleaners to undertake lengthy commutes
from the townships. Meanwhile, the transformation of Johannesburg and other city
centres has improved access to jobs and low-income housing for black working-class
communities. A final point is that across all of Cape Town’s economic nodes, the
growth in labour demand and earnings has not been sufficient among lower ranking
occupations to lift these groups out of poverty, to narrow the income distribution or
Fig. 4.2 Different housing types, 2011. Source Census 2011, small area layer
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to encourage private housing developers to broaden their product range to meet the
majority’s needs for affordable accommodation.
4.2.3 State-Led Housing: 1990s–2020
The government has acted with unusual resolve to provide housing directly, using
fully subsidised contractors. Apartheid denied blacks the right to own property in
the cities and stopped building them houses to discourage urbanisation. This caused
serious overcrowding and gave rise to many squatter settlements. The 1994 govern-
ment saw decent housing as the key to reducing squalor and restoring dignity and
respect. Housing was treated as part of a ‘social wage’, along with welfare grants
and free basic services. Households below a certain income were promised a free
housing unit on its own small plot.
Direct state provision gave the government control over the quantity of housing
it could deliver, without relying on the vagaries of private developers. Ambitious
targets were set and broadly met. About 5,000 government houses have been built in
Cape Town every year since the early 2000s, amounting to a quarter of all housing
supplied, and almost half of the formal supply (City of Cape Town 2018). This could
have changed the city’s physical growth pattern if it was carefully targeted.
There have been undoubted benefits for households moving out of shacks or
overcrowded family homes through improved privacy, protection from the weather,
internal services, children’s safety and an asset for security. However, the state has
borne the full cost, letting the banks and private developers off the hook.Most houses
have been built on the outskirts to economise on the land. Large greenfield sites have
enabled mass construction of standardised units. A separate production process for
private sector housing has kept the occupiers far apart. This has avoided NIMBY
resistance, but contradicts the goal of racial diversity and integration.
Most government housing in Cape Town has been built around the periphery, in
Delft, Khayelitsha,Mitchells Plain, Kraaifontein and SomersetWest. This is far from
jobs, good schools, training colleges and other opportunities for advancement. The
municipality estimates that poor households spend up to 40% of their disposable
income travelling to work, which “inhibits upward socio-economic mobility and
deepens household dependency. These features are common to many SA cities but
tend to be more acute in Cape Town” (City of Cape Town 2018, p. 215). Many
households are trapped in marginal locations because they are not allowed to sell
their homes for eight years and have not received their title deeds (Turok 2016).
Many build shacks in their backyards to generate rental income (Scheba and Turok
2020). Their concentration on the Cape Flats is shown in green in Fig. 4.2.
A National Treasury review concluded that housing policy: “reinforces the legacy
of apartheid and relegates the poor to areas that are far from economic opportu-
nity” (GTAC 2016, p. 1). There is public land available within Cape Town’s historic
core that could be developed for affordable housing. Some are large parcels that
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could accommodate tens of thousands of dwellings, including Culemborg, Yster-
plaat, Wingfield, Youngsfield and Denel. There has been insufficient determination
to release these strategic assets in the public interest (Turok 2016). Civic activists
have begun to target empty buildings, golf courses and undeveloped land to protest
at the inertia (Turok et al. 2019).
4.3 Inequality in the Labour Market
4.3.1 Data and Methods
The labour market has a major influence on housing patterns. Employment and
occupation data were drawn from the 2001 and 2011 Censuses—the most accurate
and most recent source of neighbourhood information. Occupations were coded
according to the SA Standard Classification of Occupations (SASCO).2
The municipal boundary is used to define the extent of Cape Town. This approx-
imates to the functional labour market area because it includes settlements beyond
the continuous built-up area. This reflects the political imperative post-apartheid
to incorporate outlying suburbs, commuter belts and dormitory townships with the
core city in order to permit effective strategic planning and resource redistribution
(‘one city, one tax base’). A minor technical issue is that some enumeration areas
shifted between years, so the internal configuration of maps between 2001 and 2011
is slightly different if one looks at specific sub-places very closely. This doesn’t
affect broad spatial trends. A few sparsely populated sub-places were excluded from
the analysis, taking the number of sub-places to 858 in 2011.3 Sub-places range in
geographical size with larger, more sparsely populated sub-places generally located
on the periphery. The median population in 2011 was 10,140 persons and the median
area was 0.542 km2.
4.3.2 Occupational Structure
The growth rate and structure of a city’s economy determine the demand for labour,
and therefore the occupations of the local workforce. This includes the distribution
2Detailed occupation data for Census 2011 was released in late 2017, thoroughly cleaned with no
incomplete information. The occupation data for 2001 included 7% of all responses as ‘undeter-
mined’. The effect of such differences in data management between the Censuses is unclear. The
problem is fairly common in analysing cross-sectional household data which spans lengthy periods.
We omit undetermined responses for greater consistency between years when estimating the results
in the figures and tables that follow.
3Sub-places with less than 10 economically active persons are arguably too small for a sensible
classification by occupation and hence were omitted.
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of income, job security, ability to obtain home loans, and therefore the demand for
housing. SA has a very dispersed occupational structure with a very wide range of
earnings (Statistics SA 2019). Highly qualified people in high-status jobs command
a sizeable premium over those with fewer skills in lower ranking positions.
Table 4.1 and Fig. 4.3 show the broad occupational changes inCapeTownbetween
2001 and 2011. The ranking classifies almost a fifth of all jobs in the ‘top’ occupa-
tional category. This assessment is very similar to the World Bank’s (2018b). They
add that the top skill quintile earns almost five times as much as low-skilled workers.
This is a powerful driver of unequal demand for housing and attractive neighbour-
hoods in the city. Real wage growth in SA has been skewed towards high skills over
the past two decades (Statistics SA 2019; World Bank 2018a). This has widened
income inequality and is bound to have affected spatial divides within cities.
Table 4.1 also indicates sizeable growth in the number of workers in the top occu-
pations between 2001 and 2011. This reflected very strong growth among legislators,
senior officials andmanagers (their numbers more than doubled), and weaker growth
among professionals. A similar pattern is evident in Johannesburg. It is striking that
the rate of increase in senior officials and managers was faster than for any other
Table 4.1 Changes in the occupation structure of Cape Town, 2001–2011
Major occupation
group




65,901 149,445 83,544 127




100,638 136,224 35,586 35




107,380 223,591 116,211 108
Skilled agricultural
and fishery workers
8,191 10,344 2,153 26
Craft and related
trades workers
110,918 154,238 43,320 39
Bottom Plant and machine
operators and
assemblers
75,086 65,523 −9,563 −13
Elementary
occupations
188,842 281,608 92,766 49
Undetermined 66,815 0
Total 939,001 1,320,467 381,466 41
Source Census 2001 and 2011; authors’ own estimates



















0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2011
2001











Fig. 4.3 Changes in the share of occupations in Cape Town, 2001–2011. Source Census 2001 and
2011; authors’ own estimates
occupation. It was partly a reflection of strong growth in the public sector during
this period, as the administration expanded alongside demands for additional service
delivery from an enlarged local population.
Table 4.1 also shows the strong growth in mid/low-level service occupations,
including retail sales, wholesale and hospitality, which offer limited opportunities
for progression into better-paid jobs. The only job losses were among plant and
machinery operators and assemblers, reflecting the impact of deindustrialisation.
Manual jobs in manufacturing have conventionally provided important routes out of
poverty for working-class communities. Jobs in elementary occupations (including
security staff and domestic workers) increased slightly faster than the average. They
tend to be low paid and offer poor prospects for advancement. Table 4.1 provides
some evidence of labour market polarisation, with the strongest growth among high-
and low-skilled occupations. The rate of unemployment (narrowly defined) remained
close to 25% over the period (World Bank 2018b). Low paid and unemployed groups
invariably struggle to compete in the housing market and end up in unsatisfactory
and informal accommodation, unless they can get government housing.
SA’s economy experienced moderate growth during the 2000s, but it has faltered
since the 2008 global recession. Total employment in Cape Town increased from
939,000 in 2001 to 1,320,000 in 2011. This partly reflected population growth and
the demand for additional consumer goods and services, along with extra public
services. Growth in tradable goods and services (arguably more productive sectors)
was weaker. So, Cape Town’s compound annual employment growth rate was 3.5%,
compared with Johannesburg’s 4.8%.
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4.3.3 Index of Dissimilarity
An important question arising from a city’s occupational profile is how directly this
translates into residential patterns of social privilege and disadvantage. A city with a
polarised labour market will not be highly segregated if many of its neighbourhoods
are socially mixed. Table 4.2 presents the dissimilarity index (DI), which captures
the degree of residential segregation between occupations in 2001 and 2011. The
cells in the bottom-left part of the table show the DI values for 2001 and the cells
in the top right show the values for 2011. The estimates include a category for the
unemployed, because the sheer scale of joblessness cannot be ignored. However, the
unemployed are excluded in the subsequent figures and tables as well as in the DI
values for the top, middle and bottom occupations in Table 4.2. The Johannesburg
chapter follows the same approach.
Table 4.2 reveals that Cape Town was extremely spatially divided by occupation
in 2001. The DI values imply that 67% of residents in the top occupations in 2001
would have had to move in order to achieve an even distribution of top and bottom
occupations across the city. The equivalent number in Johannesburg was only 48%.
This is a huge difference between the two cities, with Cape Town far more socially
segregated than Johannesburg. Cape Town’s polarised labour market was matched
by a partitioned city with the social make-up of different neighbourhoods being quite
distinctive.
Table 4.2 Indices of dissimilarity (multiplied by 100) between major occupations in Cape Town,
2001–2011*
DI 2011





MN 16 21 24 36 38 44 51 53 63
PRO 15 27 32 44 45 52 59 60 69
TEC 22 28 13 26 30 34 39 45 56
CLE 33 40 16 22 25 27 33 41 51
SER 38 43 25 23 29 16 25 22 36
AGR 62 66 55 53 40 28 32 38 48
CRA 55 60 40 30 25 41 17 20 31
MC 64 69 49 39 33 48 17 27 34
ELE 65 69 54 47 32 34 26 30 25




Notes *MN Managers; PRO Professionals; TEC Technicians; CLE Clerks; SER Service and sales
workers; AGR Skilled agricultural workers; CRA Crafts and related trade workers; MC Plant and
machine operators; ELE Elementary occupations
Source Census 2001 and 2011; authors’ own estimates
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Table 4.2 shows that professionals were the most segregated group, and consis-
tentlymore so than senior officials andmanagers. The same applied in Johannesburg,
albeit not to the same extent. Furthermore, the difference between top and middle
occupations was larger than the gap between middle and bottom occupations in both
cities in 2001. Therefore, the high-status groups tended to be separated off in enclaves
from everyone else, rather than the low-income groups. Among the low-status cate-
gories, unemployed people were consistently more segregated from other groups
than anyone else. They were more likely to be confined to settlements with other
unemployed people. This is unsurprising considering their weak economic position,
as explained above.
An important and original finding from Table 4.2 is that the level of segregation
in Cape Town appears to have declined between 2001 and 2011. By 2011, the DI
values imply that 55% of residents in the top occupations would have had to move
to eliminate segregation—a big reduction over the decade from 67% in 2001. The
apparent desegregation occurred across the board. It was not confined to particular
occupations. This is surprising considering that the labour market seemed to become
more polarised. A steep house price gradient also made it difficult for lower income
groups to move into more desirable suburbs. Johannesburg’s DI score between top
and bottom occupations was 47% in 2011, so the level of segregation hardly changed.
Summing up, there was noticeable desegregation in Cape Town during the 2000s,
although it remained more segregated than Johannesburg. The two cities seem to
have experienced quite different tendencies.
High but falling levels of segregation in Cape Town are borne out upon closer
inspection of the DI scores in Table 4.2. The residential difference between pairs of
occupations diminished in almost every case. Further evidence is available in most of
the maps shown below. The desegregation trend appears to be consistently stronger
than in Johannesburg. The veracity and reasons for this need further investigation.
Assuming it is correct, part of the explanation may be that Cape Town was much
more segregated to begin with, so there has been a degree of ‘catch-up’ underway.
4.4 Socio-economic Segregation
4.4.1 Occupational Location Quotients
Initial evidence of spatial segregation from the DI matrix in Table 4.2 is carried
forward into maps of location quotients (LQ) for the top and bottom occupations
in Figs. 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. Sub-places within Cape Town with a LQ score
above (below) 1 highlight where an occupation was over-(under-)represented. For
example, a LQ score of 2.5 implies that an occupation was 2.5 times more concen-
trated in that particular sub-place compared to the city-wide average. Hence, areas
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Fig. 4.4 Location quotient of top occupations in Cape Town, 2001–2011. Source Census 2001 and
2011; authors’ own estimates
Fig. 4.5 Location quotient of bottom occupations in Cape Town, 2001–2011. Source Census 2001
and 2011; authors’ own estimates
shaded dark orange and red (LQ > 2) on the map highlight where there is a dispro-
portionate concentration of those occupations, whereas areas shaded blue reflect
under-representation (LQ < 0.5).
Figure 4.4 shows how individuals in top occupations (i.e. managers and profes-
sionals) were clustered within neighbourhoods in Cape Town’s historic core and
suburban corridors. In 2001, this included almost all the Southern Suburbs, most of
the City Bowl, the Atlantic Seaboard and the Northern Suburbs. Other important
nodes included Somerset West in the south-east, and Milnerton and Bloubergstrand
along the West Coast. All these areas remained affluent in 2011, although the degree
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of concentration of top occupations diminished, i.e. changing from mostly red in
2001 (LQ > 3) to orange in 2011 (LQ > 2). A few adjacent areas also seemed to
increase their share of people in top occupations (especially in the Northern Suburbs
and Helderberg).
It could be that the strong increase in people in senior positions (shown in
Table 4.1) contributed to the spatial deconcentration by spreading into surrounding
neighbourhoods. This could have been prompted by shortages of the existing stock
and restrictions on new house-building in well-off areas, perhaps reflecting higher
land prices, NIMBY resistance or locals displaced by international buyers. Obtaining
planning approval in the southern suburbs, City Bowl and Atlantic Seaboard is noto-
riously difficult. Another explanation could be that affluent households moved out of
older, detachedproperties in neighbourhoods showing signs of decay and intomodern
properties, gated communities or apartments elsewhere. If they were replaced by
households with slightly lower incomes, this would contribute to the spatial decon-
centration of the rich. Neighbourhoods in the south such as Wynberg, Muizenberg
and Mowbray, and the Voortrekker Road corridor in the north, have experienced
such changes in recent years. This could coincide with life cycle changes, such as
older people moving into flats when their children leave home and being replaced
by younger families.
Workers in less-skilled occupations tended to live in peripheral locations. Clusters
of blue-collar workers dominated townships on the Cape Flats, along with some
smaller settlements to the north of the city. Low-skilled groups seem less concentrated
than high-status occupations, with LQs all below 2.5. This is partly because there are
simply more of them, so they cannot be so physically concentrated. In addition, the
number of low-skilled workers living in the vicinity of affluent suburbs has increased
where informal settlements or townships exist nearby, such as Imizamo Yethu and
Hangberg near Hout Bay, Masiphumelele and Ocean View near Sun Valley, and
Dunoon and Joe Slovo Park near Milnerton. There are not many of these settlements,
so demand to live in them is high because of their access to suburban jobs. Domestic
workers, gardeners and security guards living in their own quarters on the sites of
affluent households could also increase low-wage workers in the suburbs. Of course,
the co-existence of different income groups in the same sub-places does not mean
much actual social mixing or integration occurs.
4.4.2 Socio-economic Status
The concentration of people in the top, middle and bottom occupations can be used
to rank neighbourhoods according to their socio-economic status (SES). Our SES
ranking is based on the proportion of individuals in each category and follows a
similar approach to the Johannesburg chapter. Figure 4.6 divides the city into sub-
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Fig. 4.6 Socio-economic status of neighbourhoods in Cape Town, 2001–2011. SourceCensus 2001
and 2011; authors’ own estimates
places with a high, high-middle, middle, low-middle or low SES.4 Polarised SES is
a residual category with considerable socio-economic mix.
Figure 4.6 confirms the highly segregated character of Cape Town, with a stark
divide between the historic core and the Cape Flats. The status of most neighbour-
hoods appears to have been stable over time, with two exceptions. First, some parts
of the Cape Flats changed from low to low-middle SES, or from low-middle to
middle SES. Examples are Pelican Park, Blue Downs and Mitchells Plain. This
appears to have come about partly through new housing schemes, both private and
government-subsidised. Other heavily populated places remained as low SES, partic-
ularlyKhayelitsha, Philippi andDelft. Second, selected parts of the Southern Suburbs
apparently shifted from high to low or polarised SES. The extent of this phenomenon
seems to be overstated on the map by the inclusion of sparsely populated sub-places
around the mountain and by the strong growth of a few informal settlements and
townships, as mentioned above.
The earlier discussion of Fig. 4.4 suggested that people in high ranking occupa-
tions became slightly more dispersed in 2011 than in 2001. This is less apparent
when SES is considered (Fig. 4.6). It seems that the status of the most prestigious
neighbourhoods was not diminished, even if the gap with other parts of the city did
narrow slightly.
Very few areas had a polarised SES. They included agricultural areas east of
Helderberg and the Groot Constantia Wine Estate in the Southern Suburbs. There
is little or no actual residential mixing in these places. Segregation prevails through
4SES categories were defined as follows: High SES (top >= 40%; middle <= 60%; bottom <=
20%), High-middle SES (top >= 25%; middle >= 25%; bottom <= 25%), Middle SES (top <=
35%; middle >= 50%; bottom <= 35%), Low-middle SES (top <= 25%; middle >= 25%; bottom
>= 25%) and LowSES (top <= 20%;middle <= 60%; bottom>= 40%). Polarised SES is a residual
category.
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gated communities for the rich and housing compounds and informal settlements for
farm workers. Poor communities here may live closer to affluent residents than in
most suburbs, but they are kept apart by high walls and access controls.
4.4.3 Distribution of the Top Socio-economic Group
Figure 4.7 shows the absolute size and concentration of people working in well-off
occupations across the city. Sub-places were divided into five quintiles depending on
their share of individuals in the top occupational category. In 2001, the top 2% of sub-
places with the highest concentrations of managers and professionals contained 20%
of this group. This included a sizeable cluster in the Southern Suburbs (Rondebosch,
Newlands, Claremont and Wynberg), a few neighbourhoods around the City Bowl
(Gardens and Sea Point) and theNorthern Suburbs (Pinelands, Edgemead, Tableview
and Durbanville). The pattern was very similar in 2011, although it increased slightly
to 2.5% of all sub-places, including affluent neighbourhoods in Hout Bay, Milnerton
and Brackenfell.
A big contrast with Johannesburg is the CBD. Cape Town’s City Bowl has become
an increasingly desirable residential location for high income earners, as explained
earlier. Its diverse amenities and growing traffic congestion for suburban commuters
have added to its attractions as a place to live, work, study, visit and play (Turok et al.
2019).
Changes in the distribution of sub-places in the second and third quintiles were
more noticeable. Several areas in the Cape Flats (such asMitchells Plain) and around
Somerset West seem to have moved up in status. Casual observation suggests that
this could be linkedwith gradual upgrading of selected neighbourhoods in the former
Fig. 4.7 The concentration of the top socio-economic group in Cape Town, 2001–2011. Source
Census 2001 and 2011; authors’ own estimates
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and new private housing in the latter. A few large sub-places on the city’s northern
periphery also raised their status. This has a visible effect on the maps, but the real
impact is quite limited because most areas were very sparsely populated in 2001
and a few middle income housing projects and wine farms that opened during the
following decade could have had this effect.
4.5 Conclusion
Cape Town remains sharply divided by socio-economic status. Social inequalities
continue to be aligned with race, although the causes have shifted from apartheid
controls to the economy and labour market. The scale and nature of employment
growth have not been sufficient to lift many people out of poverty and into better-off
social strata. Geography reinforces social divides through the gulf in opportunities
available to residents of different neighbourhoods. Townships on the Cape Flats are
literally worlds’ apart from the southern and northern suburbs, where the contours
of affluence remain the same.
Despite the economic, social and spatial barriers to change, there appears to have
been a noticeable reduction in the degree of segregation between 2001 and 2011. This
is more substantial than in Johannesburg. The index of dissimilarity and location
quotients both indicate that the extent of socio-economic segregation diminished.
On the one hand, it appears that the concentration of top occupational groups was
somewhat diluted as some of them spread out into surrounding neighbourhoods. On
the other hand, a number of lower income neighbourhoods seemed to move up in
status.
It is important to validate this analysis with further investigation. Other economic
and social trends suggest increasingpolarisation and a steeper social gradient between
the suburbs and townships, yet the statistical analysis presented here indicates a
narrowing of the gap. It is unclear whether the decline in segregation is a real
phenomenon, or more of a construct arising from the indicators and spatial units
used to measure it. The apparent desegregation needs additional analysis, including
the application of different socio-economic indicators and the use of different sized
spatial units. Drilling deeper should help to identifywhich neighbourhoods and social
groups have been most affected, and by how much conditions have changed.
In addition, it is vital to improve understanding of the reasons for these shifts and
the detailedmechanisms involved. Research and policy concerned with spatial segre-
gation tend to focus on changes in land-use and the built environment, particularly
the housing stock. This is highly visible and relatively easily measured. The assump-
tion is that new housing developments are the main driver of change. Sometimes
this is extended to include the conversion, upgrading, extension or redevelopment of
existing buildings, in recognition that the social make-up and number of households
in a neighbourhood are affected by in situ property dynamics and not simply new
greenfield investments.
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This analysis is important and needs to be extended to investigate the less
visible social processes underway within and between neighbourhoods, including
detailed forms of householdmovement, household formation and in situ occupational
mobility, upwards and downwards. Unfortunately, the information available on these
trends is limited. Changing patterns of segregation are bound to be the outcome of
a complex interplay between alterations to the built environment and intricate social
shifts. For example, new house-building may set in train long filtering chains that
affect multiple households and neighbourhoods in unexpected ways. A better grasp
of these dynamics is essential for more effective policies to tackle spatial divides.
There are few more important research agendas in SA today.
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Chapter 5
Income Inequality and Socio-economic
Segregation in the City of Johannesburg
Richard Ballard and Christian Hamann
Abstract This chapter analyses income inequality and socio-economic segregation
in South Africa’s most populous city, Johannesburg. The end of apartheid’s segre-
gation in 1991 has been followed by both continuity and change of urban spatial
patterns. There is a considerable literature on the transformation of inner-city areas
from white to black, and of the steady diffusion of black middle-class residents
into once ‘white’ suburbs. There has been less analysis on the nature and pace of
socio-economic mixing. Four key findings from this chapter are as follows. First,
dissimilarity indices show that bottom occupation categories and the unemployed
are highly segregated from top occupation categories, but that the degree of segre-
gation has decreased slightly between the censuses of 2001 and 2011. Second, the
data quantifies the way in which Johannesburg’s large population of unemployed
people are more segregated from top occupations than any of the other employment
categories, although unemployed people are less segregated from bottom occupa-
tions. Third, over the same period, residents employed in bottom occupations are less
likely to be represented in affluent former white suburbs. This seemingly paradoxical
finding is likely to have resulted from fewer affluent households accommodating their
domestic workers on their properties. Fourth, although most post-apartheid public
housing projects have not disrupted patterns of socio-economic segregation, some
important exceptions do show the enormous capacity of public housing to transform
the spatial structure of the city.
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5.1 Introduction
The City of Johannesburg is the largest of eight metropolitan municipalities in South
Africa with respect to population size and economy. It sits within a broader city-
region of 15 million people in the province of Gauteng, including the metropolitan
municipalities of Tshwane to the north and Ekurhuleni to the east. The municipal
jurisdiction of Johannesburg measures 1,648 km2 and includes urban, peri-urban and
agricultural land uses. The population of Johannesburg grew by about 3% per annum
between the 2001 and 2011 national census counts (from 3.2 to 4.4 million people).
In line with national population composition, the majority of Johannesburg’s popula-
tion is black1 (78%). The second-largest population group, whites, constituted 12%
of Johannesburg in 2011. Indians and Coloureds2 make up 6% and 4% of popula-
tion, respectively. Education outcomes are improving; for example, the proportion of
adults who have not been to school has fallen between 2001 and 2011 and the propor-
tion of adults with tertiary education has increased. The average annual household
income in Johannesburg (adjusted for inflation) increased by 2% per annum between
2001 and 2011 (Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) 2012a), but increases are highly
uneven between population groups and across space.
Johannesburg was subject to intensive social and spatial engineering since its
origins as a gold mining town in 1886. Given the emphasis that apartheid (1948–
1994) placed on racial segregation, many analyses of spatial transformation in Johan-
nesburg have focused on the endurance or breakdown of racial segregation (Beavon
2004; Christopher 1994; Crankshaw 2008). This chapter examines residential segre-
gation between socio-economic groups rather than the more familiar focus on racial
segregation. In doing so, we do not seek to claim any primacy of socio-economic
segregation, but rather to consider the relationship between various kinds of social
and spatial stratifications and the drivers of dominant residential patterns. In fact, it is
not possible to separate social and spatial inequalities from each other or from racial
segregation in the South African context. In the post-apartheid era, legal drivers of
racial segregation have been abolished, but actual patterns of racial segregation are
slow to change precisely because of various forms of socio-economic segregation
and stratification. Furthermore, even where racial desegregation does occur, these
processes do not necessarily disrupt socio-economic segregation.
1Statistics SouthAfrica records data against fourmain population groups. Respondents self-identify
as black, coloured, Indian/Asian or white.
2Whereas the term coloured in North America is a dated synonym for African Americans, in
Southern Africa the meaning is quite different. It came to refer to mixed ancestry populations who
were (in Apartheid’s convoluted racial classifications) neither European (white) nor bantu (black),
although they could have a heritage of both.
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5.2 Drivers of Dominant Residential Patterns
5.2.1 Racial Segregation
Johannesburg is a city of extremes, with densely populated working class townships3
(such as Diepsloot, Alexandra, Soweto and Orange Farm) juxtaposed against some
of the richest neighbourhoods in Africa (Sandton and surrounding areas). Although
apartheid formally ended in 1994, a century of white minority rule continues to
affect many urban patterns. Apartheid’s policies of racial segregation resulted in the
division of residential areas between four different race groups: black, white, Indian
and coloured. This shaped where new migrants to cities could settle and whether
people could migrate to cities at all (many black people were forced to stay in rural
‘homelands’). These policies also caused the relocation of large numbers of estab-
lished urban residents. In the 1950s, for example, about 72,000 black people were
moved from established areas of Johannesburg to the new settlement of Soweto on
the south-western periphery of the city (Christopher 1994). Notwithstanding deseg-
regation inmany Johannesburg suburbs since the fall of apartheid, the overall popula-
tion distribution and associated socio-economic patterns are tenacious (Fig. 5.1). By
2019, Soweto contained about 1.8 million people or a third of the city’s population
(Quantec 2018). Soweto, along with other townships, remains almost entirely black
and poor relative to northern suburbs.
During the apartheid era, the white minority government tried to create a strong
overlap between race, socio-economic status and space. Until 1980, better paying job
categories were mostly reserved for whites, resulting in an income ceiling for black
employees. Much more was spent on the education of white children than of other
city dwellers (Seekings andNastrass 2005). Until the 1980s, most black people could
not own property in urban areas, including the homes they lived in. These and many
other policies ensured that spaces intended for black residents were also working-
class spaces, with their residents having less capacity to earn and acquire assets than
white residents of white-designated areas. As a result, there has been considerable
inertia to these patterns beyond the repeal of discriminatory policies in the 1980s
and early 1990s. Nowadays, black residents are no longer prohibited by law from
living in former white suburbs. However, poorer residents of the city are financially
excluded frommore expensive areas. Since low-income earners are overwhelmingly
black, and since expensive areas are often those that were historically designated for
white use, some of apartheid’s patterns continue.
Since the end of apartheid, some kinds of urban growth have produced entirely
new black working-class settlements or have extended or intensified longer estab-
lished townships. With racialized restrictions of urbanisation being lifted in 1986,
a period of catch-up urbanisation saw many people migrate from rural areas and
3The common name for settlements established under apartheid for black residents, although
Diepsloot and Orange Farm began much later than the others and are largely post-apartheid
settlements.
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Fig. 5.1 The City of Johannesburg: Distribution of population groups (left) and the distributions of
commercial and industrial buildings and gated communities (right). Data sources StatsSA (2011a,
b), AfriGIS (2013), GeoTerraImage (2016)
smaller towns to larger cities (Turok 2014). Existing townships densified primarily
because established residents living there built additional informal structures on their
properties for rent. Some migrants settled in informal settlements, often alongside
existing townships, or in entirely new settlements such asOrangeFarmandDiepsloot.
These relatively new settlements now contain hundreds of thousands of overwhelm-
ingly black low-income earners. Since major economic opportunities are located in
central areas (Fig. 5.1), large flows of commuters travel from these dormitory spaces
to places of employment each day (Budlender and Royston 2016; Mohulatsi 2019).
It is important to qualify this impression of townships in two respects. First,
apartheid-era townships do include some middle-class areas and some townships
are better off than others. Therefore, although they do not exhibit racial diversity,
townships have a socio-economicmixwithin and between them. Second, the apparent
lack of ethnic diversity in ‘black’ areas is misleading in that these are extremely
cosmopolitan spaces with a diversity of languages and nationalities (Hamann and
Ballard 2017).
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5.2.2 Housing
Since the end of apartheid, the state has built new settlements as a way of addressing
the housing demand. Households earning below R3,500 per month ($241 in March
2019 prices) qualify for government housing. This often takes the form of a detached
two-room ‘low-cost house’. In the first two decades of democracy, the state delivered
about 3.7million of these houses nationally4 (The Presidency 2014).With an ongoing
flowof newmigrants to cities, and the division of households into smaller sizes, many
people who qualify to be given government houses have yet to receive them. Others
do not qualify because they earn above the threshold or are migrants from other
countries. As a result, 18% of dwellings in the province are informal dwellings, and
a further 24% are unplanned-for backyard structures (Hamann 2018).
Although there have been instances of urban infill projects that break up apartheid
patterns, both in terms of race and class, most government-provided housing has
not done this (Charlton 2014). In 2013, the Johannesburg municipal government
launched a programme called Corridors of Freedom which intends to densify and
diversify residential neighbourhoods along Bus Rapid Transit routes, although this
has yet to have a major impact (Ballard et al. 2017). Other housing projects involve
upgrading settlements by clearing existing informal settlements and rehousing some
of the residents in formal accommodation on the same site or elsewhere. However,
the most common form of government-funded housing has been the development
of new greenfield settlements with hundreds or thousands of units. Concerns that
this approach will produce homogenous low-cost settlements, and therefore perpet-
uate segregation, resulted in a policy change in 2004 that promoted settlements
with a higher mix of housing types, including fully subsidised, partially subsidised,
and private (mortgage funded) homes (Department of Human Settlements 2004).
A prominent example of this new generation of ‘human settlements’ is a 12,500-
unit settlement called Cosmo City on the north-western boundary of Johannesburg
(Haferburg 2013).
While such settlements focus on social mixing, they do not achieve racial diversity
as they are almost entirely black, given the nature of the housing backlog produced by
apartheid. Such settlements do achieve some income mixing to a certain level, albeit
with small-scale segregation between different kinds of housing within a settlement.
However, the upper range of income in such settlements does not overlap substantially
with the income ranges of more affluent suburbs. In 2014, the state announced plans
to fund many more large-scale settlements of this kind, and given the shortage of
land in established urban areas, they would likely occur on peripheral greenfield sites
(Ballard and Rubin 2017). Private developers are also building low-density suburbs
on cheap peripheral land for entry-level black home buyers (Butcher 2016).
Some apartheid spaces were comprehensively transformed, such as inner-city
tower blocks and many low-rise central neighbourhoods. These areas were once
reserved for white residents but became racially mixed in the 1980s and then became
4Housing delivery figures were not available at the city level.
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primarily black by the 1990s. The white residents that had once lived in inner-
city areas left because they were following work and lifestyle opportunities in the
North, and also because of what they regarded as undesirable changes to inner-city
neighbourhoods (Beavon 2004). Some buildings were abandoned by owners and
occupied by economicallymarginal residents.As a result, conditions deteriorated, not
least because electricity, water and sewerage were cut off when municipal accounts
were no longer being paid (Murray 2008). Since the 2000s, developers began refitting
some inner-city buildings for highly controlled working-class rental accommodation
(Mosselson 2017). These spaces are diverse in terms of language, ethnicity and
nationality if not race (almost all residents are black). In terms of class, inner-city
areas are a mix of lower- and middle-class residents.
5.2.3 Suburbs
As noted above, suburbs with more affordable housing stock, like those close to
the inner-city, experienced complete transitions from majority white to majority
black populations. The activity of slumlords in some parts of such suburbs has
suppressed their average income by allowing overcrowding of units and by underin-
vesting in general maintenance. Meanwhile, affluent northern suburbs once reserved
for white residents have largely retained their expensive positions in the property
hierarchy. Newer suburban housing stock for the middle- and upper-market tends to
be ‘gated’, ranging from high-end golf estates to more modest ‘townhouse’ clustered
development. This new housing stock is generally built on land adjacent to former
white suburbs, for example, on smallholdings on the northern and western suburban
fringe, but is also inserted into the suburban footprint when large suburban plots are
redeveloped into denser clustered housing (Todes et al. 2017).
Many areas with expensive properties are dominated by white people, given their
stronger buying capacity. However, since the white population only constitutes 12%
of the city, it offers limited demand and there are many black, Indian and coloured
residents with equally significant purchasing power.5 The removal of job reservation
policies and the training of black nurses and teachers created a nascent black middle
class in the 1980s (Crankshaw1997).After the political transition in 1994, the upward
mobility of some of the black population significantly reshaped social and spatial
hierarchies (Seekings and Nastrass 2005; Crankshaw 2008). Those who did not stay
in middle-class parts of townships moved to middle-class areas elsewhere in the city.
As a result, suburbs once designated for white occupation are now some of the most
racially integrated parts of the city. Many new cluster housing developments are also
racially integrated (Chipkin 2012).
5According to the census the white population is ageing. There is also evidence of affluent white
people migrating to Cape Town or even emigrating. Therefore as new professional jobs emerge they
are taken up by individuals from other race groups who can then afford to live in more expensive
suburbs.
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However, these processes of racial diversification within former white suburbs
may be reinforcing broader patterns of socio-economic segregation (Kracker Selzer
andHeller 2010).One analysis shows that the average household income in townships
are not growing as fast as the provincial average, while many affluent areas are
growing at a faster rate (Hamann and Cheruiyot 2017). The transfer of more affluent
residents out of townships and into suburbs may account, in part, for this spatial
divergence of average incomes. Former white suburbs also attract the overwhelming
majority of private commercial and retail investment (Fig. 5.1).
Ironically, former white suburbs have lost a kind of race and class diversity that
was integral to apartheid. Before democracy, many low-income black workers lived
in ‘white’ suburbs as domestic workers on their employers’ properties. Much of this
accommodation has now been converted to rental accommodation (Falkof 2016), and
many new cluster housing developments do not build ‘servants’ quarters’ as would
have once been standard in suburban housing. Domestic workers now aremore likely
to commute from townships. In 2019, the municipality of Johannesburg introduced
an inclusionary housing policy to oblige developers of gated communities, cluster
housing and apartments to incorporate more affordable options in their plans. This
does not apply to the vast number of developments already built or that have already
been given approval, so is yet to have a diversifying effect on the city.
While race and class are being, to some extent, untethered from one another in
patterns of segregation in Johannesburg, it would be too simplistic to say that class is
replacing race, since the historical processes of class formation were so comprehen-
sively racialized. Even to the extent that racial integration is taking place through the
upward mobility of some of the black population, the high levels of socio-economic
inequality raise the important consideration of socio-economic segregation. In this
chapter, we examine inequality and segregation of occupations following the broader
methodologies of this volume in order to generate comparable findings.
5.3 Inequality in Johannesburg
5.3.1 Data Sources
In this chapter, occupation data is presented per sub-place in the City of Johannesburg
for 2001 and 2011, the two most recent census dates. There are 804 sub-places in
Johannesburg. Sub-places with zero population in either 2001 or 2011were excluded
from the analysis along with one other sub-place that is not a contiguous polygon
and is geographically very large. The remaining sub-places vary somewhat in terms
of geographic size but constitute loosely defined functional neighbourhoods. Sub-
places had an average economically active population (i.e. all those aged between
15 and 65 years) of 2,158 people in 2011, ranging from one to 35,949 people. The
major occupation categories, captured in the census by Statistics South Africa (Stats
SA), are shown in Table 5.1. All employed, economically active respondents were
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Table 5.1 Changes in the occupation structure in Johannesburg, 2001–2011
Major occupation
groupa





85,291 179,621 94,330 110.6




104,439 145,056 40,617 38.9




137,764 336,264 198,500 144.1
Skilled agricultural
and fishery workers
5,456 6,650 1,194 21.9
Craft and related
trades workers
117,674 210,206 92,532 78.6
Bottom Plant and machine
operators and
assemblers
71,636 58,563 −13,073 −18.2
Elementary
occupations
218,441 392,740 174 299 79.8
Undeterminedb 77,482 9,560 −67,922 −87.7
Total 1,080,368 1,733,152 652,784 60.4
Data source Quantec (2014, 2016) (Quantec packages and distributes various economic and
demographic datasets in South Africa, including boundary reallocated census data from Stats SA.)
aDefinitions are provided by Stats SA (2012b)
bThe ‘Undetermined’ category was excluded from the totals for the rest of the analysis
asked two questions to determine their occupation—one about the kind of work that
the respondent does and the other about the main task or duty in their daily work
(Stats SA 2011a). These questions were used to code occupations according to the
South African Standard Classification of Occupation (SASCO).
5.3.2 Changes in Occupational Structure
In Johannesburg, the workforce increased by 60% between 2001 and 2011
(Table 5.1). Similar changes are evident in other metropolitan municipalities in
South Africa. Increases are the largest in Johannesburg, followed by the other two
metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng where the workforce increase by 55% and
51% in Tshwane and Ekurhuleni, respectively. In Johannesburg, the biggest change
is seen in the number of people employed as service workers or shop andmarket sales


































MN PRO TEC CLE SER AGR CRA MC ELE
Fig. 5.2 Changes in the share of major occupations in Johannesburg, 2001–2011. Data source
Quantec (2014, 2016)
workers (144% increase). As Beall et al. (2002) note, service sector jobs bifurcate
into well paid and poorly paid. Sellers are likely to be employed in the fast-growing
retail sector but the job opportunities in this sector remain unevenly distributed in
the urban space. Most formal sector retail facilities are in the suburbs north of the
Johannesburg Central Business District (CBD) along with suburban office nodes and
there are proportionally fewer retail and office facilities in townships and the south
of the city (Fig. 5.1; Beavon 2004).
The number of legislators, senior officials and managers also increased signifi-
cantly (by 110%), as a result of the development of various strong business nodes
(like Sandton) and the swelling ranks of the public sector. Changes in the occupa-
tional structure further reflect the decreasing importance of manufacturing, as also
observed in previous studies (Rogerson and Rogerson 2015; Seekings and Nastrass
2005). Plant and machine operators are the only occupational group that declined
(by 18%). However, the number of people employed in elementary occupations
has increased. Taken together, the share of top occupations has remained the same
between 2001 and 2011, while the share of middle occupations increased by 3% and
the share of bottom occupations decreased by 3% (Fig. 5.2). Figure 5.2 also shows
the breakdown of eachmajor occupation and reveals that the share of service workers
increased by 6% while the share of machine operators declined by 4%.
5.3.3 Income Inequality
South Africa’s Gini coefficient during apartheid was estimated to have been between
0.58 and 0.68, making it one of themost unequal countries in the world. According to
Seekings andNastrass (2005: 188) “inequality inSouthAfricawashigher at the endof
the apartheid period than in, even, most other middle-income countries”. Apartheid’s
racialized income distribution continues to influence mean income. Nationally, the
average income of white household heads was 4.8 times the average for black house-
hold heads in 2014–15 (Stats SA 2017). However, the upwardmobility of some of the
black population, particularly since the 1980s, means that inequality was no longer
just driven by differences in income between races, it was increasingly driven by
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intra-racial income inequality. In 2008, Crankshaw predicted that “the major spatial
and class division in the post-Fordist spatial order [of Johannesburg] may become
characterised by a division between a racially desegregated middle class, on the one
hand, and a largely black working class on the other” (Crankshaw 2008: 1695, also
see Beall et al. 2002).
Crucially, unemployment has increased since the mid-1970s, and in the province
of Gauteng, the unemployment rate was 32% during 2011 (Stats SA 2011b). This
is the result of economic restructuring that has followed the exhaustion of gold
mines and the restriction of manufacturing by international competition. We agree
with Seekings and Nastrass (2005) that inequality is no longer just the result of
differences in wages, but also a result of the differences between the employed and
unemployed. It is important to note here that unemployment varies significantly
between population groups. Black people are overrepresented in the ranks of the
unemployed, while white people are underrepresented.
Post-apartheid income inequality has fluctuated. In Johannesburg, a sharp increase
in income inequality was evident between 1995 and 2001 (from 0.54 to 0.58),
followed by minor increases until about 2005 (to 0.6), and decreasing thereafter
to 0.58 in 2014 (Quantec 2015). The trends in Johannesburg are similar to the
national trends, but income inequality in Johannesburg is slightly lower than national
levels. Johannesburg also has lower levels of income inequality than the two adja-
cent metropolitan municipalities. This is influenced, amongst other factors, by the
strong economy of Johannesburg relative to other cities in South Africa and by the
largely urban population. By way of international comparison, income inequality in
Nairobi (Kenya) is 0.59, Sao Paulo (Brazil) is 0.55, Mexico City (Mexico) is 0.49,
and Moscow (Russia) is 0.45 (UN Habitat 2016).
5.4 Socio-economic Segregation in Johannesburg
Trends andpatterns in statistics over timehelp to set the scene for our understandingof
socio-economic inequality, but the spatial dimensions and patterns of these statistics
are valuable in understanding socio-economic segregation. In this section,we provide
various calculations that illustrate socio-economic segregation, mostly between the
top and bottom occupation groups (managers and professionals versusmachine oper-
ators and elementary occupations).Analysing these patterns over time highlights how
the socio-economic structure of Johannesburg has shifted and what prospects there
are for future socio-economic integration.
5.4.1 Dissimilarity Index
We calculated Dissimilarity Index (DI) values (as explained in the introduction of
this book) between all the major occupations as well as the top, middle and bottom
5 Income Inequality and Socio-economic Segregation … 101
Table 5.2 Indices of dissimilarity (multiplied by 100) betweenmajor occupations in Johannesburg,
2001–2011
 DI 2011 





MN   13 26 27 43 37 50 54 44 63       
PRO 12   29 31 47 41 55 59 49 67       
TEC 22 26   12 27 33 35 39 32 46       
CLE 37 41 18   22 31 30 33 28 41       
SER 48 51 32 24   38 18 21 17 28       
AGR 54 56 49 48 44   41 45 39 51       
CRA 58 61 42 31 26 39   15 14 20       
MC 64 67 47 37 31 46 15   21 18       
ELE 42 44 31 30 22 34 21 28   26       
UNE 70 72 53 42 36 50 20 13 33      
TOP                      39 47 
MID                    42   18 
BOT                    48 20   
MN Managers; PRO Professionals; TEC Technicians; CLE Clerks; SER Service and sales workers;
AGR Skilled agricultural workers; CRA Crafts and related trade workers; MC Plant and machine
operators; ELE Elementary occupations; UNE Unemployed
occupation groups (Table 5.2). As an important contextual consideration, we also
included unemployment as an additional DI calculation, but to remain within the
scope of the book we did not further investigate unemployment in the rest of the anal-
ysis. According to the DI values, top-bottom segregation and middle-bottom segre-
gation decreased slightly but top-middle segregation decreased more substantially
(see summary figures in the lower right corner of Table 5.2). Segregation between
most occupations decreased, on average by 5%. The increase in service workers is
clearly associated to lower segregation levels with all other occupations (an average
6% decrease). On the other hand, segregation between managers and elementary
occupations increased slightly (by 2%) and segregation between professional and
elementary occupations increased by 5%.
These indices of dissimilarity between top, middle and bottom occupations are
necessarily for employed people. As Table 5.2 shows, unemployed people are much
more likely to be segregated from top occupations than any of the other occupa-
tions, although even here the degree of segregation between unemployed and top
occupations had decreased slightly by 2011.
5.4.2 Location Quotient
In this section, we analyse the spatial concentration of the top and bottom occupa-
tions by using the location quotient (LQ) measure of segregation (as explained in the
introduction of this book). Figure 5.3 shows that very few sub-places represent situa-
tions where the mix of occupation groups in the sub-place is similar to the mix for the
city as a whole (light grey sub-places). Turquoise-shaded areas in the upper maps of
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Fig. 5.3 Location quotient of top and bottom occupations in Johannesburg, 2001–2011. Data
sources Quantec (2014, 2016)
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Fig. 5.3 are those in which top occupations are overrepresented while areas shaded
brown in the upper figures are those in which top occupations are underrepresented.
The highly clustered overrepresentation of top occupations (LQ higher than 1.10)
in 2001 and 2011 is apparent in much of northern Johannesburg, and some isolated
parts of southern Johannesburg. By contrast, the Johannesburg CBD and townships,
such as Diepsloot, Soweto and Orange Farm show an underrepresentation of top
occupations in 2001 and 2011. By 2011, the underrepresentation of top occupations
decreased slightly in some areas, particularly in Soweto, Cosmo City and north of
Orange Farm. Their significant underrepresentation directly east of Sandton is due to
the presence of the working-class township of Alexandra. From 1912, black people
were able to own land in the ‘freehold’ settlement of Alexandra, and as the city grew
north, Alexandra became an unusual case of a centrally-located township.
In the lower two maps, turquoise-shaded areas are those in which bottom occu-
pations are overrepresented, while brown is where they are underrepresented. Those
employed in bottom occupations are less spatially clustered than those employed in
top occupations, but they are overrepresented on the fringes of the city and in town-
ships like Soweto and Diepsloot (Fig. 5.3). The residential population of the Johan-
nesburg CBD shows a slight underrepresentation of bottom occupations in 2001,
increasing in 2011. Given that the CBD population is also highly underrepresented
by top occupations, it is likely that the CBD provides affordable homes and easy
access to middle occupations such as technicians, clerks, service workers and trades
workers. In 2001, bottom occupations were slightly overrepresented (LQ between
1.11 and 2.5) in some suburbs surrounding Sandton. These concentrations around
Sandton would include domestic workers that lived on the properties of middle- and
upper-class employers. As anticipated above, we see evidence for the reduction of
this employment category in these suburbs by 2011 as such workers now commute
from townships and other settlements. The increasing underrepresentation of bottom
occupations is evenmore striking in the arc of suburbs west of the N1 highway. These
suburbs contain many new cluster housing developments for middle- and upper-class
home buyers but provide limited accommodation for domestic workers.
5.4.3 Classification of Neighbourhoods by Socio-economic
Composition
The socio-economic status (SES) of neighbourhoods can be determined by the
proportion of occupations that are considered top, middle or bottom occupations. For
the neighbourhood classification in Fig. 5.4, the classification used by Marcińczak
et al. (2015) was altered slightly and two categories were added afterwards to allow
for the unambiguous classification of all sub-places in Johannesburg. The neighbour-
hood types that were slightly adapted include High SES (top >= 50; middle <= 35;
bottom <= 35),Middle SES (top <= 35; middle >= 50; bottom <= 35) and LowSES
(top <= 35; middle <= 35; bottom >= 50). Thereafter, the remaining uncategorised
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Fig. 5.4 Neighbourhood types in Johannesburg, 2001–2011. Data sources Quantec (2014, 2016)
sub-places were grouped into Middle and High mix SES (top >= 25; middle >= 25;
bottom <= 25) or Low and Middle mix SES (top <= 25; middle >= 25; bottom >=
25).
A clear spatial distinction exists between predominantly higher SES neighbour-
hoods in northern Johannesburg (with exceptions on the suburban fringes) and
predominantly lower SESneighbourhoods in southern Johannesburg (with the excep-
tion of a cluster of neighbourhoods south of Rosettenville which are higher SES).
This distinct separation of neighbourhoods echoes the observation by Crankshaw
(2008: 1701) that “all the neighbourhoods with more than two thirds of the popula-
tion being middle class are in the northern suburbs, none are in the South”. Suburbs
between the N1 andM1 highways (which also contain the most expensive properties
in the city) are predominantly high, middle to high or mixed SES, with an increase in
high SES suburbs north of Sandton in 2011. Suburbswithmixed SES around Sandton
and Midrand could be attributed to two possible characteristics. First, there may be
quite different occupation ranks within one household resulting from gender, age and
other stratifications in the labour market. Second, it could reflect the development of
relatively affordable cluster housing that has made these areas accessible to residents
employed in a greater mix of occupations. Low and polarised SES suburbs around
Sandton in 2001 are likely associated with the overrepresentation of top and bottom
occupations discussed alongside Fig. 5.3, above, and largely disappears by 2011.
The lower SES of Alexandra, directly east of high SES areas around Sandton, is a
striking feature of Johannesburg’s geography.
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The development of large luxury gated estates, private commercial investment and
cluster housing around Midrand has also shifted neighbourhoods from mixed SES
to high SES. Meanwhile, some public housing projects have also made a measurable
difference to socio-economic desegregation. The area labelled Cosmo City was low
to middle SES and low SES in 2001. With the construction of a major state-led
housing project there from 2004, the occupation mix had elevated to middle SES by
2011. Moreover, the category middle SES contains a mix of top, middle and bottom
occupations and this suggests thatCosmoCity has achieved its goal of creating amore
mixed-income urban environment than had been achieved in previous public housing
projects. Figure 5.4 also indicates that the Johannesburg CBD has an increasingly
middle SES. In the south of Johannesburg, the classification of suburbs in townships
are a testament to the socio-economic mix of these residential spaces. Soweto is
almost entirely characterised by middle SES, a change that is partly due to the
removal and formalisation of informal settlements in the township (Huchzermeyer
et al. 2014).
5.4.4 Location of Top Socio-economic Status Groups in 2001
and 2011
In 2001 and 2011, the top 20% of managers and professionals lived in 2% of sub-
places in Johannesburg (Fig. 5.5). The location of the quintile 1 sub-places has not
changed substantially but remains mostly located north and west of Sandton. No
more than two of these sub-places were located south of the Johannesburg CBD in
either 2001 or 2011. It is important to bear in mind that the quintile 1 sub-places
have relatively low population densities and vary in geographic size, especially in
comparison to dense sub-places in townships such as Soweto and Diepsloot. Quintile
1 suburbswere established throughout the twentieth centurywith freestanding houses
on large plots. From the 1990s, many of these neighbourhoods were retrofitted with
access control gates and new suburban developments were built with fences and
gates from the outset while also attracting substantial private commercial and retail
investment (Fig. 5.1). In this representation of the concentration of top occupations,
it is again evident that the proportion of top occupations increased in sub-places close
to the northern edge of Johannesburg (e.g. around Midrand). There has also been a
slight increase in the proportion of top occupations in parts of Soweto and in Cosmo
City.
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Fig. 5.5 The concentration of the top socio-economic group in Johannesburg, 2001–2011. Data
sources Quantec (2014, 2016)
5.5 Conclusion
Segregation by race was apartheid’s defining ambition, and one that was actively
pursued until the political transition of the early 1990s. In attempting to stratify
society and space racially, the programmes of white minority governments also influ-
enced socio-economic stratification. They produced settlements with cheaper prop-
erty for the black working class and more expensive suburbs for the white working
class, middle class and elites. Since the end of apartheid, income inequality amongst
black people has grown dramatically. Given the strong purchasing power of some
black, Indian and coloured people, suburbs once set aside for white people are now
racially diverse.
Yet the calculations presented in this chapter show theway inwhich different occu-
pations continue to be segregated.The transition fromaFordist secondary economy to
a post-Fordist service economy has served some better than others (Beall et al. 2002;
Crankshaw 2008) and unemployment also remains high. Managerial jobs have been
particularly robust, consolidating and expanding the position of those at the high-
earning end of the income spectrum. Machine operators have diminished, while in
their place low paid unskilled, industrial and retail sector categories have grown. The
effect of this employment profile is that the Gini coefficient in Johannesburg remains
amongst the highest in the world. Thus, the repeal of racial restrictions has no bearing
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on the inability of the low-earning black majority to afford housing in more expen-
sive suburbs once reserved for white occupation. The dissimilarity index between
top and bottom occupation groups decreased slightly between the 2001 and 2011
censuses but increased between other occupation groups. The concentrations of top
and bottom occupations illustrate the polarised structure of Johannesburg described
by Crankshaw (2008) as being divided into northern suburbs (mostly middle class)
and the southern suburbs or townships (mostly working class).
Residential development and job markets have both reproduced the spatial nature
of socio-economic inequality and facilitated key changes. Although state-provided
housing might have acted somewhat independently of the market to break up
these patterns, it has largely failed to do so. Essentially, long-term and deeply
entrenched inequalities have not changed substantially notwithstanding the scrapping
of apartheid segregation. The 2016 Johannesburg Spatial Development Framework
recognises these enduring patterns of socio-economic segregation and the city has
subsequently proposed more proactive responses to the situation, including densifi-
cation along transit corridors and inclusionary housing. Our analysis does suggest
that state housing developments such as Cosmo City has enabled a greater mix of
occupations than what was previously possible. Whether these proactive measures
can offset market-led production of residential space is an important issue for the
coming decades.
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Abstract Hong Kong has a dual land regime in the urban and rural territories. The
urban areas on both sides ofVictoriaHarbour (8.8%of land, excludingCountry Parks
on Hong Kong Island) and new towns (about 15.3% of land) house over 90% of the
city’s population (about 7.5 million) with an extremely high population density of
about 26,000 per km2. After deducting Country Parks and Special Areas (about 40%
of land), the rest of the rural New Territories (traditional settlements leased by the
British Government in 1898 for 99 years) constitutes about 35% of land, but houses
5.5% of all residents with a substantially lower population density of about 1,000
per km2. China’s Open Door Policy since 1978 has led to economic restructuring
in Hong Kong, changing its occupational structure, intensifying income inequality,
and leading to socio-economic and spatial segregation. Whilst the affluent classes
continue to concentrate in traditionally central locations in urban areas, or in luxurious
residential enclaves in rural New Territories, the less well-off tend to be marginalised
and live in remote new towns or rural New Territories. The latter is also a result
of a skewed power relationship between the government and the property sector
in directing spatial development that breeds a hegemonic (dis)course and regime
of urban-biased and property-dominant development, sustaining the government’s
coffer through a high land price policy.
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6.1 Introduction
This chapter illustrates and explains the situation and the underlying causes of socio-
economic and spatial segregation in Hong Kong, beginning with a brief introduction
of the city’s dual land regime, housing structure and welfare system. It then high-
lights the relationship betweenwelfare provision, economic restructuring and income
polarisation since the 1980s whenHongKongmetamorphosed from amanufacturing
city to a global financial centre due to China’s OpenDoor Policy. Based on the spatial
patterns of residential segregation of different socio-economic classes, we conclude
that in addition to income polarisation and ever-rising house prices, the urban-biased
and property-dominant mode of (re)development has led to socio-economic and
spatial segregation in Hong Kong. Also, this situation is expected to perpetuate in
the foreseeable future if the dual land regime is not changed.
6.2 Context
6.2.1 Dual Land Regime
Hong Kong was a British colony from 1842 to 1997. The city was handed over to
Chinese rule as a Special Administrative Region in July 1997. Currently, about 7.5
million inhabitants dwell within an area of 1,106 km2 (CSD 2019) (Fig. 6.1). After
Fig. 6.1 The map of Hong Kong, with locations of place names mentioned in this chapter planning
data reproduced with permission of the director of planning. © Hong Kong
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excluding Country Parks and Special Areas (as ‘Protected areas’ that occupy 443
km2 or 40% of Hong Kong’s total land area) within which urban development is
strictly prohibited, the actual territorial population density is about 11,000 per km2.
However, there is a dual land regime in Hong Kong as reflected in different
population densities between the urbanised areas (Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and
new towns, that is, about 24.1% of land area) with an average population density of
about 26,000 per km2, and the rural New Territories (with village-type settlements,
brownfield sites, agricultural land and green belts, etc.) occupying 35% of the land
with a population density of about 1,000 per km2. Such a striking difference in
population density has to do with the city’s colonial history. Colonial Hong Kong
started with the ceded territories of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula in the
mid-nineteenth century, forming the existing densely populated urban areas. Unlike
Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula, the New Territories where the existence
of indigenous villagers predated the colonists, were only leased to Britain in 1898
for 99 years.
Urban development activities in the New Territories were minimal before the
urban riots in 1966 and 1967. After the riots, in order to pacify the restless population,
the colonial government started to build public housing through developing new
towns in the 1970s (Glaser et al. 1991). Developed from market towns or along
the coast by land reclamation, the nine new towns now form pockets of densely
populated urbanised zones in the New Territories. The vast ‘rural’ area in the rest
(about 35%) of the New Territories accommodate only around 5.5% or 412,500 of
Hong Kong’s 7.5 million population (CSD 2017a). Contrary to the urban areas and
new towns, urban planning was not extended to the rural New Territories until 1991,
seven years after a court case that allowed farmland to be converted into storage
sites (Lai and Ho 2002). Consequently, massive brownfield sites with a diversity of
land uses emerged, including most notably open storage. They serve the opening and
rapid industrialising economy across the border in mainland China (Chau and Lai
2004).
To accommodate population growth and economic development, the Hong Kong
government has relied on massive land reclamation within and beyond Victoria
Harbour and incessant redevelopment of old and low-rise tenement buildings tomake
way for high-rise residential apartments (Ng 1998; Adams and Hastings 2001). This
urban-biased (re)development strategy has boosted land values and the emergence
of gated private housing estates (Wong et al. 2011) that are unaffordable for most
Hong Kong residents. As house prices in Hong Kong rank the top among other world
cities (Gurran and Bramley 2017), many less well-off residents have to rely on public
housing (mostly located in Kowloon and new towns) or move to smaller dwellings
or remote locations.
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6.2.2 Housing System
Public housing accommodates a significant proportion of households in Hong Kong
(Fig. 6.2) (Forrest and Yip 2014; Valença 2015). The proportion of households living
in public housing (i.e. public rental housing units and subsidised sale flats in Fig. 6.2)
only declined slightly from 46.2% in 2001 to 45.7% in 2016 (CSD 2012 and 2017a).
Yet, the focus of public housing provision has shifted from rental housing to assisted
home ownership. Since its inception in the 1950s, public rental housing can be
regarded as a major welfare provision (Ronald and Doling 2010), contributing much
to poverty alleviation (Guo et al. 2018). Currently, about 30% of households in
Hong Kong live in public rental housing units (CSD 2017a). Another pillar of Hong
Kong’s public housing system is the HomeOwnership Scheme (HOS; corresponding
to ‘subsidised sale flats’ in Fig. 6.2), established in the late 1970s to assist low- and
middle-income households to achieve home ownership (Lee et al. 2014). In 2016,
about 15% of households in Hong Kong lived in HOS dwellings (CSD 2017a).
Public housing is thus crucial for satisfying the housing needs of the middle and
lower classes in Hong Kong (Lau and Murie 2017).
The percentage of households living in owner-occupied units decreased slightly
from 2001 to 2016 (CSD 2002 and 2017a), implying more households have entered
the private rental market. In 2016, about 450,000 households (about 1.3 million
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Fig. 6.2 The evolution of housing structure in Hong Kong, 1981–2016 (Reproduced from CSD
1993, 2007, 2012, 2017a)
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(around 210,000 people) lived in subdivided units (CSD 2018b). Given popula-
tion growth due to immigration from China, stagnant income levels and skyrock-
eting house prices, the population living in subdivided units with harsh conditions
is expected to increase. Meanwhile, the city’s house price to income ratio of 20.9 is
one of the highest in the developed world (compared with Singapore: 4.6; New York
City: 5.5 and Greater London: 8.3) (Bertaud 2018; Ng 2018). As house prices keep
increasing, property ownership leads to a wideningwealth gap inHongKong. For the
indigenous population in rural New Territories, the colonial government introduced
the ‘Small House Policy’ in 1972 to satisfy their housing needs in the course of new
town development. Under this policy, adult male indigenous inhabitants are entitled
with rights to build a village house of 700 ft2 (approx. 65 m2) up to three stories in
approved villages in the New Territories (Hayes 2007).
6.2.3 Welfare System and Inequality
Despite the extensive provision of public housing, Hong Kong has never been a
welfare state. The government spending in Hong Kong has been capped to around
18%ofGDP,much lower than in theUSA (37.8%), Britain (41.6%) or Japan (38.7%)
(Miller et al. 2019). Education is the largest component of recurrent government
expenditure, amounting to about 17.3% of total government spending in the 2016/17
fiscal year (HKSAR Government 2017a). In September 2009, the 9-year free educa-
tion systemwas extended to 12 years, allowing school-age children to receive, respec-
tively, 6 years of free primary and secondary education (HKSARGovernment 2008).
In addition, subsidised tertiary education is provided by eight universities financed
by public funds (HKSAR Government 2018b). Health care also constitutes 17% of
the government’s total spending. The public sector provides around 74% of inpatient
and specialist medical services expenditure. In late 2016, there were around 28,000
beds in all public hospitals and institutions under the management of the statutory
Hospital Authority (HKSARGovernment 2017a). The bed-population ratio in public
hospitals is about 3.8 per 1,000, which is comparable to the aggregate ratio of public
and private hospital beds in Britain (2.8 in 2013), USA (2.9 in 2012), Japan (13.3 in
2013) and Singapore (3.2 in 2014) (HKSAR Government 2016).
As of 2019, Hong Kong has no public pension system. Retirement security provi-
sion has been delegated to the private sector via theMandatory Provident Fund (MPF)
scheme, in operation since 2000. The MPF scheme requires the working population
and employers to contribute an aggregate sum of 10% of individuals’ total monthly
salary to pension schemes offered by the private sector (Sawada 2004; Lee et al.
2014). Since the MPF contributions are tied to salaries, the non-working population
is not covered by the MPF scheme. Nevertheless, several cash transfer policies from
the public sector exist in the city.
An important cash transfer is the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance
(CSSA), which is means-tested for the economically vulnerable to support their
basic needs (SWD 2018a). Between 2001 and 2016, more than half of all CSSA
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recipients were elderly people. There are also two cash benefits for the elderly: Old
Age Allowance (OAA) and Old Age Living Allowance (OALA). The former is a
non-means-tested allowance given to the elderly aged 70 or above (Lee et al. 2014).
The latter, introduced in 2013, is means-tested for poor elderly people aged 65 or
above with monthly income and assets lower than a defined level (SWD 2018b).
Cash transfers and subsidies are also available in transport. To facilitate commu-
nity participation and social inclusion of the elderly and the disabled population, a
schemewas launched in June 2012 to covermajor transport modes, and the beneficia-
ries only need to spend HK$2.0 (US$0.25) for each trip whilst the fare differentials
are subsidised by the government (TD 2018). In January 2019, the government intro-
duced the Public Transport Fare Subsidy Scheme. If the monthly transport-related
expenditures of commuters exceed HK$400 (US$51.3), the exceeded expenses are
entitled to a cash rebate equivalent to 25% of travelling expenditure with a monthly
maximum of HK$300 (US$38.5). This scheme aims particularly at lessening the
transport burden of long-haul commuters in new towns and rural New Territories
(HKSAR Government 2018a).
The Gini Index offers a clear indication of income inequality in Hong Kong.
Notwithstanding the enhancement ofwelfare provision over recent decades, the index
soared from 0.451 in 1981, surpassed the 0.5 mark in 1996 and then gradually
climbed to 0.539 in 2016 (HKSARGovernment 2017b), the largest inequality among
all developed economies (Central Intelligence Agency 2019). Such upward trend
suggests that occupational polarisation due to economic restructuring has brought
about income polarisation in Hong Kong.
6.3 Census Data and Spatial Units
In this chapter, data obtained from the 2001 and 2011 Population Census and the
2016 By-census are used for the segregation analysis. Each dataset consists of data
with nine occupational groups, categorised according to the International Standard
Classification of Occupation (ISCO) published by International Labour Organisation
(ILO). The ISCO-08 version is applied in the 2011 Census and the 2016 By-census,
whilst ISCO-88 is applied in the 2001 Census (CSD 2017b). The nine occupational
groups are further classified into three large socio-economic status (SES) groups
based on their income:
Top SES (income) group (TOP)
– Managers and Administrators (MAN)
– Professionals (PRO)
Middle SES (income) group (MID)
– Associate Professionals (APR)
– Clerical Support Workers (CLE)
– Craft and Related Workers (CRA)
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Bottom SES (income) group (BOT)
– Service and Sales Workers (SER)
– Plant and Machine Operators (MAC)
– Elementary Occupations (ELE)
– Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers; and Occupations not Classifiable
(data are combined with ‘Elementary Occupations’ in the analysis).
In 2016, the average gross median monthly income of the top SES group
was HK$39,500 (US$5,064), whilst the corresponding figures of the middle SES
group and the bottom SES group were HK$16,750 (US$2,147) and HK$10,750
(US$1,378), respectively, compared with the city’s overall median of HK$15,000
(US$1,923) (CSD 2017b). The spatial (or neighbourhood) unit used for the analyses
is Large Street Block Group (LSBG). LSBG is the smallest spatial unit that contains
sufficient relevant census data available for public access, and each LSBG consists
of a street block cluster. In all three snapshot years, the average area and population
of urban LSBGs were 0.18km2 and 2,162, whereas rural LSBGs were 2.2km2 and
934, respectively.
6.4 Spatial Patterns of Occupational and Income
Disparities
6.4.1 Changing Occupational Structure and Growing
Income Disparity
Hong Kong’s economy has undergone tertiarisation since the 1980s after the imple-
mentation of theOpenDoorPolicy inmainlandChina. The enlargement of the tertiary
sector took place in tandem with the shrinkage of the secondary sector. By the early
2000s, the tertiary sector had become the mainstay of Hong Kong’s economy. From
2001 to 2016, the proportion of the working population (excluding foreign domestic
helpers) classified as managers and administrators as well as professionals (i.e. high
paid tertiary workers) grew from 17.3 to 18.8%, whilst the corresponding figure of
services and salesworkers aswell as elementary occupations (i.e. low-income tertiary
workers) rose from 30.9 to 32.5% (Fig. 6.3). Between 2001 and 2016, the average
gross median monthly income of high paid tertiary workers increased by 41.1%
from US$3,590 to US$5,064, outstripping significantly that of low-income tertiary
workers with the corresponding growth (i.e. 31.9%) from US$924 to US$1,218.
Although the implementation of Statutory Minimum Wage since 2011 has prob-
ably led to the income increases of the latter occupational groups (CSD 2007 and
2017a), the figures still show widening income disparities between the high-income
and low-income tertiary workers over time.
Whilst 98% of business units in Hong Kong are Small and Medium Enterprises
(SMEs), they provide only 45% of employment (LegCo 2018). The profitability












































Occupational structure of Hong Kong in 2001, 2011 and 2016
MAN PRO APR CLE CRA SER MAC ELE
Fig. 6.3 Occupational structure of Hong Kong, 2001–2016 (Reproduced from the datasets of
2001 and 2011 Population Census and 2016 By-census, CSD) *Please refer to Sect. 6.3 for the
abbreviations of occupational groups
gap between SMEs and non-SMEs, as shown by the difference in profit ratios, had
widened from 2.7 in 2011 to 6.7 in 2016 (LegCo 2018). This may also reflect the
widening income gap between SME and non-SME employees. Occupational and
income disparities have worsened the issue of housing affordability in Hong Kong,
whilst the urban-biased and property-dominant (re)development strategy has led to
escalating house prices. Since 2000, property prices and rental values have been
tripled and doubled, respectively (see Fig. 6.4). This has led to increasing levels of
spatial segregation, which can be illustrated by two quantitative approaches: Index of
Dissimilarity (IoD) measuring the evenness of distribution of various occupational
groups, and Location Quotient (LQ) serving to investigate the patterns of spatial
concentration of selected occupational groups.
6.4.2 Socio-Economic Segregation
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 display the IoD between various occupational groups in specified
years. Generally, socio-economic segregation increased in HongKong between 2001























Property price and rental indices of Hong Kong, 1981-2018 
Property price index Rental index
Fig. 6.4 Property price and rental indices of Hong Kong, 1981–2018 (Reproduced from Rating
and Valuation Department 2019a, b.
Table 6.1 Index of Dissimilarity (multiplied by 100) between the occupational groups in Hong
Kong in 2001, 2011 and 2016
MAN PRO APR CLE CRA SER MAC ELE MAN PRO APR CLE CRA SER MAC ELE
20 32 48 61 56 61 65 MAN
19 27 43 57 51 57 62 PRO 17
32 26 23 39 33 39 45 APR 27 23
45aaaaa41 20 23 19 23 29 CLE 39 35 18
60 55 36 21 17 19 19 CRA 56 54 37 26
52 48 29 17 17 21 20 SER 49 46 30 20 17
60 56 37 22 14 20 22 MAC 55 53 36 25 20 21







Table 6.2 Index of
Dissimilarity (multiplied by
100) between the Top, Middle
and Bottom groups in Hong
Kong in 2001, 2011 and 2016
2001 2011 2016
TOP–MID 40 38 31
TOP–BOT 55 57 50
MID–BOT 20 24 24
and 2011, but then slightly decreased until 2016. The economy was very bad in the
first decade of the millennium due to economic depression induced by the Asian
financial crisis in 1997 and epidemic outbreak such as bird’s flu and SARS in the
early 2000s, triggering the acceleration of ‘neoliberal’ policies. When the economy
gradually improved, the government implemented more social policies and hence
segregationwas slightly attenuated.Nevertheless, the figures between top and bottom
SES groups in all three years stand much higher from the rest. This numerical pattern
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reveals apparent segregation between top and bottomSESworking population aswell
as the persistence of self-segregation of the top SES workforce.
6.4.3 Residential Locations of Top and Bottom SES
Workforce
Figure 6.5 shows the distribution of neighbourhoods with top SES working popu-
lation in 2001 and 2016. In this figure, all neighbourhoods are categorised into five
quintiles (Q1–Q5), each ofwhich accommodates about 20%ofHongKong’s top SES
working population. Seemingly, quite a number of neighbourhoods with large top
SES working populations (Q1–Q3) were initially concentrated in the formally ceded
territories of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon. As time passed, more neighbourhoods
in new towns had a large top SES working population. This may contribute to a slim
drop in the extent of segregation. Owing to the compact urban environment of Hong
Kong, neighbourhoods with the largest top SES working population (categorised as
Q1) are usually located in high-density residential areas, some of which are coastal
areas with beautiful sea views or recently redeveloped districts. Additionally, these
neighbourhoods often consist of middle-class private housing estates and gated resi-
dential areas with detached houses. It should, however, be noted that traditionally
wealthy residential areas such as southern Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Tong are
not featured in the maps because these districts are of much lower density and hence
they accommodate a smaller number of top SES workers.
There is a huge wealth gap even within the top SES working population, and the
prohibitively high house prices in wealthy residential areas in Hong Kong mean that
these areas are only accessible to a very small percentage of the top SES group. The
rest of the topSESworkforce thusmostly live inmore densely populatedmiddle-class
residential areas in which Q1 neighbourhoods are located.
The LQ analysis offers us another perspective to examine residential locations of
various SES groups. An LQ value greater and smaller than 1.0 indicates a higher and
lower share of an occupational group within a neighbourhood than the city’s overall
share, respectively, whilst a value of 1.0 implies an equal share of an occupational
group compared to the city as a whole. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 depict the spatial distri-
bution of residence of top SES and bottom SES working population, respectively.
According to Fig. 6.6, the residential distribution of top SES working population
in 2001 is clustered around The Peak, southern coast of Hong Kong Island and
Kowloon Tong. These are areas where luxurious residences and detached houses
dominate. Meanwhile, fewer neighbourhoods in the New Territories had their LQ
exceeding 1.0. The distribution of the top group became more even in 2016 as some
neighbourhoods in the New Territories experienced LQ increases due to large-scale
low-density gated residential developments, whilst the LQ decreased in conventional
wealthy residential areas as a result of the reduction of top SES workers who might
move to the newly completed gated communities in the New Territories. Whilst still
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Fig. 6.5 Spatial distribution of residential location of top SES group in Hong Kong, in 2001 and
2016. Planning data reproduced with permission of the director of planning. © Hong Kong
evident, self-segregation of top SESworking population has become less pronounced
in the study period as the decrease in top SES workers in conventional wealthy areas
was largely replaced by middle SES workers after 2011. This might be a result of
the retirement of the top SES workers with off-springs still in their middle career.
The residential distribution of bottom SES workers (Fig. 6.7) was comparatively
even throughout the study period. However, some spatial clusters were still visible
in urban areas where public housing and old tenement buildings dominated such as
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Fig. 6.6 LQ map of top SES group in Hong Kong, in 2001 and 2016. Planning data reproduced
with permission of the director of planning. © Hong Kong
Chai Wan on Hong Kong Island, Sham Shui Po and Kwun Tong in Kowloon as well
as new towns farther away from urban areas. Notwithstanding the existence of the
above clusters, the spatial concentration of bottom SES group was less marked than
that of top SES group.
Additionally, some neighbourhoods in urban areas had significant LQ fluctuations
in top and bottom SES working population. For example, some neighbourhoods in
Wan Chai, a rapidly gentrifying inner-city area, experienced marked LQ increases in
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Fig. 6.7 LQmap of bottom SES group in Hong Kong, in 2001 and 2016. Planning data reproduced
with permission of the director of planning. © Hong Kong
top SES working population due to the completion of urban redevelopment projects.
Meanwhile, neighbourhoods affected by urban renewal projects in Kwun Tong, an
industrial and working-class residential area in east Kowloon transforming into a
new commercial district, experienced a relatively significant LQ decrease in bottom
SES working population.
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6.4.4 Socio-Economic Composition of Neighbourhoods
To further examine the pattern of residential segregation, all neighbourhoods are
categorised in accordance with their respective proportions of working population
from different SES groups. As shown in Fig. 6.8, the majority of neighbourhoods
Fig. 6.8 Spatial distribution of neighbourhoods classified by SES in Hong Kong, in 2001 and 2016
(Reproduced from the classification provided by Marcińczak et al. 2015. Planning data reproduced
with permission of the director of planning. © Hong Kong)
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in Hong Kong can be categorised as mixed (Middle/Top or Middle/Bottom) SES
neighbourhoods during the study period, meaning that most neighbourhoods are
socio-economically heterogeneous. This situation is probably due to a compact and
dense urban living environment where populations with diverse SES have to be
accommodated within small areas. Yet, the distribution of ‘Middle/Top SES’ and
‘Middle/Bottom SES’ neighbourhoods is rather distinctive, echoing the distribution
of the top and bottom SES workforce.
In urban areas, ‘Middle/Top SES’ neighbourhoods can be found in middle-class
and wealthy residential areas, such as the northern coast of Hong Kong Island and
coastal areas of Kowloon Peninsula (where gated private high-rise residential towers
were built), as well as central Kowloon, a low-density residential area. On the other
hand, ‘Middle/Bottom SES’ neighbourhoods are located in inner cities and public
housing areas such as Chai Wan on Hong Kong Island as well as Sham Shui Po and
Kwun Tong in Kowloon, all of which had low LQs of the top SES working popu-
lation. The neighbourhood classification reveals clear socio-economic and spatial
segregation in the urban areas of Hong Kong.
Meanwhile, a minority of neighbourhoods labelled as ‘Middle SES’ and ‘Multi-
SES’ neighbourhoods were evenly distributed throughout the urban areas and new
towns without apparent spatial clustering. In new towns, the widespread presence of
‘Middle/Bottom SES’ neighbourhoods is probably associated with the prevalence
of public housing, often considered as neighbourhoods for low-income households.
There is sporadic existence of ‘Middle/Top SES’ neighbourhoods amidst primarily
‘Middle/Bottom SES’ ones. Hence, new towns in Hong Kong could be regarded as
residential areas mainly for the middle and bottom SES population.
Notwithstanding the prevalence of mixed SES neighbourhoods, spatial clustering
of top SES neighbourhoods within luxurious residential areas in urban areas (e.g.
The Peak and southern HongKong Island) was clearly observable. However, some of
these neighbourhoods were no longer dominated by top SES population and became
‘Middle/Top SES’ neighbourhoods by the end of the study period. This was probably
due to the departure of top SES population to gentrified urban areas or newly built
gated communities in the New Territories, whilst the population there was replaced
bymiddle SES population. Self-segregation of the top SESworkforce takes place not
only in urban, but also in rural areas. In Fig. 6.8, ‘Middle/Top SES’ neighbourhoods
are confined within gated low-density residential areas with detached houses. In the
meantime, rural New Territories house the majority of agricultural workers, who are
classified as part of the bottom SES group. Together with other bottom SES workers,
they spread evenly in various typical rural settlements, thus giving rise to an extensive
‘Middle/Bottom SES’ residential area throughout rural New Territories, particularly
in northwest and northeast New Territories adjacent to the Hong Kong-Shenzhen
border.
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6.5 Underlying Causes for Socio-Spatial Segregation
Socio-spatial segregation in Hong Kong has been attributed to income polarisation
due to economic restructuring together with rising house prices since the 1980s.
After the implementation of China’s Open Door Policy in the late 1970s, economic
restructuring in Hong Kong transformed the city into a financial and service hub and
China’s strategic gateway to the global economy. As a consequence, the occupational
structure of Hong Kong changed, with a shrinking manufacturing sector and an
expanding tertiary sector (see Sect. 4.1). The tertiary sector is subdivided into high-
income tertiary sector workers (e.g. managers and administrators, professionals)
and low-income tertiary sector workers (e.g. services and sales workers, elementary
occupations). Although Hong Kong had experienced rapid and continuous economic
growth until the Asian financial crisis in late 1997 (the year Hong Kong returned to
Chinese rule), most economic benefits were skewed towards the high-income tertiary
sector including the financial and professional sectors. Therefore, top SES workers
who were engaged in related occupations experienced rapid income increases. On
the contrary, bottom SES workers, many of whom were originally employed in the
manufacturing sector that moved out of Hong Kong to mainland China since the
early 1980s, had to enter the low pay tertiary sector, sharing little, if any, benefit
from economic growth.
Concurrently, soaring house prices over recent decades have made home owner-
ship a very remote dream for those in the bottom SES workforce (see Fig. 6.4).
Even though bottom SES workers have experienced income increases, these were
severely outpaced by a massive rise of property and rental values. Therefore, bottom
SES workers mostly could not afford to buy private units and have to either apply for
public rental housing or rent low-cost private units including subdivided flats. These
types of dwellings are mostly located in new towns and in inner-city areas such as
Sham Shui Po, with relatively high proportions of the impoverished bottom SES
working population (see Fig. 6.7). Given the relatively large population size, segre-
gation of the bottom SES workforce was less pronounced than the self-segregation
of the top SES workforce over the study period.
Secondly, the urban-biased and property-dominant mode of (re)development led
by the government and property developers have sustained or even intensified socio-
spatial segregation in Hong Kong. For many decades, the Hong Kong government
has relied on massive reclamation projects to create new land along coastal areas
to accommodate urban growth and new town development, whilst the vast rural
land resources in the heart of the New Territories have been largely left untouched.
Urban development has thus long been confined to urban areas and new towns.
The Hong Kong government, as the city’s dominant landowner under the leasehold
land tenure system, has relied on high land prices and related income as major
sources (at least 20%) of revenue (Wong 2015). As a thriving property sector is
indispensable to sustain high land prices, an ‘alliance’ between the government and
big property development tycoons is perceived to have developed in the course of
urban development. To maximise profit from developing valuable land plots, the
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planning and building mechanisms have allowed property developers to build high-
rise residential blocks, especially in coastal areas with great sea views that often give
rise to ‘wall-like buildings’, ‘overshadowing’ old urban areas (Ng et al. 2011; Ng
2014;Wong et al. 2011). The exorbitant prices for these housing units mean that only
the top SES workforce can afford to live there. Hence, coastal areas in both urban
areas and new towns have become primarily top SES neighbourhoods (see Figs. 6.5
and 6.6).
Redevelopment is an alternativemeans of recycling scarce land resources in urban
Hong Kong. Usually, redevelopment projects are carried out by public–private part-
nership between property developers and the Urban Renewal Authority, a statutory
body responsible for facilitating urban redevelopment (Ng 2002; Ye et al. 2015).
Therefore, redevelopment projects in the city are directed towards the maximisation
of exchange value (Tang 2017) and often result in gentrification of neighbourhoods.
As residents affected by redevelopment often cannot afford soaring house prices
within their original communities of residence, they are often displaced to other
areas with lower rents such as other inner-city areas, new towns (Ye et al. 2015)
or even the rural New Territories. Meanwhile, the regenerated built environment
in redeveloped areas can only be afforded by the top SES population. As a result,
socio-economic segregation in urban HongKong is also characterised by the infilling
of the top SES population into gentrified inner cities and the exodus of the bottom
SES population to other inner cities and remote areas. This process is expected to
accentuate in years to come.
Interestingly, it seems that colonial legacies continue to influence the current
socio-spatial distribution of Hong Kong’s population. In urban areas, the designation
of The Peak on Hong Kong Island as a European-exclusive residential zone in the
first half of the twentieth century (Lai and Yu 2001) and the establishment of a low-
density Garden City in Kowloon Tong before World War II had attracted the elite
and affluent population for residence (Forrest et al. 2004; Lo 2005). These residential
areas are still mainly for the top SES population today. In the massive territory of the
rural New Territories where the colonial government had avoided major investments,
except for coastal areas reclaimed for new development, most neighbourhoods are
classified as ‘Middle/Bottom SES’ neighbourhoods.
6.6 Conclusion
The legacies of Hong Kong’s colonial urban development history can still be seen in
the new millennium. Dictated by historical events, a dual land regime can be seen in
Hong Kong: dense urban development had once been concentrated on Hong Kong
Island and Kowloon until the development of new towns in the 1970s; the imple-
mentation of a ‘Small House Policy’ since 1972, and the designation of conservation
areas, green belts and Sites of Special Scientific Interest in rural New Territories,
have led to low population density. Such spatial patterns of urban development and
population distribution have sustained a property-dominant mode of urban-biased
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development, a cornerstone of the government’s high land price policy to sustain its
coffer.
Meanwhile, the restructuring (or tertiarisation) of Hong Kong’s economy as a
result of the Open Door Policy in China since the 1980s has led to occupational and
income polarisation among the city’s working population. As depicted by the rising
trend of theGini Index, the income gapwidened constantly despite the improvements
in welfare provision over recent decades. The widening income gap coupled with
the astronomical rise of housing costs also intensified residential segregation in the
city, especially in urban areas and new towns.
As indicated in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and Fig. 6.8, self-segregation of the top SES
working population is arguably one of the key features of socio-spatial segregation
in Hong Kong as the IoD levels between top and bottom SES occupational groups
mostly stood at 0.5 or above throughout the study period. Spatial clustering of top
SES neighbourhoods is clearly identifiable. In the meantime, the IoD levels between
middle and bottom SES groups as well as between top and middle SES groups
generally stayed at 0.4 or below, showing no apparent residential segregation between
these occupational groups.
Contrary to other major cities where segregation is characterised by monotonous
neighbourhoodswith a dominant SES and/or racial group, segregation inHongKong,
due to its dual land regime, is marked by the clustering of two types of socio-
economically mixed neighbourhoods: ‘Middle/Top SES’ neighbourhoods in high-
and middle-class residential areas and ‘Middle/Bottom SES’ neighbourhoods where
old tenement buildings and public housing dominate. This is especially obvious
towards the end of the study period. Such a dichotomy of socio-economically hetero-
geneous neighbourhoods, a consequence of a compact urban environment in the city’s
dual urban–rural land and density regimes, demonstrates Hong Kong’s distinctive
feature of residential and socio-economic spatial segregation.
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Marcińczak S, TammaruT,Novák J,GentileM,Kovács Z, Temelová J,ValatkaV,KährikA, SzabóB
et al (2015) Patterns of socioeconomic segregation in the capital cities of fast-track reforming post-
socialist countries. Ann Assoc Am Geogr 105(1):183–202. https://doi.org/10.1080/00045608.
2014.968977
Miller T, Kim AB, Roberts JM, et al (2019) 2019 Index of economic freedom: 25th anniversary
edition. The heritage foundation. https://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2019/book/index_2019.
pdf. 11 Mar 2019
Ng E, Yuan C, Chen L, Ren C, Fung JC et al (2011) Improving the wind environment in high-density
cities by understanding urban morphology and surface roughness: a study in Hong Kong. Landsc
Urban Plan 101(1):59–74. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2011.01.004
Ng I (1998) Urban redevelopment in Hong Kong: the partnership experience. Int J Public Sect
Manag 11(5):414–420. https://doi.org/10.1108/09513559810226879
Ng MK (2002) Property-led urban renewal in Hong Kong: any place for the community? Sustain
Dev 10(3):140–146. https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.189
Ng MK (2014) The state of planning rights in Hong Kong: a case study of ‘wall-like building.’
Town Plan Rev 85(4):489–511. https://doi.org/10.3828/tpr.2014.28
Ng MK (2018) Transformative urbanism and reproblematising land scarcity in Hong Kong. Urban
Stud. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098018800399
Rating and Valuation Department, HKSAR Government (2019a) Price indices by class (Territory-
wide) (from1979). https://www.rvd.gov.hk/en/property_market_statistics/index.html. 5 Jun 2019
Rating and Valuation Department, HKSARGovernment (2019b) Rental indices by class (Territory-
wide) (from1979). https://www.rvd.gov.hk/en/property_market_statistics/index.html. 5 Jun 2019
Ronald R, Doling J (2010) Shifting East Asian approaches to home ownership and the housing
welfare pillar. Int J Hous Policy 10(3):233–254. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616718.2010.506740
Sawada Y (2004) The social security system in Hong Kong: establishment and readjustment of the
liberal welfare model. Dev Econ 42(2):198–216. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-1049.2004.tb0
1063.x
Social Welfare Department, HKSAR Government (SWD) (2018a) Comprehensive social secu-
rity allowance (CSSA) scheme.https://www.swd.gov.hk/en/index/site_pubsvc/page_socsecu/
sub_comprehens/index.html. 15 Jan 2019
SocialWelfare Department, HKSARGovernment (SWD) (2018b) Old age living allowance. https://
www.swd.gov.hk/oala/index_e.html. 15 Jan 2019
Tang WS (2017) Beyond gentrification: hegemonic redevelopment in Hong Kong. Int J Urban Reg
Res 41(3):487–499. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12496
Transport Department, HKSARGovernment (TD) (2018) Government public transport fare conces-
sion scheme for the elderly and eligible persons with disabilities.https://www.td.gov.hk/en/gov_
public_transport_fare_concession/index.html. 15 Jan 2019
Valença MM (2015) Social rental housing in HK and the UK: Neoliberal policy divergence or
the market in the making? Habitat International 49:107–114. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.
2015.05.017
Wong MS, Nichol J, Ng E et al (2011) A study of the ‘wall effect’ caused by proliferation of
high-rise buildings using GIS techniques. Landsc Urban Plan 102(4):245–253. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.landurbplan.2011.05.003
Wong SHW (2015) Real estate elite, economic development, and political conflicts in postcolonial
Hong Kong. China Rev 15(1):1–38
Ye M, Vojnovic I, Chen G et al (2015) The landscape of gentrification: exploring the diversity of
‘upgrading’ processes in Hong Kong, 1986–2006. Urban Geogr 36(4):471–503. https://doi.org/
10.1080/02723638.2015.1010795
6 Dual Land Regime, Income Inequalities and Multifaceted Socio-Economic … 133
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 7
Income Inequality and Socioeconomic
Segregation in Jakarta
Deden Rukmana and Dinar Ramadhani
Abstract Socioeconomic segregation has become a common phenomenon, both in
the Global North and Global South, and highly relates to income inequality. The
merging of these two notions affects the geography of residential areas which are
based on the socio-occupational composition. This chapter focuses on the Jakarta
Metropolitan Area (JMA). Not only is Jakarta the largest metropolitan area in South-
east Asia, it is also one of the most dynamic. Batavia, the colonial capital of the
former Dutch East Indies in the first half of the twentieth century, was a small
urban area of approximately 150,000 residents. In the second half of the century,
Batavia became Jakarta, a megacity of 31 million people and the capital of inde-
pendent Indonesia was beset with most of the same urban problems experienced
in twenty-first-century Southeast Asia, including poverty, income inequality, and
socioeconomic segregation. This study aims to identify the correlation among income
inequality, socioeconomic segregation, and other institutional and contextual factors
which caused residential segregation in JMA. The analysis consists of two stages.
First, we examine income inequality measured by the Gini Index as well as the occu-
pational structure based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations
(ISCO). Second, we investigate residential segregation by using the Dissimilarity
Index as a result of socioeconomic intermixing in residential areas. The data in this
study comes from multiple sources including Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statis-
tics, Indonesia’s National Socio-economic Survey (Susenas), Indonesia’s Economic
Census, Jakarta’s Regional Bureau of Statistics, and policies related to the housing
system and investment in the JMA. This study also produces maps of socioeconomic
segregation patterns from several sources including Jakarta’s Geospatial Information
Centre, Jakarta’s Spatial Plan Information System, and the Indonesian Poverty Map
by the SMERU Research Institute.
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7.1 Introduction
Socioeconomic segregation has become a common phenomenon, both in the Global
North and theGlobal South, and is strongly related to income inequality. The residen-
tial geography of income inequality represents where different income groups live,
but also affects an individual’s spatial opportunity structures. This study will focus
on residential segregation in the metropolitan region of Jakarta. Not only is Jakarta
the largest metropolitan area in Southeast Asia, it is also one of the most dynamic.
Batavia, which used to be the colonial capital of the Dutch East Indies in the first half
of the twentieth century was a small urban area of approximately 150,000 residents.
In the second half of the twentieth century, Batavia became Jakarta, a megacity of
31 million people and the capital of independent Indonesia was beset with most of
the same urban problems experienced in twenty-first-century Southeast Asia.
The modern city of Jakarta was envisioned by President Soekarno in the early
1960s. He used the 1962 Asian Games to modernize Jakarta by building the national
monument of Monas, government and parliament buildings, shopping plazas, the
national stadium, and hotels. The New Order regime continued such development
while Indonesia enjoyed steady economic growth during the 1980s and 1990s. The
boom of the property sector through foreign and domestic investments transformed
Jakarta as it gained the status as a global city. Jakarta has been the powerhouse of
Indonesia’s economy since the colonial era due to its high concentration of skilled
labor and entrepreneurs and Jakarta’s dominance in the financial and business sector
(Firman 2008; Salim andKombaitan 2009). Jakarta is also themost attractive area for
domestic and foreign investment in Indonesia. Jakarta’s contribution to Indonesia’s
GDP increased from 14.9% in 2000 to 16.7% in 2010 and 17.5% in 2016.
Despite robust development and economic growth, Jakarta remains a place of
poverty. The contrast between rich and poor is highly pronounced in many parts
of the city (Prasetyanti 2015; Salim et al. 2019). Many modern towers in Jakarta
are surrounded by kampungs, which are unplanned, incrementally developed areas
with small plots of land and low-quality building structures and materials and are
often associated with slums (Winarso 2010). Most of the inhabitants of kampungs
are low-income residents.
This chapter explores income inequality and residential segregation between
socioeconomic groups in Jakarta, and the institutional and contextual factors that
cause residential segregation in the metropolitan region of Jakarta. The analysis
consists of two stages. First, we examine income inequality measured by the Gini
Index as well as the occupational structure based on the International Standard Clas-
sification of Occupations (ISCO). Second, we investigate residential segregation
by using the Location Quotients (LQs) and the Dissimilarity Index as a result of
socioeconomic intermixing in residential areas.
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This chapter uses data frommultiple sources including Indonesia’sCentral Bureau
of Statistics, the National Socio-Economic Survey (Susenas), the National Labor
Force Survey (Sakernas), and the Jakarta’s Regional Bureau of Statistics, as well
as policies related to the housing system and investment in the metropolitan region
of Jakarta. The study will also create maps representing socioeconomic segrega-
tion patterns and the data will be obtained from several sources including Jakarta’s
Geospatial Information Centre, Jakarta’s Spatial Plan Information System, and the
Indonesian Poverty Map by the SMERU Research Institute.
7.2 Jakarta: The Core, Inner Peripheries and Outer
Peripheries
Jakarta is the capital of Indonesia and the largest city inSoutheastAsia. The core of the
metropolitan region of Jakarta is calledDaerah Khusus Ibukota (DKI) or the Special
Capital Region of Jakarta. DKI Jakarta has provincial government level status and
covers a total area of 664 square kilometers. DKI Jakarta consists of five municipali-
ties (West Jakarta City, East Jakarta City, Central Jakarta City, North Jakarta City, and
South Jakarta City) and 42 districts (kecamatan). The metropolitan region of Jakarta
is popularly known as Jabodetabek, taken from the initial letters of the administra-
tive units of Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi. Jabodetabek consists
of the core, inner peripheries, and outer peripheries. The inner peripheries of the
metropolitan region of Jakarta include four municipalities (City of Tangerang, City
of South Tangerang, City of Depok, City of Bekasi), whereas the outer peripheries
of Jabodetabek include the City of Bogor, Tangerang Regency, and Bekasi Regency.
The peripheries of Jabodetabek are within the jurisdiction of two provinces. The City
of Bogor, City of Depok, City of Bekasi, and Bekasi Regency are within the juris-
diction of West Java Province, whereas Tangerang City, City of South Tangerang,
and Tangerang Regency are within the jurisdiction of Banten Province as shown
in Fig. 7.1. The metropolitan region of Jakarta covers a total area of 6,392 square
kilometers. The four municipalities within the inner peripheries of Jabodetabek are
founded in the 1990s and 2000s. Tangerang City, City of Bekasi, City of Depok,
and City of South Tangerang were founded in 1993, 1996, 1999, and 2008, respec-
tively. Depok City seceded from Bogor Regency and Bekasi City was part of Bekasi
Regency. Meanwhile, Tangerang City and City of South Tangerang seceded from
Tangerang Regency.
The population of Jakarta was about 115,000 in 1900, and increased to 544,823
in 1940. After Independence, Jakarta’s population increased by nearly three times
to 1.43 million in 1950. It increased to 2.91 million in 1960 and 4.47 million in
1970. Table 7.1 shows the population of the metropolitan region of Jakarta including
Jakarta, the inner and outer peripheries of Jakarta, from 1990 to 2010 and 2015. All
data come from the population censuses, except the population data of 2015 from
the intercensal survey of Indonesia (SUPAS). The population of the metropolitan
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Fig. 7.1 Map of the metropolitan region of Jakarta
region of Jakarta increased from 17.14 million in 1990, to 20.63 million in 2000,
to 28.01 million in 2010, and to 31.62 million in 2015. In 2015, the metropolitan
region of Jakarta accounted for 12.39% of Indonesia’s total population, while this
population resides in less than 0.3% of Indonesia’s total land area. The proportions of
Jabodetabek’s population to the total Indonesia’s population have steadily increased
from 9.6% in 1990, to 10.0% in 2000, and to 11.8% in 2010.
This chapter focuses on the core and the inner peripheries of the metropolitan
region of Jakarta or Jabodetabek including all five municipalities within DKI Jakarta
and Tangerang City, South Tangerang City, Depok City, and Bekasi City as the study
area. The selection of the core and the inner peripheries of Jabodetabek refers to
the functional urban areas (FUAs) as defined by the OECD. As shown in Fig. 7.1,
Tangerang City, South Tangerang City, Depok City, and Bekasi City are neighboring
areas of DKI Jakarta to the West, South, and East, respectively. The population
density of these municipalities in 2015 is 11,531 inhabitants per square kilometers.
The population density of each municipality in the inner peripheries of Jabodetabek
is presented in Table 7.1.
The chapter uses a report published in 2014 by the Central Board of Statistics
“Statistik Komuter Jabodetabek” (The Statistics of Commuters in Jabodetabek) to
identify the proportion of employed residents of the peripheries of the metropolitan
region of Jakarta who work in the urban core or DKI Jakarta. According to this report
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Table 7.1 Population and population density of the metropolitan region of Jakarta in 1990–2015
Area Number of population (in millions) Area (in sq. km) Population
density in 2015
(per sq. km)
1990 2000 2010 2015
Core 8.26 8.39 9.60 10.17 664 15,316
DKI Jakarta 8.26 8.39 9.60 10.17 664 15,316
Inner
peripheries
n.a 4.93 7.22 8.36 725 11,531
City of
Tangerang
n.a 1.33 1.80 2.04 164 12,439
City of South
Tangerang
n.a 0.80 1.29 1.53 151 10,132
City of Depok n.a 1.14 1.75 2.09 200 10,450
City of Bekasi n.a 1.66 2.38 2.7 210 12,857
Outer
peripheries
8.88 7.31 11.20 13.09 5003 2,616
City of Bogor 0.27 0.75 0.95 1.04 109 9,541
Tangerang
Regency
2.77 2.02 2.84 3.36 960 3,500
Bekasi
Regency
2.10 1.62 2.63 3.23 1,270 2,543
Bogor
Regency
3.74 2.92 4.78 5.46 2,664 2,049
Jabodetabek 17.14 20.63 28.02 31.62 6,392 4,946
Sources Rukmana et al. (2018), Central Board of Statistics (2015)
(Central Board of Statistics 2014), less than 15% of residents living in municipalities
within the outer peripheries of Jabodetabek, actually work in DKI Jakarta. The City
of Bogor, Tangerang Regency, Bekasi Regency, and Bogor Regency have 3.2%,
1.7%, 4.2%, and 2.8% of their residents, respectively, who commute and work in
DKI Jakarta.
Meanwhile, three municipalities within inner peripheries of the metropolitan
region of Jakarta, including Depok City, South Tangerang City, and Bekasi City,
have at least 15% of their residents who commute and work in DKI Jakarta. Depok
City, South Tangerang City, and Bekasi City have 15.7%, 15.3%, and 15.5% of their
residents, respectively, working in the core of Jabodetabek. Tangerang City is the
only municipality within the inner peripheries of Jabodetabek has less than 15%
of the residents working in DKI Jakarta (10.7%). However, Tangerang City is still
included in the study area of this chapter because of its high population density
(12,439 inhabitants per km2), and its close proximity to the core of Jabodetabek.
140 D. Rukmana and D. Ramadhani
7.3 Rapid Urbanization and Income Inequality
Jakarta experienced rapid urbanization in the 1980s and 1990s. The population of
the core area of Jabodetabek or DKI Jakarta increased from 6.50 million in 1980
to 8.26 million in 1990. The population of the peripheries of Jabodetabek increased
from 5.41 million to 8.88 million in the same period (Rukmana et al. 2018). In
the 1990s, Jakarta sustained the rapid growth of population, but the growth occurred
mostly in the peripheries. The core area of Jabodetabek experienced a slow growth of
population of 0.15% per year, but the peripheries of Jabodetabek experienced a very
high growth of population of 3.78% per year. In addition to a high population growth
and rural-to-urban migration, this rapid suburbanization was a result of Indonesia’s
steady economic growth and Indonesia’s growing linkages to the world economy
(Herlambang et al. 2019; Indraprahasta and Derudder 2019; Leaf 1994; Winarso
et al. 2015). In the early 1980s, agricultural areas and forests in the outskirts of
Jakarta were transformed into large-scale subdivisions and new towns (Silver 2008).
Jakarta’s suburbanization followed the development of a network of freeways from
Jakarta to the peripheries including the Jagorawi toll road, the Jakarta-Merak toll
road, and the Jakarta-Cikampek toll road (Henderson and Kuncoro 1996).
The urban development in the peripheries of Jabodetabek is a planned or regu-
lated process (Leaf 1994). It contrasts the unregulated urban growth in the Jakarta’s
kampungs. Suburban development in Jakarta is made up of large-scale housing
projects and new town developments by private developers. These housing projects
and new towns are sold to mostly middle and upper-income residents (Firman 2004;
Leaf 1994). Some of the new towns have excellent infrastructure and facilities,
including shopping malls, hospitals, and golf courses. Many middle and upper-
income residents moved from the core of the urban region to new towns in the
peripheries. The poor and lower middle-income residents of the metropolitan region
of Jakarta still live in unplanned and unregulated settlements of kampungs located
in both the core area and in the peripheries. Most residents in kampungs own their
housing units, built with low-quality building materials on small plots of land. Most
of the dwellings are constructed gradually by the residents from permanent and non-
permanent materials, depending largely on what the residents can afford (Tunas and
Peresthu 2010). Many poor kampung residents in the metropolitan region of Jakarta
are marginalized urban residents who illegally construct their dwellings on state land
such as riverbanks, disposal sites, and railway tracks, or on private unoccupied land
(Rukmana 2018; Winayanti and Lang 2004).
Jakarta is a city of dualistic contrasts (Leaf 1994). The new suburban settlements
or the ‘modern’ city are associated with wealth, formality, and globalized standards
of urban development. Meanwhile, the kampung city is associated with poverty,
informality, and traditional standards of living. The existence of new suburban
communities and kampungs in Jakarta reflects the socioeconomic dualism which
pervades Indonesia’s urban society (Leaf 1994; Winarso 2010). The dualism of
Jakarta’s society also reflects the widening socioeconomic disparities and residen-
tial segregation based on income level and lifestyle. Firman (2004) argues that the
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suburban development of Jakarta creates enclave settlements which segregate middle
and upper-income residents from low-income residents.
The 1992 Housing and Settlement Law introduced a 1:3:6 provision that requires
developers to build three middle-income and six low-income units for every high-
income housing unit. This socially integrated housing policy had two main objec-
tives including producing more affordable houses and encouraging more socially
integrated housing development through mixed-income residential areas (Mungkasa
2013; Silver 2008; Yuniati 2013). In most large-scale housing projects in the
metropolitan region of Jakarta, the developers negotiated the housing compositions
with local governments and even replaced low-cost housing units with public facil-
ities and infrastructure development (Tunas and Darmoyono 2014). The developers
circumvented the 1:3:6 regulation by building the required low-income housing
elsewhere, or not at all (Herlambang et al. 2019).
Suburban development in the region of Jakarta was disrupted by the economic
crisis which hit many Asian countries in 1997. This crisis resulted in a rapid decrease
in domestic and foreign investment in Jakarta. The annual economic growth in Jakarta
fell to minus 7% (Firman 1999). More than 450 developers who built new towns
and large-scale housing projects in the metropolitan region of Jakarta went out of
business. The property industry consolidated through mergers (Herlambang et al.
2019). By 2002, about two-fifths of the property projects in the metropolitan region
of Jakarta suddenly came to a stop (Firman 2004; Indraprahasta and Derudder 2019).
From the late 1960s to the mid-1990s, Indonesia’s income per capita increased by
5% per year and the overall Gini coefficient was about 0.33. Indonesia’s Gini coeffi-
cient is lower than those of the Philippines and Thailand (0.45) and Malaysia (0.50)
(Timmer 2007). The Asian economic crisis caused a sharp reduction in Indonesia’s
GDP of over 13% and poverty rates doubled in 1998 (Skoufias and Suryahadi 2000).
The Asian economic crisis also sharply reduced inequality in Indonesia, particularly
in the metropolitan region of Jakarta.
Indonesia’s economy recovered from the Asian economic crisis as early as 2005
(Herlambang et al. 2019). The rate of Indonesia’s economic growth was 5.7% per
year between 2004 and 2008 (Rukmana et al. 2018), and the influx of foreign
direct investment increased again in the metropolitan region of Jakarta (Indrapra-
hasta and Derudder 2019). The recovery of Indonesia’s economic growth resulted
in the construction of high-rise luxury apartments (Rukmana et al. 2018) in many
districts of the core of the metropolitan region of Jakarta such as Nerina Tower in
Cempaka PutihDistrict, ParadiseMansionApartment inKalideresDistrict, and Elpis
Residence in Sawah Besar District (Colliers International 2017). Many investors of
these apartments came from China, Singapore, Japan (Colliers International 2018).
Income inequality measures at the neighborhood level, such as sub-districts (kelu-
rahan), with a population of approximately 20,000 people are not available in
Indonesia (Roitman and Recio 2019). Unlikemost census data sets in countries in the
GlobalNorth, Indonesia’s censuses do not provide information on household income.
This chapter uses the Gini Index of household expenditure as a proxy measure of
income inequality. The Gini Index of household expenditure in Indonesia was calcu-
lated and published by the SMERU Research Institute. The data source for the Gini
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Index is the National Socioeconomic Survey (Susenas) and Indonesia’s Economic
Census.
The Gini Index of household expenditure in Indonesia by districts is available
for 2010 and 2015. The average population of each district is about 100,000. The
SMERU Research Institute published the Gini Index in both years and made them
available on their website. The SMERU Research Institute stated in 2019 that the
Gini Index was developed from a series of variables from individual, household, and
sub-district levels, and that the standard error of the 2010 Gini Index derived from
the National Socioeconomic Survey (Susenas) of 2010 is large. This chapter uses
only the 2015 Gini Index due to the large standard error of the 2010 Gini Index.
We retrieved all Gini Indices for all 85 districts of the study area from the SMERU
Research Institute website. The 85 districts of the study area include 42 districts in
DKI Jakarta, 13 districts in Tangerang City, 7 districts in South Tangerang City, 11
districts in Depok City, and 12 districts Bekasi City.
The 2015 Gini Index in the study area ranges from 0.25 in Bantargebang District
of Bekasi City to 0.40 in Kelapa Gading District of DKI Jakarta’s North Jakarta City.
The 2015 Gini Index average in the area study is 0.31. This Gini Index is slightly
lower than Indonesia’s Gini Index (0.40) in the same year. The Gini Index of four
municipalities in the inner peripheries of themetropolitan region of Jakarta including
Depok City (0.30), South Tangerang City (0.31), Tangerang City (0.31), and Bekasi
City (0.30) are slightly lower than those of the municipalities in DKI Jakarta (0.33)
(Fig. 7.2).
The distribution of the 2015 Gini Index in the study area is presented in Fig. 7.3.
Five districts in the study area with the highest Gini Index are located in Central
Jakarta City (Cempaka Putih and Menteng Districts), North Jakarta City (Kelapa
Gading District), East Jakarta City (Duren Sawit District), and South Jakarta City
(Kebayoran Baru District). A high Gini Index indicates high levels of economic
inequality in those districts. In districts with high-economic inequality, many luxury
apartment buildings, shopping malls, and offices are surrounded by kampungs
(Budi 2013; Simatupang et al. 2015; Yunianto 2014). Districts with high-economic
inequality also have gated communities which represent socioeconomic enclaves for
the rich (Hun 2002). People who can afford to live in gated communities in Jakarta
do so because of security reasons (Leisch 2002). In the inner peripheries of the
metropolitan region of Jakarta, there are a number of districts with a moderate-to-
high level of income inequality. This income inequality increased in those districts
because of the existence of gated communities including in South Tangerang City
(Leisch 2002;Winarso et al. 2015;Yandri 2015), TangerangCity (Leisch 2002; Surya
Wardhani 2016), and Bekasi City (Diningrat 2015).
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Fig. 7.2 Distribution of occupational groups and change over time in the metropolitan region of
Jakarta
7.4 Changes in Occupational Structures
The economy of the metropolitan region of Jakarta is composed of very diverse
activities and related occupations. This section discusses changes in the occupation
structures in themetropolitan region of Jakarta.We use data from the annual National
Labor ForceSurvey (Sakernas) in three years (2011, 2015, and 2018).Weuse this data
to analyze the patterns of socioeconomic segregation over time. The classifications
of the economically active population by occupation in the Sakernas are in line
with those of the International Standard Classification on Occupations (ISCO). The
breakdown of occupational structures of the ISCO also relates to earlier studies on
socioeconomic segregation (Marcińczak et al. 2015; Musterd et al. 2017).
The occupation classifications of the Sakernas has nine ISCO categories including
managers (MAN), professional (PRO), technicians (TEC), clerks (CLE), sellers
(SEL), agriculture workers (ARG), industrial workers (IND), machine operators
(MAC), and unskilled workers (UNS). The nine categories were grouped into three
broader occupational groups. The managers and professionals fall into the top occu-
pational group (TOG). The technicians, clerks, and sellers are categorized in the
144 D. Rukmana and D. Ramadhani
middle occupational group (MOG), while agricultural workers, industrial workers,
machine operators, and unskilled workers form the bottom occupational group
(BOG).
Figure 7.2 shows the distribution of occupational groups in 2011, 2015, and
2018 in the metropolitan region of Jakarta. It is clear that the population in Jakarta
Metropolitan Area (JMA) is dominated by the MOG, and the percentage of this
middle group has grown between 2011 and 2018. Sellers are the largest occupational
group, followed by unskilled workers, clerks, machine operators, industrial workers,
professionals, technicians, manager, and agricultural workers. The small number of
agricultural workers in the Jakarta region is due to the urban character of the region,
and the disappearance of farmland and rice fields in the JMA. The largest occupa-
tional category in the BOG consists of unskilled workers. As can be seen in Fig. 7.2,
both the TOG and MOG have been increasing from 2011 to 2018. In the meantime,
the BOG have been decreasing during the same time period. The percentage of the
TOG is far below the BOG and MOG. The number of workers in the TOG, with
high-quality human resources, is still low for a growing megacity like the JMA. The
size of this top group has hardly increased between 2011 and 2018.
Fig. 7.3 The 2015 Gini index in the metropolitan region of Jakarta
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7.5 Levels of Residential Segregation Between
Socioeconomic Groups
The Dissimilarity Index (DI) in Table 7.2 shows the level of segregation between
the different occupational categories. This chapter uses data on the occupation struc-
ture from the annual National Labor Force Survey (Sakernas) to calculate dissimi-
larity index in the metropolitan region of Jakarta. Indonesia’s censuses or household
surveys do not provide socioeconomic information of households at the neighbor-
hood level. Data on the occupation structure derived from the annual National Labor
Force Survey (Sakernas) can only be used at the level of municipalities or higher.
We have a total of nine municipalities including five municipalities within DKI
Jakarta (West Jakarta City, East Jakarta City, Central Jakarta City, North Jakarta
City, and South Jakarta City) and four municipalities in the inner peripheries of the
metropolitan region of Jakarta (City of Tangerang, City of South Tangerang, City of
Depok, City of Bekasi). The population size of these municipalities in 2015 ranges
from 0.91 million in Central Jakarta City to 2.84 million in East Jakarta City. The
Sakernas has very limited samples at the district or sub-district levels; therefore, we
cannot use a smaller geographic unit for calculating a dissimilarity index.
In Table 7.2, the DI in 2011 is shown below the diagonal gray cells, while the DI
in 2018 is shown above the diagonal gray cells. The most prominent DI in 2011 is
segregation between agricultural workers and all other categories in the TOG and
MOG. But it has to be noted that the group of agricultural workers is very small. The
lowest DI is denoted by technicians and professionals (6.3), followed by unskilled
workers and clerks (9.7). In 2018, the highest DI is found for sellers and agricultural
workers (33.9), and the lowest DI for clerks and other categories with values below
11, except that of the agricultural workers (33.9). The lowest DI in 2018 is found for
technicians and professionals (5.6).
Table 7.2 Indices of dissimilarity (multiplied by 100) in 2011 and 2018 in the metropolitan region
of Jakarta
Jakarta 
MAN PRO TEC CLE SEL AGR IND MAC UNS TOP MID BOT
MAN 11 11 6 8 32 13 10 7
PRO 11 6 10 14 29 15 13 14
TEC 12 6 10 15 32 15 13 15
CLE 18 11 11 7 31 9 9 7
SEL 24 20 16 10 34 12 13 6
AGR 47 44 46 45 41 24 29 32
IND 24 21 25 19 18 29 10 12
MAC 15 14 17 17 21 38 12 13
UNS 16 12 14 10 12 38 12 12
TOP 8 9
MID 15 6
BOT 13 9 
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For the broader occupational group, it can be seen that the DIs for all combi-
nations of groups are decreasing. It means that the spatial enclaves of these socio-
occupational groups are getting smaller. In other words, the segregation level among
occupational groups is decreasing and the municipalities in Jakarta are more mixed
in 2018 than in 2011. It is especially apparent in the spatial proximity between the
kampongs and neighboring luxury apartment buildings in the inner city, such as in
Mega Kuningan (Budi 2013), Menteng, and Rasuna (Simatupang et al. 2015), and
Kemayoran (Yunianto 2014).
The biggest decline is related to the DI between the TOG and MOG category,
which halves from 15 in 2011 to 7.7 in 2018. It is then followed by the 3.9 points
decrease of the TOP and BOG from 13 in 2011 to 9.1 in 2018. The smallest reduction
is found for the DI of the MOG and the BOG category from 8.6 in 2011 to 5.9 in
2018. It can also be seen that the order of the highest to smallest DI is shifting. The
order in 2011 is TOG-MOG (15), TOG-BOG (13), and MOG-BOG (8.6), while the
order in 2018 is TOG-BOG (9.1), TOG-MOG (7.7), and MOG-BOG (5.9). From the
order of the DI, it can be concluded that TOG is still the most segregated group when
compared with the others, though the gap is getting smaller.
7.6 Geography of Residential Segregation Between
Socioeconomic Groups
This section analyzes the geography of residential segregation between the top and
the bottom socioeconomic groups. We use location quotient maps for the top and
bottomoccupation groups at the level ofmunicipalities as a proxymeasure of changes
in residential segregation between socioeconomic groups. Location quotients of the
occupational structure by municipalities in the study area were calculated from the
2011 and 2018 Sakernas surveys. The location quotients of the TOG in 2011 range
from 0.58 in North Jakarta City to 1.72 in Central Jakarta City. Central Jakarta
City remained as the municipality with the highest location quotient (1.45) and East
JakartaCity became themunicipalitywith the lowest location quotient (0.88) in 2018.
The location quotients for the BOG in 2011 ranged from 0.72 (East Jakarta City) to
1.42 (Tangerang City). In 2018, East Jakarta City remained as the municipality with
the lowest location quotient (0.71) and Central Jakarta City was the municipality
with the highest location quotient for the BOG (1.75).
Figure 7.4 shows the location quotient maps for the top and bottom occupational
groups in 2011 and 2018. Thesemaps cannot showchanges in residential segregation,
but they do give an indication of changes in the geographical concentrations of
the top and bottom occupational groups at the municipal level. The TOG remains
highly concentrated in Central Jakarta City and South Tangerang City. Some luxury
apartments such asKeraton andLe Parc inCentral Jakarta City reached toUS$10,700
and US$5,350 per m2, respectively (Alexander 2019). This price is far higher than
the rest of the city. In contrast, the lowest land price in the inner city of Jakarta
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Fig. 7.4 Location quotients for the top and bottom occupational groups in the metropolitan region
of Jakarta
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can be found at Kamal Muara, North Jakarta, which is worth merely US$34 per
m2 (Elmanisa et al. 2016). Meanwhile, South Tangerang City has a couple of large
luxury residential areas including Bintaro Jaya and BSD City.
Central Jakarta City became a concentration area for both the TOG and BOG.
According to an interview with staff from the Housing Department of Jakarta
Province, such a concentration is the result of the fact that luxury houses and apart-
ments are increasingly found in Central Jakarta City. It is also the location of many
shopping malls, the central business district, government buildings, embassies, and
official government houses which makes the land and housing prices expensive. The
high concentration of the TOG in South Tangerang City is caused by the develop-
ment of a new central business district, and middle-upper class housing, especially
in Bumi Serpong Damai (BSD). In addition, both Central Jakarta City and South
Tangerang City have good accessibility and are connected with highways and train
routes.
In reference to Fig. 7.4a, b, many households of the top occupational groupmoved
from Tangerang City to the core of the metropolitan region of Jakarta. It relates to the
fact that a large industrial area is located inTangerang. The laborerswhich fall into the
BOGmostly reside in Tangerang. Meanwhile, the BOG remains highly concentrated
in Central Jakarta City and Tangerang City. Behind the high-rise buildings in Central
Jakarta City, there can be found many informal housing areas in the form of urban
kampongs. Based on an interviewwith a staff member from the Housing Department
of Jakarta Province, urban kampongs in Jakarta are the residential locations for
the BOG or informal sector workers such as street vendors, cleaning workers, and
security guards.
The changes of location quotients indicate that four municipalities have an
increased concentration of the TOG in 2018 includingWest Jakarta City, East Jakarta
City, North Jakarta City, and Depok City. It is marked by several concentrations
of luxury apartments found in those municipalities, such as Veranda Residence,
Wang Residence, St Moritz (West Jakarta City), The H Residence, Patria Park (East
Jakarta City), Regatta London Tower, The Summit, Sherwood Residence (North
Jakarta City), De Vonte Apartments, Grand Depok City, Permata Green Sentosa, and
Victoria Hills Residence (Depok City).
In the meantime, three municipalities experienced an increased concentration of
the BOG in 2018 including Central Jakarta City, South Jakarta City, and Bekasi City.
Tangerang City is the only municipality in the study area experiencing a decreased
concentration of both top and bottom occupational groups from 2011 to 2018. A
further analysis shows that Tangerang City has an increased concentration of the
middle occupational group during the same period.
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7.7 Conclusion
This chapter describes changes in inequality and socioeconomic segregation in the
core and the inner peripheries of the Jakarta metropolitan region. Under the transfor-
mative government of Indonesia, Jakarta has experienced various kinds of develop-
ment, the most important of which is openness to private and foreign investment. The
suburban area of Jakarta has grown rapidly and transformed rural areas and agricul-
tural land into a vast area of housing which were targeted mostly to the middle-upper
class community. This has led to rather homogenous socioeconomic areas in the
outskirts of themetropolitan area.As the result, theGini Indices in the inner periphery
of Jakarta are lower than those in the municipalities of DKI Jakarta. It means that the
household expenditure inequality in the inner periphery is narrower than that in the
municipalities of DKI Jakarta. The high Gini Indices in the municipalities of DKI
Jakarta are caused by the existence of urban kampongs among the high-rise building
with luxury apartments, offices, and shopping center. Meanwhile, segregation in the
periphery of Jakarta occurred because of gated communities developed by the private
sector.
In 2030, vertical housing for the low, middle, and upper class will dominate the
city. A lecturer from the University of Tarumanegara, Suryono Herlambang, argued
that the existence of vertical housing will worsen residential segregation (Mariani
2019). Vertical residential buildings tend to be more socioeconomically segregated.
The luxury apartments and penthouse for the upper class are built separately from
low-cost apartments for the middle-low class will (Mariani 2019). This chapter used
data by municipalities for calculating the segregation indices. If data would have
been available at a smaller geographical unit, the levels of residential segregation
would be possibly higher.
The occupational profile breakdown shows that the Jakarta Metropolitan Area
residents are dominated by the MOG, and then followed by the BOG and TOG. The
largest groups are the sellers (MOG) and unskilled workers (BOG), and the size
of the TOG group is relatively small. As the LQ maps showed, it is obvious that
the high proportion of LOG occupied more municipalities than the TOG. However,
housing provision by the private sector does not meet the demand for the middle-
and low-class population of society who reside outside gated communities and create
segregated residential areas.
The socioeconomic segregation in JMA is fostered by the government’s policy on
land use. The privatization of land in the core and the inner peripheries of Jakarta by
private developers affected the housing market and the affordability of the commu-
nity. Addressing segregation in this context should not only rely on controlling
the housing market, but also on developing community capacity and creating more
employment opportunities in JMA.
In August 2019, Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo announced Indonesia’s
capital relocation plan. The government of Indonesia selected two regencies (North
Penajam Paser and Kutai Kartanegara) in East Kalimantan as the new site for
Indonesia’s capital. The governmental function and buildings will be moved to the
150 D. Rukmana and D. Ramadhani
new site and will be ready for occupation in 2024. However, Jakarta will remain
the country’s economic hub. It means that the housing market in Jakarta will remain
tense. Furthermore, the 2030 Jakarta Spatial Plan also mentions the phrase ‘estate
management’ which means land management in Jakarta will be bestowed to private
developers. The relocation of Indonesia’s capital out of Jakarta will not ease the
myriad of problems Jakarta will face, especially as it is projected that 1.5 million
people will migrate from Jakarta (Walton 2019). Jakarta’s problems will remain in
place unless serious attention is paid to them including socioeconomic segregation
and income inequality.
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Chapter 8
Socio-spatial Segregation and Exclusion
in Mumbai
Abdul Shaban and Zinat Aboli
Abstract Indian society is characterised by significant horizontal (religious,
regional, linguistic) and vertical (income, occupation, caste) divisions. These socio-
economic fragmentations significantly shape the production of space in cities. In
fact, all major cities in the country are pervaded by socio-spatial divides, which
often become sources of conflict, violence, exclusion and, also, solidarity. Mumbai
is the industrial, commercial and financial capital of the country. Bollywood has, over
the years, helped in carving out a distinct (pan) Indian identity for itself and the city,
both within and outside India, and is a major rallying and unifying aspect for India.
Among all its glitter, the city is also infamous for its underworld (originating from its
excluded and marginalised neighbourhoods), slums and poor residential areas. The
city is pervaded by socio-spatial fragmentation and is a divided city. This chapter
shows that the highest level of segregation in Mumbai is based on religion (Muslims
and Non-Muslims), followed by class, caste and tribe.
Keywords Socio-spatial segregation · Real estate prices · Slums · Communal
violence ·Marginalisation
8.1 Introduction
India is socio-culturally a very diverse country. Historically, it has been home to all
the major races, castes, languages and religions. Hundreds of minor groups have
also existed side by side. Indian civilisation has evolved through the processes of
immigration, assimilation and adaptation. Although large-scale inter-group wars and
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violence have been absent in Indian history, as experienced by European civilisa-
tion, the processes of devalourisation, de-assimilation, discrimination and peaceful
hostility against marginalised and minorities have existed in one form or another.
About 80% of the Indian population follows Hinduism. Caste, especially in
Hinduism, has been one of the major defining social features, based on the concep-
tion of purity and pollution, endogamy and commensality. Hindus are divided into
four varnas1 (major caste groups) where the lowest caste group is Shudras (the
untouchables), now termed as Scheduled Castes2 (SCs). The Shudras, historically,
have faced socio-spatial exclusion. Another defining feature of Indian society is the
division based on tribes. Tribal groups in India belong to different ethnic groups and
are often treated as outcaste population. Although the Government of India has made
several provisions and anti-discrimination laws, socio-spatial exclusion, discrimina-
tion and segregation continue to be practised both in urban and rural areas. These
socio-spatial practices largely shape the morphologies of Indian villages and cities.
The early twentieth century saw the emergence of religion-based politics in India.
Hinduism became a major rallying point for certain political parties [Jana Sangh,
now Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and cultural groups like Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS)]. Muslims, as a religious minority group, have been under constant
threat from hostility, violence and discrimination by right-wing Hindus. Thousands
of lives from both communities have been lost in these hostilities. The open and tacit
discrimination against Muslims in the housing market, jobs and education have also
existed since then. Succumbing to theHindu right-wing groups, the State has not been
able to bring any separate provisions to deal with the violence and discrimination
against Muslims [as has been done in the case of SC and Scheduled Tribes (STs)3].
As a result, today, a very polarised communal (religious) concentration exists in
Indian cities.
These socially discriminatory practices have also shaped the morphology and
distribution of populations in Indian cities. All the major cities in the country,
including Mumbai, are pervaded by socio-spatial divides, which in turn become
sources of conflict, violence, exclusion and, also, of solidarity. Mumbai is the indus-
trial, commercial and financial capital of the country. Among all its glitter, the city
is also infamous for its underworld (originating from its excluded and marginalised
social groups and neighbourhoods), slums and poor residential areas. The city is
pervaded by socio-spatial fragmentation and the divides run deep along religious,
class and caste lines. We do not have city-level data for income inequalities, but the
World Bank (2020) estimates show that income inequalities at the country level in
1There are four varnas among Hindus, namely Brahmins (priestly castes), Kshatriyas (warrior
castes), Vaishyas (cultivators and merchant castes) the Shudras (the lowest castes in the hierarchy,
the untouchables).
2Scheduled Caste is an officially designated group of historically disadvantaged people in India.
The British in India created a list of castes belonging to Shudra group which was adopted in 1935
under the Government of India Act (see Dushkin 1967: 626).
3Scheduled Tribes are the tribal groups of India scheduled under the Government of India
Constitutional Order of 1950 or the Act as amended thereafter (Government of India 1950).
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India measured through the Gini index have risen from 32.1 in 1982, to 34.4 in 2004
and 35.7 in 2011.
The present paper attempts to examine exclusionary development and socio-
spatial divides in Mumbai on class (population with formal housing versus those
living in informal neighbourhoods, called slums), religion (between Non-Muslims
and Muslims), castes (non-SCs and SCs) and tribes (non-STs and STs) bases. The
paper is divided into six sections. Section 8.2 outlines the data and methods used to
examine the socio-spatial segregations. Section 8.3 deals with real estate prices and
slums in Mumbai. Section 8.4 examines the religious conflicts and segregation of
Muslims in the city. Section 8.5 discusses the spatial concentrations and exclusions
of SCs and STs. The last section concludes the paper.
8.2 Data and Methods
Mumbai city (Greater Mumbai) has seen a steady increase in population over the
years. The population of the city has risen from 0.9 million in 1901 to 12.4 million
in 2011. The population density of the city is currently about 28,472 persons/sq. km.
This population growth has been fuelled by migration from different states of the
country including from within Maharashtra state (in which Mumbai is located). The
city is home to all major religious communities in the world. Muslims constituted
20.7% of the total population ofMumbai city in 2011 and formed the largest religious
minority group (Census of India 2011). The share of Hindus in the same year was
66%. Other religious groups like Buddhists (4.9%), Jains (4.1%), Christians (3.3%),
and Sikhs (0.5%) individually constituted less than 5% each of the total population
of the city.
For this study, data has been collected from various sources to examine place-
based segregation and interaction between dominant and marginalised ethnic groups
in Mumbai city. The decennial population census of India is a major source for data
on religion, caste and tribes. It provides data at ward and sub-ward (section) levels
for SC and ST populations for cities. There are 88 sections in Mumbai and they have
an average population of around 141,000. Data on the religious groups are avail-
able only at city and district levels, which are meso units. Therefore, an attempt was
made to find out the data from alternative sources. The Election Commission of India
provides the eligible voter’s name.An attemptwasmade to sort the names ofMuslims
from the voter lists of 2018 [(as has been done by Susewind (2017) for 11 cities of
India)]. The adults over 18 years old are registered in these voter lists. The distinctly
‘Muslim sounding’ names were sorted out from the lists. However, there remains a
possibility of errors of 5–10% due to non-recognisable names and non-registration of
Muslims in voter lists (see Shariff and Shaifullah 2018 on Muslim missing voters).
There are in total 36 assembly constituencies in Mumbai and Mumbai Suburban
districts. Together these districts are known as Greater Mumbai or Mumbai City
(see Fig. 8.1). The data was compiled for 7289 polling booths (with an average
number of voters about 930, and a population of about 1250, respectively, per booth)
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Fig. 8.1 Assembly Constituencies in Mumbai and General Geographical Context, 2018. (Source
Authors). Note The base map used from Esri’s ArcGIS online, while the Assembly Constituencies
are drawn by the authors
under 27 assembly constituencies. Data for 9 constituencies could not be gathered,
namely Borivali, Dahisar,Magathane, Kandivali, Charkop,Mankhurd Shivaji Nagar,
Anushakti Nagar, Vandre West and Wadala. The total registered voters in these
constituencies (leaving out nine constituencies) were 5,503,051 and the total number
of Muslim voters were 1,271,655, that is 23.1%. As per the Census of India (2011),
Muslims comprised about 21% of the total population of Mumbai City.
Index of Dissimilarity (D), Entropy Index (h) and Interaction or Exposure Index
(B) have been computed to examine the spatial segregation and interaction of the
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above-mentioned ethnic groups. For discussion on D, h and B indices, see also
Chap. 1 of this book.
The data for slums by census tracts or sections are available only for the year
2001. The 2011 Census provides data for slum population only at the city level.
Therefore, only the 2001 Census data, for its 88 sections are used for understanding
the distribution and concentration of slum populations in the city. The data on real
estate (residential/flat) prices are taken from supplements published by the popular
broadsheet daily, The Times of India and adjusted to property tax wards.
8.3 Real Estate and Increase of Slums in the City
Residentially,Mumbai is a divided city. On the one hand, there are upper andmiddle-
class high rises and colonies, on the other, there are vast areas of slums inhabited
by lower and underclasses. The high rises and middle- and upper class colonies are
also interspersed by slums. It is a city where thousands also live on the pavement
in rudimentary structures, which may have not be classified as slums by the Census
of India.4 In fact, an increasing population, a lack of land supply, and lackadaisical
government policy response have created considerable housing and shelter issues in
the city. The prices of the houses in the city have grown enormously over the years
and have gone beyond the reach of the lower class population. The ratio between the
index number of the income of factory workers (this index is used for the working
class related inflation and as most of the population in the city are workers, it is the
most appropriate index) in Maharashtra and the price of residential flats in Mumbai
provides further insight into this issue (Table 8.1). The ratio has considerably risen
over the years. Notwithstanding the rise in income of factory workers, the compara-
tively higher rise in real estate prices have dashed the hopes of lower classes to own
a house. Between 2003 and 2012, the price of real estate in the city increased by 3.5
times relative to the wages of the factory workers. Only in the Eastern Suburb of the
city, the increase in real estate priceswas slightly lower,while the highest increasewas
in Mumbai District. During 2003–2012, the average flat prices in Mumbai District
[from INR 6,872 (US $147.5) to INR 36,056 (US $773.7)], and Western Suburb
[from INR 3,726 (US $80.0) to INR 18,211 (US $390.8)] have risen more than five
4Census of India (2011: 4) defines a slum as residential areas where dwellings are unfit for human
habitation by reasons of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangements and design of such build-
ings, narrowness or faulty arrangement of street, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities
or any combination of these factors which are detrimental to the safety and health. Three types of
slums have been identified for the purpose of Census. There are: (i) notified slums (All notified
areas in a town or city notified as ‘slum’ by State, UT Administration or Local Government under
any Act including a ‘Slum Act’), (ii) recognised slums (All areas recognised as ‘Slum’ by State,
UT Administration or Local Government, Housing and Slum Boards, which may have not been
formally notified as slum under any act) and (iii) identified slums (A compact area of at least 300
population or about 60–70 households of poorly built congested tenements, in unhygienic envi-
ronment usually with inadequate infrastructure and lacking in proper sanitary and drinking water
facilities).
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Table 8.1 Comparison of wages of factory workers and prices of flats in Mumbai
Wages/Prices/Index 2003 2012
Average annual wages of factory
workers*
Per annum (Indian Rupees, Rs. or
INR)
71,778 103,000
Index no. of wages 100 143.5
Average price of flats in Greater
Mumbai (INR)#
Per sqft (INR) 3725 18,632
Index number 100 500.2
Average price of flats in Mumbai
District (INR) #
Per sqft (INR) 6872 36,056
Index number 100 524.7
Average price of flats in Western
Suburb (INR) #
Per sqft (INR) 3726 18,211
Index number 100 488.8
Average price of flats in Eastern
Suburb (INR) #
Per sqft (INR) 2269 10,736
Index number 100 473.2
Flat price index–wage index ratio
(2003 and 2010)
Greater Mumbai – 3.5
Mumbai District – 3.7
Western Suburb – 3.4
Eastern Suburb – 3.3
Source *Government of Maharashtra 2005, 2012. # Times of India (2003, 2012)
times, while the same has been comparatively lower in the Eastern Suburb [from
INR 2,269 (US $48.7) to INR 10,736(US $230.4)] of the city. While for the city
as a whole, the average flat prices rose from INR 3,725 (US $79.9) in 2003 to
INR 18,623 (US $399.8) in 2012 (Times of India 2003, 2012). Mumbai District
and Western Suburbs house a majority of the upper and middle classes of the city,
while the Eastern Suburb traditionally has housed lower class workers. However,
of late, the class character of the Eastern Suburb has also changed drastically and a
number of upper and middle-class colonies have emerged. This change started since
the liberalisation of the economy in 1991, which allowed more inflow of capital in
the built environment of the city. Since then, a relatively higher growth rate of the
economy had led to the rise of per capita income and hence rise of the demand for
better housing. Further, the development of road infrastructure like Vashi–Mankhurd
bridge, Eastern Freeway, Chembur–Wadala sky-bus, etc., added to this process of
gentrification.
Figure 8.2 shows that the growth rate in real estate prices in the city has been
significantly higher in almost all the property tax wards. The prices between 1993
and 2012 have increased by more than 12% per annum and this increase has been as
high as 28.6% in some wards. In some areas of South Mumbai (in Mumbai district)
and Bandra, also known as Vandre (in Western Suburb), the residential flat prices
were as high as 71,000 per sq. ft. in 2012.
Overall, the above discussion shows that the workers’ wages are not keeping pace
with the rise in real estate prices. A large proportion of the population of the city,
specifically slum dwellers and those working at the lower spectrum of the informal
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Fig. 8.2 The growth of prices of residential flats by property tax ward, 2003 and 2012. Note INR
= Indian Rupees; ACGR = Annual compound growth rate (%); The data related to residential/flat
prices available from The Times of India have been adjusted to property tax wards. Source Based
on data from The Times of India (2003, 2012)
sector, cannot afford housing inMumbai. For slum dwellers, average family earnings
remain at onlyRs 5,000 permonth (at 2007–2008 prices) andmany of them somehow
subsist on this (Jain and Shaban 2009; Sujata and Shaban 2008; Sharma et al. 2008;
Shaban 2010). This forces them to squat on public land and trade their goods through
hawking and vending. Given this situation, the housing market in Mumbai, in fact,
denies any access to formal housing to a large majority of its citizens (Sharma 2007:
291).
The rise of real estate prices in Mumbai has, among others, been determined by
its large population living in small houses or in slums. With liberalisation and the
opening of the service sector (especially the Financial and Information Technology
sectors), there has been a significant increase in the share ofmiddle-class citizenswho
desire better housing. The share of the middle class in urban areas in India has risen
from 54.7 to 72.4% during 1999–2000 to 2011–2012 (Krishnan and Hatekar 2017).
The limited land supply in the island city (Greater Mumbai) and lack of effective
integration with its periphery has added to the significant rise of real-estate prices in
the city (Migozzi et al. 2018).
The archaic Rent Control Act 1974 (amended several times) has also resulted in
rapid obsolescence of buildings in Mumbai city. Most of the buildings constructed in
the 1940s and 1950s require repair and maintenance (Shaban 2010). It is estimated
that there are about 16,502 buildings in the city built before 1940 (Janwalkar 2006)
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which are in a dilapidated condition; some of them have collapsed in recent years,
killing several. A judgment passed by the Supreme Court on September 4, 2008, has
paved the way for the redevelopment of these buildings by providing an extra Floor
Space Index (FSI)5 to the builders. They now can profitably build the structures and
make a 225 sq. ft. flat available to every resident family of the buildings, free of cost
(Mahapatra 2008). The decision by the court ushers hopes for the redevelopment of
dilapidated buildings in south and central Mumbai (in Mumbai District).
The government’s inadequate response and skewed policies are responsible for the
housing crisis in the city. Mumbai was expecting a massive respite from congestion
due to the availability of about one-third of some 600 acres of land from 60 textile
mills for open space. Mumbai has an open space ratio of about only 0.03 acres per
1000 persons. Recommended open space at the international level is often 4 acres per
1000 persons. The availability of mill land was expected to somewhat correct this.
However, much of the land went to builders and only 133 acres have been provided
for open spaces and public housing (Katakam 2006).
The controversy over the sale of mill land dates back to 1991 when the govern-
ment, in response to appease mill owners, introduced Sect. 58 in the DCR. Better
known as the ‘one-third formula’, DCR 58 allowedmill owners to divide the area into
three parts. They could then sell one-third, give the second part to Greater Mumbai
Municipal Corporation to create open spaces and the other third to the Maharashtra
Housing and Area Development Authority to provide affordable housing to the fami-
lies of mill workers who lost their livelihoods with the closure of the mills. In 2001,
however, the state government used a loophole in the Maharashtra Regional and
Town Planning Act, 1966, and amended DCR 58–DCR 53 (I), according to which
the only land that is vacant—that is, with no built-up structure—shall be divided
under the one-third formula. Thus, the mill owners managed to keep the bulk of the
land and the area to be given to the municipal corporation and to the workers was
substantially reduced (Katakam 2005, 2006).
The political bargaining and competition within the city have assured some
housing schemes for the poor in an otherwise neoliberal regime. In the 1990s, popular
city leader Bal Thackeray initiated the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRA). SRA
attempted to provide houses for slum dwellers through cross-subsidy. The transfer
of development rights was granted to the builders who came forward to develop
slums and provide flats of 225 sq. ft., free of cost to the dwellers. The scheme has
been hugely successful as poorer sections of the population have been able to acquire
constructed homes free of cost in place of their hutments. This has also resulted in
the decline of the slum population, as is evident from the data of the 2001 and 2011
Indian censuses, mentioned below.
In sum, the lack of adequate provisions for affordable formal housing has created
a huge number of slums in Mumbai. High real estate prices, government apathy and
lower wages have undermined the city’s development. This has resulted in amassing
of the lower class population in slums. In fact, in 2001 and 2011, 54.0% and 41.1%,
5Floor Space Index (FSI) is the ratio of built or constructed area and actual land area. For instance,
if a land is 100 sq. ft. and construction on the same land is of 300 sq. ft. area, FSI is 3.
8 Socio-spatial Segregation and Exclusion in Mumbai 161
respectively, of Mumbai’s population was living in slums (Census of India 2014a, b).
In 2011, 15.85% of Mumbai district (489,068 of total population of 3,085,411) and
49.38% in Mumbai suburban district (4,620,654 of total population of 9,356,962)
lived in slums (Census of India 2014a, b). One of the reasons for this has been the
success of the SRA. However, many claim that the Census of India undercounts the
slum population and does not reflect the actual situation in the city. Going by this
claim, the proportion of population living in slums in Mumbai is estimated to be
about 60% of the total population (Shaban 2008).
The lack of development of social and physical infrastructure, poverty, large size
families and a dense population do increase the probability of social deviance. It
is found that slum areas of the city are also prone to a higher crime rate (Shaban
2010). A large family with limited resources often results in family disruption and
decreasing formal and informal social controls. Communities with a higher level of
social disruption tend to be characterised by a lower rate of participation in voluntary
organisations and local efforts, which have an important role to play in controlling
crime. Overcrowding in houses means that personal matters are difficult to keep
private in domestic life (Shaban 2010).
The slumpopulation is not evenly distributed in the city. The highest concentration
of the slum population is found in the Eastern Suburb, which is the least developed
part of the city (Shaban 2010). As shown in Fig. 8.3, Mankhurd, Trombay, Govandi,
Deonar, Vikhroli, Bhandup, Bazar Church-Hall and Chembur, have a large share of
their total population living in slums.
The computed Dissimilarity Index (D) between non-slum and slum population for
the year 2001 inMumbai city is 0.460, which shows high levels of spatial segregation
between non-slum and slum population (Table 8.2) (Jahn et al 1947). Further, the
computed value of Interaction or Isolation Index (B) for slum and non-slum popu-
lations for the year 2001 is 0.321, showing that the probability of a slum dweller
interacting with a non-slum dweller is about 32.1%.
8.4 Inter-religious Conflicts and the Segregation of Muslims
Hindu–Muslim rivalry in India arose during the colonial period in the latter half of
the nineteenth century. It gave rise to religious nationalism and an ethno-nationalist
philosophy, which resulted in the division of India in 1947 into India and Pakistan.
After independence, the Hindu right-wing with their political formations have
attempted to communalise Indian democracy. This has resulted in the marginali-
sation of Muslims. As Sen (2013) writes “India’s Muslims are … victims of untold
indignities in a country still fighting the ghosts of a blood-soaked partition in 1947
that turned vast swathes of it into Muslim-majority Pakistan. The baggage of history
and the cynical calculus of caste, class, community and religion still dictate the fate
ofmost things in India: fromwhowins elections andwields power towho has a better
chance of getting jobs, healthcare or justice” (p. 127). The religious politics of the
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Fig. 8.3 Distribution of
slum population in Mumbai
by sections, 2001. [Source
Based on data from Census
of India (2001)]
Hindu right-wing has resulted in religious violence (communal riots), discrimina-
tion against and the stigmatisation of Muslims. This has further led to the geographic
concentration of Muslims in urban centres, both as a result of discrimination (in the
housing market) and violence. The Sachar Committee Report (2006) contends that
“fearing for their security, Muslims are increasingly resorting to living in ghettos
across the country” (p. 14). Other studies have also pointed out the spatial and social
segregation of Muslims in urban centres is mainly because of state’s apathy and
negligence towards Muslims, recurrence of communal violence and perception of
security concerns by Muslims themselves (Gayer and Jaffrelot 2012; Thorat et al.
2015; Shaban and Khan 2013). Contractor (2012), in her study on Shivaji Nagar in
Mumbai, argues that ghettoisation increases with new communal riots.
As mentioned above, the cityscape of Mumbai is fractured on class, caste and
religion. In terms of religion, the city is largely polarised in Hindu and Muslim
areas. The Muslim concentrated areas have been shaped and reinforced by frequent
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Table 8.2 The dissimilarity, entropy and interaction indices
Indices Groups 1991 2001 2011 2018
Dissimilarity index (D) Non-SC/SC populations 0.241 0.242 0.231 –
Non-ST/ST populations 0.291 0.253 0.191 –
Non-slum/Slum populations – 0.460 –
Non-Muslims/Muslims
populations
– – – 0.609
Entropy (h) index Non-SC & Non-ST/SC/ST
populations
0.271 0.220 0.270 –
Interaction or exposure Index
(B)
Non-SC/SC populations 0.913 0.932 0.914 –
Non-ST/ST populations 0.974 0.986 0.986 –
Non-slum/Slum populations – 0.321 – –
Muslims/Non-Muslims
populations
– – – 0.486
Source Computed using data from Census of India (1991, 2001, 2011) and Government of
Maharashtra (2018)
communal riots and discriminations against Muslims in the formal and informal
housingmarkets. Dongri, Pydhonie,Nagpada, Byculla,Mazgaon,Mahim inMumbai
city district, Bharat Nagar, Millat Nagar, Behrampada and Jogeshwari in Western
Suburb, and Kurla, Sonapur–Bhandup, Govandi, Cheeta Camp and Kidwai Nagar
(Wadala East) in Eastern Suburb are examples of areas where there is a high concen-
tration of Muslim populations. Between 1927 and 2008, a total of 84 Hindu–Muslim
riots have been recorded in the city. In these riots, about 1870 persons have been
killed, 8463 injured and millions of rupees in property has been destroyed. The
incidence of riots between the two religious communities was very high prior to
Independence. The decade of the 1950s was a relatively peaceful period. But the city
again experienced a higher incidence of riots during 1970–75, 1984–87, 1991–93
(see Wilkinson 2005; Punwani 2018; Shaban 2008; 2016; 2018).
The computed values of Dissimilarity Index (D) of 0.61 for the year 2018 show
that spatial segregation among Muslims and non-Muslims is very high in the city
(Table 8.2). This indicates that 61% of the Muslim population need to move to
other polling booths in order to create a uniform distribution of Muslim and Non-
Muslim populations in all the polling booths of the city. Further, the interaction
index (B) computed for non-Muslims and Muslims is 0.486, showing that the proba-
bility of a non-Muslim interacting with a Muslim is about 48.6%. This shows higher
segregations, as Muslims will meet more Muslims rather than non-Muslims.
164 A. Shaban and Z. Aboli
Fig. 8.4 Location quotient for Scheduled Castes (SC) population in Mumbai, 1991 and 2011.
[Source Based on data from the Census of India (1991, 2011)]
8.5 Segregation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
Mumbai is also polarised on caste and tribe lines, though relatively less in degree,
as compared to religion. The SC population though clustered, is relatively more
spread out or ubiquitous in the city than Muslim populations (Shaban 2012). The
areas inhabited by the SCs often act as a buffer between the areas dominated by
Muslims and higher caste Hindus. In other words, the SC population often acts
as a shock absorber between higher caste Hindus and Muslims. The major area of
concentration of SCs is in theEastern Suburb,where their share in the total population
ranges from 5 to 15%. The location quotient for SCs in most of the sections of the
Eastern Suburbs are higher than 1 in both the years 1991 and 2011, showing that these
sections have higher share of SC population than the share of SC population at the
city level (Fig. 8.4). Besides the Eastern Suburbs, the major areas of concentration
of SCs are Dharavi, Agripada–Byculla and Mulund. In central Mumbai, SCs are
generally concentrated in 33 labour6 camps and Bombay Development Directorate
(BDD) chawls (a cluster and basic housing scheme with community toilet, water
supply and little open spaces by the Municipal Corporation of Mumbai for textile
workers started in the mid-twentieth century). The concentration of the SCs has
6Labour campswere built by theGovernment ofMaharashtra in the first half of the twentieth century
to tackle housing formigrantworkers from the interiors ofMaharashtrawhowere employed in textile
mills in the city and/or railways. They still mainly house the poorer section of the society or SCs.
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increased in the Eastern Suburb, between 1991 and 2001, because of the growth of
slums (see the location quotient distribution in Fig. 8.4).
Given the legal provisions and affirmative actions deployed by the State, the open
discrimination against SCs and STs is becoming rare. However, the social divides
resulting in spatial segregation does show up in residential differentiations. SCs
mainly worked in textile mills in central Mumbai, while STs are relatively more
concentrated in the northern part of the city. A comparison between the location
quotient of 1991 and 2011 reveals that the relative share of STpopulation has declined
in the southern part of the city and increased in the northern part. This is mainly
because of exclusionary urban development in the southern and central parts of
the city. However, the northern part of the city, i.e. the area around Sanjay Gandhi
National Park and mangrove forests around the coast provide them with a livelihood
(like fishing) and also offer them opportunities to build their rudimentary houses on
relatively cheaper and development-free lands. This explains the location quotients
for ST population being higher in the northern part of the city (Fig. 8.5).
Our computation shows that the Dissimilarity (D) Index for SCs with respect
to non-SC population in the city has largely been stable between 1991 and 2011
(Table 8.2) but substantially lower than Muslim–Non-Muslim Dissimilarity Index
value. The index shows that about 24% of the SC population need to move in order
to achieve a uniform distribution of population by caste (SC and non-SC) in the city.
The D values for SCs are lower compared to D for the religions. The reasons are (i)
Fig. 8.5 Location quotient for Scheduled Tribes (ST) population in Mumbai, 1991, 2011. [Source
Based on data from the Census of India (1991, 2011)]
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religion-based discriminations are stronger in the city, (ii) as opposed to Muslims
who can be easily recognised by their Arabic, Turkish or other Central Asian origin
names and surnames, and also by his/her religious practices, one cannot easily find
out a person’s caste and tribe by name, and, therefore, it is easier for lower castes and
tribal groups to find houses in other Hindu areas andmixwith other Hindu castes, (iii)
caste- and tribe-based discrimination is punishable through a special Government of
India Act, called ‘The Scheduled Castes and The Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989’ (Government of India 1989) and there are no such special
provisions and rules against discriminations based on religion. In fact, the D for STs
has declined over the years, which indicates that a relatively uniform distribution of
SCs is emerging in the city. The interaction or exposure (B) index for both the SCs
and STs have been significantly higher in comparison to Muslims. During the period
between 1991 and 2011, it has ranged between 0.913 and 0.932 for SCs and 0.974
and 0.986 for the STs. The index shows that SCs and STs have a significantly higher
probability of interaction with other groups (non-SCs and non-STs, respectively)
than Muslims. Thus, the study shows that the major social and spatial segregation in
the city exist on the basis of religion (Muslims and non-Muslims) rather than caste
and tribes, though they do have their own residential segregations.
As h-index is based on the summation of individual geographic unit score; the
higher the individual units or section’s score, the greater the diversity in the section.
Therefore, we have mapped the scores of individual geographic units. On average,
the h-index for SCs and STs are higher in the Eastern Suburb and northern part of the
city than those in theWestern Suburb andMumbai district (Fig. 8.6). This shows that
ethnically the Eastern Suburb and northern part of Mumbai are more diverse than
western and southern parts of the city. Given the economically marginalised nature
of SC and ST communities, cheaper real estate and large-scale slums (informal
settlements) allow them to inhabit in large numbers Eastern Suburb and northern
part of the city, and this creates greater diversity in these parts of the city. Figure 8.4
shows that the concentration of SCs has significantly increased between 1991 and
2001 in Chuna Bhatti, Ghatkopar and Vikhroli.
8.6 Conclusions
Mumbai, the commercial and financial capital of India, is also a divided city. The
divide runs deep along religious, class and caste lines. The housing market of the
city and government apathy to inclusive development has led to the emergence of a
large number of informal settlements or slums, where millions of people are forced
to survive in substandard living environments without adequate social and physical
infrastructure (such as better transport facilities, educational institutions, health care,
access towater supply, sanitation, etc.). The fast-rising real estate prices and relatively
lower increase in wages make it impossible for millions of people in the city to have
any formal housing.
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Fig. 8.6 Entropy index (h) for the Non-SC & Non-ST, SC and ST population groups in Mumbai,
1991, 2011. [Source Computed using data from Census of India (1991, 2011)]
In their study, Gupta et al (2009) find that a disproportionately large share of
historically disadvantaged caste groups live in slums. Mehta (1969) in a longitudinal
study also shows the highest segregation of lower caste groups and the persistence
of the same phenomenon in Pune city. In a recent study on spatial segregation, based
on data from the Census of India, 2011, focusing on seven major cities (Ahmedabad,
Bangalore, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad, Kolkata and Mumbai) of India, Vithayathil
and Singh (2012) show that the degree of residential segregation by caste (combined
SC and ST)—is highest in Kolkata (D index= 0.364) followed byHyderabad (0.325)
and in Mumbai (0.222). It is argued that a lower segregation index for Mumbai for
lower castes (SC and ST combined), in comparison to other major cities, is mainly
due to the dispersal of SCs and STs in central and South Mumbai.
Mumbai is also extremely divided on a religious basis. In a large part of the city,
Muslim and non-Muslim areas are highly segregated. In fact, the segregation index,
on the basis of religion (Muslim and non-Muslim), is found to be higher than the
slum and non-slum divide. Even the slums are divided on the basis of religion. The
Hindu–Muslim divide that emerged during the early twentieth century has been a
bane for the city. The recurring communal riots have taken thousands of lives and
destroyed properties worth millions of rupees. The fear of riots and violence has kept
Muslim populations concentrated in a few pockets of the city, and these pockets are
transforming into underclass ghettos. The communal production of spaces not only
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manifest various forms of injustices but actually produces and reproduces them, and
thereby maintains established social relations based on domination and oppression.
To bridge these social and spatial divides, the city needs new emancipatory poli-
tics. The emancipation from suppression, domination, repression and exclusion. This
emancipatory approach should be able to free and liberate those trapped and incarcer-
ated in space, chained to a place or disabled by socially produced spaces. This politics
needs to end the social devalourisation of communities and avert social exclusion
and spatial segregation.
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Chapter 9
Social Polarization and Socioeconomic
Segregation in Shanghai, China:
Evidence from 2000 and 2010 Censuses
Zhuolin Pan, Ye Liu, Yang Xiao, and Zhigang Li
Abstract China’s rapid economic growth since the early 1980s has been accom-
panied by a substantial increase in economic inequality. Economic restructuring,
rural–urban migration, globalization and marketization have jointly led to a trans-
formation of the socio-spatial structure of large Chinese cities. Although a handful
of studies have examined the level and pattern of socioeconomic segregation in a
particular Chinese city using neighbourhood-level census data from the year 2000,
little research has been done to investigate in-depth changes in the level and pattern
of segregation using more up to date and more geographically detailed data. This
chapter aims to examine the levels, patterns and drivers of socioeconomic segrega-
tion in Shanghai, China, using neighbourhood-level and subdistrict-level data from
the 2000 and 2010 decennial population census. This chapter uses the dissimilarity
index to measure the overall level of socioeconomic segregation by occupation and
household registration (hukou) status. Based on a location quotient and neighbour-
hood composition, it also illustrates the change in the spatial pattern of segregation.
The chapter ends with a discussion on the possible drivers of segregation and policy
suggestions to combat segregation in large Chinese cities.
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9.1 Introduction
Over the past four decades, rapid economic growth has been interwovenwith internal
and international migration during a process of globalization, which has led to an
unprecedented socioeconomic transition around theworld (Marcińczak 2012). Rapid
growth in the economy is inevitably accompanied by a substantial increase in socioe-
conomic inequality (Marcińczak et al. 2015), and China is no exception. According
to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the Gini Index of the country increased
from 0.317 in 1978 to 0.465 in 2016, which indicates a widening income gap. In
the largest Chinese cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, rising income
inequality has resulted in socioeconomic segregation. Evidence from the 2000 and
2010 censuses showed that many large cities in China have experienced a rise in resi-
dential segregation by class, household registration (hukou) status and housing tenure
(Li and Wu 2006, 2008; Chen and Li 2014). The increase in residential segregation
has resulted in a number of detrimental consequences, such as the reproduction of
marginality, the prolonged and rising rate of unemployment in deteriorated towns, the
widening of social inequality and the weakening of social solidarity (Wilson 1987;
Bolt et al. 2010). Understanding the pattern and drivers of residential segregation
in large cities in China will help policymakers to achieve the goal of building an
inclusive and harmonious society.
A growing body of literature has explored patterns of residential segregation
in large Chinese cities since the beginning of the reforms in 1978. Earlier studies
have focused mainly on the delineation of socio-spatial differentiation in Chinese
cities (Gu and Kesteloot 1997). More recently, growing attention has been paid
to the drivers and mechanism of residential segregation (Gu et al. 2006; Li and
Wu 2006). Nevertheless, most earlier studies on residential segregation were based
on the fourth and fifth waves of the national population census carried out in the
years 1990 and 2000, respectively (Gu and Kesteloot 1997; Feng and Zhou 2003).
Recently, a few studies have examined the residential segregation of a particular city,
such as Shanghai and Nanjing, using data from the sixth round of population census
conducted in 2010 (Wu et al. 2014, 2018; Shen and Xiao 2020), but surprisingly,
little attention has been paid to neighbourhood segregation with regard to hukou
status, occupation and socioeconomic status (Liao and Wong 2015; Wu et al. 2018).
Moreover, little research has been done to investigate the changes in the spatial pattern
of residential segregation over time in globalized Chinese cities, and the process of
urban socio-spatial reconfiguration remains under-researched.
This chapter aims to examine and compare the level and pattern of socioeconomic
segregation between 2000 and 2010 by occupation and hukou status in Shanghai
using neighbourhood-level and subdistrict-level data from the decennial population
census. As a polarizing global city with a dramatically rising number of both super-
rich and extremely disadvantaged and poor citizens, Shanghai provides an ideal labo-
ratory to investigate the patterns, drivers and consequences of residential segregation
against the backdrop of globalization and marketization in China.
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9.2 Residential Segregation in Large Cities in China
Residential segregation has always existed in the history of urbanization (Nightngale
2012). InEurope andNorthAmerica, racial segregation is regarded as themost persis-
tent form of segregation, and a large number of empirical studies have been devoted
to this form of segregation (Massey 1985; Wilson 1987). Although some globalizing
Chinese cities attract a large number of international migrants, they account for only
a very small proportion of the total population of these cities (for example, 0.71% of
Shanghai’s total population in 2000), exerting an insignificant effect on the spatial
pattern of residential segregation. Socioeconomic status has become a major dimen-
sion of residential segregation in the newmillennium in the transition from a planned
economy to a market-oriented economy (Li and Wu 2008). Socioeconomic segre-
gation was not severe in the period of the planned economy when the state exerted
a monopoly over a wide range of resources, and state-owned work units played an
important role in arranging resource allocation (Wu and Li 2005). The work unit
determined workers’ wage levels and the allocation of means of subsistence, such as
housing and health care. Meanwhile, the hukou system imposed stringent constraints
on internalmigration and excluded outsiders fromurban public services (Chan 2009).
Chinese cities experienced a low degree of socioeconomic differentiation before the
early 1980s as a result of the state-dominated housing system and the stringent hukou
system.
The advent of the reform and the opening up has provided more freedom and
incentives for the growth of the private sector and thereby generated a new-rich class,
but the reform of the state-owned work units has also led to millions of workers being
made redundant, and housing is now no longer allocated by work units (Wu 2004; Li
andWu 2008). Although the government still owns the land after the housing reform,
real estate developers can obtain the land use right through the land conveyance
system. Supported by bank loans, real estate developers have gradually become the
principal participants in the housing development (Fu 2013). Housing reform has
promoted the formation of housing marketization in China and increased levels of
housing consumption. From 1984 to 2010, the rate of homeownership increased
from 9.4 to 89.3% in China. However, the market mechanism has led to the rise
of house prices in large cities, and housing has become a commodity which can be
purchased on the market rather than a welfare benefit allocated by the state and work
units (Wu and Li 2005; Logan et al. 2010). The market-oriented housing reform has
aggravated the segregation among socioeconomic status groups, thus restructuring
the socio-spatial structure of Chinese cities (Walder and He 2014; Song et al. 2017).
In addition, internal migration has also contributed to the socio-spatial restructuring
of urban China (Liao and Wong 2015). The loosening of the hukou system and
the growth of low-end urban job opportunities have caused the influx of migrants
into urban areas since the mid-1980s (Fan 2008). However, the long-established dual
systembetweenmigrants and urban residents excludesmigrants from themainstream
socialwelfare system (Chan andZhang1999;Chan andBuckingham2008).Migrants
suffer from only limited accessibility to the urban formal housing system, and they
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are unlikely to be able to afford the soaring cost of housing in large Chinese cities
(Huang and Jiang 2009; Logan et al. 2009). Therefore, they have no choice but
to concentrate in particular urban areas and form migrant enclaves, such as Little
Hubei in Guangzhou and Zhejiangcun in Beijing (Zhang 2001; Liu et al. 2015). In
contrast, higher socioeconomic status groups prefer to live in gated communities
with guaranteed safety and favourable amenities (Wu and Webber 2004). Thus, the
rising housing stratification exacerbates the residential segregation in large cities in
China.
Numerous studies on residential segregation have been conducted since the late
1980s, when socio-spatial differentiation began to emerge in urban China (Xu et al.
1989; Gu and Kesteloot 1997). The reform amplified some of the effects inherited
from the pre-reform era and aggravated the residential segregation during the tran-
sitional period (Wu et al. 2010). Meanwhile, market forces became interwoven with
state forces to generate multiple dimensions of segregation, including segregation by
hukou status, education, housing tenure, working status and occupation (Wu and Li
2005; Li andWu2008). It can be expected thatwith increasing levels ofmarketization
of housing, the widening of the income gap by occupation, the influx of migrants,
and the level of socioeconomic segregation in Shanghai will increase (Shen and Xiao
2020).
9.3 Data and Methods
9.3.1 Data
In this chapter, we examine the level and the pattern of socioeconomic segregation at
the neighbourhood (residential committee, juwei) level and the subdistrict (jiedao)
level in Shanghai using data from the 2000 and 2010 decennial population censuses.
The residential committee along with the village committee is the lowest level of
administration unit in China with an average population of 3,000. The subdistrict is
the second lowest level of administration unit in urban areas and is constituted by
several residential committees. We are not able to examine socioeconomic segre-
gation by occupation at the neighbourhood level in 2000 due to a lack of relevant
data. The research area of the current study covers the entire administrative area
of Shanghai, including 329 subdistricts and 6,256 residential committees for the
2000 census database, and 230 subdistricts and 5,432 residential committees for the
2010 census database. Please note that administration units’ boundaries in Shanghai
changed slightly over the decade.
Although income is not recorded in Chinese population censuses, it is highly
related to occupation and hukou status, both of which are available in census data.
Occupation has been largely affected by market factors following the economic
reform and represents the best single-variable indicator of socioeconomic status. We
divided occupations into three categories: the TOPgroup, theMIDDLEgroup and the
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BOTTOM group. The TOP group consists of heads of government agencies (HEA),
party agencies, enterprises, institutional organizations and professional personnel
(PRO); the MIDDLE group consists of clerks and related personnel (CLE); and the
BOTTOM group consists of employees in commerce and service sectors (COM),
people operating manufacturing and transportation equipment and related personnel
(MAN) and employees in the farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery sectors
(FAR). In contrast, hukou status is affected by institutional factors and underlies a
deep rural–urban chasm inChina (Chan 2009). Rural hukou holders in cities normally
have limited access to the public goods and services provided by the city government
(Wu 2002). As for residential segregation by hukou, people living in Shanghai are
divided into two groups: Shanghai hukou holders and migrants. In this chapter, the
term ‘migrants’ refers to people who have lived in Shanghai for at least 6 months
(whose place of usual residence is Shanghai) without Shanghai hukou (non-Shanghai
hukou holders), and ‘locals’ refers to people who have lived in Shanghai for at least
6 months and who have Shanghai hukou.
During the period 2000–2010, the total population of Shanghai increased from
16.74 million to 23.02 million. The influx of migrants from other parts of China
contributed to the growth of the population of Shanghai. Migrants accounted for
23% of the total population in 2000, and the proportion increased to 39% in 2010.
Regarding occupational groups, the proportion of theTOPgroup andMIDDLEgroup
increased slightly, while the proportion of the BOTTOM group dropped from 72 to
66% over the decade (Fig. 9.1). With the improvement in educational attainment or
technical ability of migrants, the proportion of the TOP group has increased along
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Fig. 9.1 Distribution of occupational groups and hukou status in 2000 and 2010
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Fig. 9.2 Geography of Shanghai
the suburban area are demarcated by the Outer Ring Road (hereafter ORR), and
the west bank of the Huangpu River (Puxi) inside the Inner Ring Road (hereafter
IRR) is the old town of Shanghai, where the Shanghai municipal government and
traditional cultural, residential and commercial centres are located. The east bank
of the Huangpu River (Pudong) inside the IRR is the financial centre of Shanghai,
and it accommodates many advanced producer service firms and the headquarters of
multinational and national corporations. Pudong has experienced radical changes in
its economic and demographic landscapes and built environment over the past three
decades. Besides, as the northernmost district of Shanghai, Chongming is proceeding
with its development in the ecological environment and industry in recent years, and
a large proportion of the territories are still undeveloped or under protection.
9.3.2 Methods
We examined residential segregation in Shanghai using several methods. In the first
stage, we used the traditional index of dissimilarity (DI) to assess the overall level of
socioeconomic segregation in 2000 and 2010 for Shanghai. Indices of dissimilarity
for occupational groups and hukou status were calculated at both the neighbourhood
level and the subdistrict level. In the second stage, we adopted several approaches to
depict the spatial pattern of socioeconomic segregation of Shanghai in 2000 and 2010
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by occupational groups. First, we visualized the distribution of the location quotient
(LQ) of the TOP group and BOTTOM group. Second, we applied the typology of
units (subdistricts and neighbourhoods) for further analysis. Third, we inspected the
location of the TOP group of Shanghai and revealed the changes in the social–spatial
pattern over the period 2000–2010. In the third stage, we illustrated the spatial pattern
of segregation by hukou status and then discussed its connection to segregation by
occupation.
9.4 Results
9.4.1 Level of Segregation in Shanghai
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 report the results of DI by occupation. Regarding major occupa-
tional groups, there was a moderate level of segregation between the TOP and the
BOTTOM group (0.32), and a moderate level of segregation between the MIDDLE
and the BOTTOM group (0.35) at the subdistrict level in 2000. From 2000 to 2010,
the level of segregation at the subdistrict level did not change dramatically, and
there was only a moderate level of segregation between the TOP and the BOTTOM
group (0.33) in 2010. Regarding sub-major occupational groups, DI for all pairs of
occupational groups except DI for segregation between FAR and any other occupa-
tional group was below 0.5 at the subdistrict level, which indicated that FAR were
segregated from any other occupational groups. Besides, Tables 9.1 and 9.2 suggest
that the level of segregation at the neighbourhood level was higher than that at the
Table 9.1 Dissimilarity Indices (multiplied by 100) by occupation for Shanghai in 2000 and 2010
at subdistrict level (left) and in 2010 at neighbourhood level (right)
HEA PRO CLE COM MAN FAR HEA PRO CLE COM MAN FAR
22 27 27 48 75 HEA
25 14 20 46 75 PRO 33
31 11 14 41 72 CLE 39 22
25 17 16 34 70 COM 44 33 26
34 35 36 26 55 MAN 62 60 52 41



































Table 9.2 Dissimilarity Indices (multiplied by 100) between Top, Middle and Bottom groups for
Shanghai in 2000 and 2010
TOP - MID TOP - BOT MID - BOT
2000 subdistrict level 14 32 35
2010 subdistrict level 16 33 28
2010 neighbourhood 
level 24 47 38
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subdistrict level in 2010. At the neighbourhood level, there was a higher level of
segregation between the TOP and the BOTTOM group (0.47), and FAR as well as
MAN were highly segregated with other occupational groups, especially HEA and
PRO. In 2000 and 2010, FAR accounted for 11.3% and 6.3%, respectively, which
led to a relatively higher level of segregation between FAR and other occupational
groups.
Regarding hukou status, DI between migrants and Shanghai hukou holders
increased over the period 2000–2010. The hukou-based segregation at the subdistrict
level increased from 0.24 to 0.30. DI at the neighbourhood level also increased from
0.31 to 0.39. This indicates a moderate level of segregation by hukou status.
In summary, Shanghai is characterized by a moderate level of segregation by
occupation and hukou status over the period 2000–2010, and the level of segregation
between the TOP group and the BOTTOMgroup and that betweenmigrants and local
hukou holders increased over the same period. Moreover, the level of segregation
by occupational groups exceeded the level of hukou-based segregation both at the
subdistrict level and neighbourhood level in 2000 and 2010.
9.4.2 Spatial Pattern of Occupation-Based Segregation
in Shanghai
The spatial distribution of the TOP group changed substantially from 2000 to 2010
(see Fig. 9.3). In 2000, people from the TOP group were mainly concentrated in
the Puxi area and in areas between the Inner Ring Road (IRR) and the Outer Ring
Road (ORR) in the southwest corner (where many research institutions, universi-
ties, government organizations and a sub-CBD were located). Outside the ORR, the
suburban area had only a few sporadic subdistricts with a higher concentration of the
TOP group. In 2010, the spatial distribution of the TOP group showed a characteristic
of sprawling from the IRR to the ORR, and the old town of Shanghai (small area
next to the west bank of the river) was largely occupied by the BOTTOM group.
A significantly increased concentration of the TOP group was found in the Pudong
area. Since the development of the Pudong area started in 1990, the area has gradu-
ally become the financial centre of China. Most of the residents from the TOP group
concentrated here are from private sector organizations, such as transnational corpo-
rations. In 2010, the TOP group was more concentrated at the neighbourhood level
than at the subdistrict level and was located mainly along with the IRR of Shanghai.
Besides, a few sporadic neighbourhoods showed a higher level of concentration of
the TOP group in the suburban area, in which some high-tech parks are located.
There is a stark contrast between the residential distribution of the BOTTOM
group and that of the TOP group. In 2000, a higher level of concentration of the
BOTTOM group was found in the Pudong area and the suburban area. Most of these
areas were farmland or industrial parks. From 2000 to 2010, with the expansion
of urban land, some of the farmland or industrial parks were expropriated by the
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Fig. 9.3 Location quotient for the TOP and BOTTOM occupational groups in 2000 and 2010
government, such as the Pudong area. Some residents of the BOTTOM group were
concentrated in the old town of Shanghai in 2010. However, although they have
the most convenient location in Shanghai, they suffer from shabby and crowded
residential conditions compared with other locations.
As we can see from Fig. 9.4, the geography of subdistricts’ socioeconomic inter-
mixing experienced dramatic changes from 2000 to 2010. In 2000, the low socioe-
conomic status subdistricts outnumbered the middle and high socioeconomic status
subdistricts. Especially in the suburban area, nearly all subdistricts belonged to low
socioeconomic status subdistricts. Inside the IRR, the old town of Shanghai was
characterized by residents with middle socioeconomic status, while the west of the
old town was characterized by residents with high or middle socioeconomic status.
The Pudong area witnessed a growing number of mixed subdistricts where resi-
dents with high, middle and low socioeconomic status lived together. However, in
2010, although the low socioeconomic status subdistricts remained dominant across
Shanghai, their share had decreased significantly, and the proportion of the middle
to high socioeconomic status subdistricts had increased by 18% over the decade.
These subdistricts were mostly distributed on both sides of the IRR, surrounding
the old town of Shanghai. In 2010, the old town of Shanghai was characterized
by residents with low or middle socioeconomic status. The outskirts of the central
area were largely identified as mixed, middle to high and high socioeconomic status
neighbourhoods, whereas in the suburban area, most of the neighbourhoods were
identified as low socioeconomic status neighbourhoods. From 2000 to 2010, with
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Fig. 9.4 Classification of subdistricts/neighbourhoods by socioeconomic composition in 2000 and
2010
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the expansion of urban land and the improvement in the average socioeconomic status
of the population in Shanghai, the districts with residents with high socioeconomic
status sprawled from the west of the old town to other areas inside the ORR. The
pattern at the neighbourhood level was much more fragmentized due to smaller scale
geographic units. Neighbourhoods in the old town largely belonged to low, low to
middle or middle socioeconomic status neighbourhoods, surrounded by middle to
high and high socioeconomic status neighbourhoods.
Figure 9.5 depicts the residential landscape of theTOPgroup in Shanghai. In 2000,
subdistricts of Q1 were mainly located in and dispersed across the central area and
largely situated near the universities, government organizations and the sub-CBDs.
In 2010, Q1 was situated mainly between the area of the ORR and the IRR, and
especially concentrated in the Pudong area, which has become the financial centre
of Shanghai, attracting an increasing number of experts from all over the world.
Although the proportion of each type of subdistrict remained fairly stable over the
period 2000–2010, the spatial distribution changed significantly.
9.4.3 Spatial Pattern of Hukou-Based Segregation
in Shanghai
In 2000,most Shanghai hukou holders lived in the old townof Shanghai, andmigrants
weremainly concentrated along both sides of the ORR. In 2010, the location quotient
of migrants was found at a low level inside the IRR. Migrants’ agglomerations had
been moved away from the IRR, and neighbourhoods on both sides of the IRR were
mainly inhabited by local hukou holders in 2010 (Fig. 9.6).
Above all, it was found that segregation by occupation is interwoven with segre-
gation by hukou status. Over the period 2000–2010, the spatial distribution of the
BOTTOM group was similar to that of migrants, while the spatial distribution of the
TOP group was contrary to that of migrants. This indicates that, in Shanghai, most
migrants occupy the lowest position in the socioeconomic hierarchy. Shanghai local
hukou is highly associated with higher socioeconomic status, while those without
Shanghai hukou may suffer from lower socioeconomic status and so be segregated
from residents with high socioeconomic status.
9.5 Drivers of Changing Patterns of Residential
Segregation in Shanghai
Our findings reveal that the level of segregation by occupational groups has surpassed
the level of hukou-based segregation, and occupation has become an increasingly
significant factor in the reconstruction of the social space. In the post-reform era,
educational attainment, occupation and income are interrelated and reinforce each
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Fig. 9.5 Location of the TOP occupational group in 2000 and 2010
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Fig. 9.6 Location quotient of migrants in 2000 and 2010
other. The rapid growth of the TOP group and the huge proportion of the BOTTOM
group in the occupational hierarchy may exacerbate income inequality and socioeco-
nomic segregation in Chinese rapidly globalizing cities. The proportion of the TOP
group increased over the 2000–2010 decade, and the BOTTOMgroup still accounted
for a large share of the population in 2010. Under the influence of globalization and
marketization, housing accessibility is increasingly dependent on occupation and
income (Bian and Liu 2005; Wu et al. 2018). As a result, the spatial process of
socioeconomic polarization accelerates and results in residential segregation (Xiao
et al. 2016). In the era of financialization of housing, the appreciation of housing
values and the rapid increase of house prices have driven the process of socio-spatial
differentiation, sorting people with different abilities to pay into different areas (Song
et al. 2017; Shen and Xiao 2020). Under such circumstances, housing differentiation
is supposed to be intensified, and market forces are assumed to play an increasingly
dominant role in shaping the process of segregation of Shanghai over time.
Nevertheless, the institutional factors can never be ignored. In largeChinese cities,
it is difficult for migrants without higher educational attainment to achieve upward
social mobility (Wang and Fan 2012). The hukou system excludes migrants from a
large variety of goods and services provided by local governments, thereby circum-
scribing unwantedmigrants andmaximizing government revenue (Zhang2010;Chan
2012). In Shanghai, althoughmigrants can apply for the urban hukou, they are obliged
to meet several criteria, such as the possession of bachelor’s degrees and regular
residence in Shanghai or stable employment in formal enterprises. The qualified
applicants will be ranked by the rating scheme and those applicants with a total
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score higher than the qualification mark set by the Shanghai government can attain
urban hukou. These criteria are intentionally skewed in favour of those with higher
educational attainment or technical credentials (Zhang 2010; Zhang andWang 2010).
Even though the hukou system has been relaxed and migrants can attain urban hukou
easily in small- and medium-sized cities, in large cities, hukou remains as an insur-
mountable barrier for most of the migrants to obtain public goods and services such
as education and medical insurance, owing to the high threshold and limited quota
of urban hukou attainment in large Chinese cities. Nevertheless, as the Lewis turning
point is reached, surplus rural labour has been absorbed by the manufacturing sector
and labour supply has become limited in urban China. The labour-intensive growth
model in China has gradually lost its competitiveness (Cai 2010; Zhang et al. 2011).
Therefore, the reform will be deepened, and an increasing number of migrants will
be encouraged to integrate into urban China to spur economic growth. The market
mechanism will play a significant role in mobility and resource allocation, and the
level of hukou-based segregation will decrease at the expense of the increasing level
of segregation by socioeconomic status.
Additionally, social factors play an important role in shaping the process of segre-
gation in large Chinese cities. Chain migration is one of the most important forms
of migration, and migrants tend to congregate in a particular location with the aid
of kinship ties and native place ties (Liu et al. 2015). These social ties are vital for
migrant communities to survive and thrive in large cities, as newly arrived migrants
tend to seek jobs and accommodation with the aid of their family, relatives and
fellow townsmen (lao xiang) (Liu et al. 2012; Huang et al. 2017). Besides, poor
socioeconomic status and lower educational attainment reinforce the disadvantaged
position of migrants in urban China, who suffer from persistent discrimination by the
local residents (e.g. exclusion from community activities, difficulty in constructing a
social network with local residents) (Chen andWang 2015). As a result, migrants are
isolated by the local residents, and they subsequently prefer to congregate in migrant
enclaves for both instrumental and emotional support (Liu et al. 2012). Both the
internal cement within each migrant group and the external discrimination against
migrant groups contribute to the residential segregation between migrants and local
hukou holders in Chinese cities.
Besides, the historical legacy of urban inequality laid a foundation for the structure
of urban space (Wu and Li 2005; Li and Wu 2006). In the pre-reform era, rural
labourers were forced to stay in rural areas, and urban residents who were affiliated
with state-owned work units lived in city centres (Wu 2002; Chan 2009). The process
of the marketization of housing affected the acquisition of housing property rights
(Wu 2017). In the early period after the reform in 1988, as the sitting tenants of public
housing inShanghai, local hukouholders could affordhousing and acquire property at
highly subsidized prices (Logan et al. 2009). They benefitted from the housing reform
and thus owned housing properties at the centre of Shanghai. The offspring of the
beneficiaries of the housing reform inherited these properties, and some of them still
lived in the centre of Shanghai. Thus, the housing reform and the commodification of
housing have led to the problem of housing unaffordability and housing inequality,
and therefore familial financial support and intergenerational transmission of housing
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are increasingly important for young people to achieve homeownership (Cui et al.
2019). The drastic increase in house prices after the housing reform in Shanghai and
the intergenerational transmission of housing reinforce the historical pattern of urban
social space and aggravate the hukou-based segregation in Shanghai.
Moreover, urban planning by the local government also plays an active role in
reshaping the socio-spatial configuration in Shanghai (Feng and Zhou 2003). The
renewal projects in the rundown neighbourhoods have improved the living conditions
and residential environment of the old town in Shanghai, attracting residents with
a higher socioeconomic status and resulting in the gentrification of the city centre
(He 2010). Besides, the development of the metro network and the construction of
the new high-tech development zone have promoted the development of suburban
areas and new towns. With the improvement of public transportation, residents who
were employed in high-tech industries located in suburban areas tended to move to
the periphery of the central area for a better job-housing balance and better living
conditions (Liu andHou 2014). Thus, Shanghai experienced the processes of gentrifi-
cation and suburbanization (Yang 2005). Additionally, the construction of the metro
network exerts a direct effect on house prices. Houses around the metro stations
are more expensive than those away from metro stations, which are unaffordable
for people from the BOTTOM group, aggravating segregation between the TOP
and the BOTTOM groups. Through planning intervention, the Shanghai municipal
government also contributed to the exacerbation of residential segregation.
Apart from the driving forces mentioned above, demographic factors, such as
the family structure and household life cycle, play an important role in shaping
the socio-spatial configuration in urban China (Feng and Zhou 2008). For example,
the elderly may prefer inner-city areas with good access to public services, such as
public-funded hospitals, over suburban areas, while families with children would
rather live in gated communities in the periphery for more a spacious environment
and better living conditions (Feng and Zhong 2018). The demographic processes
result in socio-spatial differentiation in housing demands and thus shape the spatial
pattern of residential segregation.
9.6 Conclusion and Discussion
China’s economic reform has brought about a widening gap between the rich and
the poor and thereby has led to a rise in socioeconomic segregation in large cities.
This chapter provides an overview of the change in the level and spatial pattern
of residential segregation in Shanghai over the period 2000–2010. Our findings
reveal that socioeconomic status based on occupation has become a dominant axis
of segregation in large Chinese cities, as the level of segregation by occupation
has surpassed the level of hukou-based segregation. The evolving socioeconomic
residential segregation patterns in Shanghai have emerged from the combination of
market and institutional forces both of which favour higher socioeconomic groups
over lower socioeconomic groups.
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An increasing level of segregation in Shanghai is affected by various driving forces
at the macro, meso and micro levels. Market factors (e.g. globalization and marketi-
zation), institutional factors (e.g. the hukou system), social factors (e.g. social bonds
withinmigrant groups and discrimination from themainstream society), the historical
legacy of urban inequality, urban planning practices and demographic processes (e.g.
family structure and household life cycle) have been interwoven to reshape the socio-
spatial structure of Shanghai. The confluence of these forces has led to the change in
the level and pattern of residential segregation. Inconsistent with findings from cities
of transitional Central and Eastern European countries, where increasing economic
inequality has promoted the formation of mixed neighbourhoods rather than segre-
gated neighbourhoods (Marcińczak et al. 2015), our findings from Shanghai suggest
that thewidening of the incomegap and the influxof internalmigrants fromelsewhere
have led to an increasing level of socioeconomic segregation.
It would be difficult to reverse the trend of increased segregation in Chinese cities
in the near future, as the market mechanism plays a dominant role in shaping the
urban landscape (Xiao et al. 2016). However, it is advisable for Chinese policy-
makers to adopt the following measures to counter segregation. Most importantly,
the government is advised to lower the threshold of attaining urban citizenship (urban
hukou) and gradually remove institutional barriers against migrants. Current qual-
ifications of urban hukou in large Chinese cities strongly favour those with higher
educational attainment or desirable skills (Zhang 2010). In addition, strict rules and
limited quotas exclude most of the migrants from urban hukou and the affiliated
public goods and services such as pension and medical insurance. A comprehensive
urban citizenship can improve migrants’ integration and lower the level of residen-
tial segregation. Second, the government is advised to provide education and skill
training for the low-end labourers and migrants since the accumulation of human
capital is effective for migrants to integrate into the host society and achieve upward
social mobility (Bian and Logan 1996).
Additionally, there is a need to provide more affordable housing in locations
accessible to the disadvantaged. Recent years have witnessed large-scale redevelop-
ment schemes carried out in many large cities. These redevelopment schemes are
criticized because they fail to satisfy migrants’ basic demand for accommodation
and do not address the negative consequences of poverty concentration (Wu et al.
2012). Besides, policymakers are advised to promote the development of mixed
communities by providing public rental housing1 in middle-class neighbourhoods or
providing a rental allowance to avoid an excessive concentration of the vulnerable.
Moreover, the disadvantaged are forced to congregate in enclaves with poor living
environments. Providing open green spaces and improving the traffic conditions can
increase the value of these areas and therefore attract residents with a higher socioe-
conomic status. Last but not least, the pursuit of land revenue by the local government
1Public rental housing is a government sponsored economic assistance aimed towards alleviating
housing expenses for low-income families or individuals, retired elderly, disabled or migrants with
stable employment in urban areas. The public rental housing is owned by the local government, and
the rental price is slightly lower than the market rental price.
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has led to a rapid increase in the price of housing and increased resident segregation
in urban China. Therefore, the local government should implement stiffer regula-
tions on real estate investment. By implementing these strategies, governments can
prevent the marginalization of the disadvantaged and ease the level of segregation in
Chinese large cities.
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Chapter 10
Increasing Inequality and the Changing
Spatial Distribution of Income in Tel-Aviv
Tal Modai-Snir
Abstract Despite its egalitarian past, in recent decades Israel followed the foot-
steps of the United States in terms of growing inequality levels and reduced
welfare arrangements. It is assumed, therefore, to have followed similar trends of
increasing residential segregation between income groups. This study focuses on the
metropolitan area of Tel-Aviv, Israel’s financial and cultural centre and examines the
change in the spatial distribution of income groups between the years 1995–2008. It
identifies trends in segregation between top and bottom income earners, as well as
those between other income groups, given corresponding trends in income inequality.
In addition, it examines spatial patterns of affluence and poverty concentration and
assesses the influence of concentrated disadvantage among specific income and
religious groups on overall segregation trends.
Keywords Spatial inequality · Income segregation · Tel-aviv · Inequality trends
10.1 Introduction
The level of residential segregation by income (income segregation from hereafter)
is affected by the level of income inequality. This association has been investigated
in several studies during the past decade (Watson 2009; Reardon and Bischoff 2011;
Tammaru et al. 2015, 2019; Quillian and Lagrange 2016), and there is growing
insight about several aspects of this relationship. First, it is understood that different
characteristics of the income distribution affect the segregation of different income
strata. Second, it is known that the residential distribution of income groups can
follow diverse spatial patterns. Finally, it is acknowledged that given income dispar-
ities among ethnic or social sub-groups, increasing inequality affects the segregation
between such groups.
This chapter focuses on the metropolitan area of Tel-Aviv, Israel’s financial and
cultural centre. It examines the change in income segregation between the years 1995
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and 2008. Those were the years when population censuses were conducted, but also
a period in which inequality substantially increased. The study follows segregation
trends of various income-group combinations, relating them to trends in inequality at
different parts of the income distribution. A popular belief in Israel attributes a large
extent of inequality to the effect of two extremely disadvantaged groups in society,
Arabs and ultra-orthodox Jews. This study, therefore, also examines the effects of
those groups on total income segregation in the metropolitan area.
The objective of this chapter is to explore patterns of change in the spatial distri-
bution of income classes in the Tel-Aviv metropolitan area. The chapter will address
several questions that arise given the background of Israel’s inequality trends, its
unique socio-demographic context and the patterns of urban development in the Tel-
Aviv MA: How did the segregation of different income classes evolve and how did
segregation patterns correspond to inequality trends? Did the increasing relative
disadvantage of Arabs and ultra-orthodox Jews play a role in increasing income
segregation? How are the different income classes spatially distributed? Is this
distribution indicative of spatial patterns of poverty/affluence concentration?
10.2 Increasing Income Inequality in Israel
and Socio-spatial Implications
Israel was born as a socialist state in 1948 and through its first decades was char-
acterized by a progressive welfare policy. The days of socialism came to an end
within three decades. A political upheaval in 1977 marked a shift to a neo-liberal
regime, when the labour party, which led all governments until then, handed over the
reins to a right-wing coalition. This political shift is believed to have transformed
Israeli society. Another event, however, has also been considered a turning point
in Israel’s economy. A dramatic stabilization programme, which was conceived in
1985 following a severe economic crisis, reflected a final transition from socialism
to capitalism.
Following these developments, and as part of Israel’s integration in the global
economy, income inequality levels have increased substantially since the 1980s. The
Gini coefficient for disposable incomes1 increased from 0.33 in 1985 to 0.38 in 2010.
Inequality in market incomes also increased substantially due to structural processes
in the labour market, with Gini coefficients mounting from a low of 0.47 in 1985 to a
high 0.51 in 2005. The significant reductions in direct taxes and transfers resulted in
increased participation in the labour market and decreased unemployment, which led
to a substantial decrease in inequality, based onmarket incomes, from 2005 onwards.
Inequality in disposable incomes, however, remained very high given the reduced
transfers (Cornfeld and Danieli 2015), and as of 2015, Israel stands out together with
the US as the most unequal among developed countries (OECD 2015).
1OECD data, extracted from OECD.Stat.
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Israel also stood out (as of 2005) as having extreme upper and lower tail inequality
(Ben-David and Bleikh 2013). Trends in wage decile ratios over the past decades
indicate substantial increases in upper tail inequality (P90/P50) and decreases in
lower tail inequality (P50/P10) during about a decade since the mid 1990s, which
offset increases in that inequality during the previous decade (Cornfeld and Danieli
2015). The concentration of income among the top decile and top percentile is less
extreme in Israel than in several OECD countries (Ben-David and Bleich 2013, as
of 2005).
Increasing residential segregation appears from increasing income disparities
among classes that affect the differential spending on housing. The increase in
inequality levels involves diverse changes in the distribution of income and corre-
spondingly, there may be diverse patterns of change in income segregation. Under
conditions of increasing inequality, income disparities between the top and bottom
classes inevitably increase and so does the segregation of top and bottom income
groups. A study of income inequality and segregation among 13 European cities
revealed that, in all of them, segregation between top and bottom classes increased
with the increase in income inequality (Marcińczak et al. 2015). Increasing inequality
may also manifest in changing disparities within different parts of the distribution
which can affect income segregation, respectively. Lesser disparities in the lower
part of the distribution and greater disparities in the upper part of the distribution are
associated with greater segregation of affluence which is a most common aspect of
segregation in contemporary cities of the developed world (Reardon and Bischoff
2011; Marcińczak et al. 2015; Quillian and Lagrange 2016).
The degree to which the income differential is translated into increasing resi-
dential segregation depends, to a great extent, on housing policies. The decline
of the Israeli welfare state manifested also in the evolution of housing policies.
During the first decades after Israel’s establishment, housing policies were directed
to achieve collective goals such as immigrant absorption and population dispersal in
the country’s periphery (Carmon 2001). The public housing sector peaked at a share
of around 23% by the end of the 1950s, a share that remained stable for another
decade (Werczberger and Reshef 1993). In contrast with many countries where the
privatization of public housing reflected a reversal of housing policies, in Israel priva-
tization was an ongoing policy long before the political shift, reflecting a preferential
status of homeownership (Werczberger and Reshef 1993; Werczberger 1995). Priva-
tization through the sale of public housing units to occupying renters intensified over
the years and by 2015, the public housing sector constituted only 3% of the housing
stock in Israel (Hananel et al. 2018). Despite the important decline of this sector,
it is not assumed to have had an important role in changing residential segregation
within the Tel-Aviv MA, as most public housing were located in peripheral areas.
However, it may have played a role in the positioning of Israel’s central urban area
as increasingly wealthier.
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10.3 Inequality Among Socio-demographic Groups
in Israel
In many cities, income disparities among ethnic groups generate complex patterns of
segregation that involve both the socioeconomic dimension and the ethnic dimension.
The effect of increasing income inequality on the segregation of disadvantaged social
groups depends on whether disparities are growing between or within sub-groups. In
addition, there is also a question of whether groups compete in the same housing sub-
markets. The less the groups are constrained to separate sub-markets, the stronger the
link between income inequality and segregation within each sub-market (Reardon
and Bischoff 2011).
The Israeli population is very heterogeneous in terms of ethnic origin and religious
identity. Income inequalities are related, to some extent, to disparities among popula-
tion sub-groups. The two most disadvantaged groups are Arabs2 and ultra-orthodox
Jews,3 which together account for approximately 30% of the total population, and are
both characterized by low education levels, low participation in the labourmarket and
high fertility rates. Poverty rates among these groups (based on disposable incomes)
significantly increased during the period 1992–2011 and reached a high of 50% and
57%, respectively (Ben-David and Bleikh 2013). The popular belief is that the high
overall poverty rates in Israel (among the highest in OECD countries4) and the high
inequality levels can be attributed to the effect of those disadvantaged sub-groups.
A simulation of poverty rates excluding those sub-groups revealed that in such case
poverty rates would not show important increases since the late 1990s and that the
rate as of 2011 would be 8.5% points lower (ibid.). Similar simulations (excluding
Arabs and ultra-orthodox Jews) with respect to inequality levels show a relatively
modest reduction in the Gini index which would, nevertheless, still be very high
compared to OECD countries (Ben-David and Bleikh 2013; Cornfeld and Danieli
2015).
Arabs and ultra-orthodox Jews are extremely segregated spatially. Of the total
Arab population, at least 65% live in separate towns and villages5 (in which the
population is almost 100% Arab). The rest who live in a few mixed cities are also
highly segregated, mostly in separate neighbourhoods (Falah 1996). Of the ultra-
orthodox Jews population, it has been estimated that during the period 2002–2009
around 75% lived in cities or neighbourhoods identified as relatively homogeneous
2The Arab ethnic category composes approximately 20% of the Israeli population. It consists of
Muslims, Christians, Druze and more, of which the former is the largest (82% of total population
with Arab ethnicity, according to 2008 census) and the most disadvantaged.
3Ultra-orthodox Jews accounted for approximately 10% of the population in 2008. Identifying the
group of ultra-orthodox in statistics is very complex. These figures are estimated by Friedman et al.
(2011).
4Around 18% in 2011, according to OECD data, retrieved from OECD.Stat.
5Estimated by the author based on published census data from 2008.
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ultra-orthodox.6 Economic inequalities are not themain driver of segregation of either
of these groups. The segregation of Arabs has been shaped by historical settlement
patterns and by the ongoing political tension between the Arab minority and Jewish
majority. The segregation of ultra-orthodox Jews is voluntary and is based on their
rejection of secular western values, culture and lifestyles and as a means of limiting
external influence on the community (Shilhav 1993). Even though segregation in
these two cases is not driven by economic factors, the groups may contribute signif-
icantly to indices measuring economic segregation given their spatial isolation and
distinct socioeconomic disadvantage. Since these groups do not compete in the same
housing sub-markets as the majority group, their increasing relative disadvantage
may manifest as increasing income segregation, whereas the sorting processes itself
would not necessarily be highly affected by increasing income disparities.
Being an immigrant society, Israel’s Jewish population is also very diverse in
terms of ethnic origin. The main ethnic division is between Jews that originated
from Europe and America and those that originated from countries in Africa and the
Middle East. Those originated from Europe and America consistently held a higher
socioeconomic status than those from Africa and the Middle East and income gaps
are persistent (Haberfeld andCohen 2007). The socioeconomic gap plays a role in the
residential segregation of the two ethnic groups (Kraus and Koresh 2012). In contrast
with Arab and ultra-orthodox Jews, those ethnic groups take part in the same housing
market. Socioeconomic disparities are assumed to take the lead in residential sorting
processes between those sub-groups, but prejudice and discrimination are not likely
to be substantial in the housing market within Israel’s central region compared to the
context of non-Western immigrants in other developed countries and compared to
the context of racial divisions in North America.
10.4 The Tel-Aviv MA: Development and Transition
The Tel-AvivMA is Israel’s financial and cultural centre. Its core city was established
in 1909 as a Jewish suburb of the historical Arab city of Jaffa. The urban area devel-
oped along the Mediterranean seashore to the north and south. According to current
delineations, the MA stretches between the ‘Hefer Valley’ regional council in the
north (bordering the city of Netanya) and the city of Ashdod in the south (Fig. 10.1).
Themetropolitan area unites 30 cities and towns, and 183 rural settlements. The popu-
lation of theTel-AvivMA increased from2.45million in 1995 to 3.23million in 2008,
constituting 44% of the Israeli population in both years. As of 2008, 90.4% were
Jewish, 5.4% Arabs and 4.3% ‘others’ (a category which commonly refers to non-
Arab Christians).More than 60% ofArabs live in six Arab towns/villages and the rest
live in three mixed cities: Tel-Aviv, Lod and Ramla, where they constitute 4%, 30%
6These figures are based on estimates by Gurovich and Cohen-Kastro (2004) who used voting
patterns to identify ultra-orthodox geographic concentrations in 1996 and updated estimates for the
period 2002–2009 (Friedman et al. 2011).
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Fig. 10.1 Map of the
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and 20% of local populations, respectively, and mostly live in predominantly Arab
neighbourhoods. Of the Jewish population, approximately 8% are ultra-orthodox
that live in predominantly ultra-orthodox cities and neighbourhoods.
Due to the increasing connectivity with global markets, Tel-Aviv has evolved as a
world city (Kipnis 2004). While in 2000, it was classified as a Gamma city based on
global connectivity rankings,7 in 2008 and 2016 it was classified Beta+ and Alpha−,
respectively. These leaps in rankings exemplify the intense effect of globalization
processes on the city of Tel-Aviv as well as its increasing importance worldwide. One
of the claimed developments of globalizing cities is the changing income structure
7Based on The Globalisation andWorld Cities Research Network (https://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/).











Fig. 10.2 Distribution of income groups and change over time (Processed by author based on the
census data acquired specifically for this research from the Israeli CBS)
which is also evident in the Tel-Aviv MA. The top income quintile, based on the
national income distribution, has gradually increased, whereas the bottom income
quintile has slightly dropped (Fig. 10.2). It means that higher income groups were
over-represented and lower incomewere under-represented in theMA. These figures
indicate higher productivity andhigherwages in the core region.They alsomost likely
indicate that income sorting processes within the MA are intertwined with sorting
processes occurring at the inter-regional level.
The increasing economic dominance of the MA has manifested in increasing
housing demand. This led to extensive growth and expansion outwards which
involved the massive conversion of agricultural land to residential use in the less
urbanized periphery of the MA (Razin 1996; Bittner and Sofer 2013). This expan-
sion reproduced the socioeconomic landscapeof the historical north–south disparities
that were prevalent since the establishment of Tel-Aviv city in 1909 along the histor-
ical railway to Jerusalem. The patterns of new development intensified disparities
such that the MA can be considered as highly polarized between north and south
(Modai-Snir and van Ham 2018).
Given the background of Israel’s inequality trends, its unique socio-demographic
context and the patterns of urban development in the Tel-Aviv MA, the chapter will
address the following questions:
(1) How did the segregation of different income classes evolve and how did segrega-
tion patterns correspond to inequality trends? In the absence of housing policies
to counteract segregation, inequality trends are expected to have translated into
increased segregation of top and bottom classes. Also, the segregation of afflu-
ence is expected to increase given the increasing upper tail inequality in Israel.
As the concentrations of income among the top decile are not extreme in Israel,
this will manifest in the segregation of affluence which does not necessarily
increase at the extreme of the income distribution.
(2) Did the increasing relative disadvantage of Arabs and ultra-orthodox Jews play
a role in increasing income segregation? The modest effect of those groups
on the overall inequality is expected to be replicated in the context of income
segregation. Since the groups (especially Arabs) are underrepresented in the
Tel-Aviv MA, the effect might turn out as negligent.
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(3) How are the different income classes spatially distributed? Is this distribu-
tion indicative of spatial patterns of poverty/affluence concentration? There
is already evidence that the socio-spatial structure of the Tel-Aviv MA has
developed in a spatially polarized manner. Addressing this question, additional
spatial aspects of the clustering of income classes are examined, which cannot
be explored using dissimilarity indices alone.
10.5 Data and Methods
This study is based on data from the two recent censuses, 1995 and 2008, which
were processed by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Compared to other
countries, therefore, census data is less updated, and the 13-year time gap between
censuses is longer than the 10-year standard gap in most countries. The research area
is the Tel-Aviv MA as delineated by the Israeli CBS. Its boundaries are based on
functional relationships among localities that surround the city of Tel-Aviv and are
identical in 1995 and 2008. The basic spatial unit used is the census tract, which is a
close approximation of a neighbourhood. The division to census tracts is only avail-
able in localities with more than 10,000 residents. Smaller localities are considered
one census tract.
In this study, income data was used to analyse residential segregation. The dataset
comprises of counts of individuals pertaining to each income decile, of those who
were employed andwhosemonthly income exceeded 100ILS,8 including all employ-
ment statuses. Income data from the 1995 census were collected from a 20% sample.
The 2008 census data were collected for the whole population from administra-
tive sources. Income decile cut-offs are based on the national income distribution
of each year, respectively. Census tracts with less than 30 employed individuals
were excluded from the analysis. Also, illegal workers and asylum seekers are not
included in census data, and so their effect on segregation is not accounted for. The
number of census tracts, as well as the number of employees, have substantially
grown between the two censuses. This reflects extensive metropolitan development
during that period. The final dataset includes 900 census tracts in 1995, in which the
average number of employees was 949, and 1027 census tracts in 2008, in which the
average number of employees was 1484.
Income quintile counts are used for mapping location quotients and neighbour-
hood income compositions. Segregation is measured using dissimilarity indices for
different pairs of income classes, using various aggregations of the data.
8ILS—Israeli new shekel. 100 ILS was equivalent to 20 EUR in 2008 (around 25 Euros as of 2019).
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10.6 The Segregation Between Income Classes
in the Tel-Aviv MA
Dissimilarity indices (DI) for different combinations of income groups for the years
1995 and 2008 (Table 10.1) reveal the trends in income segregation. The most domi-
nant trend is the increase in the segregation of the top group (deciles 1 and 2) from
middle and middle-high groups, increases of more than 20%. There were also more
moderate increases inDI concerning the bottom andmiddle/top deciles. Those trends
are also evident when focusing on aggregate income groups; the DI of the top and
middle groups increased by 18%, while those of top/bottom and middle/bottom
groups increased by only 12% and 10%, respectively. Another interesting finding is
that, in 2008, the DI of the top and middle groups is not much lower than the index
computed for the top and bottom groups (0.26 vs. 0.28, respectively).
The level of aggregation is an important issue to consider. The segregation of top
and bottom income groups appears to have increased the most when operationalized
as the top and bottom quintiles (from 0.28 to 0.33, 18%, compared to 15% when
operationalized as the top and bottom deciles and 12% when operationalized as
three top and three bottom deciles). It appears that in the case of the Tel-Aviv MA,
the top quintile is the most important aggregation to focus on when dealing with the
segregation of affluence. The trends in income segregation, as shown in the changes
in DI among income groups, conform to the evolution of inequality in Israel which
has been characterized by increasing income gaps at the top of the distribution, with
less extreme concentration of income at the top decile and top percentile compared
to several OECD countries.
Another feature of Israel’s inequality is the contribution of two disadvantaged
groups, namely Arabs and ultra-orthodox Jews, to the level of inequality in Israel.
Table 10.1 Dissimilarity indices (multiplied by 100) for income groups in Tel-Aviv, 1995 and 2008
(below and above the diagonal, respectively). Top and Bottom groups refer to deciles 1–3 and 8–10,
respectively, and Middle group refers to deciles 4–7. (Processed by author based on the census data
acquired specifically for this research from the Israeli CBS)
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 TOP MID BOT 
1 22 30 36 41 42 44 43 42 39 
2 20 16 21 26 28 30 30 29 27 
3 25 13 15 18 20 23 22 22 22 
4 30 18 14 14 16 18 18 19 19 
5 34 21 16 13 14 15 16 16 17 
6 36 24 18 15 13 14 15 16 18 
7 38 26 21 16 14 13 15 15 17 
8 39 27 21 17 15 13 14 14 17 
9 38 27 21 17 16 13 14 13 15 
10 34 23 18 16 16 15 16 15 15 
TOP 26 28 
MID 22 11 
BOT 25 10 
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Table 10.2 Dissimilarity indices computed for top and bottom income groups (three different
classifications) in the Tel-Aviv MA, 1995 and 2008, after excluding tracts which are predominantly
Arab or ultra-orthodox (Processed by author based on the census data acquired specifically for this
research from the Israeli CBS)
1995 2008 % change (%)
Top/botom decile 0.33 0.38 15
Top/botom 2 deciles 0.28 0.32 14
Top/botom 3 deciles 0.24 0.27 13
Table 10.2 presents a simulation that aims to examine whether income segregation
levels in the Tel-Aviv MA are affected by the presence of these populations. DI of
top and bottom income groups, using different aggregations were computed after
excluding tracts which are predominantly Arab or ultra-orthodox. In the case of
the Arab minority, tracts in ethnically mixed cities were excluded if the minority
accounted for more than 60% of the local population. In total, 49 tracts out of 900
were excluded in 1995 and 60 tracts out of 1027 in 2008. Excluded ultra-orthodox
tracts were those identified as such by Gurovich and Cohen-Kastro (2004) based on
voting patterns. The results of the simulation indicate slight reductions in income
segregation levels. For example, the simulated DI of top and bottom deciles in 2008
is 0.38, compared to 0.39 for the total sample of tracts. The simulation for 1995
reveals the same reduction of DI (0.01), 0.33 compared to 0.34 for the total sample.
The indices computed for top and bottom quintiles and for the top and bottom 3
deciles show a consistent reduction of 0.01 for both 1995 and 2008. Altogether,
the simulated DI show reductions ranging between 2 and 4% when excluding tracts
which are predominantly Arab or ultra-orthodox, indicating a weak effect of the
presence of those specific populations on income segregation in both years.
10.7 Changing Spatial Distributions of Top and Bottom
Income Quintiles in the Tel-Aviv MA
The period 1995–2008 was not only dramatic in terms of the growth and expansion
of the MA, but also in terms of change in the socio-spatial structure. The change is
very much evident in maps that portray the spatial distributions of the top income
quintile (Fig. 10.3, top panel). In 1995, census tracts that were characterized by the
highest Location Quotient (LQ) of the top income quintile (i.e. those with the highest
concentration of high-income residents) were scattered and quite uniformly spread
throughout the MA. In 2008, such census tracts were substantially more clustered,
and their spatial distribution was skewed to the north; most large clusters of neigh-
bourhoods of the highest LQ can be found in the northern part of the MA, while
in the south such neighbourhoods remained scattered. The visual impression of the
differences between the maps, however, is distorted by the significant increase in the
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Fig. 10.3 Location quotients of the top and bottom income quintile (top and bottom panels, respec-
tively) in the Tel-Aviv MA, 1995 and 2008 (Processed by author based on the census data acquired
specifically for this research from the Israeli CBS)
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number of neighbourhoods during that period. Both the numbers of neighbourhoods
characterized by the highest and lowest LQ increased. However, in percentage terms,
the former increased from 12 to 17%, whereas the latter stayed stable. Further exam-
ination reveals that neighbourhoods with very high concentrations of high-income
residents increased at the expense of more mixed neighbourhoods with moderate
concentrations, as will also be confirmed in subsequent analysis. As for the spatial
distribution of the bottom income quintile, (Fig. 10.3, bottom panel), there is no
substantial change over the study period in clustering patterns and locations of
neighbourhoods with different relative shares of low-income residents. Moreover,
the shares of each LQ categories were similar in 1995 and 2008.
10.8 Changing Socioeconomic Compositions in Tel-Aviv
Neighbourhoods
The changing spatial distribution of income groups is also reflected in how they
mix within neighbourhoods. Based on a typology of neighbourhood socioeconomic
compositions fromMarcinczak et al. (2015), which is based on occupational groups,
in this chapter, the neighbourhoods are classified according to the composition of
income classes. Each neighbourhood type is characterized by a distinctive mix of
income classes which is defined by the shares of individuals pertaining to each
class. Income classes to which individuals pertain were defined based on income
deciles: Those pertaining to the three top and three bottom deciles were considered
as pertaining to ‘high’ and ‘low’ income classes, respectively. Those pertaining to
the four middle deciles (4–7) were considered as pertaining to the ‘middle’ income
class.
During the study period, the share of neighbourhoods that were classified as
‘mixed’ decreased significantly (from 33.6 to 22.7%). This decrease was accompa-
nied by a substantial increase in the proportion of neighbourhoods with high and
middle-high statuses (from 36.3 to 45.9%) and a lesser increase in the proportion
of middle-low neighbourhoods. Interestingly, the proportion of low-income neigh-
bourhoods slightly decreased, but it was very small in the first place (2.4% in 1995
and 1.6% in 2008).
The changing distribution of metropolitan neighbourhoods among types involved
distinctive spatial patterns (Fig. 10.4). While the decrease in the proportion of
mixed neighbourhoods seems to be uniformly spread, the increase in high and high-
middle neighbourhoods is not even. The emergence of high-income neighbourhoods
was mainly in the north part of the MA, closer to the core. Middle-high-income
neighbourhoods emerged in the southern part of the metropolitan area and in its
northern outskirts. Middle-low-income neighbourhoods continued to cluster in the
most urbanized areas (visually they can be identified as the smaller tracts). Polarized
neighbourhoods changed locations completely between1995 and2008, implying that
polarization characterizes neighbourhoods in transition. A close inspection reveals
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Fig. 10.4 The distribution (bottom panel) and spatial distribution (top panel) of neighbourhood
types based on their income composition in the Tel-Aviv MA, 1995 and 2008 (Processed by author
based on the census data acquired specifically for this research from the Israeli CBS)
that neighbourhoods that were polarized in 1995 were predominantly middle-high-
or high-income in 2008. Polarization can be thus considered a temporary phase that
characterizes upgrading neighbourhoods. While in most urban areas, this process
would be associated with gentrifying inner-city neighbourhoods, in the Tel-AvivMA
at that period this process is rather associated with the upgrading of rural places at the
outskirts of the MA. Those places did not only experience generational replacement
but also expansion and development following themassive conversion of agricultural
land to residential use.
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10.9 Conclusions
This study explores the changing spatial distribution of incomes in the metropolitan
area of Tel-Aviv, Israel. It is focused on the period between 1995 and 2008 during
which inequality increased substantially. The study addresses a series of questions
of which the first deals with the segregation of different classes and the connection to
inequality trends. Predictions regarding this question were quite correct. Segregation
of top and bottom income groups significantly increased between 1995 and 2008,
for all group definitions (narrower and wider), as reflected in dissimilarity indices.
The segregation of top and bottom quintiles was larger than the segregation of top
and bottom deciles, which corresponds to the fact that Israel does not stand out
in income shares held by the top decile or centile. The segregation of affluence was
much higher than the segregation of poverty in both years, and its rate of increase was
the highest. This corresponds to the trends in upper tail inequality. Trends in income
segregation also correspond to the changes in the distribution of neighbourhoods
among neighbourhood types according to their income composition. A decline of
around 50% in the proportion of neighbourhoods which were ‘mixed’ is quite a
dramatic change in the socio-spatial structure which inevitably means an increase in
segregation.
The second question was whether the increasing relative disadvantage of Arabs
and ultra-orthodox Jews played a role in increasing income segregation. The simula-
tion of dissimilarity indices after excluding predominantly Arab and ultra-orthodox
tracts revealed that the two distinct populations seem to not have a significant effect
on income segregation inmetropolitan Tel-Aviv; the exclusion of those tracts reduced
between 2% and 4% of segregation measures. The effect of the presence of those
disadvantaged groups on residential segregation is much weaker than we would
expect, given the substantially higher poverty rates among those groups and the
significant increase in poverty rates during the period 1992–2011 (Ben-David and
Bleikh 2013). Thismay be related to the under-representation of the groups in the Tel-
Aviv MA (especially the Arab group which makes up around 5% of the metropolitan
population compared to 20% in the total Israeli population). Another possible expla-
nation is that disparities between those groups and the majority population within
the MA are lesser than at the national level. This possibility should be addressed in
further research provided that sufficient individual-level data of these groups can be
collected, which is especially challenging in the case of ultra-orthodox Jews.
The last question deals with how income classes were spatially distributed across
the MA over time, and whether there are indications of changing spatial patterns of
affluence/poverty concentration. Themaps provide preliminary indications regarding
the changing socio-spatial structure of the MA and the changing concentration of
affluence andpoverty over the research period.Location quotientmaps show that low-
income classeswere quite evenly spread both in 1995 and 2008,whereas high-income
classes became very spatially clustered in 2008. The clusters of affluent groups are
much larger in 2008 than in 1995 and indicate that they no longer concentrate in
specific neighbourhoods but in entire districts or cities. This change may have a
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negative impact on the potential interaction among classes and on the distribution of
economic and political resources featured at the municipality level.
The numbers of high- and middle-high-income neighbourhoods increased signif-
icantly over time and so did their shares of total metropolitan neighbourhoods. The
changing distribution of neighbourhoods among types involved particular spatial
patterns. Themap of neighbourhood types highlights a distinction between the spatial
distributions of high- and middle-high-income neighbourhoods. In 1995, both were
evenly spread across theMA, apart froma slight under-representation of high-income
neighbourhoods in the far north of themetropolitan area. In 2008, high-incomeneigh-
bourhoods were clustered across the entire northern part of the metropolitan area,
and especially close to the core; middle-high-income neighbourhoods emerged in
the southern part of the metropolitan area and in the northern outskirts. This finding
adds insight into the patterns of north–south polarization.
Poverty rates in Israel are among the highest in the OECD, but both the location
quotient map and the neighbourhood types map indicate that there was hardly any
concentration of poverty in theMA in either year. There were very few scattered poor
neighbourhoods. The lowest prevalent neighbourhood statuswas low-middle-income
neighbourhoods. In that respect, it can be said that the socioeconomic landscape of
the Tel-Aviv MA, despite the high inequality and poverty rates in Israel, is different
than urban areas in the United States where concentrated poverty is an issue of great
concern. There is, however, some difference between the classification of ‘concen-
trated poverty’ in the United States and ‘low-income’ neighbourhoods in the context
of this study, which should be considered. Neighbourhoods of concentrated poverty
in the United States are usually characterized as those with at least 40% poor (e.g.
Jargowsky 2013). In this study, low-income neighbourhoods are those in which at
least 50% of the residents are low income. However, low-income residents in this
classification are those pertaining to the three bottom deciles, which is a much wider
group than those defined as strictly poor. With poverty rates in Israel of around 18%,
the poor can be defined approximately as those pertaining to the two bottom deciles.
The inclusion of low-income people who are not considered strictly ‘poor’ should
compensate for the reductionist 50% definition of neighbourhoods with concentrated
poverty.
Altogether, this study reveals trends of increasing income segregation in Tel-Aviv
MA, which conforms to other cities in the developed world. However, the fine-
grained picture of segregation reflects particular inequality trends in Israel, as well
as the interaction with its particular socioeconomic landscape and patterns of urban
development.
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Chapter 11
Changes in Occupational Structure
and Residential Segregation in Tokyo
Masaya Uesugi
Abstract Similar to other industrialized countries, Japan has experienced a growth
in income inequality since the 1980s. Furthermore, in the past few decades, Tokyo
has come to adopt a more liberalist position for not only welfare and housing policy
of the state but also to urban policy. This chapter examines the changes in socio-
spatial inequality in Tokyo from2000 to 2015.During this period, segregation indices
confirm some level of residential separation between the top and bottom occupational
groups, and segregation is fairly stable over time. This suggests that certain factors
counteract the increase of residential segregation. A comparison between the Tokyo
Metropolitan Region and the core city reveals that the core city amplifies spatial
inequality. In contrast to the limited change in the city-wide levels of segregation,
the changes in the residential patterns show that people with high occupational status
tend to concentrate around the main railway station in suburban areas in the region
and inside the core city, especially adjacent to the central neighborhoods.
Keywords Occupational structure · Residential segregation · Neighborhood ·
Tokyo
11.1 Introduction
Since the 1960s, a robust middle class has developed along with the growth of
the economy in Japan. Around 1970, Japan belonged to the group of the lowest
economic inequality among the OECD countries, along with the Nordic countries
(Sawyer 1976). However, the Gini coefficient and the relative poverty rate increased
and became higher than the OECD average in the 2000s, which evoked public and
political discourse on various forms of inequality (Chiavacci and Hommerich 2017).
An important manifestation of inequality from a geographical perspective is resi-
dential segregation. Recent international comparative studies suggest that levels of
residential segregation depend not only on levels of economic inequality but also
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on contextual factors such as welfare, housing regimes, and political and institu-
tional environments (Tammaru et al. 2016). Tokyo is not only Japan’s center of
economy, politics, and culture but also one of the most global cities with New
York and London, as highlighted by Sassen (1991), whose examination of social
polarization and its impact on social geography has attracted abundant interest from
scholars. In the central part of Tokyo (Tokyo City area consists of 23 special wards;
hereinafter, referred to as City), a distinct pattern of socio-economic segregation
has been identified for several decades: white-collar workers are concentrated in the
upland area (Yamanote) and spread from the center to the west of the city, and the
blue-collar workers live principally in the lowland downtown area (Shitamachi) in
the east (Kurasawa and Asakawa 2004). In the early 2000s in particular, managerial
workers tended to concentrate in the city center (Wakabayashi and Koizumi 2018).
On the other hand, although acknowledging such a contrast in general, Fujita and
Hill (2012) and Wissink and Hazelzet (2012), who investigated the proportion of
different social classes at the neighborhood level, suggested that neighborhoods in
Tokyo are socially mixed.
Another definition of the Tokyo area is the Tokyo Metropolitan Region (here-
inafter, referred to as Region), which includes suburban areas of neighboring
municipalities. Studies at the level of municipalities found that the distribution of
high-income residents shifted from the suburbs to the city from the 1980s to the
2000s (Jacobs 2012; Toyoda 2007). They also stress that residential segregation has
increased with elevated income levels in Yamanote and the city center, and decreased
income levels in Shitamachi and the peripheral area.
We must ask ourselves if the level of residential segregation in Tokyo is greater
than in cities of other countries. Fielding (2004) demonstrated that although there
is a certain degree of socio-economic segregation at neighborhood level in Japan,
it is lower than that of a British city. As reasons for this, he refers to the smaller
income disparity in Japan compared to Great Britain. In addition, Fujita and Hill
(2012) argued that several factors, including a centralized tax system and public
housing policy, prevent income inequality from leading to class-based segregation
in Tokyo. Jacobs (2005, 2012) confirmed that residential segregation in Tokyo was
less than in the larger US metropolitan areas, despite the fact that income disparity
between municipalities expanded in the Tokyo metropolitan area after the 1980s.
He emphasizes the significance of severe restrictions on immigration (the number
of migrant workers is very low in Tokyo) and the government policy to prevent
socio-economic fragmentation of municipalities in Japan.
Previous studies on segregation in Tokyo covered its changes until the mid-2000s,
but since the late 2000s, Tokyo has experienced somemajor socio-economic changes,
such as the global financial crisis triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in
2008, the M9.0 Great East Japan earthquake1 of 2011, and unprecedented monetary
easing by the central bank of Japan from2013. Income inequality, thewelfare system,
and the housing system are also changing. In this chapter, based on these contextual
changes, we elucidate the process of social–spatial change in Tokyo from 2000 to
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2015. In addition, this studywill contribute to the field of socio-economic segregation
by emphasizing the relationship between city and suburb based on two different
definitions of Tokyo (Region and City).2
11.2 Context
11.2.1 Income Inequality
Since the 1980s, income inequality has been increasing in many countries (OECD
2015). During this time, income inequality has also been on the rise in Japan,
albeit slightly, as indicated by the Gini coefficients of equivalent disposable income.
However, the size of the coefficient varies somewhat depending on which data are
used. OECD data indicate the coefficient increased from 0.30 in 1985 to 0.34 in
2000 and decreased slightly to 0.32 in 2003. After that, the coefficient rose to 0.34
again in 2009. Nevertheless, the Gini coefficient of 0.33 in 2013 remained higher
than the OECD average of 0.32 (OECD 2015). Japan’s Gini coefficient, based on
the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure provided by the Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Communications, is smaller in size, but indicates a similar trend:
it increased from 0.25 in 1984 to 0.28 in 2009 and remained flat in 2014.
The publication of statistics indicating growing income inequality in Japan from
the 1980s until the 1990s provoked strong reactions; for example, Tachibanaki’s
(2005) assertion that Japan is no longer a middle-class society. However, the reasons
for these changes are not universally agreed upon, with some also pointing a finger
at the aging population and the shrinking size of households (Ohtake 2008). Never-
theless, Shikata (2013) argued that income inequality began to increase within age
groups after 2000 and that this was due to factors such as the increase in irregular
employment in all age groups, rather than demographic causes. In fact, since 2007,
over one-third of all workers have been irregular workers, and their number has
doubled since the 1990s (MHLW 2013).
11.2.2 Welfare System
There is no consensus regarding which of the three main types of welfare regimes of
Esping-Andersen (1990) corresponds to that of current Japan. As described below,
the characteristics of the Japanese welfare state can be aligned with multiple welfare
regimes (MHLW 2012). First, policy in Japan has emphasized employment security,
protecting employment through measures such as minimizing layoffs by companies
and public work projects. Japan also guarantees a pension, health insurance, and
services to all its citizens.As a result, the country hasmaintained a lowunemployment
rate on par with that of countries with social democratic welfare regimes. Conversely,
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Japan’s system includes characteristics of a conservativewelfare regime; for example,
the generous social security benefits for the elderly and its strong emphasis on the
family. However, the system also contains elements peculiar to a liberal welfare
regime. Social security expenditure, as a whole, is relatively limited and medical
benefits (universal health care) in Japan are comparable to those in the US and the
UK as a share of GDP.
Since the 1990s, however, increasing globalization of the economy and intensified
international competition among companies as a result of the government’s liberal
policies, have fostered an increase in the number of irregular workers, who can be
utilized flexibly and cheaply. Widespread layoffs of temporary workers became a
social problem during the 2008 economic crisis, highlighting the limited institu-
tional support available to those who have left the labor market. As social secu-
rity expenditure balloons to keep pace with the aging population, calls for fiscal
reform have increased and benefits, such as medical benefits and pensions, are being
reduced. Consequently, for example, individual pensions have become smaller for
nearly 20 years.
11.2.3 Housing System
Japan’s post-WWII housing policy was drawn up with the aim of improving defi-
cient housing and ameliorating housing shortages. Under the principle that every
family should have its own home, the core of the housing policy was that such
housing systems should ultimately allow individuals to acquire their own housing
via the market, principally by providing support in the form of mortgage loans. The
government provided themiddle-income householdswith long-term and low-interest
loans to buy their own home through the Government Housing Loan Corporation. In
addition to that, the government encouraged housing ownership with a tax reduction.
The population living in urban areas increased rapidly in Japan during the period of
high economic growth from the 1950s to the 1960s. As the economy grew, residential
developments in the suburbs, featuring mainly detached single-family homes, served
to house the rapidly expanding middle class. During the 1980s economic bubble,
soaring land prices further accelerated the move to the suburbs. An overview of
the Tokyo metropolitan area suggests that homeownership developed chiefly in the
suburbs. In the city center and adjacent areas, where land prices were high, affordable
land and housing were in short supply. Consequently, homeownership rates limped
behind those observed in the suburbs (Takagi 2012).
Therefore, Tokyo, to this day, has a relatively small stock of public housing,
including housing aimed at the middle-income bracket, and the percentage of people
who own their houses is almost the same as the percentage of people using the
private rental market. In spite of the weak support for the private rental market and
the absence of rent regulation, the proportion of private rental housing tends to be
high in urban areas. On the contrary, public housing provided by local governments
has an income ceiling for tenants and the rents are regulated. The census revealed
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Table 11.1 The number of households by housing tenure, 2000–2015
Owned houses Private rented
houses
Public rented houses Others
Region 2000 6,957,839 (54%) 4,247,686
(33%)
928,973 (7%) 780,023 (6%)
2005 7,878,778 (57%) 4,418,882
(32%)
957,324 (7%) 671,051 (5%)
2010 8,604,807 (56%) 5,063,638
(33%)
957,222 (6%) 682,040 (4%)
2015 9,151,634 (57%) 5,328,063
(33%)
903,839 (6%) 584,339 (4%)
City 2000 1,535,209 (42%) 1,552,984
(43%)
308,846 (8%) 255,952 (7%)
2005 1,802,545 (46%) 1,594,717
(41%)
317,194 (8%) 222,169 (6%)
2010 1,974,012 (44%) 1,928,585
(43%)
320,316 (7%) 244,417 (5%)
2015 2,131,735 (45%) 2,060,441
(44%)
308,212 (7%) 222,845 (5%)
Source Population census
that in 2010, 44% of households in the City-owned their own houses, while those in
private rental housing comprised 43%, and those in public housing 7%, indicating
that little has changed since 2000 (Table 11.1).
However, this system has been gradually crumbling since the mid-1990s. The
5-year housing plans, which were implemented by the goverment from 1961 during
a period of high economic growth in order to supply sufficient housing stock, took
a more market-oriented turn in the 2000s. Another development was the Basic Act
for Housing, enacted in 2006 amid trends such as population decrease, a declining
birthrate, and an aging population. This law aims to improve the environment of
the housing market by, for example, ensuring a stable supply of housing loans and
implementing tax-related measures.
11.2.4 Urban Policy
In Tokyo, Urban Regeneration was launched by the state as a policy to reverse
the long-term recession that followed the collapse of the bubble economy in 1991
and that dragged on throughout the 1990s. The “emergency development areas for
urban regeneration” were designated principally in the three central wards, with the
aim of attracting private investments in urban development. By the first half of the
2000s, these areas experienced a marked increase in the supply of office buildings
and condominiums (Ueno 2008). During the same period, deregulation of urban
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planning encouraged private investments in urban redevelopment. Deregulation, as
part of urban policy, is commonly considered to be an important factor behind social
and spatial changes (vanKempen 2007). In fact, although some urban redevelopment
projects are implemented jointly by private developers and public sectors in Tokyo,
most are undertaken by the private sector, mainly by large Japanese corporations,
backed by the TokyoMetropolitan Government. This has played a large role in urban
restructuring in Tokyo (Waley 2007), mainly taking place in the center of the city
and by Tokyo bay.
The above-mentioned developments changed the urban landscape and the spatial
structure of Tokyo (Waley 2013). Lützeler (2008) suggested that this kind of middle
class-oriented development of a city center risks triggering class-selective migration
and increases the overall level of residential segregation. Hirayama (2005) high-
lighted urban renewal policy implemented from the late 1990s to the early 2000s
stimulated the housing market, which resulted in the simultaneous emergence of
“hot spots” in the city center and “cold spots” in the surrounding areas as a notice-
able example of residential inequality. The “hot spots” were characterized as clusters
of condominium skyscrapers, such as Roppongi, Shinagawa, and Toyosu districts
(see Fig. 11.2). As one of those urban development projects—Roppongi Hills that
consists of a mix of office, commercial, and residential functions with 720 thousand
m2 of floor space implemented by a private developer—became a symbol of those
high-end neighborhoods of Tokyo. In Shinagawa District near Tokyo bay, several
private developers built high-rise buildings for offices and residences, using the site
of Japan National Railway. The Japanese National Railway, a former government-
owned company, has been privatized in 1987 and disposed of some railway yards
that were no longer used in order to reduce the debt. High-rise condominiums have
also been on the rise in the waterfront area around Toyosu. Conversely, the market
was stagnant in the “cold spots.” In the early 2000s, some cities located in the
suburban area, such as Sayama City and Konan Ward in Yokohama City, had lost
their population despite their advantage of access to the city center.
11.3 Data and Methods
In this research, we used census data from 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015. Tokyo
is defined in two ways: Region and City. The Region is the functional urban area
(FUA) and comprises Tokyo and certain areas in Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Ibaraki,
Yamanashi, and Tochigi prefectures, as defined by the OECD (2013). The City is
the central area of the Region and consists of 23 special wards. As of 2015, the
population of the City is 9.3 million and the population of the Region is 35.7 million,
accounting for approximately one-quarter of the entire Japanese population. In the
census, the number of employed persons by occupation is available at cho district
level (hereinafter, referred to as neighborhood level), which is the smallest census
tract. The average number of residents of this unit is approximately 1,700 for the
Region and approximately 3,000 for the City.
11 Changes in Occupational Structure and Residential … 215
However, there are two problemswith this data. First, since the boundaries of some
neighborhoodswere changed between 2000 and 2015, in this study, we re-aggregated
the census data from 2010 and before according to the latest 2015 census boundaries.
Second, the Japan Standard Occupational Classification, which does not necessarily
correspond to the International Standard Occupational Classification (ISCO), was
revised in 2009 (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2009). Some
major groups of blue-collar workers were abolished and restructured to new groups.
Moreover, classifications of some sub-major groups were revised, although the label
did not necessarily change. In this study, major occupational groups are assigned
to three socio-economic groups as follows: the top group consists of administrative
and managerial workers and professional and technical workers; the middle group
of clerical workers, sales workers, security workers, and service workers; and the
bottom group of transport and communication workers and production process and
related workers (manufacturing process workers, construction and mining workers,
and carrying, cleaning, packaging, and related workers in 2010 and 2015).
We first examined the polarization thesis of Sassen (1991), starting from the
2000s, based on the changes in occupational structure. Subsequently, we measured
residential segregation between the top and bottom occupational categories using the
dissimilarity index (DI) (Duncan and Duncan 1955), which is a traditional indicator
of residential segregation between two specific groups. Next, from a geographical
point of view, we used three kinds of maps to verify the spatial patterns of residential
segregation: concentration of the top occupational group, location quotient (LQ)
for the top and bottom occupational groups, and classification of neighborhoods by
socio-economic composition. First, the areas where the top group are concentrated
are identified and sorted in a descending order based on the number of people in the
top group. Neighborhoods including a cumulative population of one-fifth of the top
group are labeled Q1, neighborhoods that contain the next one-fifth population in
the top group are labeled Q2, and so on. If the number of Q1 neighborhoods is small,
it means that top occupational groups are residentially concentrated only into a few
neighborhoods.
Second, the spatial distribution of the LQ at both ends of the occupational hier-
archy or top and bottom occupational groups is explored. LQ or the ratio of a certain
occupation group in each neighborhood divided by the ratio of the same occupa-
tion group occupying the whole area is a well-known method for representing the
spatial distribution of socio-economic segregation (Tammaru et al. 2016). When the
LQ ratio for a certain group is greater than one, the group is over-represented in the
neighborhood.
Finally, we investigated the within-neighborhood socio-economic intermixing
from the spatial distribution of neighborhood classifications by socio-economic
composition. According to the classification based on the proportion of the three
socio-economic groups ofMarcińczak et al. (2015), all neighborhoods fall into seven
types: high socio-economic status (SES) neighborhoods, middle to high SES neigh-
borhoods, mixed neighborhoods, middle SES neighborhoods, low to middle SES
neighborhoods, low SES neighborhoods, and polarized neighborhoods.
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11.4 Occupational Structure
Sassen (1991) highlights that global cities have taken on a new role of strengthening
and controlling global networks since the 1970s. In Tokyo, however, although glob-
alization and de-industrialization have progressed, clear social polarization has not
been observed.Machimura (1994) andSonobe (2001) suggested that therewere some
signs of polarization in the 1980s because both the number of professional/technical
workers and the number of labor workers increased, although the number of interme-
diate workers did not decrease. Nevertheless, subsequent development, including the
impact of the collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s, has not been investigated
sufficiently.
Figure 11.1 shows changes in the occupational structure after 2000 for the Region
and the City. Although it should be noted that the occupational classification was
revised between 2005 and 2010, the occupational composition in the Region and
the City has remained stable over time. In both the Region and the City, the propor-
tion of professional and technical workers has been increasing and the proportion
of production process and related workers has been decreasing. At the same time,
administrative and managerial workers constitute only a small percentage of the
population, which, to some extent, has been declining in the 2000s. In the recession
following, the bursting of the bubble in the early 1990s, many industries promoted
the reduction of managerial and administrative positions by corporate restructuring.
There was also an increase in business closure amongst small and medium enter-
prises. Thus, these processes suggested professionalization (Hamnett 1994) rather
thanpolarization.Additionally, this tendency constantly continueduntil 2015, despite
changes in socio-economic circumstances, such as the financial crisis of 2008 and
the great earthquake of 2011.
Fig. 11.1 Occupational structure in the Region and the City, 2000–2015. Notes Agriculture,
forestry, and fishery workers and workers not classifiable by occupation are not included. 2000
and 2005: (a) Administrative and managerial, (b) Professional and technical, (c) Clerical, (d) Sales,
(e) Security, (f) Service, (g) Transport and communication, (h) Production process and related.
2010 and 2015: (A) Administrative and managerial, (B) Professional and technical, (C) Clerical,
(D) Sales, (E) Security, (F) Service, (G) Transport and machine operation, (H) Manufacturing
process, (I) Construction and mining, (J) Carrying, cleaning, packaging, and related
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11.5 Residential Segregation
We used the DI to identify the extent to which the top and bottom socio-economic
groups are residentially separated in the Region and in the City. The DI values range
from 0 to 1, with a higher value representing greater levels of segregation. Table 11.2
shows the changes in the DI in both the Region and City between 2000 and 2015.
The DI for the City is greater than that for the Region. Interestingly, Musterd and
van Gent (2016) found a higher level of segregation for the metropolitan region
than for the municipality of Amsterdam. For Tokyo, it seems the City amplifies
residential inequality through the unique urban policies rather than serving as a
“melting pot.” In the Region, the DI has been stable, ranging from 0.26 in 2000 to
0.28 in 2005. Similarly, in the City, the DI has stayed almost unchanged at around
0.30. All in all, the range of change for both scales for the 15-year study period
is quite small. Considering the limited change in the Gini coefficient, residential
segregation might reflect the stability of income inequality rather than the change in
occupational structure.
Table 11.2 Dissimilarity index (multiplied by 100) in the Region and the City, 2000–2015
Region
a b c d e f g h TOP MID BOT A B C D E F G H I J TOP MID BOT
a 17 17 18 37 22 34 31 A 17 17 19 35 23 33 35 34 31
b 16 10 12 33 16 30 26 B 17 9 12 30 17 29 32 30 27
c 16 11 7 30 12 25 21 C 17 9 8 29 14 26 28 27 23
d 17 12 7 31 11 24 21 D 19 12 8 27 11 23 25 24 20
e 38 34 31 32 32 32 29 E 37 32 30 29 27 28 29 29 27
f 21 17 13 11 29 21 17 F 22 17 13 11 25 18 20 19 15
g 33 30 24 24 33 23 13 G 33 29 25 23 29 19 15 16 13
h 30 26 20 21 30 19 13 H 35 32 27 24 31 20 16 15 13
TOP 11 27 I 33 30 26 23 30 20 16 16 16
MID 11 20 J 31 27 22 19 28 15 14 13 16




a b c d e f g h TOP MID BOT A B C D E F G H I J TOP MID BOT
a 15 19 20 39 24 41 34 A 15 18 20 37 25 34 41 38 34
b 15 10 13 35 17 35 28 B 15 8 11 32 17 27 35 30 28
c 18 12 7 31 11 28 21 C 18 9 7 29 13 22 30 26 22
d 19 13 7 31 9 27 19 D 20 12 7 28 9 19 27 22 19
e 40 37 33 33 34 35 32 E 39 34 31 30 30 29 33 30 28
f 22 17 12 9 31 26 17 F 23 17 12 9 27 15 23 19 15
g 40 35 27 27 37 29 14 G 35 30 24 20 32 18 17 14 12
h 34 29 20 19 34 20 15 H 41 36 30 27 35 25 17 15 14
TOP 12 30 I 37 31 25 22 32 20 15 16 15
MID 13 20 J 34 28 22 19 31 16 12 15 15











2000 and 2005: (a) Administrative and managerial, (b) Professional and technical, (c) Clerical, (d)
Sales, (e) Security, (f) Service, (g) Transport and communication, (h) Production process and related.
2010 and 2015: (A)Administrative andmanagerial, (B) Professional and technical, (C) Clerical, (D)
Sales, (E) Security, (F) Service, (G) Transport and machine operation, (H) Manufacturing process,
(I) Construction and mining, (J) Carrying, cleaning, packaging, and related
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11.6 Spatial Distribution of Occupational Groups
11.6.1 Concentration of the Top Occupational Groups
Figure 11.2 illustrates the geographical distribution of the top occupational group
in 2000 and 2010. The two main findings are as follows: first, top occupational
groups are concentrated in the City, particularly in the central and western areas;
and second, small clusters are formed along the railroads, in particular around some
specific stations in the suburbs. It seems that the top occupational groups prefer to
live around the railway station and commute to the city center by rail. Since 2000,
there has been no major change and spatial patterns as of 2000 have been maintained
throughout the 10-year study period. However, there is little change in the number
of neighborhoods in Q1 inside the City—Q1 neighborhoods near the southern part
of the City center increased and those around the western area decreased from 2000
to 2010, resulting in the growth of concentration for the top occupational group in
Fig. 11.2 Location of the top occupational group in 2000 and 2010
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the central districts of Tokyo. This demographic change is partly associated with
gentrification that accompanied the upward shift in the socio-economic structure
of residents. For instance, more and more wholesale shops and factories have been
replaced by condominiums in such districts as Nihonbashi, Tsukishima, and Minato
(Fujitsuka 2017). These districts are locatedwithin 2 or 3 km southeast of the business
district surrounding Tokyo station.
11.6.2 Location Quotient for the Top and Bottom
Occupational Groups
Figure 11.3 shows the LQ for the top and bottom occupational groups in 2000 and
2010.3 In terms of the residential location of the top occupational group, in line
with the findings of the previous section, there were several clusters in the Region,
including in the center of the City. The residential patterns based on the concentric
structure around the city center and railroad network have remained robust over time.
Within theCity aswell, the top occupational groupwas concentrated in the city center.
Neighborhoods with a high LQ prevailed in the center and became geographically
agglomerated, especially inside the southern half of the Yamanote loop line. On the
other hand, neighborhoods with a high LQ for the bottom occupational group spread
to the suburbs, to the periphery of the Region, avoiding areas along the railroad lines.
These sorts of low socio-economic neighborhoods are growing where the proportion
of the bottom occupational group was already above average and the concentration
continues to increase.
11.6.3 Classification of Neighborhoods by Socio-economic
Composition
Figure 11.4 presents the geographical distribution of seven neighborhood types based
on socio-economic composition. As confirmed in the previous section, high SES and
high-middle SES neighborhoods are spreading from the center of the City to the
west side and are scattered along the railroad toward the suburbs. Low SES and low-
middle SES neighborhoods are distributed to the peripheral area. In the Region as a
whole, there has been a remarkable growth of high-middle SES neighborhoods since
2000. Thus, while the absolute number of people in the bottom occupational group is
decreasing, they are being pushed to peripheral areas of the Tokyo metropolitan area.
In the City, the high SES and high-middle SES neighborhoods filled the inside of
the Yamanote loop line to the west part of the City, including Roppongi, Shinagawa,
and Toyosu districts. Additionally, as mentioned above, gentrification is generally
considered to have occurred from the southern part of the city center to the east
side. Although it is not shown on this map, the spatial patterns of 2010 are almost
maintained in 2015.
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(a) The top occupational group
(b) The bottom occupational group
Fig. 11.3 Location quotient for the top and bottom occupational groups in 2000 and 2010
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Fig. 11.4 Classification of neighborhoods by socio-economic composition in 2000 and 2010
11.7 Discussion and Conclusions
The results of the analysis of this chapter can be summarized as follows: A slight
increase in income inequality that began in the 1980s continued apace during the
early 2000s, spurred by the introduction of liberal welfare and housing policies.
However, the trend somewhat reversed itself during and after the latter half of the
2000s, when the global financial crisis and the great earthquake occurred. Because
the most recent data used in this study were from 2015, they may not fully reflect the
impact of the large-scale monetary easing that Japan’s central bank began in 2013.
Nevertheless, the examination of the occupational structure in the Region and the
City indicated that the social polarization thesis is not necessarily supported. The
results of this research rather suggest that the occupational structure has been stable
and a trend toward professionalization has occurred.
From a geographical perspective as well, the overall levels of residential segrega-
tion observed in Tokyo are very stable, with no sudden changes. One characteristic
of metropolitan areas in Japan is that trains are the preferred mode of transport for
people commuting to school and work, regardless of social class. This tendency
is particularly strong among high-income people, as supported by the fact that the
area with higher per-capita income is associated with shorter commuting time in
the Tokyo metropolitan area (Yoshida and Endo 1999). Beginning from the period
of high economic growth in the 1950s, urban areas have expanded along railway
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lines, resulting in the development of city structures defined by railway lines and
concentric circles expanding from the city center into the Region. Nevertheless, the
constant level of residential segregation in the Region and the City during the 2000s
suggests that small variations in residential segregation may reflect limited changes
in income inequality and not so much the changes in occupational structure. During
this period, Tokyo follows several trends identified by previous research (Koizumi
and Wakabayashi 2015): for example, people in the high socio-economic group
became concentrated even further in established, convenient, high-density areas.
Trends such as gentrification may have an important influence on residential moves
through exclusionary effects, which would be in line with the gentrification of the top
and suburbanization of the bottom occupational groups observed in Western cities
(Hochstenbach and Musterd 2018).
These results suggest that in Tokyo, social polarization and residential segregation
did not increase as predicted by the global city thesis. Some studies have identified
the strength of government control as the cause for this observation (Jacobs 2005;
Waley 2013). Although, and as mentioned above, government regulations relevant
to the labor market, the housing market, and urban policy are evolving in a more
liberal direction, there has not been a complete turn toward neo-liberalism (Waley
2013). Strict regulations towards immigration still play an important role since in
many global cities immigrants from low-wage countries often take on low-skilled,
low-wage jobs in growing personal and production services. This makes an influx of
immigrants: one of the main causes of social polarization in many other global cities
(Sassen 1991). The census indicates that foreigners comprised 2.1% of the total
population of the Region in Tokyo in 2015, which is very low compared to other
countries. Even within the City, the 2.1% figure only increased to 3.4% between
2000 and 2015. According to the latest census, most of the foreign population living
in the city came from Asian countries and, in particular, Chinese and Korean people
account for about 60% of the foreign population. Because they tend to be employed
as non-regular workers, who are usually paid less than regular workers, an increase
in foreigners has the potential to affect social polarization in Tokyo in the future.
While residential segregation of the foreign population is certainly confirmed in both
the Region and the City (Kurasawa and Asakawa 2004; Wakabayashi and Koizumi
2018), this has only a limited influence on the overall levels of residential segregation
because the absolute number of foreign residents is currently small.
The relatively limited correlation between income and occupational status may
also be the reason that income inequality, occupational structure, and residential
segregation are not strongly linked. One possible cause for this may be time lag
effects. Tammaru et al. (2020) found that there is roughly a decade between inequality
and segregation based on a comparative study of European cities. From a different
point of view, Fujita andHill (2012) proposed that Japan’s compressedwage system is
the primary reason income inequality does not translate into class-based residential
segregation in Tokyo. Many companies in Japan still use a job evaluation-based
wage system, which is partly because of the nature of the welfare system. It appears
that as a consequence, disparities in income are more related to differences in the
type of employment and seniority than differences between occupations. In fact,
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the weekly wages by occupations in Tokyo calculated according to the Employment
Status Survey (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications) indicate that, while
there is some correlation between occupation and income, the average wage of the
highest occupational status (Administrative and managerial workers) is 3.0 times
higher than that of the lowest occupational status (Production process and related
workers) in 2012. This is still amodest difference compared to theEuropean countries
(Tammaru et al. 2016).
However, the above observations do not imply that occupational structures or
residential segregation have not changed at all over 15 years. One particular cause of
changes in residential segregation seems to be changed in land prices influenced by
the overall socio-economic situation. The decline in land prices increased the supply
of condominiums, which, in turn, helped in the recovery of population numbers in
central Tokyo begin in the second half of the 1990s. By 2004, prices for residential
land in the city had fallen to less than a third of what they were at the peak due
to the economic bubble in 1992. Although the subsequent “mini-bubble” that took
place in 2006–2008 somewhat helped prices recover by 2008, the financial crisis that
struck that year pushed them down again, and the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
ensured that prices continued to stagnate. In 2014, land prices began to climb as a
result of the monetary easing that began in 2013. The level of residential segregation
observed in the Region and the City has remained constant since the mid-2000s,
which implies that the stagnation of the housing market and segregation is linked.
While land prices increased in the center of the city and the bay area during the mini-
bubble and resumed their climb after the monetary easing policy was implemented,
in the surrounding areas real estate prices have continued to decline, with suburban
condominium buildings constructed during the bubble era being severely affected
(Hirayama 2017). Although Tokyo is located far away from the areas affected by the
2011 earthquake and tsunami, residents of the city have also become more safety-
conscious, which has negatively affected land prices in low-lying eastern parts of the
city that are vulnerable to disasters (Yamada 2015). It should be noted that although
this study did not indicate the impact of the recovery period that came after 2014 if
concentrated investment in “hot spots” recover along with the economy, residential
segregation may once again become more pronounced.
Another important factor responsible for changes in residential segregation is
residential preference. A survey among owners of new condominiums in the Tokyo
region by Recruit Sumai Company Ltd. indicated that “walking time to the nearest
station” is becoming an increasingly important factor for people planning to buy
and rent houses: 75.5% rated it as important in 2005, which increased to 84.0% in
2010. This indicates that mainly high-income households, are choosing to live in
highly convenient areas because such areas are relatively expensive. As the suburban
population returns to the city center, suburban residential areas are also undergoing
increasing selection and elimination as the overall demand for housing decreases.
Population decrease and declining birth rate in Japan will no doubt spur more
changes in welfare and housing policies. For example, as the revised Immigration
Control Act was approved at the end of 2018, the decline of the labor force has
forced the Japanese government to open doors for low-skilled immigrants, a category
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that had hitherto not been admitted. Insufficient development of housing policies
toward them remains another issue. As for urban policy, in 2014, the government
revised the Act on Special Measures concerning Urban Reconstruction to realize
compact cities suitable for the declining population. The Act gave each municipality
the ability to designate specific areas where city functions and residential housing
could be consolidated to encourage residents to move there. Such policies stimulate
the selection and concentration of population in city centers, meaning they could
accelerate residential segregation. In short, future trends in economic inequality and
residential segregation in Tokyo will be an important topic of study.
Notes
1. Tokyo was not a direct disaster area, but the earthquake influenced the energy
policy and real estate market nationwide.
2. This corresponds to the relationship between New York City and New York
Metropolitan Area in the US as an example.
3. Neighborhoods with fewer than 50 workers are not reported.
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Tammaru T, van Ham M, Marcińczak S, Musterd S (eds) (2016) Socio-economic segregation in
European capital cities: east meets west. Routledge, London and New York
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Abstract Despite enduring political rhetoric that promotes Australia as ‘the lucky
country’ and ‘the land of the fair go’, recent decades have seen a noticeable increase in
levels of income inequality. This growing economic divide has driven housing prices
up and left lower-income families unable to access the housing market in inner-
city locations. In contrast to other countries, Australia’s socioeconomic segregation
does not overlap with ethnic segregation. Australia’s highly regulated immigration
program has resulted in a relatively well-educated and employable foreign-born
population who largely reside in middle-income neighbourhoods. These particu-
larities make Australia an interesting context to explore patterns of socioeconomic
segregation over time. In this chapter, we will utilise both traditional measures of
segregation (such as the dissimilarity index) as well more spatialised measures (such
as location quotients and Local Morans I) to assess socioeconomic segregation at
the local level. Drawing on four waves of census data (2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016),
we explore how socioeconomic segregation has changed over time across nearly 500
neighbourhoods in Melbourne. We further examine the degree to which socioeco-
nomic segregation aligns with ethnic segregation patterns and levels in this city. We
find patterns of socioeconomic segregation remain relatively unchanging over time
in Melbourne. Additionally, our findings highlight important differences in patterns
and levels of socioeconomic and ethnic segregation in the Australian context.
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12.1 Introduction
In the 2019 federal election campaign, opposition leader Bill Shorten promised
Australian voters a ‘fair go’ government if elected. While campaigning, Shorten
assured voters, ‘if we win this election, our priority is not making the very rich
even richer… it is getting wages moving again for working people’ (Benson 2019).
Shorten went on to accuse current PrimeMinister Scott Morrison of only ‘defending
the top end of town’, positioning himself and the Australian Labour Party as the key
to a fairer, more egalitarian society (Bagshaw 2019). This campaign strategy is not
unprecedented. Australian politicians from both sides of the political spectrum have
long capitalised on the general public’s attachment to the ‘fair go’ sentiment. In fact,
polling data shows that over 90% of Australians perceive the ‘fair go’ to be a core
Australian value (Gough 2006).
Given the importance of the ‘fair go’ to Australians, many have voiced concerns
about growing levels of income inequality. In fact, 78% of Australians believe the
current gap between the rich and the poor is too large (Douglas 2018). Public percep-
tions of growing inequality are reflected in the data. Income inequality, as measured
by the Gini coefficient, has increased from 0.313 in 1981 to 0.358 in 2014 (World
Bank 2019). At the same time, house prices in Australia’s capital cities have skyrock-
eted—growing by 250% since the 1990s (OECD 2017). Growth in house prices
has outpaced growth in incomes, leaving many lower-income households strug-
gling to access the housing market, especially in inner-city locations where jobs
and services are concentrated (Spiller 2014). Consequently, lower-income house-
holds and younger generations are increasingly forced to live on the outskirts of the
city in neighbourhoods that offer fewer employment opportunities, particularly in
high skilled jobs (Randolph and Tice 2014). This trend reflects a growing spatial
divide between the haves and the have nots—a process described by Randolph and
Tice (2014: 385) as the ‘suburbanisation of disadvantage’.
Set against this backdrop of growing inequality and increasing house prices, this
chapter examines trends in socioeconomic segregation over time acrossMelbourne—
Australia’s second-largest city. Using occupational categories as a proxy for socioe-
conomic status, we draw on both traditional measures of segregation (such as the
dissimilarity index) as well as more spatialised measures (such as location quotients
and Local Morans I) to assess socioeconomic segregation across nearly 500 neigh-
bourhoods over time. We further consider whether trends in socioeconomic segre-
gation align with ethnic segregation patterns in the Australian context. The find-
ings demonstrate relatively stable, albeit slightly increasing trends in socioeco-
nomic segregation over time in Melbourne and highlight differences in patterns of
socioeconomic segregation and ethnic segregation.
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12.2 Welfare in Australia
There are two primary objectives that underpin tax-transfer systems globally. The
first is referred to by Barr (2001: 1) as the ‘piggy bank objective’ whereby the system
is designed to provide insurance against unemployment, disability or sickness—that
is, periods during an individual’s life cycle when they have greater needs or lower-
income (Barr 2001). The second is described as the ‘Robin Hood objective’ (Barr
2001: 1) whereby taxation is used to redistribute wealth amongst residents by taking
from the rich to give to the poor. To achieve this, high-income earners are taxed at
a much higher rate than low-income earners and lower-income households receive a
greater proportion of social benefits.
According to Whiteford (2010), Australia’s welfare system strongly emphasises
the latter objective, offering a safety net to those unable to support themselves.
Those eligible for welfare payments in Australia include the elderly, persons with a
disability, carers, families with children, veterans, and unemployed persons (AIHW
2017). Income support payments are fully funded by government revenue generated
through the tax system (AIHW 2017). As such, Australians are not required to make
individualised social security contributions and income support payments are set at
a flat rate rather than linked to past earnings (Whiteford 2015).
Expenditure on welfare in real terms has risen over the past decade. In 2016,
the Australian government spent $6,566 AUD per resident, up from $5,663 AUD in
2006 (AIHW 2017). Yet compared to other OECD countries, Australia is a relatively
low social spender (Whiteford 2017), with social spending as a proportion of GDP
well below the OECD average (17.8% compared to 20%) (OECD 2019). Whiteford
(2017) attributes this low social spending to Australia’s relatively efficient welfare
system, which utilises means-testing to determine eligibility. While means-testing is
not unique to the Australian context, it is more widely used in Australia compared
to any other OECD country, with approximately 80% of cash benefits means-tested
(AIHW 2017). In 2011, the most disadvantaged households in Australia (the lowest
quintile) received 42% of social benefits, while the most advantaged households (the
highest quintile) received only 3.8% of social benefits (Whiteford 2017). In other
words, the poorest 20% received 11 times more in social benefits than the richest
20% (Whiteford 2015). Given Australia’s social spending is largely directed towards
the poorest quintile, Whiteford (2017: 1) argues that ‘an across-the-board reduction
in social security spending in Australia would increase income inequality more than
in any other OECD country’.
12.3 Income Inequality in Australia
Since the 1980s,Australia’s incomedistribution has gradually grownmore unequal—
rising from 0.313 in 1981 to 0.358 in 2014 (World Bank 2019). Globally this places
Australia behind France (0.323), the United Kingdom (0.34) and Canada (0.34) but
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ahead of theUnited States (0.411) (World Bank 2019). Although household incomes2
experienced growth between 1993–94 and 2013–14, the degree of growth was not
uniform across all quintiles. The highest quintile experienced the greatest amount of
growth, with incomes rising by 80% (AIHW 2017), doubling the gap between the
highest quintile and the lowest quintile over this time period (AIHW 2017). While
Australians wish to see the gap close (Douglas 2018), there is limited support for
the tax increases necessary to allow for greater social spending. In fact, 50% of
Australians believe they pay too much tax and an additional 34% believe they pay
enough (Herscovitch 2013).
12.4 The Australian Housing System
This growing inequality directly threatens the ‘great Australian dream’ of home-
ownership—a widely held aspiration amongst Australians dating back to the mid-
twentieth century (Gurran and Phibbs 2016). Colic-Peisker and Johnson (2010: 352)
suggest that ‘the importance of homeownership inAustralia is closely associatedwith
a perception of an egalitarian society where everyone can become a homeowner’.
Unfortunately, this dream has become increasingly unattainable in recent years. The
last twodecades have seen astronomical increases in house prices—growing by 250%
since the 1990s (OECD 2017). Even after adjusting for growth in income between
1980 and 2015, a 78% increase in Australian house prices remains (AIHW 2017).
As rising house prices have outpaced household incomes, homeowners have become
increasingly reliant on mortgages to finance housing. In 2016, 32.8% of households
owned their home outright, 35.7% owned their home with a mortgage and 31.5%
were renting (ABS 2016).
Overall rates of homeownership have moderately declined over the last twenty
years in Australia (Burke et al. 2014). Indeed, 71% of Australians owned their home
either with or without a mortgage in 1994–95 compared to 67% in 2013–14 (AIHW
2017). Sharper decreases in homeownership are evident amongst young people.
While 60% of persons between 25 and 34 years owned their own home in 1988–
89, this number fell to just 39% in 2013–14 (AIHW 2017). This downward trend
suggests housing affordability issues have created a barrier to accessing the housing
market for younger generations, giving rise to intergenerational inequities (Saunders
2017).
For the averageAustralian household, housing costs (either rent payments ormort-
gage repayments) account for approximately 18%of total household expenditure and
represent the largest household expense (ABS 2011; Saunders 2017). Homeowners
that spend over 30% of their gross income on housing costs are deemed to be expe-
riencing mortgage stress. In 2017, one in four households with mortgages were
12013 World Bank estimate.
2Measure of equivalised household weekly income which is the total household income after
adjusting for differing household size and composition (ABS 2006).
12 The Land of the ‘Fair Go’? Mapping Income Inequality … 233
considered in financial distress (Hughes 2017). Low-income renters are also strug-
gling. In 2013–14, 50% of lower-income rental households reported spending more
than 30% of their gross income on housing compared to 42% in 2005–06 (AIHW
2017). There are no national-level rent control systems for the private rental market
in Australia, with the rental market overseen at the state level.
For those unable to afford housing through the private market, public housing is
provided by the state and federal government (Morris 2018). Low-incomehouseholds
are prioritised for public housing, particularly those who also have special needs
such as Indigenous Australians, young people, old people, persons with disabilities,
victims of domestic and family violence and the homeless (AIHW 2017). Rents
are monitored to ensure that eligible tenants pay no more than 30% of their gross
income (AIHW2017).Yet demand for public housing far exceeds supply,with almost
200,000 households onwaiting lists in 2015. Further, wait times are long, with almost
50% of households waiting for more than two years (AIHW 2017).
12.5 Greater Melbourne
Melbourne is the capital of the state of Victoria and is the second most populated city
in Australia. Melbourne has been ranked as one of the world’s most liveable cities by
the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (The Economist 2018). Indeed, Melbourne
held the number one ranking across 140 cities for seven years. Greater Melbourne
spans nearly 10,000 km2 and is home to a residential population of approximately
4.5 million persons (ABS 2016) (see Fig. 12.1). Similar to other Australian cities,
Melbourne is a low-density city—with the average household comprising 2.7 persons
and the majority of residents (66%) living in detached houses on suburban blocks
(ABS 2016).
Between 2001 and 2011, the median house price in Melbourne increased by
163% (Department of Transport, Planning and Local Infrastructure (DTPLI) 2012).
At the same time, wages increased by just 57% (DTPLI 2012). As a consequence of
soaring house prices, inner-city neighbourhood housing is largely inaccessible for
homebuyers on low to moderate household incomes (Goodman 2018). While those
on an average household income could afford to buy a residence within 10 kms from
Melbourne’s central business district (CBD) in 1994, by 2009 this distance increased
to 40 kms (DTPLI 2014). Low-income renters are similarly struggling to find housing
close to the city centre. According to Hulse, Reynolds and Yates (2014), the shortage
of affordable and available rental dwellings exceeds 20,000 in the middle suburbs of
Melbourne. Given the majority of jobs and services inMelbourne are concentrated in
and around the CBD, lower-income households are left at a significant disadvantage
(Spiller 2014).
The Residential Tenancies Act (1997) provides the legislative framework which
guides the rental market inMelbourne. In 2017, these rental laws were reviewed with
a series of reforms set for implementation by July 2020 (Victoria State Government
2019). Most notable of these reforms was a reduction in how often landlords can
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increase rent (previously every six months, now every 12 months). Further, several
reforms focused on improving the long term suitability of rental properties for house-
holds by introducing long term leases, permitting minor modifications and allowing
pets (Victoria State Government 2019).
As a longstanding gateway city for new immigrants arriving in Australia,
Melbourne is renowned for being a progressive city with a strong history of ethnic
diversity and inclusion (ABS 2014). In many countries, socioeconomic and ethnic
segregation patterns are largely indistinguishable with certain ethnic groups living
in the more disadvantaged areas (Iceland and Wilkes 2006). However, Australia’s
highly controlled immigration program has resulted in a relatively well-educated and
employable foreign-born populationwho largely reside inmiddle-incomeneighbour-
hoods (Sydes 2018). Between 2006 and 2016, the proportion of Melbourne’s popu-
lation born overseas increased from 28.9% up to 33.9% (ABS 2016). In Australia,
immigrants who arrive through the skilled stream are required to speak English profi-
ciently, and thus the number of linguistically isolated immigrants is relatively small.
While 38% of Melbourne’s population spoke a language other than English in 2016,
just 5.6% reported not speaking English well or not at all (ABS 2016). In 2016,
the top five countries of birth residing in Melbourne included India (3.6%), China
(3.5%), England (3%), Vietnam (1.8%) and New Zealand (1.8%) (ABS 2016). In
contrast to the immigrant population, Indigenous Australians experience high levels
of disadvantage (Altman, Biddle, and Hunter 2018). In 2016, Indigenous Australians
comprised just 0.5% of the total population inMelbourne—amuch lower percentage
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compared to other capital cities such as Sydney (1.5%) and Brisbane (2.4%) (ABS
2016).
12.6 Neighbourhoods in the Australian Context
The unit of analysis used in this chapter is the state suburb—an approximation of
localities gazetted by the Geographical Place Name authority in each State and Terri-
tory (ABS2019). State suburbs are themost equivalentAustralian unit to census tracts
in the United States andMiddle Layer Super Output Areas in the United Kingdom. In
the Australian context, the state suburb is synonymouswith the neighbourhood and is
widely used in neighbourhood-based research (Benier andWickes 2016; Foster et al.
2010; Wickes et al. 2013; Zahnow et al. 2013). Census data are also available at the
state suburb level at each census. In 2016, 561 state suburbs comprised the Greater
Melbourne region. However, some neighbourhoods are inappropriate for inclusion
due to small residential populations. To avoid skewing the results, neighbourhoods
were considered non-residential if they had less than 300 persons, usually resident
(Sydes 2018). This process resulted in a total neighbourhood sample of N = 474
in 2001, N = 487 in 2006, N = 479 in 2011, N = 486 in 2016. The total persons
residing within these neighbourhoods ranged from 305 to 50,479 persons, with an
average population of 7,993 residents. Recognising that neighbourhood boundaries
shift over time, data from 2001, 2006 and 2011 census were concorded to the 2016
state suburb boundaries using a proportional approach (ABS 2018).
12.7 Change in Occupational Structure in Melbourne
In this chapter, we use occupation categories as a proxy formeasuring neighbourhood
advantage and disadvantage. The ABS broadly classifies occupations under eight
categories: (A) labourers; (B)machinery operators and drivers; (C) salesworkers; (D)
clerical and administrative workers; (E) community and personal service workers;
(F) technicians and trade workers; (G) professionals; and (H) managers (ABS 2016).
We collapsed these broad occupation categories into three key socioprofessional
groups. To represent the top socioprofessional group, we combined managers and
professionals. To represent the bottom socioprofessional group, we pooled labourers
andmachinery operators and drivers (also referred to as unskilled workers). All other
remaining categories were merged to represent the middle socioprofessional group.
To demonstrate the utility of occupation categories as a proxy for measuring
advantage/disadvantage, weekly personal income by group was examined. In doing
so, we find clear differences in personal weekly income across the three groups. In
2016, 29.8% of the top socioprofessional group in Melbourne reported receiving a
weekly income greater than $2,000 per week compared to just 2.9% of the bottom
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socioprofessional group. Alternatively, while over a quarter of the bottom sociopro-
fessional group received an income of less than $500 per week, just 7.5% of the top
socioprofessional group reported such earnings (ABS 2016).
Figure 12.2 demonstrates the changes in Greater Melbourne’s occupational struc-
ture over the period of study. Here it is evident that the size of the bottom sociopro-
fessional group has reduced over time. In 2001, the bottom group comprised 16.5%
of Melbourne’s workforce. By 2016, this figure dropped to just 13.9%. Both occu-
pation categories that comprise the group—labourers and machinery operators and
drivers—experienced a reduction in group size between 2001 and 2016. Reductions
in size are also seen in the middle socioprofessional group—moving from 57.0% in
2001 to 47.2% in 2016. All occupation categories within the middle group declined
in size over time with the exception of community and personal service workers.
Rather, this group experienced growth, increasing from 7.6% in 2001 to 10.4% in
2016. The size of the top socioprofessional group increased by almost 5 percentage
points between 2001 and 2016. While both managers and professionals increased
as a share of the labour force overtime, the greatest amount of growth was apparent
amongst professionals—increasing from a 21.6% share in 2001 to a 25.4% share in
2016. Taken together, these results show a gradual move towards professional and
managerial positions—a trend that likely reflects growing education levels amongst
























































































Fig. 12.2 Distribution of occupational groups and change over time in Melbourne
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12.8 Socioeconomic Segregation in Melbourne
In their landmark review, Massey and Denton (1988) identified five different dimen-
sions of residential segregation—evenness, exposure, concentration, centrality and
clustering. With these different dimensions in mind, Massey and Denton (1988: 312)
argue that segregation should be measured by ‘a battery of indices’ rather than a
single measure. Recognising the need to tap into these multiple dimensions of segre-
gation, we utilise a wide range of segregation measures in this study, including the
Dissimilarity Index, LocationQuotients (LQs) andLocalMoran’s I (LM-I) to capture
socioeconomic segregation patterns in Melbourne.
12.8.1 Dissimilarity Index
Tables 12.1 and 12.2 present the dissimilarity indices across the four census waves
(2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016). In comparing the dissimilarity indices for the top,
middle and bottom groups, there appears to be little difference over time. The dissim-
ilarity indices for the top–bottom comparison ranges from 0.38 to 0.39 overall time
points. In other words, almost 40% of the bottom group would have to move to
another neighbourhood to make the top and the bottom group evenly distributed
across all neighbourhoods. The dissimilarity score for the top-middle (0.21) and
middle-bottom (0.20) comparison is much lower and does not change over time.
Limited change over time is also apparent when examining the occupation cate-
gories. The greatest score in dissimilarity is between professionals and machinery
operators and drivers (slightly increasing over time from 0.44 to 0.46); followed by
Table 12.1 Dissimilarity index (multiplied by 100) between the occupational groups
MAN PRO TEC COM CLE SAL MAC LAB MAN PRO TEC COM CLE SAL MAC LAB
12 24 17 15 15 39 32 MAN 10 25 18 14 16 41 32
13 33 22 21 23 46 39 PRO 11 31 22 20 21 46 36
24 33 12 13 12 20 12 TEC 25 32 10 13 12 22 13
17 21 14 7 8 27 20 COM 17 22 11 8 8 26 16
15 22 12 8 6 28 21 CLE 14 20 12 7 5 29 20
16 23 12 9 5 28 20 SAL 15 22 12 8 5 29 18
38 44 18 27 26 26 10 MAC 41 46 22 27 29 29 14









Table 12.2 Dissimilarity index (multiplied by 100) between top, middle and bottom groups
2001 2006 2011 2016
TOP - MID 21 21 21 21
TOP - BOT 38 39 39 38
MID - BOT 21 20 21 20
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managers and machinery operators and drivers (also increasing over time from 0.38
to 0.41). While Tables 12.1 and 12.2 provide some insight into socioeconomic segre-
gation in Melbourne, traditional segregation indices like the dissimilarity index are
often criticised (Wong 2016). First, the dissimilarity index is aspatial in nature, with
each neighbourhood unit treated independently without considering the character-
istics of nearby areas. Second, the dissimilarity index is global and thus provides a
single score to summarise segregation patterns for the entire city and thereby fails to
capture variations at the local level. Third, the dissimilarity index represents just one
dimension of residential segregation—evenness. Given these limitations, we next
consider other more spatialised measures of local segregation to more fully explore
trends in socioeconomic segregation over time across Melbourne.
12.8.2 Location Quotients (LQs)
As a measure of relative concentration, LQs provide a clear visualisation of residen-
tial distributions—tapping into both the concentration and evenness dimensions of
segregation (Brown and Chung 2006) (please refer to Chap. 1 for further information
on LQs). Figure 12.3 shows the residential distributions of the top socioprofessional
group and the bottom socioprofessional group in 2001 and 2016. As illustrated in
Fig. 12.3 Location quotients
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Fig. 12.3, the top socioprofessional group are heavily overrepresented in neighbour-
hoods in and around the city centre at both time points. This trend is not surprising
given that neighbourhoods closer to the city centre boast higher real estate values and
are conveniently located near jobs and services (Goodman 2018). However, while
a number of neighbourhoods outside of the CBD are highlighted as having more
than their expected share of managers and professionals in 2001, in 2016, areas with
high LQ values are restricted largely to the inner city region. This suggests that these
slightly more distal neighbourhoods have become less popular for managers and
professionals over time. By comparison, areas with low LQ values tend to be middle
to outer ring neighbourhoods. Areas with low LQ values are relatively consistent
over time.
Compared to the top socioprofessional group, unskilled workers occupy vastly
different areas of Melbourne. In fact, neighbourhoods with an overrepresentation of
the bottom socioprofessional group tend to be located on the fringes of the city—
reflecting more affordable housing options. Some areas, particularly in Melbourne’s
east and/or on the outskirts of the city, have seen increasing levels of overrepresen-
tation over time. Neighbourhoods with less than their expected share of unskilled
workers (in other words, have LQ scores of less than 0.75) are largely co-located and
situated in Melbourne’s CBD area. Over time, there appears to be a spatial spillover
with LQ values increasing in nearby neighbourhoods. Overall, these maps present
clear trends in residential segregation linked to socioprofessional status. The areas
least populated by the bottom socioprofessional group are the same areas that are
most populated by the top socioprofessional group and vice versa.
12.8.3 Local Moran’s I (LM-I)
While LQs show how a population is distributed across a city, LM-I captures the
co-location of neighbourhoods which share similar characteristics—depicting the
clustering-exposure dimension of segregation (Brown andChung 2006). LM-I exam-
ines each neighbourhood in relation to the characteristics of surrounding areas and
highlights the incidences of spatial clustering (Anselin 1995; Brown and Chung
2006). The LM-I procedure was computed in ArcGIS and used a rook spatial conti-
guity matrix due to its more conservative approach in identifying neighbouring areas
(Dubin 2009). The LM-I procedure allocates neighbourhoods to one of five clusters:
HighHigh (HH) clusters (high concentration surroundedbyhigh concentration); Low
Low (LL) clusters (low concentration surrounded by low concentration); High Low
(HL) clusters (high concentration surrounded by low concentration); LowHigh (LH)
clusters (low concentration surrounded by high concentration) and non-significant
neighbourhoods.
Figure 12.4 presents the LM-I results for the top and bottom socioprofessional
groups in 2001 and 2016. In 2001, 107 neighbourhoods are identified as a HH cluster
for the top socioprofessional group. These neighbourhoods are located in one of three
locations—in and aroundMelbourne’s CBD, inMelbourne’s east and inMelbourne’s
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Fig. 12.4 Local Moran’s I
south. However, the majority are situated close to the CBD. While HH clusters were
largely located in Melbourne’s CBD again in 2016, the size of the HH grouping has
reduced considerably—with only 77 neighbourhoods classified as a HH cluster. The
areas previously highlighted as a HH cluster in 2001, that are no longer HH clusters
in 2016, are typically further away from the CBD. NoHH clusters in the east or south
remain in 2016.While sixHL clusterswere identified in 2001 and seven in 2016—the
neighbourhoods highlighted as a HL cluster are not consistent over time. While the
neighbourhoods classified as HL clusters change over time, they are largely located
on the outskirts of the city at both time points. Neighbourhoods categorised as a
LL cluster are spread across the city—although they are largely located in middle
and outer ring suburbs. In contrast to HH clusters, the number of LL clusters has
increased over time from 61 neighbourhoods in 2001 to 83 neighbourhoods in 2016.
The LM-I results for the bottom socioprofessional group reveal notably different
segregation patterns. In 2001, the neighbourhoods identified as HH clusters for
unskilled workers are located in the middle and outer ring. Areas highlighted as a
statistically significant LL cluster are mainly located in and around the city centre—
directly overlapping the areas classified as HH clusters for the top socioprofessional
group. Several HL clusters are identified on the outskirts of the city in 2001. In 2016,
a greater number of LL clusters was found for the bottom socioprofessional group—
increasing from 41 in 2001 to 131 in 2016. For the most part, these LL clusters again
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cover the area surrounding Melbourne’s CBD. Also increasing is the number of HH
clusters for the bottom socioprofessional group in 2016, from 70 to 86. Compared
to 2001, these HH clusters are slightly further away from the city centre and largely
located on the fringes ofMelbourne. NoHL clusters for the bottom socioprofessional
group are identified in 2016. Taken together, these findings likely reflect the inner
city’s growing house prices over time and the limited affordable housing options for
the bottom socioprofessional group.
12.8.4 Classification of Neighbourhoods by Socioeconomic
Composition
Using the criteria outlined in Chap. 1, Fig. 12.5 displays the classification of
Melbourne neighbourhoods by socioeconomic composition in 2001 and 2016. In
2001, most neighbourhoods within the Melbourne context meet the criteria of either
a middle-income neighbourhood (N = 156) or a middle to high-income neighbour-
hood (N = 259). Only 9 neighbourhoods meet the criteria of a high-income neigh-
bourhood. In 2001, 38 neighbourhoods are classified as low to middle income and 10
neighbourhoods are considered mixed. No low income or polarised neighbourhoods
are identified. In 2016, middle income and middle to high-income neighbourhoods
continued to represent the majority of neighbourhoods in Melbourne (N = 123 and
N = 307, respectively). By comparison to 2001, the number of high-income neigh-
bourhoods has increased in 2016 (N= 24) while the number of low tomiddle-income
neighbourhoods has decreased (N= 26). Similar to 2001, no neighbourhood in 2016
is classified as a low income or polarised neighbourhood.
Fig. 12.5 Classification of neighbourhoods by socioeconomic composition
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Fig. 12.6 Location of the top socioeconomic group
12.8.5 Location of the Top Socioprofessional Group
Lastly, we examined the degree of spatial concentration of the top socioprofessional
group inMelbourne (seeChap. 1 for furthermethodological explanation). Figure 12.6
illustrates the location of the top socioprofessional group in 2001 and 2016. In 2001,
Q1 comprises 20 neighbourhoods. In other words, 20% of Melbourne’s top socio-
professional group resides in just 4% of Melbourne’s neighbourhoods. These neigh-
bourhoods are largely proximate to one another and located nearby the city centre. In
2016, the number of neighbourhoods that fall within Q1 remains largely unchanged
at 21. Again, these neighbourhoods are largely located near the city centre. However,
two areas, further away from the CBD are highlighted as Q1 in 2016. These neigh-
bourhoods—Berwick and Point Cook—were two of the five most highly populated
Melbourne neighbourhoods in 2016, with populations exceeding 45,000.
12.9 Socioeconomic Segregation and Ethnic Segregation
Patterns
To provide a visual representation of how socioeconomic and ethnic segregation
trends overlap in the Australian context, an additional series of maps were created.
Figure 12.7 highlights areas that are HH clusters for linguistically isolated resi-
dents (i.e. those who are not proficient in English) and Indigenous residents. As
can be seen in Fig. 12.7, areas that are popular for persons who are not proficient
in English are relatively consistent over time. Neighbourhoods identified as a HH
cluster are largely co-located in one of three areas, all located in middle-ring suburbs.
By comparison, neighbourhoods identified as a HH cluster for Indigenous residents
are notably different in 2016 compared to 2001. Additionally, fewer HH clusters
were found in 2016. Nevertheless, at both time points, HH cluster neighbourhoods
for Indigenous residents tend to be located on the outskirts of the city. Interestingly,
there is limited overlap between areas identified as a HH clusters for non-English
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Fig. 12.7 Socioeconomic segregation and ethnic segregation
proficient residents and Indigenous residents. In 2001, just four neighbourhoodswere
classified as HH clusters for both group. In 2016, there was no overlap between the
groups. This suggests Indigenous Australians and linguistically isolated residents
occupy different areas of the city.
Overlayed on thesemaps are areas highlighted asHH clusters for the top sociopro-
fessional group and bottom socioprofessional group. While some neighbourhoods
deemed to be HH clusters for Indigenous residents or non-English proficient resi-
dents are also identified as HH clusters for the bottom socioprofessional group, these
neighbourhoods are not completely overlapping. However, it is clear that Indige-
nous residents and non-English proficient residents are largely absent from the top
socioprofessional neighbourhoods. In 2001, nine neighbourhoods were classified as
both a HH cluster for the top socioprofessional group and linguistically isolated
residents. By 2016, this overlap was reduced to just three neighbourhoods. Further,
no neighbourhood deemed a HH cluster for the top socioprofessional group is also
classified as a HH cluster for Indigenous persons. Thus, while these ethnic groups
are not necessarily restricted to residing in just the poorest neighbourhoods, they
lack presence in the top socioeconomic areas.
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12.10 Conclusions
While the overwhelming majority of Australians perceive the ‘fair go’ to be a core
Australian value, the growing levels of income inequality, issueswith housing afford-
ability and increasing socioeconomic segregation outlined in this chapter present a
threat to its longevity. Melbourne is expected to be the largest city in Australia in
the coming decades and is predicted to grow to a population of 8 million people by
2051 (Victoria State Government 2016). Therefore a key priority for government
and urban planning is to maintain liveability and ensure that access to housing and
employment does not fall outside of the reach of ‘ordinary’ Australians.
The results of the analyses undertaken for this chapter highlight clear trends in
socioeconomic segregation in Melbourne. Traditional measures of segregation like
the dissimilarity index indicate that almost 40% of the bottom socioprofessional
group would need to move to another neighbourhood in order to make the top and the
bottom group evenly distributed. However, the dissimilarity indices show a limited
change in socioeconomic segregation over time.
By comparison, the more spatialised measures reveal a growing spatial divide
between the top and bottom socioprofessional groups. Looking first to location
quotients, the top socioprofessional group are overrepresented in neighbourhoods
closest to the centre of the city. Results also show that top socioprofessional group
and unskilled workers inhabit different parts of city, with the bottom socioprofes-
sional group residing in the city’s outer suburbs. Put simply, those areas least popular
for the top socioprofessional group are the areas where unskilled workers are most
likely to live. Similar patterns are found when looking at the LM-I results. Taken
together this demonstrates a growing geographical distance between the ‘haves’ and
the ‘have-nots’. This increasing segregation is likely to be further compounded by
the expected population growth of Melbourne.
References
ABS (2006) Household income—equivalised (HED). https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/
A390E2529EC00DFECA25720A0076F6C6?opendocument. Accessed 30 May 2019
ABS (2011) 2011 census data via Tablebuilder. https://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.
nsf/home/tablebuilder. Accessed 15 May 2019
ABS (2014) Where do migrants live? https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4102.
0main+features102014. Accessed 15 May 2019
ABS (2016) 2016 census data via Tablebuilder. https://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.
nsf/home/tablebuilder. Accessed 20 May 2019
ABS (2018) Australian Statistical Geography Standard (ASGS) correspondences. https://www.abs.
gov.au/websitedbs/D3310114.nsf/home/Correspondences. Accessed 22 May 2019
ABS (2019) Census geography basics. https://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/D3310114.nsf/home/
2016%20Census%20Geography%20Basics. Accessed 22 May 2019
AIHW (2017) Australia’s welfare 2017. Canberra, AIHW
12 The Land of the ‘Fair Go’? Mapping Income Inequality … 245
Altman J, Biddle N, Hunter B (2018) How realistic are the prospects for ‘closing the gaps’ in
socioeconomic outcomes for Indigenous Australians. Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy
Research, Canberra
Anselin L (1995) Local indicators of spatial association—LISA. Geographical Anal 27(2):93–115
Bagshaw E (2019) Labor’s $32 billion plan to tax the ‘top end of town’ will hit 10% of taxpayers,
May 10. The Sydney Morning Herald. https://www.smh.com.au/federal-election-2019/labor-s-
32-billion-plan-to-tax-the-top-end-of-town-will-hit-10-per-cent-of-taxpayers-20190508-p51lf9.
html. Accessed 22 May 2019
Barr NA (2001) The welfare state as piggy bank: information, risk, uncertainty, and the role of the
state. Oxford University Press, New York
Benier K,Wickes R (2016) The effect of ethnic diversity on collective efficacy in Australia. J Sociol
52(4):856–873
Benson S (2019) Bill Shorten’s ‘fair go’ wealth transfer, May 6. The Australian. https://www.the
australian.com.au/nation/politics/bills-fair-go-wealth-transfer/news-story/fca0ea2a0c8ed4609d
3642a19413c26d. Accessed 22 May 2019
Brown LA, Chung SY (2006) Spatial segregation, segregation indices and the geographical
perspective. Populat Space Place 12(2):125–143
Burke T, Stone W, Ralston L (2014) Generational change in home purchase opportunity
in Australia. https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2014/11/apo-nid420821198866.
pdf. Accessed 22 May 2019
Colic-Peisker V, Johnson G (2010) Security and anxiety of homeownership: perceptions of middle-
class Australians at different stages of their housing careers. Hous Theory Soc 27(4):351–371
Douglas B (2018) A fair go for all Australians. https://www.tai.org.au/sites/default/files/A%20F
air%20Go%20For%20All%20Australians.pdf. Accessed 22 May 2019
DTPLI (2012) Metropolitan planning strategy—housing fact sheet. Department of transport, plan-
ning and local infrastructure, Melbourne. https://www.planmelbourne.vic.gov.au/_data/assets/
pdf_file/0011/130322/330_60_2-NEWfact-sheets-Housing-11052012. Accessed 30 May 2019
DTPLI (2014) Plan Melbourne metropolitan planning strategy. Department of Transport, Planning
and Local Infrastructure, Melbourne
Dubin R (2009) Spatial weights. In: Fotheringham S, Rogerson PA (eds) The SAGE handbook of
spatial analysis. SAGE Publications, California, pp 125–159
The Economist (2018) The global liveability index. https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.
aspx?campaignid=liveability2018. Accessed 15 May 2019
Foster S, Giles-Corti B, Knuiman M (2010) Neighbourhood design and fear of crime: a social-
ecological examination of the correlates of residents’ fear in new suburban housing developments.
Health Place 16(6):1156–1165
Goodman R (2018) Melbourne-growth challenges for a liveable city. Plan Rev 54(1):6–17
Gough D (2006) Australians value a ‘fair go’ highest. https://www.theage.com.au/national/austra
lians-value-a-fair-go-highest-20061112-ge3juk.html. Accessed 27 May 2019
GurranN, Phibbs P (2016) Boulevard of broken dreams’: planning, housing supply and affordability
in urban Australia. Built Environ 42(1):55–71
Herscovitch B (2013) A fair go: fact or fiction? https://apo.org.au/node/34061. Accessed 27 May
2019
Hughes D (2017) Record numbers under mortgage stress, May 1. https://www.afr.com/wealth/rec
ord-numbers-under-mortgage-stress-20170501-gvw2vt. Accessed 23 May 2019
HulseK,ReynoldsM,Yates J (2014)Changes in the supply of affordable housing in the private rental
sector for lower income households, 2006–11. AHURI final report no. 235. AHURI, Melbourne
Iceland J, Wilkes R (2006) Does socioeconomic status matter? Race, class, and residential
segregation. Soc Probl 53(2):248–273
Massey DS, Denton NA (1988) Suburbanization and segregation in US metropolitan areas. Am J
Sociol 94(3):592–626
Morris A (2018) The financialisation of housing and the housing affordability crisis in Sydney.
Hous Finance 32(4):63–69
246 M. Sydes and R. Wickes
OECD (2017) Affordability housing database. https://www.oecd.org/social/affordable-housing-dat
abase.htm. Accessed 27 May 2019
OECD(2019)Social expenditure database. https://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm.Accessed
10 May 2019
Randolph B, Tice A (2014) Suburbanizing disadvantage in Australian cities: sociospatial change in
an era of neoliberalism. J Urban Affa 36(1):384–399
Saunders P (2017) Housing costs, poverty and inequality in Australia. Hous Stud 32(6):742–757
Spiller M (2014) Social justice and the centralisation of governance in the Australian metropolis: a
case study of Melbourne. Urban Policy Res 32(3):361–380
Sydes M (2018) Where immigrants live: capturing ethnic segregation at the local level in two
Australian cities. Austral Geograph 1–21
Victoria State Government (2016) Victoria in future 2016 population and household projec-
tion. https://www.planning.vic.gov.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0014/14036/Victoria-in-Future-2016-
FINAL-web.pdf. Accessed 10 June 2019
Victoria State Government (2019) Rent fair-rental reforms for Victorians. https://www.vic.gov.au/
rentfair-rental-reforms-victorians. Accessed 15 May 2019
Whiteford P (2010) The Australian tax-transfer system: architecture and outcomes. Economic
Record 86(275):528–544
Whiteford P (2015) The tax-transfer system, progressivity and redistribution: how progressive is
the Australian transfer system. Tax and Transfer Policy Institute, Canberra
Whiteford P (2017) Social security and welfare spending in Australia: assessing long-term trends.
Tax and Transfer Policy Institute, Canberra
Wickes R, Hipp JR, Zahnow R, Mazerolle L (2013) “Seeing” minorities and perceptions of
disorder: explicating the mediating and moderating mechanisms of social cohesion. Criminology
51(3):519–560
Wong DW (2016) From aspatial to spatial, from global to local and individual: are we on the right
track to spatialize segregation measures?. In Howell F, Porter J, Matthews A (eds) Recapturing
space: new middle-range theory in spatial demography (pp 77–98). Springer, Cham
World Bank (2019) GINI index (World Bank estimate). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.
POV.GINI?end=2017&start=1979&view=chart. Accessed 22 May 2019
Zahnow R, Wickes R, Haynes M, Mazerolle L (2013) Change and stability in ethnic diversity
across urban communities: explicating the influence of social cohesion on perceptions of disorder.
Austral New Zealand J Criminol 46(3):335–356
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by





Making Sense of Segregation
in a Well-Connected City: The Case
of Berlin
Talja Blokland and Robert Vief
Abstract This chapter analyses socioeconomic segregation and segregation by
migration background for Berlin, Germany. Berlin’s history of division and reunifi-
cation affected suburbanization patterns and the unequal economic restructuring of
the city over time. Within this historical context, we present our empirical results on
segregation, and we reflect on the implications of segregation for the daily use of
the city. Arguments that segregation affects access to amenities (as in the literature
on ‘food deserts’) or reduces access to jobs (as in spatial mismatch theories) are
not so useful for Berlin with its strong public transport infrastructure. We find that
socioeconomic segregation was moderate and stable for the working-age population
between 2007 and 2016, whereas segregation of poor children increased. At the same
time, segregation of foreigners and segregation by migration background strongly
declined. And yet, even though segregation levels are low and public services are
present everywhere, the social use of the city, we argue, may be more segregated
than statistical indicators suggest. Drawing on various case studies, we suggest that
the use of the overall city reflects segregation patterns of the use of space for other
reasons than commonly suggested.
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13.1 Introduction
Residential segregationmeans that people put in a box of statistical similarity (socioe-
conomic or racially/ethnically constructed categories) live closer to people in that
same box than to others. Living is measured in most segregation studies by where
one is registered. In most cases, that is where we sleep.
Policymakers and politicians see segregation as problematic for roughly three
sets of reasons. First, segregation can reinforce inequalities if it constitutes differ-
ential access to urban amenities, as discussions of, for example, ‘food deserts’ and
spatial mismatch in the labour market suggest (Holzer 1991; Wrigley 2002). Espe-
cially in non-European cities, the presence and quality of formal amenities connect
directly to segregation patterns (Marques 2012). Second, whether from a perspective
of containment and punishment of the poor in the hyper-ghetto (Wacquant 2008), or
conservative versions of the culture of poverty thesis (Herrnstein and Murray 1996),
segregation discussion may include cultural worries (Sampson 2012; Gould 1999):
isolation reduces connection to mainstream values, with various ascribed negative
consequences. Third, worries about segregation premise that negative consequences
occur as neighbourhood effects. Living among others with similar limitations, so
the argument goes, would further limit chances to get ahead (Souza Briggs 1997),
or hamper collective efficacy (Sampson et al. 1997). In European cities especially,
segregation of income groups correlates with segregation of people without and with
(recent) migration histories or ‘ethnic minorities’, which is a result of specific racial-
ized logics of capitalism and colonialism and thus of global inequalities. Many Euro-
pean public discussions thus express worries about segregation not simply because of
poor people’s isolation. Instead, these discussions at times disguise a cultural-racist
debate when labels of disadvantaged neighbourhoods or concentration areas point to
where the poor live in higher densities but primarily draw attention to ethnic minority
concentration.
All these approaches share the assumption that where we sleep has high relevance
for our lives. This seems obvious in a favela where the bus may only come twice a
day (or not at all). It may even apply to Chicago (but not NewYork; Small 2009). But
what does residential segregation mean in a well-connected and not-so-huge city?
Do residential segregation patterns matter? What for?
Berlin, as amedium-sized citywith awell-functioning public transport system and
infrastructure, serves as a case to reflect on these questions. Its history as a divided city
makes it an exceptional case, provoking questioning of some standard segregation
arguments. This chapter aims to explore whether Berlin has segregation patterns at
all, how these patterns may have developed over time, and how to interpret them.
We first discuss the German and Berlin historical context. After describing Berlin’s
data-shortage and our analytic choices, we analyse indicators for socioeconomic and
migrant segregation. Finally, we connect statistical findings to city use as a daily
routine, pleading for more focus on social rather than residential segregation.
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13.2 From Divided to Gentrified City
Germany’s socioeconomic inequality, measured by the GINI index (G), decreased
from 1990 to 1998 and increased from 1998 to 2005 (28.3 in 1998 to 32.3 in 2005).1
Scholars using different data acquire different results, but sketch a similar trend of
strongly increasing inequality from the 1990s to 2005. Since then, World Bank data
suggest a drop in income inequality from 2005 to 2010 (32.3 to 30.2) and an increase
until 2015 (31.7).Although theGINI coefficient cannot be reported for all years of our
analysis for lack of data (2007, 2012, 2016—see methods section below), the trend
lagged by one year shows a slight U-shape (2006: 31.3; 2011: 30.5; 2015: 31.7).Most
statistical offices also computed aminor drop after 2005 but underline amostly stable
situation from 2005 to 2016, around a GINI coefficient of 0.29 (Grabka et al. 2019).
In contrast, some researchers emphasize that affluent households profited most from
wage increases over the last twenty years, while in the lowest deciles of the income
distribution, hardship remained. Income inequality since 2010 sharpened, especially
in major cities in Germany, where low-income households have become dispropor-
tionally numerous (ibid.). Berlin’s statistical office highlights an increase of the GINI
coefficient until 2003 and stability since then (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg
2017a: 48), showing a very similar stable pattern for our period of interest as for
Germany overall (G = 30.0 for 2006, 2011 and 2015). Berlin’s Bezirke (12 districts
of around 300.000 inhabitants) have higher income inequality in theWest than in the
East. EastBerlin’s Lichtenberg (G=23) orMarzahn-Hellersdorf (G=25) havemuch
lower levels of income inequality than for example Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf (G
= 35) in the West (ibid.: 49). This inequality, and forms of segregation connected to
it, must be understood in Berlin’s peculiar context.
After the Second World War, Soviet Union, France, UK and USA divided
Germany into two: German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Federal Republic
of Germany (FRG). Berlin, as capital, was divided into four sectors, one in East
(under Soviet control) and three in West Berlin (under control of France, UK and
USA). Soon, the tension between the USSR communist project in East Berlin and the
predominantly USA project of market capitalism in West Berlin created a peculiar
situation for residents. The breaking up of Germany (and Berlin) was an imposed
political project against its unity, not a fortification of a boundary that in any sensewas
lived—ideologically, religiously, or else—by people or their movements. Notwith-
standing regional differences, nation-state building since the late nineteenth century
had worked effectively towards the creation of German unity. Berlin’s division thus
resulted not, as former divided cities like Belfast or Mostar, from activation of
symbolic boundaries of ethnicity, religion or both. Figure 13.1 shows Berlin’s current
Bezirke and the Wall’s location.
Of all Germans, Berliners experienced the artificiality of the divided life most
extremely. With the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, places and people in the
daily lives of Berlin residents were suddenly separated. To understand contemporary
Berlin, this division matters in various ways. First, the building and then the removal
1https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=DE.
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Fig. 13.1 Berlin’s Bezirke (today) and the Wall until 1989
of the Wall through the city’s (war-damaged) heart moved the city’s core. Today’s
central sites used to be dead-end streets facing the Wall, which had a ca. 100-m-
wide ‘Dead Strip’ on the East. This vacant land strip was a waiting opportunity for
developers in the 1990s (Fig. 13.2).
GDR politics of a classless society favoured massive apartment constructions,
especially in Lichtenberg and Marzahn-Hellersdorf, while ignoring, for example,
Prenzlauer Berg with its bourgeois housing. Low levels of maintenance and invest-
ment (Dahn 1987: 39 in Häußermann and Kapphan 2002: 71) caused major housing
deterioration. People living there were denied access to the new higher-quality apart-
ment blocks for lack of state compliance, voluntarily distanced themselves from the
state, or temporarily waited there for better housing (ibid.). In the 1990s, these dilap-
idated buildings with desirable 1800s Altbau designs provided excellent investment
opportunities. After the fall of the Berlin Wall (the Wende in 1989), the area near
the Wall, which for decades was two cities’ edge, became a central district with
high-quality amenities, international schools, bilingual kindergartens, yoga-classes
for toddlers, etcetera. Especially since the early 2000s, the central city attracted a
middle class and saw its public and private service sector changing tremendously.
Third, politics of representation in West and East Berlin before the Wende had
created two divergent urban landscapes (see Häußermann and Kapphan 2002: 62–
4). After the Wende, a quick expansion and integration of infrastructures and public
transport in what was to become the capital of reunited Germany became politically
urgent. Themove of the federal parliament’s seat andmostWest-German government
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Fig. 13.2 Berlin Wall, 1986. Source https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Berlinermauer.jpg, by
user: Noir/WikiCommons, 22-Mar-2004, GNU free under a CC BY-SA-3.0 Unported license.
Photographer Thierry Noir/Bethaniendamm, Berlin-Kreuzberg, Germany, 1986
institutions from Bonn to Berlin in 1991 strengthened this process (Kemper 1998b:
1766). Political choices in housing policies since the unification (see Bodnar and
Molnar 2010) produced a housing system dominated by private rental apartments.
Homeownership remained hard to realize within the city. Especially the privatisation
of GDR state-owned areas where rents had been fixed at very low rates before reuni-
fication produced an exception to common understandings about housing markets.
Privatisation of public housing to reduce the city’s financial problems and restitu-
tion of buildings collectivized under communism to previous owners, also impacted
the rental market. In short, Berlin’s contemporary housing situation results from a
combination of investments of second circuit international capital (Harvey 1978) at
a historical moment of an ideological belief in the superiority of market capitalism,
a need to increase state revenue because of the historically conditioned need for
public investment, and unprecedented freedom of residential choice. Berlin’s gentri-
fication—the increase of middle and upper-class residents displacing lower-income
residents—occurred in this context.
Meanwhile, the Wall’s disappearance made suburbanization possible overnight,
causing a sharp population-decline in 1990s Berlin (Beyer and Schulz 2001:
123 quoted in Kirchner 2009). In Germany’s specific suburbanization trajectory
(Matthiesen and Nuissl 2002), Berlin was even more specific (Bluth 2004). In pre-
1989 East Berlin, limited possibilities of homeownership and strict state-led distri-
bution of rental dwellings had prevented market-led suburbanization. InWest Berlin,
the Wall had prevented all outward expansion. Berlin’s population dropped between
1990 and 2004 while surrounding Brandenburg saw a sharp population increase
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(Beran et al. 2015). For example, Falkensee, bordering directly at West Berlin’s
Spandau, grew in a decade from 22,087 to 40,511 residents, causing challenges to
cohesion, identity and infrastructure (Kirchner 2009: 41f). Since 2004, more people
move fromBerlin to Brandenburg than in the other direction (Beran et al. 2015). And
yet, the influx from other German states and abroad made Berlin grow from 3.3 to
3.75 million between 2004 and 2018 (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2019).
Both in the East and the West before the Wende, industries received politically
motivated state-support. As this disappeared after the Wende, deindustrialisation
followed, especially but not exclusively in the East, causing high unemployment
rates and the lowest GDP of all European metropoles compared to their nationwide
averages (Bernt et al. 2013: 16; Gornig et al. 2013: 8f). In the early 2000s, sociolo-
gists predicted growing economic marginalization (Kronauer 1997 in Häußermann
and Kapphan 2002: 18). Instead, in the last decade, Berlin grew economically, land
values increased, and unemployment rates declined. This decrease in unemployment
partly results from growth in flexible service-jobs with little income security. In
East Berlin, pre-1989 full employment with absolute job security and low income
and little consumer goods availability has now turned into low unemployment but
high job insecurity, continuous low or moderate incomes, rent increase and endless
consumer goods—unaffordable for many. Additionally, younger and new Berliners
face precarity in self-employment in the creative sector.2
Berlin has moved from a politically divided city to a city with new divisions. It
undergoeswell-documented gentrification (Holm 2013), towhich political initiatives
seek answers, including housing development in selected surrounding Brandenburg
areas, which will further affect its demography. But Berlin also moved from a city
initially divided only by political decision to a city of distinctive social lives. We
explorewhat segregationmaymean in this context after presentingBerlin’s statistical
development of segregation.
13.3 Methods
German scholars and journalists vigorously debate segregation but lack precise,
small-scale data to demonstrate the existenceof poverty pockets before 1998 (Kemper
1998a: 22) and have limited data since then. Some described a stable rate of socioeco-
nomic segregation between 1990 and 2005 for Berlin (Friedrichs and Triemer 2009:
120), but only based on analysis of large spatial units (ibid.: 20) or argued that in the
1990s, poverty increasingly concentrated in specific neighbourhoods (Häußermann
and Kapphan 2004) and produced social problems, but again drawing on limited
2Figures suggest weak correlations between education and income for residents without migration
background or European Union backgrounds (especially Italy, Spain, Greece since 2008s crisis)
(Gathmann et al. 2014).
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data. Others found that social segregation by Sozialgesetzbuch II3 slightly increased
between 2005 and 2014 (Helbig and Jähnen 2018: 139).
Germany has poor statistics. Before 1989, the FRG and the GDR had their own
ways of collecting census data. After reunification, Germany delayed the census to
2011, leaving a 24 year gap (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2015:
9). Berlin does not have a useful panel of census data since 1989. Germany does not
collect census data on income. It does not publish data on occupational status for cities
(which it collects; Eisenmenger et al. 2014; Heckel and Heyde 2015). On the local
level, census data regulations are stricter than in other countries. The Mikrozensus,
Germany’s largest household survey, allows predictions of income distributions but
does not publish data for spatial units smaller than Berlin’s 12 Bezirke. The spatial
sampling of the Mikrozensus is on the same scale, so we cannot infer to smaller
levels.
Berlin answered in 2006 to the lack of data with the Monitoring Soziale Stad-
tentwicklung, an initiative of academics and city planners to join available data
sources on a low spatial scale to assess neighbourhoods’ relative positions. The
LORs (Lebensweltlich-Orientierte Räume) in the Monitoring provide 447 spatial
units (Planungsräume) with 7,500–10,000 inhabitants (Bömermann et al. 2006).4
The data do not include income. Fortunately, income is only one indicator suggesting
where the rich, the poor and others live. As proxies for economic status, theMonitor
contains information on unemployment, state family subsidies and child poverty.
We analyse data for three time points (2007, 2012, 2016) with four indicators of
socioeconomic segregation: unemployed persons among people aged 15–65; long-
term5 unemployed persons among those aged 15–65; non-unemployed recipients of
state subsidies in all age groups (for example when people work but make too little
to reach the minimum state-guaranteed standard, receive very low pensions, or have
children living in a poor household); and poverty among children aged 0–15. These
indicators allow an estimation of the lower part of the income distribution. They
cannot show polarization of the rich within neighbourhoods and throughout Berlin.
Scholars have also investigated ‘ethnic’ segregation of legally defined foreigners
in neighbourhoods. Kemper (1998a, b) found ethnic segregation to be stable during
the 1990s in West Berlin and to decline in East Berlin until 1996. Overall, ethnic
segregation rates were higher in East Berlin, where residential mobility was very
low. Friedrichs and Triemer (2009: 120f) observed an increasing level of segregation
until the mid-2010s. Helbig and Jähnen (2018) observed a decrease since 2002.
Again, both used data on a high spatial scale. Häußermann and Kapphan (2002: 212)
underlined the increasing concentration of foreign-born residents since the 1970s
(with only 20,000 foreigners in entire East Berlin), then stability since the 1990s,
but on Bezirke scale. Existing studies thus do not report consistent results and use
different spatial scales—we aim to clarify the recent development on a small spatial
scale.
3Sozialgesetzbuch II only covers a part of the unemployed population.
4We exclude 14 LOR-Planungsräume with fewer than 300 inhabitants in our analyses.
5Unemployed over one year without interruption, Sozialgesetzbuch II and III (Nagel 2018: 16f).
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Germany collects no data of racialized categories, but we can compute segregation
of foreigners and Germans with a migration background, also clustered by country
-of -origin groups. We analyse such segregation using proportions of foreigners and
persons with a migration background,6 and by country groups (European Union and
Turkey/Muslim States).7 We are aware of the ways in which statistics construct cate-
gories: as our last section will show, for Berlin’s social landscape, or how the city is
lived and used, these social constructions and their imaginations matter: stereotyping
people with certain passports as ‘Muslim’ is an act of othering.
We calculated residential segregation using the segregation index (IS)8 and the
location quotient (LQ) with the Geo-Segregation Analyzer (Apparicio et al. 2013).
We cannot report indices of dissimilarity between groups of our analysis, because the
groups partly overlap (long-term unemployed residents count also as unemployed;
poor children may also be residents receiving subsidies, etc.).
13.4 Socioeconomic Segregation
Figure 13.3 shows the IS for 3 years of data for socioeconomic and ethnic indi-
cators: Berlin’s moderate unemployment and long-term unemployment segregation
was stable between 2007 and 2016, with a tiny drop between 2007 and 2012. Poor
children and state support recipients became slightly more segregated over time,
especially between 2007 and 2012. Poor children lived overall much more segre-
gated than other categories (IS .43/42 in 2012/2016). As school-aged children typi-
cally have high neighbourhood use (Blokland 2003; Karsten 2002), this may affect
social segregation (see Table 13.1).
Figures 13.3, 13.4, 13.5, 13.6 and 13.7 map the distribution of the LQs of our
indicators in both 2007 and 2016. In Fig. 13.3, LQs of unemployment for 2007 and
2016 reveal a very slight decrease in poverty concentration areas. The index went up
in areas at the city borders far from the new centre such as the South-West, where we
nowobserve less concentration of employedpeoplewithout benefits andwithout poor
children than in 2007. Other outskirts (as theNorth ofMarzahn-Hellersdorf) desegre-
gated somewhat. Formerly deprived inner-city neighbourhoods (parts of Kreuzberg
and Neukölln) now have intermediate values, but pockets of high concentrations of
unemployment remained. Land values and rents increased disproportionally here
6Foreigners and Germans born outside of Germany with second nationality, naturalized citizens,
children of two foreign parents born in Germany since 2000. Changes in data-collection after 2014
ask for cautious interpretation of 2016 numbers (Nagel 2018: 59f).
7Egypt, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, Qatar, Comoros, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates.









and the most common one-group segregation measure. In this formula, n is the number of spatial
units in the overall city (in our case: Berlin), xi is the total population of group X in spatial unit i,
ti the total population in spatial unit i, X is the total population of X within the overall city. T is the
total overall city population.
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Fig. 13.3 Location quotients of unemployment (among 15- to 65-year-old population), in 2007
and 2016
(Holm 2013). Three factors may explain the invisibility of this gentrification. First,
as a strategy to cope with the rent increase, people increasingly share apartments
(Investitionsbank Berlin 2019). Second, highly mobile young people and global
middle classes tend to prefer them. We have a division here between short-time
working residents moving in and out quickly and a stable population for whom the
new forms of the social mix have changed nothing for their unemployment rates and
little for their children’s poverty. Third, Kreuzberg and the North of Neukölln have
inner-city modernist housing estates. New rental contracts see sharp rent increases
(when new renters move in), but the moderate building structure and relative low
level of amenities of these estates made their increase less than in other buildings,
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Table 13.1 Indices of segregation in Berlin
2007 2012 2016 Overall trend
Socio-economic indicators
-unemployed persons 0.19 0.19 0.18 stable
-long-term unemployed persons 0.20 0.19 0.19 stable
-non-unemployed persons 
receiving state subsidies 0.28 0.30 0.31 + slight increase
-child poverty 0.40 0.43 0.42 +slight increase
Ethnic indicators
-foreigners 0.35 0.33 0.28 - strong decrease
-persons with migration 
background 0.34 0.33 0.30 - fair decrease
-migration background: Turkey 
and Arabic states 0.51 0.49 0.41 - strong decrease
-migration background:
0.23 0.23 0.23 stable
European Union
and residential stability remained high here. So far, this enabled residents to continue
living there, as the German system of rent protection is relatively strong.
The LQ for child poverty for 2007 and 2016 (Fig. 13.4) indicates consid-
erably stronger spatial segregation compared to unemployment, and concentra-
tions in poverty, in contrast to all other indicators, slightly increased. Overall, the
outskirts show a high concentration of non-poor children (Steglitz-Zehlendorf, parts
of Marzahn-Hellersdorf, the north of Reinickendorf and the North-East of Pankow).
These areas have the highest residential ownership rates. They have more single-
family dwellings than average, making them preferred locations for affluent-enough
families, reducing the likelihood of child poverty. Some of the spatial concentration
of unemployment rates in inner-city areas results from the exceptionality of Berlin
mentioned before. The current centre of the city has the redeveloped ‘dead zone’
(see Fig. 13.2) and renovated bourgeois housing ignored by the GDR. As luxury
apartments are usually bought by people who work but are not necessarily preferred
by parents, child poverty can remain stable while other indicators change.
The slight increase in segregation by child poverty after 2007 also produced new
clusters in the outskirts where a large proportion of poor children lives, especially
in Spandau’s high-rise areas. Here, a closer analysis of suburbanization would be
interesting. Located right at the city’s edge, the disappearance of the Wall opened a
hinterland for anyone who could afford to move, without an extreme increase in, for
example, commuting time to workplaces since a regional train—connecting West
Berlin with the hinterlands—returned for commuters in 1995. Selective migration
from Spandau to Falkensee (noted above) maywell help explain this poverty concen-
tration. Kirchner (2009: 39) explained a high proportion of Falkensee’s demographic
growth as in-migration from Berlin. Spandau, in the 1920s already predominantly
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Fig. 13.4 Location quotients of child poverty (among 0–15 years-old population), in 2007 and
2016
working-class (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002: 45), was never a highly attractive
city-part. Residents may have found better housing options in the direct geograph-
ical presence of their previous apartment after the Wende, an exceptional situation
with Berlin’s sudden opening up of hinterlands. If this is the case—and it begs
further research—then social networks and even routines of daily activities may
have changed very little. So even though residential segregation measured by child
poverty has increased, we do not know what this means for social segregation.
Prenzlauer Berg (south of Bezirk Pankow), the gentrified neighbourhood with the
highest birth rate for some years, where the stereotype of the latte-macchiato mother
with an expensive stroller has beenpasted to, saw its child poverty rate decrease.Other
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Fig. 13.5 Location quotients of Inhabitants with a migration background, in 2007 and 2016
areas (Charlottenburg-North, Wedding (Mitte), Reinickendorf’s South) show much
higher child poverty concentration than in 2007. This suggests that poor families
increasingly disappear from areas where they lived before: either because they are
no longer poor—the overall child poverty decrease suggests this plays some role—
or because they moved elsewhere. Poor children may now also have become poor
adults—we have no figures to measure this—and children who took their places may
come from better-off families. Gentrification suggests that some previous poverty
concentration hotspots now host wealthy young professionals and poor families.
When poor children live increasingly in areas with other poor children, does
that matter in a city with Berlin’s size and infrastructure? Are they able to leave their
residential pockets and travel elsewhere in the city, for example?Weconnected theLQ
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Fig. 13.6 Location quotients of Inhabitants with migration background from Turkey and Arabic
States, in 2007 and 2016
data on child poverty segregation, unemployment rates and foreigners with indicators
of distance from underground and regional train stations. Over time, concentration
areas with few poor children had constant low access to public transport (Table 13.2).
This affects their access to the city, but their parents mostly drive, and their access
reflects low residential density. Poor children and (long term) unemployed residents
now live in areas with worse public transport access than in 2007. As almost all
post-reunification train lines re-openings were completed by 2006 and little changed
between 2007 and 2016, poor families and unemployed residents thus moved (or had
to move) to areas with poorer public transport access.
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Fig. 13.7 Location quotients of Inhabitants with migration background from the European Union,
in 2007 and 2016
13.5 Segregation by Foreigner/Migration Background
German cities alwaysweremore segregated bymigration background than by socioe-
conomic groups, scholars claim (Friedrichs and Triemer 2009). In Berlin, both types
of segregation approach each other. The IS for foreigners decreased from 0.35 in
2007 to 0.28 in 2016 (see Table 13.1), as did segregation by migration background
(from 0.34 in 2007 to 0.30 in 2016).
The dispersion of segregation trends in Fig. 13.5 shows that foreigners and
Germans with migration background continue to live more in West than East
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Table 13.2 Public transport access by the level of segregation and year
Access to public transport by the
level of segregation
Average distance to next U-Bahn, S-Bahn or regional
train stop in meters
Indicator Year 2007 2016
Neighbourhoods
with LQ range
Mean SD N Mean SD N
Socioeconomic indicators
– unemployment
0.3 or less 1833 1620 19 1204 948 9
0.31–0.75 1006 886 147 1090 1022 156
0.76–1.25 770 751 152 733 673 162
1.26–1.75 735 625 96 691 538 82
1.76 or more 876 613 19 1214 1021 24
– long-term unemployment
0.3 or less 1497 1360 39 1739 1619 39
0.31–0.75 1019 941 135 929 809 127
0.76–1.25 775 698 152 788 703 153
1.26 1.75 622 564 77 689 545 85
1.76 or more 1036 821 30 1183 929 29
– child poverty
0.3 or less 1512 1322 75 1197 1244 86
0.31–0.75 851 799 125 849 705 145
0.76–1.25 864 753 101 836 764 70
1.26–1.75 731 572 97 774 549 70
1.76 or more 608 595 35 805 748 62
Berlin.9 Between 2007–2016, some clusters of foreigners remained. Others acquired
a more balanced LQ (such as Kreuzberg). More foreigners now also live in Eastern
areas. Foreigners is a broad concept. For example, in gentrifying Neukölln and
Kreuzberg, ‘foreigners’ include more and more EU and US citizens. Over 10,000
of the 13,263 residents who moved to Neukölln between 2011–2017 carry these
passports. People from ‘Muslim countries’ went up by only 2,600 (Amt für Statistik
Berlin-Brandenburg 2012, 2017b). Our analysis of segregation by migration back-
ground from Turkey/Arabic States underlines this aspect (Fig. 13.6). The IS for this
group dropped sharply from 0.51 to 0.41 in nine years. More persons from this
group left formerly very segregated inner-city pockets (such as Wedding, Kreuzberg
or Neukölln-North). The overall segregation for EU-citizens is moderate and stable
(around 0.23), but the development of their segregation shifts to inner-city areas
(Fig. 13.7).
9Except for one in Lichtenberg, with Vietnamese residents, an increase of Bulgarians and other
Eastern Europeans and a refugee center.
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13.6 How Does Segregation Matter?
As Marcuse (1993: 357 in Hamnett 2003: 167) argued 25 years ago, divided cities
are nothing new. From ancient Athens and Rome onwards, the poor have lived away
from the rich: ‘at least from the outset of the industrial revolution, cities have been
divided in ways that are quite familiar to us’ (ibid.). So how does segregation matter?
Statistics of where people sleep matters when we assume that people do not leave
their concentration areas and residents have access to amenities, networks or other
resources only through their residential location. This assumption is questionable
(Blokland and van Eijk 2010). A mixed environment can be social wallpaper for the
better-off (Butler 2003) without them ever building network ties with people in lower
social, economic or cultural positions. Curley (2008) showed that people whomoved
frompoverty pockets tomixed areas benefitted because their resourceswere no longer
drained, not because new social capital emerged. Kronauer (2002) suggested that
much depends on life conditions: single mothers found best support infrastructures
in apartment blocks on the outskirts, single unemployed persons benefitted most
from inner-city resources. So, segregation effects on life chances are multi-faceted
and dynamic, even within one life-trajectory.
Besides networks, social capital and cultural interpretations, scholars may want to
focus much more on urban infrastructure, including its precise workings for access
to resources. Social segregation, the degree to which people conduct their role reper-
tories (Blokland 2003; Hannerz 1980) in relative isolation or interaction with people
with a different class or racial/ethnic position than theirs, emerges through these
workings.
Berlin is a well-connected city; public transport is affordable and even free for
school children. However, segregated poverty, as we saw before, coincides now with
less easy transport access. When moving around the city becomes more difficult
for those who are most disadvantaged, it starts to matter where things are located.
Resource access is central to how segregation matters, especially for resources
through which social positions are reproduced: resources for raising kids. Four
examples, drawing on students’ work at Humboldt, support this claim.
First, this work suggests a congruence of socioeconomic segregation and distribu-
tion of certain child-oriented resources.Wemapped elementary schools, kindergarten
and praxis for speech- and ergo-therapy. The choice of kindergarten types is smaller
in high unemployment areas (Fritz 2013). Elementary school access is equal, but
high unemployment areas have fewer schools with special profiles. Other indica-
tors (teacher absence, computers in school, teacher/student ratio) show no system-
atic pattern (Zwirner 2013). People living in affluent areas have a higher chance of
having therapists nearby. As high child poverty shifted to locations with worse public
transport, this can point to a difference in life chances.
Second, school segregation does not require residential segregation. Berlin’s
elementary school zoning laws should create schools with the same composition
as their catchment zone. Parents cannot simply send children elsewhere. In practice,
parents differ in their possibilities to do so (Blokland and Große Löscher 2016).
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Especially in not segregated neighbourhoods, schools are more segregated than
they should be for the residential composition (Vief 2018). As strongest school-
neighbourhood segregation gaps occur in mixed settings, residential mix does not
necessarily create a social mix in important institutions.
Third, as children’s actual neighbourhood use tends to be high (Blokland 2003),
the interplay of family and neighbourhood works differently in areas different in
poverty concentration. In amiddle-class pocket in Lichterfelde (Steglitz-Zehlendorf)
and an owner-occupied development in Kreuzberg, qualitative interviews with
parents taught us that both lived with people with similar orientations on domi-
nant parenting ideas. Interviewees showed little awareness of the rest of the city
and a localness in their use of facilities and non-family networks. The neighbour-
hood worked as village—or exclusive island. The interviewees did not intentionally
avoid mixing with people unlike themselves. But even in a middle-class enclave in a
hyper-diverse district, the parents were so oriented on organizing the best resources
for their children that it never occurred to them that their practices of secluding
(Giustozzi et al. 2016) excluded others (Blokland and Große Löscher 2016: 81–82).
Giustozzi concluded (2016: 100): ‘Effectively (…) these mothers avoided routes
through the city—also shown in their preference for cars over public transport—for
fluid encounters (…) with residents unlike themselves. (…) Segregation, then, was
actively enhanced and reified by residential choices and everyday practices of these
mothers.
Fourthly, social processes affect the relative absence of migrants and foreigners
in East Berlin. The long length of residence in some of these areas suggest that
few places became vacant, and residential mobility is low there. Häußermann and
Kapphan (2002) claimed that foreigners chose not to move to the East because of
Neonazis. That certain Eastern parts were ‘spaces of fear’ for migrants had since
become a claim frequently used geographically to address the right-wing extremism
and related fears of their potential victims, non-White Germans and immigrants
(Lewek 2016: 37), producing imaginaries accordingly. The reproduction of the
imagery of racism is a problem of ‘the East’ locates it away from the core of the
city and its proper ‘Western’ democratic qualities, but the evidence is weak. When
we asked people with a Sub-Saharan migration background to draw on a Berlin map
where they went or did not go, they excluded Eastern Berlin areas. In the early 2000s,
racist violence tended to be stronger in the East of the city. Some nationalist, racist
meeting venues moved from Eastern areas to the region around Berlin (Shoshan
2016), but the extreme right-wing political party AFD holds office in Köpenick
and focusses electoral propaganda on Treptow-Köpenick and Marzahn-Hellersdorf,
making racism visible.
That segregation occurs from migrant choices not to move to East Berlin out
of a fear of racism (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002) is tentative but a common
narrative. This narrative, Lewek (2016) argued, helped the city marketing itself as
diverse, hip and tolerant. By effectively spatializing racism in areas with low tourist
attractivity anyway, where it was constructed as a problem of the particular back-
wardness of a particular part of Berlins population, the rest of the city could be
marketed as welcoming cosmopolitan. The imagery may have worked: in the last
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20 years, migration background only increased slowly and slightly in these areas,
although collective performances of right-wing extremists today are less spatially
concentrated in the Eastern part of Berlin (ibid.: 248). Most reported racist incidents
now happen in Neukölln and the new Mitte, in contrast to the early 2000s.10
In another study, lower-classmigrant youth reported avoidance of areaswhere they
felt unwelcome (Blokland and Šerbedžija 2018). Young men with Arab and Turkish
roots in two Kreuzberg estates curbed their city use to avoid racist encounters. Diego
expressed fear in Marzahn: ‘five or six Germans who will stand next to you will
think: Come on, there is a foreigner, he is going to get beaten’. Another youth had
been ‘stupidly talked to’ by a ‘Granny’ who scolded that ‘you foreigners’ made her
Bezirk, Hellersdorf, kaputt. Their local comfort zone (Blokland and Nast 2014) was
a response to experiences of discomfort elsewhere, interviewee Serdar suggested:
[…] [what causes that] you don’t like to go much into other Bezirke?
‘You can’t really put that to words, because I had a job training once (…) in Spandau (…) I
felt not at all, zero well there, for real. Because you notice like, they look at you differently.
(…) we, apparently, the foreigners have something against the Germans, they treat them
badly and so on (.) But really (…) the ones that label us that way, these are mostly the
people, that live according to the old (…) mentalities, like so GDR, like some of them still
have that in their heads. And you see it very well, one recognizes it clearly (…) Even though
you’re born here, you have no difference form them, only that in your roots you happen to
be Turkish (..) they say (…) you aren’t a German and so on (…) they want to be the only
Germans. (Blokland and Šerbedžija 2018: 35)
Serdar interpreted his Spandau experience through the common lens of East Berlin
as a container of racists. Spandau, however, was always West-Berlin. These expe-
riences were not at all located in the East only. Two young migrant women felt
discomfort in all Bezirke with few people with migration background: exactly the
locations where mothers quoted above felt so comfortable as they did not ‘have to
protect’ their children, living in a ‘village’. Here these women felt ‘uncomfortable’
and ‘as exclusion, to be honest’:
When one gets to places where there are few migrants (…) it is always quite glaring (krass).
In Zehlendorf (…), I was there (…) because my brother-in-law was in the hospital (…) I
walked around with my nephew (…) and two minutes down the street, there is a lamppost,
and it has sticker on it, ‘Islamist out’, ‘Migrants out’, ‘Nafros go home’ - so really krass.
And then I walked around there thinking, shit, when I would be wearing a headscarf here,
what would happen to me? (…) You get a look, I don’t know, it is always this krasse feeling,
then I think, I belong here too, what are you looking at me like that for?’.
The closure of the city goes further than that when migrant youth experience that
‘normal’ behaviour is demonized. Emre reportedly travelled to his internship but was
late, so ran from his train over the platform at a main railway station. He was stopped
by police or security. They asked his ID, then to open his bag, then questioned him
if he had stolen something—all taking 10 min of Emre’s time, making him arrive
late at his workplace: ‘they did not believe me at first because I was out of breath,
because I ran, they thought I must be fleeing’. Not everyone running at a station is
10See for example: Register Berlin (2019); Senatsverwaltung für Inneres und Sport (2007).
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stopped. Emre sensed that. For these youngsters, the everyday experience of being
undesired and put under general suspicion and policing was even stronger outside
their neighbourhood. They limited their use of the city for stories told and experiences
made with subtle and direct racism. To these experiences, East/West divisions do not
apply—but discursively impact imaginaries.
13.7 Conclusion
Berlin’s residential segregation is moderate to low, and not univocally increasing,
especially not for people with migration background. Socioeconomic inequality
by income was stable between 2007 and 2016 but could only be measured at the
Bezirke level. On a smaller spatial scale, segregation for the working-age population
was stable, but slightly increased for poor children. Contrary to public perception,
segregation by foreigners/migration backgrounddecreased, especially for inhabitants
with roots from Turkey and ‘Muslim’ states. Some pockets of poverty concentration
shifted from (well-connected) inner-city areas to (worse-connected) outskirts.
Residential segregation does not necessarily mean social segregation, no more
than that, residential mix means social mix. Statistical segregation in terms of
where people fitting certain categories spend the nights may have little connection
to their actual city use, although neighbourhood use may correlate with our role
repertoires, and role repertories change over time (Blokland 2003). We suggested
that social segregation, more than residential segregation, is what divides a city. A
strong role in how Berliners use the city play, firstly, subtle forms of racism—a sign
on a wall, a remark made loudly, a seat changed on the bus to not come near ‘a
migrant’. Secondly, the middle class, especially German and European, may engage
in secluding practices when organizing their daily lives, securing the best resources
for their own—excluding others as a consequence.
So social and residential segregation must be analytically separated, especially
for understanding (the reproduction of) urban inequalities. We suggest that social
segregation in Berlin is a more important theme than the statistical question of who
sleeps where. Social segregation of the use of urban places and institutions in the
city may influence the reproduction of disadvantage across groups and possibly
generations.
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Chapter 14
Socio-spatial Disparities in Brussels
and its Hinterland
Rafael Costa and Helga A. G. de Valk
Abstract Brussels’ urban and suburban landscape has changed considerably since
the 1980s. The consolidation of socioeconomic fractures inside the city, a reinforce-
ment of long-lasting disparities between the city and its prosperous hinterland, aswell
as the increasing diversification of migration flows—both high- and low-skilled—
contributed to these disparities. Recent evolutions of these patterns, however, have
not been investigated yet and therefore remain unknown. Besides, the extent to which
segregation is primarily related to economic inequalities and to migration flows—or
a combination/interaction between the two—so far has not been studied. This chapter
offers a detailed overview of the socio-spatial disparities in the Brussels Functional
Urban Area. Our analyses relied on fine-grained spatial data, at the level of statis-
tical sections and of individualised neighbourhoods built around 100 m x 100 m
grids. We analysed socioeconomic segregation measures and patterns, as well as
their evolution between 2001 and 2011. Socioeconomic groups were defined based
on individuals’ position with respect to national income deciles. In line with previous
research, our results show very marked patterns of socioeconomic segregation in and
around Brussels operating both at a larger regional scale and at the local level.
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14.1 Introduction
Socioeconomic segregation, its origins and its consequences have attracted the atten-
tion of public policy and scientists alike. This also holds for Brussels, where the urban
and suburban landscape has changed considerably since the 1980s with the consol-
idation of socioeconomic fractures inside the city, a reinforcement of long-lasting
disparities between the city and its prosperous hinterland, as well as the increasing
diversification of migration flows in terms of origin, occupations and socioeconomic
position. Recent evolutions in these patterns, however, have not been investigated by
the latest research and remain unknown. Besides, the extent to which segregation in
Brussels is primarily related to economic inequalities and to migration flows—or a
combination/interaction between them—so far remains unclear.
In this chapter, we provide a detailed overview of segregation patterns in Brus-
sels and the hinterland and discuss whether and how these patterns can be linked to
economic inequality and migration. We focus on the local level at Brussels’ munic-
ipalities and the city’s outskirts. This level of detail is needed as overall income
inequality has remained relatively stable in Belgium over the past decades. Going
beyond the national level and looking at processes of spatial inequality at a smaller,
local-level scale can help us understand what is driving change or stability.
Our analyses are based on fine administrative units aswell as individualised neigh-
bourhoods. We first investigate socio-spatial inequalities in and around Brussels, in
particular the residential segregation of high- and low-income groups. For this end,
we rely on income data based on tax returns for 2001 and 2011 at the level of the
statistical sections in theBrussels FunctionalUrbanArea (FUA).We then concentrate
on the deprived and affluent spots that have experienced the fastest improvements
or deterioration of socioeconomic composition over the study period. This can help
understand what is steering local-level disparities. The use of individualised neigh-
bourhoods based on gridded data from the 2001 to 2011 Censuses allows us to take
a closer look at these areas. Looking at socioeconomic segregation at a very detailed
spatial level may shed new light on issues that remain unnoticed when taking a higher
level of analyses.
14.2 Background
Brussels, such as other Belgian cities, is characterised by relatively high levels of
socioeconomic segregation compared to other European cities (Musterd 2005). This
is the result of both the specific migration history to the country and the housing poli-
cies in which homeownership is key. Housing policies in Belgium are characterised
by a deregulated rental market, limited public housing and public policies focused
on homeownership (De Decker 2008; Kesteloot and Cortie 1998). Social housing in
Belgium in general and Brussels alike is limited and the public rental sector is not
well developed. In fact, public housing accounts for only 8% of the housing stock in
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Brussels, whereas one-third of the city’s households meet the socioeconomic criteria
to apply for social housing (Dessouroux et al. 2016). In turn, homeownership was
and is seen as the preferred option for a family, whereas suburbanisation was facil-
itated by investments in commuting facilities. Stimulating homeownership resulted
in large-scale suburbanisation and a decline of the inner-city neighbourhoods (De
Decker 2008; Kesteloot and Van der Haegen 1997).
Suburbanisation was peaking in the 1960s, an economic boom time at which
Belgium, like many other north-western European countries, started to recruit inter-
national migrants to fill in the ill-paid low skilled (mostly industrial) jobs (Kesteloot
and Van der Haegen 1997; Kesteloot and Cortie 1998; Van Mol and de Valk 2016).
These labour migrants mostly came from Italy, Spain, Greece, Morocco and Turkey,
and they mainly settled in the central nineteenth-century neighbourhoods left behind
by the Belgian middle-class (De Winter and Musterd 1998; Kesteloot and Van der
Haegen 1997). Housing in these neighbourhoods was (and still is) characterised by
cheap, low-quality dwellings that were part of the private rental market. Since then,
migration from the mentioned countries continued, but other migrants, also from
more affluent backgrounds, arrived in Brussels. These include a substantial share
of European citizens coming to work in Brussels for the European and international
organisations in the city (Corijn andVloeberghs 2013; DeWinter andMusterd 1998),
mainly settling in the more affluent neighbourhoods of the city and the urban fringes.
The different types of migration resulted in a spatial duality in Brussels. Figure 14.1
clearly shows how this is still the case today (Census 2011 data): migrants origi-
nating from European and those of non-European countries live in different parts of
Brussels.
Fig. 14.1 The spatial distribution of European and non-European migrants in Brussels (2011)
Source Own calculations based on the Census 2011 (Statistics Belgium)
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The reported duality was reinforced during the economic transition to a post-
industrial economy after the 1970s, which led to a polarisation in terms of settlement
and labour market into those with high- and low-skilled jobs. Similar to many Euro-
pean cities, new urban jobs in the post-industrial economy were mainly taken up by
high-skilled workers, while the low-skilled urban populations had less opportunities
in the labour market. In the case of Brussels, high-skilled jobs were filled espe-
cially by suburban commuters and international workers (De Winter and Musterd
1998; Corijn and Vloeberghs 2013). On the other hand, migrants of Turkish and
Moroccan origin living in the city were among the groups that suffered most from
the urban economic changes. Upward mobility was most difficult for these groups
not only due to their low education level but also because they are more likely to
face discrimination in the labour market (Rea 2013) as well as in the housing market
(Verstraete and Verhaeghe 2019). As such, they were forced to stay in the neighbour-
hoods where they had initially settled (Kesteloot and Cortie 1998). Research has
shown that also to date, newly arrived migrants from non-European countries tend to
settle in the same central deprived neighbourhoods, where the housing stock is older
and cheaper, where socioeconomic conditions are worse, and where a strong ethnic
concentration prevails (Van Hamme et al. 2016; Costa and de Valk 2018). Moreover,
due to the lack of public housing in Brussels (and the resulting long waiting lists),
thesemigrantsmainly have to rely on the private rentalmarketwith the lowest-quality
housing stock, often located in inner-city neighbourhoods previously occupied by
the industrial workers and earlier migrants.
More recently, Brussels’ central neighbourhoods have experienced gentrification
processes. Since the end of the twentieth century, Brussels has increasingly attracted
young, well-off households composed of childless couples or isolated individuals,
mainly highly educated and coming from other parts of Belgium andWestern Europe
(Van Criekingen 2010). Typically, these households only spend part of their early
adulthood in Brussels before relocating to more prosperous areas: the city is thus
a stage in their professional and family trajectories (Van Criekingen 2010). These
households tend to establish themselves in inner neighbourhoods originally inhab-
ited by low-income households (many from foreign origin), attracted by their central
location and cheap rental prices (Van Hamme et al. 2016). The intense coming
and going of such households has led to the reinvestment of certain inner neigh-
bourhoods, with a housing offer increasingly targeted at higher-income earners and
escalating rental prices—which is facilitated by the deregulated housingmarket (Van
Criekingen 2010). There is, therefore, strong demographic pressure and increasing
competition in the rental market in central areas that concentrate deprived households
and ethnic minorities. Whereas long-distance displacement of these groups is still
limited (Van Criekingen 2009), some low-income households have been pushed to
adjacent poor neighbourhoods (Van Criekingen 2008; Van Hamme et al. 2016). But
other households find themselves trapped in their neighbourhoods and experience a
deterioration of their housing conditions, ending up in lower-quality or overcrowded
dwellings (Van Criekingen 2010). At the city level, these gentrification processes in
Brussels’ inner neighbourhoods may appear as a rise in the social mix since young
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professionals share the space with low-income households, but at the local level, they
certainly contribute to socio-spatial disparities.
In sum, segregation patterns in Brussels were shaped by urban economic tran-
sitions—similar to many other Western cities—combined with specific housing
policies and migration background in Belgium. As a result, Brussels is marked
by important socio-spatial inequalities inside the city as well as in respect to the
hinterland.
In the more recent period, the persistent levels of socioeconomic segregation
in European cities have been ascribed to the rise in income inequality produced by
economic liberalisation since the 1980s and subsequent economic crises (Marcinczak
et al. 2015). However, it is unclear to what extent this also holds for Brussels, as
income distribution seems to have remained rather stable in Belgium over the last
decades.
Belgium is among the countries with a relatively low level of income inequality
worldwide, close to (or even lower than) the Scandinavian countries. The Gini coef-
ficient for disposable income remained stable over time and varied between 30 and
26 in the time period 1995–2017, with even a recent downward trend between 2000
and 2017 (EU-SILC data via Eurostat 2019). In addition, Belgium was the only
country in Europe in which the share of the national income captured by the top 10%
earners did not increase since the 1980s (Blanchet et al. 2019; Decoster et al. 2017).
The few existing studies suggest that, contrary to many other countries, economic
liberalisation over the last decades and the economic crises of 1998 and 2008 did not
increase overall income inequality in Belgium. This is believed to be due to institu-
tional factors, namely a rigid system that regulates salaries and labour, as well as the
importance of the trade unions (Valenduc 2017).
Compared to the national level, income inequality is higher in Brussels, as is
the case for most large cities. For comparison, Brussels had a Gini coefficient of
36 in 2013, at a similar level as Paris, and slightly higher than the Scandinavian
capitals (OECD 2019). It is unclear, however, how the income distribution evolved
over the last decades. On the one hand, the protective systems regulating salaries
and labour also hold for Brussels, and they would have prevented inequalities from
rising in Brussels as well. On the other hand, it has been shown that the Brussels
population in the lowest income decile has been losing purchasing power since the
1980s at a higher rate than the other income deciles (Kesteloot and Loopmans 2009).
Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent changes observed in segregation are linked
to changes in income distribution.
In the remainder of this chapter, we aim to produce a detailed update of the recent
trends in segregation in Brussels and its hinterland. In addition, we look into how
these trends are related to income inequalities and what other factors may be at play.
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Fig. 14.2 The Brussels functional urban area
14.3 Space, Data and Methods
14.3.1 Space Delimitation and Spatial Units
We focus on theBrussels FunctionalUrbanArea, as defined by theOECD (Fig. 14.2).
This area covers a large surface encompassing 10% of the Belgian territory and
making up for 23% of the country’s population (2,531,106 inhabitants in 2011).
It extends over the three administrative Regions of Belgium—Flanders, Wallonia
and the Brussels Capital Region1—including French-speaking, Dutch-speaking and
bilingual zones, and is marked by a highly diverse population in terms of culture
and origin. In our analyses, we make use of two types of spatial units: administrative
units and individualised neighbourhoods constructed around geocoded grids.
The administrative units chosen for this study are the ‘statistical sections’
(Fig. 14.2), which are intermediate units between the very small statistical sectors (or
1The Brussels-Capital Region is, in fact, one of the three administrative regions in Belgium. It is
composed of 19 municipalities, among which is the City of Brussels. Throughout the text we do not
make any reference to these municipalities or the City of Brussels; we refer to the Brussels-Capital
Region simply as ‘Brussels’ or ‘city’.
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wards)2 and the broader municipalities. The Brussels FUA contains 1,069 sections;
from these, 180 were dropped due to the small number of inhabitants (<200 in 2001)
in order to avoid random fluctuations. In the remaining 874 sections, the number of
residents in 2011 ranged from 222 to 27,217 (average = 2,879; median = 1,546). In
addition to sections, we use a nearest-neighbours approach in order to zoom in on the
Brussels FUA. This approach implies that we start from geocoded individual data
instead of areal units and use these data to construct individualised neighbourhoods
with 200 nearest neighbours. These are fine-scale units that are independent of admin-
istrative borders (Fig. 14.1). The individualised neighbourhoods were constructed by
dividing the territory into grids of 100 m by100 m (resulting in a total number of
79,588 grid cells in the FUA). We then used geocoded individual data to identify
the population aged 25–64 inside each grid by their x–y coordinates. Individualised
neighbourhoods were constructed for each grid with the EquiPop software (see Östh
et al. 2015). This software adds up adjacent grid cells until it reaches the 200 nearest
neighbours. If a given grid cell has more than 200 individuals (due, for instance,
to the presence of apartment blocks), the software does not add up adjacent cells.
Most of the resulting individualised neighbourhoods have around 200 working-age
individuals, except for a few outliers.3
14.3.2 Data and Definitions
In Belgium, there are no complete data on the professional occupation. Such data
are available from surveys but are not representative at a fine spatial level and are
thus not suitable for our spatial analyses. Therefore, we use income data as an
alternative measure of socioeconomic position. We start from an individual-level
dataset containing individuals’ position in national income deciles (obtained from
tax returns). This dataset, based on the administrative census, contains all individuals
residing in Belgium in 2011. Null incomes were excluded from our analyses as they
comprise many international employees who do not pay income taxes in Belgium or
accompanying spouses with no own income. Excluding them is necessary as other-
wise, they would falsely appear in the statistics as being poor. After the exclusion
of null incomes, we computed the proportion of sections’ population aged 25–64 in
each income decile in 2011. Note that the dataset contains individual income and
not household income. This is a limitation because high- and low-income earners in
the same household are counted separately, as if they were neighbours of different
income levels.
2We chose not to work with the statistical sectors—which are the smallest spatial units available—
because they are often too small: the median population of sectors in 2011 was only 429, whereas
one-third of sectors had less than 200 inhabitants.
3The active population in individualised neighbourhoods range from 200 to 1,094, with a median
of 205; 99% of these neighbourhoods have less than 315 inhabitants. Of note, in the computation of
individualised neighbourhoods together with Statistics Belgium, we did not keep the original grids’
population (prior to the aggregation of adjacent grids) for privacy reasons.
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Table 14.1 Missing individuals by age group in 2001 and 2011 (%)
25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 Total 25–64
2001 25.88 19.41 13.15 9.55 7.13 5.14 4.68 3.77 12.52
2011 1.89 1.77 1.26 0.83 0.48 0.37 0.21 0.12 0.91
Source Own calculations based on tax returns data (IPCAL database) and censuses 2001 and 2011
(Statistics Belgium)
The individual-level dataset also contains past income deciles for individuals who
lived in the same place in previous years. Using this information, we computed the
share of sections’ population aged 25–64 by income decile in 2001 as well. However,
information is missing for a considerable number of individuals who lived elsewhere
in 2001 (Table 14.1), and this concerns especially the young age groups who are
more mobile. Besides, the dataset does not include individuals who were present in
2001 and not in 2011 (i.e. who emigrated or died). Hence, our income data at the
section level for 2001 is incomplete and results for that year must be interpreted with
caution. In particular, it is important to keep in mind that results for 2001 concern an
older and less mobile population, and because of the absence of individuals in the
early stage of their career, lower-income groups are likely to be underrepresented.
We defined three income groups as follows. The high-income group is composed
of the working-age persons in the three highest deciles of national income (8th
through 10th); the low-income group is composed of those in the three lowest deciles
(1st through 3rd); and themiddle-income group consists of the remaining deciles (4th
through 7th). We also refer to highest- and lowest-income groups as the 10th and the
1st deciles, respectively. Figure 14.3 shows the distribution of the Brussels FUA’s
population by income groups and deciles. Income groups and deciles are based on the
national income distribution, not the FUA’s. This means that if income distribution in
the FUA were identical to that at the national level, we would have 10% of the active
population in each decile, and 30%, 40% and 30% in the high-, middle- and low-
income groups, respectively. In 2011, high- and low-income groups comprised 40%
and 25% of the FUA’s population, respectively. Hence, high-income groups are over-
represented in the Brussels FUA, while low-income groups are under-represented.
The distribution of the active population into income groups and deciles varied
very little between 2001 and 2011. As expected, the low-income group was smaller
in 2001 due to the absence of young, low-earner individuals; however, the difference
is very small (only 2% points). This is reassuring for the comparison between 2001
and 2011.
At the level of individualised neighbourhoods, we had access to four indicators
that refer to the 200 nearest neighbours for each 100m × 100 grid: (i) high education:
share of persons aged 25–64 with completed tertiary education (2001 and 2011); (ii)
employment: share of persons aged 25–64 in employment (2001 and 2011); (iii) high
income: share of persons aged 25–64 with income in the 10th decile (2011); and (iv)
poverty: share of persons aged 25 and above with income below 60% of the national
median income (2011).
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Fig. 14.3 Distribution of the Brussels FUA’s active population by income group
14.3.3 Methods
We first focus on the statistical section level to assess segregation patterns using
the same techniques as in the other chapters of this book (i.e. location quotients,
socioeconomic classification of neighbourhoods, location of high-income earners
and dissimilarity indices). Next, we go to a finer level using individualised neigh-
bourhoods based on grid data. We locate the spots where change is happening faster
since 2001, that is, affluent and deprived spots that have concentrated more affluent
and deprived people between 2001 and 2011.
14.4 Findings
14.4.1 Location Quotients
Segregation in the Brussels FUA mirrors very marked spatial disparities, both inside
the city and between the city and the hinterland. These spatial disparities can be
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Fig. 14.4 Location quotients the highest-income group (10th decile) and high-income group (8th
through 10th deciles), 2001 (left) and 2011 (right)
observed on the maps of location quotients (LQ) for selected income groups in
2001 and 2011 at the section level (Figs. 14.4 and 14.5). The maps report LQs for
high- and low-income groups as well as for the highest and lowest income deciles
separately. Income groups are underrepresented in the sections depicted in shades
of green, and they are overrepresented in sections depicted in shades of brown. The
maps reveal marked spatial patterns of segregation. The most obvious pattern is
the central zone located north-east of the Brussels historical centre, known as the
‘Poor Croissant’. It has the highest concentration of low-income earners and the
lowest concentration of high-income earners. This zone stretches along the canal in
the nineteenth-century working-class neighbourhoods, which have been inhabited
by deprived households since the last decades. Many of these households are of
non-European origin (Fig. 14.1). In fact, these are very dense neighbourhoods: areas
with LQ > 1.5 of lowest-income decile in 2011 represent only 4% of the statistical
sections, but they have 15% of the FUA’s population. High-income groups, in turn,
have relatively lowerLQvalues; that is, affluent households seem to bemore scattered
in less dense areas. Finally, as we would expect, the spatial patterns are the clearest
for the highest and lowest income groups.
Furthermore, there is a clear socioeconomic duality between the city and the
hinterland. The concentrations of high-income groups are located in peripheral areas,
in particular the zone extending south-east from the city centre and into the Flemish
region. These are traditionally affluent neighbourhoods dominated by single-family
dwellings and green zones. The duality between the city and the hinterland seems
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Fig. 14.5 Location quotients of the lowest-income group (1st decile) and low-income group (1st
through 3rd deciles), 2001 (left) and 2011 (right)
to have become more marked in 2011 compared to 2001, especially for the highest
and lowest income groups.
14.4.2 Income Classification of Neighbourhoods
The segregation patterns in the Brussels FUA are synthesised in themaps in Fig. 14.6,
which depict the income classification of neighbourhoods4 for 2001 and 2011. These
maps are consistent with those observed for LQs: they show the duality between the
city and the hinterland, with deprived neighbourhoods in central areas and affluent
neighbourhoods in the suburbs.
In fact, the socioeconomic geography in 2011 follows a concentric pattern. Low-
income earners are clustered in the area stretching along the canal, west from the
city centre (‘Low’). As we move away from this area, socioeconomic conditions
improve. The immediate surroundings have a somewhat lower concentration of low
income-earners (‘Low tomiddle’), followed by a layer of neighbourhoodswithmixed
socioeconomic status. These mixed neighbourhoods extend over a large portion of
theBrussels-Capital Region. They are followed by a layer of affluent neighbourhoods
4The income classification of neighbourhoods is based on the proportion of income groups in the
sections. Income groups are those defined in Sect. 14.3.2. The neighbourhood types were obtained
using the same criteria as elsewhere in this book.
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Fig. 14.6 Socioeconomic classification of neighbourhoods in 2001 (left) and 2011 (right)
that surrounds the city. Finally, the rest of the Brussels FUA—further away from the
city and its immediate surroundings—is marked by the presence of middle to high-
income earners. These general patterns did not vary much between 2001 and 2011,
although socioeconomic contrasts became more evident with the demarcation of
extreme types (‘High’ and ‘Low’). Finally, it is interesting to notice that that ‘Middle
SES’ neighbourhoods are all but inexistent in the Brussels FUA.
14.4.3 Location of High-Income Earners
As we have seen, the strongest clusters of high-income earners are located in periph-
erical neighbourhoods around the city, whereas the city itself is dominated by low-
income and mixed neighbourhoods. However, this does not mean that the city has
fewer high-income inhabitants compared to the hinterland. In fact, it is inside the city
that we find the largest absolute numbers of high-income earners (Fig. 14.7). Many
of the statistical sections in the first quintile of high-income inhabitants are located
in the Brussels mixed neighbourhoods—particularly east from the canal area. This is
due to the fact that Brussels is much more densely populated than the hinterland and
high-income earners live mixed with or close to low- and middle-income earners.
Between 2001 and 2011, the number of sections in the first quintile of high-income
earners decreased from 50 to 46; this indicates that high-income earners became
more concentrated. Moreover, high-income earners became more and more present
in the European Quarter over the study period. These findings are in line with the
influx of young high-earners (many fromEuropean origin) in Brussels’ central neigh-
bourhoods, in particular, the historical centre and around the European Quarter (Van
Criekingen 2010; Van Hamme et al. 2016; see Sect. 14.2 and Fig. 14.2).
14 Socio-spatial Disparities in Brussels and its Hinterland 283
Fig. 14.7 Location of high-income earners (8th through 10th deciles) in 2001 (left) and 2011 (right)
14.4.4 Dissimilarity Indices
Table 14.2 presents dissimilarity indices (DI) between income groups and income
deciles in 2001 and 2011. Not surprisingly, segregation is highest between top- and
low-income groups. In 2011 the highest-income group (d10) was by far the most
segregated from middle- and low-income groups. Due to the limitations in our data
for 2001—namely the underrepresentation of young individuals—evolutions over
the period must be interpreted with caution. Still, it is telling that DI values in the
Brussels FUA increased substantially and consistently between income groups and
between most income deciles. DI values for low-income groups increased by more
than 70% over the period with respect to both middle- and high-income groups.
However, this could be partly due to the structure of our data in which low-income
Table 14.2 Dissimilarity indices (multiplied by 100) between income groups (top of the matrix:
2011; bottom: 2001)
d10 d9 d8 d7 d6 d5 d4 d3 d2 d1 HIGH MID LOW 
d10   13 20 19 25 30 35 39 40 42       
d9 9   10 9 14 19 24 28 29 33       
d8 15 10   7 8 12 16 20 21 25       
d7 12 8 10   9 14 19 23 25 30       
d6 15 10 9 7   7 11 16 18 25       
d5 16 11 8 8 6   7 11 13 22       
d4 20 15 11 12 9 7   7 10 20       
d3 23 17 12 15 12 10 6   7 18       
d2 23 18 12 17 14 12 10 8   12       
d1 27 24 18 24 23 22 22 19 14         
HIGH                       16 28 
MID                     14   16 
LOW                     16 9   
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groups were underrepresented in 2001. On the other hand, segregation between (the
more reliable) high- and middle-income groups remained stable over the period.
If we look at income deciles, some interesting differences appear. DI scores for
the highest income group (d10) increased by more than 50% in respect to deciles
d1 through d7. Such substantial increases are also observed between higher-income
deciles (d7 through d10) andmiddle- to low-income deciles (d5 through d3). The fact
that DI became consistently higher, also among middle- and high-income deciles,
suggests that there was indeed a rise in segregation from 2001 to 2011.
14.4.5 The Local Spots of Change
Next, we take a closer look at the socio-spatial disparities in the Brussels FUA using
individualised neighbourhoods. These are built with a nearest-neighbours approach
based on 100 m × 100 m grids (see Sect. 14.3). At this fine level of spatial detail,
it is possible to locate the affluent and deprived spots where socioeconomic change
is occurring more rapidly. In order to identify these spots, we use four indicators:
the share of persons with high income (2011), the share of persons at risk of poverty
(2011), the share of persons with tertiary education (2001 and 2011) and the share
of persons in employment (2001 and 2011) among the 200 nearest neighbours (see
Sect. 14.3.2).
Figure 14.8a, b depict the distribution of high income and poverty in 2011. The
results are consistent with the findings at the statistical section level, yet they give
a more nuanced and detailed picture of socio-spatial disparities in the Brussels
FUA. These fine-grained measures are independent of administrative boundaries;
furthermore, they allow the observation of the places that are actually inhabited.
Poverty is highly clustered in dense central neighbourhoods: there is one contiguous
zone around the historical city centre where the poor account for more than 40%
of working-age residents and where high-income earners are all but absent. These
are the old industrial neighbourhoods marked by bottom-quality dwellings from the
private rental market; they are since long occupied by low-income households, many
from the foreign origin (see Sect. 14.2). In contrast, clusters of high-income earners
are scattered over populated areas, especially towards the southeast of the city, around
the Sonian Forest.
We classified individualised neighbourhoods by a combination of two features:
advantaged/disadvantaged and improving/deteriorating (Fig. 14.8c). An individu-
alised neighbourhood is considered advantaged (disadvantaged) if high income in
2011 is in the top (bottom) quartile and poverty in 2011 is in the bottom (top) quar-
tile. Moreover, a neighbourhood is considered to be improving (deteriorating) if the
proportion change in tertiary education and employment between 2001 and 2011 is
in the top (bottom) quartile.5 For instance, a neighbourhood that is ‘advantaged &
5Tertiary education and employment are the only SES variable at our disposal in 2001 and 2011.
Tertiary education in 2011 is highly correlated with high incomes (r = 0.83) and in a lesser extent
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Fig. 14.8 Income distribution by the grid (individualised neighbourhoods)
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improving’ is at the same time among the highest shares of high incomes, the lowest
shares of poverty, and the highest improvement in tertiary education and employ-
ment. All the individualised neighbourhoods that fall out of the four combinations
of advantaged/disadvantaged and improving/deteriorating are considered ‘stable’.
The resulting map (Fig. 14.8c) reveals interesting patterns. Disadvantaged spots
(both improving and deteriorating) are much more frequent than advantaged ones
and the vast majority of them are located within the city. Disadvantaged and deteri-
orating spots are by far the most frequent type and extend over contiguous zones in
and around the city centre, but not in the most deprived neighbourhoods identified
earlier. Instead, the most deprived neighbourhoods (‘Poor Croissant’) are marked
by disadvantaged and improving spots. Although these neighbourhoods continue to
concentrate the highest proportions of poor households, there seems to be a change
in composition locally with an increase in highly educated inhabitants in employ-
ment. It is likely that gentrification contributes to these processes of improvement
and deterioration of central areas. On the one hand, improvements in socioeconomic
composition in the most deprived neighbourhoods may be stirred by new real estate
projects in the canal area targeted at young, socially advantaged households; on the
other hand, socioeconomic deterioration in adjacent poor neighbourhoods could be
partially due to the arrival of low-income households pushed away from gentrified
spots in the city centre, thus relocating to less-gentrified affordable neighbourhoods
(Van Criekingen 2008; Van Hamme et al. 2016). In contrast to disadvantaged spots,
advantaged spots are much less numerous and are scattered outside the city borders:
these are isolated spots, each encompassing nomore than (portions of) specific streets
in wealthy neighbourhoods. In sum, there is a certain stability in wealthy neighbour-
hoods, whereas change—both improvement and deterioration—is happening faster
inside the city among the already deprived neighbourhoods.
Between 2001 and 2011, there was a substantial change in the migration back-
ground in deteriorating spots. The average proportion of non-European migrants
halved over the period in ‘disadvantaged and improving’ spots (from 14.2 to 7%),
while it doubled in ‘disadvantaged and deteriorating spots (from 13.4 to 24.5%). This
could indicate that improving spots have attracted Belgian and European households,
whereas low-income households of non-European origin have been moving away
from gentrified spots towards other deprived neighbourhoods. Of note, the propor-
tion of migrants is very small in the spots that are ‘advantaged and improving’ (less
than 3%).
with poverty (r = –0.33). Employment is fairly correlated both with poverty (r = –0.59) and tertiary
education (r = 0.53).
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14.5 Discussion
This chapter offers an overview of the socio-spatial disparities in the Brussels Func-
tional Urban Area. Our analyses relied on fine-grained data, at the level of statistical
sections and of individualised neighbourhoods built around 100 m × 100 m grids.
We analysed socioeconomic segregation patterns and levels in 2001 and 2011 with
different methods and using data on income, education and employment. The anal-
yses carried out here provide an update on the situation based on the latest available
data and go beyond that of previous studies by using individualised neighbourhoods
based on grid data. In line with previous research, our results show very marked and
persistent patterns of socioeconomic segregation in and around Brussels, operating
both at a larger geographic scale and at the local level.
At the large-scale level, there is a clear divide between deprived central neighbour-
hoods and prosperous outskirts. Low-income groups are highly clustered in dense
neighbourhoods in and around the city centre. In fact, around 15% of the Brus-
sels FUA total population lives in central neighbourhoods where the low-income
group is overrepresented (LQ ≥ 1.5). In turn, high-income groups are more sparsely
distributed in the south-east neighbourhoods of Brussels and across most of the
hinterland. These large-scale patterns of segregation, with a poorer centre and pros-
perous suburbs, are typical in Belgium, also for other cities; they are due to specific
long-term territorial processes and housing policies (see also Costa and de Valk
2018).
Below these large-scale disparities, segregation processes operate at the local
level, especially inside the city. Low-income groups are highly clustered in the neigh-
bourhoods around the historical centre—the so-called ‘Poor Croissant’. These are the
old industrial neighbourhoods, with low-quality dwellings and which also concen-
trate a large share of migrants from non-European countries. Apart from these poor
neighbourhoods, the largest portion of the city is composed ofmixed neighbourhoods
(with 25–50% of each low-, middle- and high-income group). Interestingly, these
mixed neighbourhoods are home to the highest absolute numbers of high-income
earners of the Brussels FUA. In contrast with their suburban counterparts, this urban
elite share their space with the middle class. Finally, we also find clustering of high-
income earners in the green south-east part of the city, where single-family dwellings
are most frequent.
Due to limitations with regard to the data on income we have at hand, it is a bridge
too far to decisively conclude that segregation levels increased between 2001 and
2011, although our analyses point in that direction. In all cases, our findings show
the tenacity of the same patterns of segregation in Brussels over time. Moreover,
below these persistent patterns, change seems to take place at the local level in the
already deprived areas inside the city. Most of these areas have been deteriorating
over time in terms of socioeconomic composition; but interestingly, themost deprived
neighbourhoods from the Poor Croissant have improved over the study period.
Although we know that inequalities measured by the Gini coefficient at the
national level remained stable, it is yet unclear whether income inequalities have
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increased in the Brussels FUA over the last decades. Either way, it is unlikely that
variations in income inequalities are the primary cause of the observed segrega-
tion patterns. Rather, the persistence of these patterns in Brussels may be driven by
migration patterns influencing socio-spatial inequalities, as well as specific housing
policies.
First, international migration may fuel the existing segregation patterns (Van
Hamme et al. 2016). On the one hand, it is likely that many non-European migrants
with a low socioeconomic position establish themselves in the most deprived neigh-
bourhoods. Not only do these neighbourhoods offer affordable housing (albeit of low
quality), they can also be an easier gateway to the city because of the existing ethnic
networks as well as language (and commercial) facilities. In addition, discrimination
in the housing market may limit the residential choices of non-European migrants
and thus their access to other neighbourhoods (Verstraete and Verhaeghe 2019).
Our results have shown, indeed, that the most deprived neighbourhoods are also
those which concentrate the highest proportions of non-European migrants. On the
other hand, newly arrived international professionals are likely to choose neighbour-
hoods with a high proportion of expats, especially those in the European Quarter.
These neighbourhoods are close to many international institutions and also to the
city centre. In addition, real estate agencies operating in expats networks often attract
newcomers to these areas. This explanation is supported by our finding that there was
an increase in the top-income group settling in the European Quarter since 2001. In
sum, if newcomers establish themselves in the typical concentration neighbourhoods
according to their socioeconomic position and transnational networks, their residen-
tial choices (or lack thereof) are likely to maintain and even reinforce the existing
segregation patterns.
Second, internal migration can also contribute to the observed segregation
patterns. Whereas low-income groups are often forced into deprived neighbour-
hoods, higher-income groups have the choice to live in well-off neighbourhoods.
As our results suggest, the richest 10% are by far the most segregated group and
are highly clustered in specific spots. In addition, Brussels’ central neighbourhoods
have increasingly attracted highly educated youngsterswho spend a part of their early
adulthood in the city, before moving to outer neighbourhoods (Van Criekingen 2010;
Van Hamme et al. 2016). The constant renewal of these transient residents has led to
reinvestment in central neighbourhoods and consequently to gentrification processes
(Van Criekingen 2008, 2009). The increasing competition in the housing market and
the resulting rise in rental prices have forced low-income households that stayed in
these neighbourhoods intomore precarious conditions, whilemany relocated to other
central neighbourhoods with more affordable rentals. These processes are supported
by our analysis of local spots of change: some spots in the most deprived neighbour-
hoods have improved their socioeconomic composition over time—likely due to the
arrival of better-off young households—whereas many other central areas have dete-
riorated their socioeconomic composition—probably aided by the residential move
of low-income households coming from gentrified neighbourhoods. All in all, these
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selective residential moves might be contributing, at a large scale, to a greater socioe-
conomic mix in Brussels as a whole, but at the same time, at the local level, they
might be fuelling socio-spatial fractures in central neighbourhoods.
Third, the housing market and housing policies do not seem to be effective in
reducing socio-spatial disparities, and may even reinforce them. Belgium is char-
acterised by liberal housing policies with a deregulated rental market and a focus
on homeownership (De Decker 2008). Deprived neighbourhoods are dominated by
bottom-quality dwellings in the private rental market, whereas the affluent neigh-
bourhoods are dominated by owner-occupied dwellings. At the same time, social
and public housing remain marginal in Brussels and is way below the population
needs, which results in long waiting lists (Dessouroux et al. 2016). More recently,
it is likely that regional (neoliberal inspired) housing policies in Brussels have
favoured the emergence of large real estate projects targeted to the young middle-
and upper class (Decroly and Van Criekingen 2009). These projects are especially
situated in the remaining available spaces in the canal area. This could explain our
finding that in some deprived local spots in this area, socioeconomic composition
has improved since 2001. Such local-level processes driven by liberal policies and
private investments may increase and fuel local inequalities.
It is difficult to determine what ultimately drives socio-spatial inequalities at the
local level. Local concentrations of socioeconomic groups can be easily altered by
small changes, for example, in the housing stock and in population composition due
to in- and out-migration or social mobility processes. Future research should make
use of longitudinal micro-data linked with fine-grained spatial information in order
to understand how individual mobility and migration background interact with the
existing segregation patterns as well as how they act to reinforce or attenuate them
over time. This type of detailed analyses is much needed and could help clarify the
underlying causes of socioeconomic fractures and point to policy interventions that
may counteract high socio-spatial disparities and its determinants in Brussels.
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Chapter 15
Residential Segregation in a Highly
Unequal Society: Istanbul in the 2000s
Oğuz Işık
Abstract Contrary to trends in many European countries, income inequality in
Turkey, measured by the Gini coefficient, has declined between 1994 and 2014,
with a small but consistent increase since then. Turkish income inequality is among
the highest in OECD countries, with levels not lower than 0.4. This chapter will
examine residential socio-economic segregation in Istanbul against the backdrop of
this relatively stable and high-income inequality. The chapter shows signs that resi-
dential segregation is on the rise. Istanbul has undergone a radical change in the
2000s thanks to active intervention by the state in the real estate market by opening
up large pieces of land in the outskirts and gentrifying inner-city areas once occupied
by unauthorized settlements that once were home to the poor. Dynamics of urban
development, fueled by rapid urban sprawl in peri-urban areas and ceaseless gentri-
fication of inner-city areas, gave way to diverse patterns of segregation depending
on the already existing divisions and physical geography of cities. Given the lack
of neighbourhood level data on either occupations or income, this chapter analyses
segregation through indices based on fertility and educational level, which we know
from detailed household microdata are closely correlated with income. On the basis
of 2000 and 2017 neighbourhood data, we show that in Istanbul, there is a clearly
visible pattern where the poor are progressively pushed further to the city limits,
while some parts of built-up areas once home to middle classes, were recaptured
by the poor. The result in some parts of the city is a juxtaposition of seemingly
conflicting patterns: parts of the inner city were reclaimed by the poor while some
parts were gentrified led by the nascent urban elite. The urban periphery was partly
occupied by the bourgeoning middle classes and was also home to the urban poor
who were displaced by urban transformation projects.
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Turkey is a land of vast and enduring inequalities. Ever since the first reliable studies
were made on income inequality in the late 1960s, the Gini coefficient has not fallen
below 0.4 except a few years in the early 2000s, making Turkey one of the most
unequal countries in the OECD, and placing it somewhere between European coun-
tries with relatively low levels of inequality and Latin American countries where
income inequality has been notoriously high. In the face of a state unwilling to take
active measures to reduce inequality, the society devisedmany ingenious ways, espe-
cially in the urban labour and property markets, to cope with high levels of inequality
and to keep at bay the tensions that may arise therefrom. Things went well till the
2000s and the poor were able to find a place to live for themselves in the rapidly
bourgeoning urban propertymarket thanks to networks of solidarity they set up, span-
ning in most cases the boundaries between the formal and informal and authorised
and unauthorised. Thanks to the innovative survival strategies of the urban poor, the
problems that are often associated with high inequality and residential segregation
went unnoticed for most of society.
The 2000s have been frantic years in terms of urban development in all large
cities in Turkey, a period when the mechanisms devised by the urban poor proved
inefficient, and the state that had been a silent partner became an active agent in
the housing and urban property market. Given the voracious desire on the part of
the state to appropriate ever-increasing land values in many gargantuan projects, the
poor found it increasingly difficult to maintain their positions in the city and were
driven to the city limits where they had to compete with many other agents for land
and shelter, finding themselves unable to use space as means of power as they had
done in previous periods.
This chapter is an attempt to assess how already high levels of residential segre-
gation have changed in line with the massive urban restructuring of the 2000s. The
objective is to understand how the construction frenzy and urban sprawl of the 2000s
were articulated with the existing pattern of residential segregation inherited from
earlier periods of urban development. Starting with a summary of the basic contours
of urban development in Turkey, the chapter discusses the problems of studying
segregation with limited available data in Istanbul, where the physical geography
has a strong impact on almost every urban process, including residential segregation.
15.2 Background: Frantic years of 2000s
Compared to the 2000s, urban development in Turkey in the pre-2000 period was
certainly a calm process, which ensured that some of the big problems encountered
by similar countries undergoing a rapid process of urbanisation were solved without
causing large-scale unrest. The basic characteristics of this period can be described
succinctly in a few statements: An informal job and urban property market which
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guaranteed that the ceaseless flux of newcomers would easily find a job and a shelter
thanks to the networks of solidarity they set up, though the jobs they found were as
shaky as the squatters they built up for themselves on vast state land, mostly at the
periphery of cities; a populist-clientelist state apparatus, incapable of responding to
the needs of these newcomers, that happily turned a blind eye, in exchange for their
votes, to people who squat illegally on state land or who run informal businesses
(Işık and Pınarcıoğlu 2009). Things did really go well both for the urban poor and
the state till the late 1990s; by exploiting the opportunities of the informal labour
and real estate markets, the urban poor were able to transfer part of their poverty
conditions to newcomers and thus to climb up the social ladder into the ranks of
the rapidly growing middle class. This undeclared alliance between the state and the
urban poor secured a decent place for the latter while the politicians were able to
maintain their position, thus laying the foundations for amore repressive and populist
political climate in the 2000s.
This tacit alliance, whereby the urban poor made use of the informal labour and
property markets as leverage to cope with the prevailing levels of inequality, came
to an end in the late 1990s due to several intertwined processes. The reasons behind
the collapse of this alliance and the ensuing changes that Turkish society has gone
through in the 2000s are too large to be summarised in a few words. The 2000s can
be best described by rising to the power of the Justice and Development Party (JDP),
an Islamist-leaning party, and their desire to mould the society in their vision, in a
way described by some rightfully as the marriage of Islamism and neo-liberalism
(Gürcan and Peker 2015; Karaman 2013a; Atasoy 2009) with strong populist over-
tones. The JDP and local governments launched an ambitious ‘urban transformation
programme’ through public–private partnership schemes inmost large Turkish cities,
under the strong support of the state-runhousing administration (TOKI).TOKIunder-
took huge housing projects at the outskirts of cities and played a leading role in the
clearance of formerly unauthorised housing areas in inner cities where land prices
had soared (Türkün 2011; Karaman 2013b). TOKI became the most powerful agent
in the real estatemarket, by acquiring the right to transfer public land to private devel-
opers for the construction of housing estates on the outskirts through public–private
partnership scheme with titles delivered to prospective buyers. In a country where
owner-occupation is the rule (nearly 2/3 of the existing stock is owner-occupied)
and public housing ownership is an exception, projects undertaken through public–
private partnership programmes such as those by TOKI fuelled the fragmentation of
the housing market. It is estimated that some 66 million square meters of state land
were transferred to TOKI between 2002 and 2008. In inner-city areas, TOKI helped
clear former squatter areas and residents’ property rights were transferred to housing
projects far from the city centre. When considered in combination with the privatisa-
tion frenzy of the JDP and their obsession with grandiose urban projects (including
renovation of former shipyards, ports and railway stations and large-scale urban
renewal projects, shopping malls, colossal luxury hotels and gated communities),
this heralded the end of a long period in Turkish history of urbanisation where the
migrating masses had used their networks of solidarity as a survival strategy under
the harsh conditions of persistent inequality. Devoid of any chance and means to
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secure a place for themselves in the property market, the poor were gradually pushed
further out of the city and found only limited space of manoeuvre in inner-city areas
where the urban elites had no interest for. The urban middle classes seized every
opportunity they found and were the main beneficiaries of new housing schemes in
both central and peri-urban areas where the poor had been displaced. The nascent
urban elites, on the other hand, found themselves unrivalled in both the peri-urban
and inner-city areas and continued to live in now poor-proof neighbourhoods.
Figure 15.1 shows the evolution of the Gini coefficient since the late 1980s. With
the exception of 2005 and 2014, the Gini has been above 0.4, exhibiting an upward
trend in the last few years. In the case of Istanbul, for whichwe have reliable data only
after 2006, the Gini coefficient has been somewhat lower than the one for Turkey
but started to rise sharply after 2014. In Istanbul, income inequality seems to have
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Fig. 15.1 Income inequality in Turkey and Istanbul: Gini Coefficient*. Source a Figures before
1986 from TurkStat Household Income and Consumption Expenditures Survey, 1986
b 1994 figures from TurkStat Household Income Distribution Survey
c 2002–2017 results from TurkStat Income and Living Conditions Survey
*TurkStat started carrying out income distribution surveys on a regular basis in 2002. The figures
obtained after 2002 are reliable and in compliance with EU standards. However, there are signifi-
cant methodological differences between surveys made before and after 2002. Post-2002 surveys
used equivalised disposable income as their basis, while no equivalisation was made for surveys
made before then. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that pre-2002 household surveys tend to
overestimate income inequality slightly. The figures before 2002 must therefore be treated with
some caution
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15.3 Studying Segregation in Istanbul
The study of segregation in Istanbul is beset by a number of difficulties. The first
set of problems originates from the fact that Istanbul is literally a city in flux, a
site of a never-ending process of creation and destruction. Its population rose from
7.2 million in 1990 to 11 million in 2000 and finally to 15 million in 2017. This
refers to an annual growth rate of no less than 2% on most occasions, a rate which
is difficult to imagine for many cities of the West. In a similar fashion, the number
of neighbourhoods increased from 550 in 2000 to some 780 in 2017, making the
measurement of segregation and comparisons over time an arduous task.
The second set of difficulties arises from the unique geographical setting of the
city. Built on two continents (Europe and Asia), with an extremely busy seaway
(Bosporus) in between connecting Balkan countries and Russia to the rest of the
world, Istanbul is divided into two distinct geographical units. For the study of
settlement and segregation patterns, this means that Istanbul is destined to be a
polycentric city, with each geographical unit having its core and peripheral areas
(Dökmeci and Berköz 1994). The uneven distribution of population between these
two parts (nearly two-thirds living on the European side and one-thirds on the Asian
side) generates an immense volume of traffic and development pressure for the whole
city. Fifteenmillion people squeezed on a piece of land slightly larger than 5,000 km2
and the existence of numerous naturally and historically important sites in and around
the city make land the most precious commodity for Istanbul. Fierce competition for
land contributes to the emergence of a segregation pattern resembling a patchwork,
especially at the periphery.
Though not peculiar to Istanbul but common to all cities of Turkey, the main
challenges arise to those interested in the study of segregation, mostly due to the
limited availability of geocoded data. Given the absence of appropriate spatial data
and the fact that most cities are in a constant process of building and destruction, one
has to find some innovative and particularly indirect ways to decipher the pattern of
segregation observed in Turkish cities. It is to this problem of data and methodology
that I turn briefly in the following section.
15.4 Data and Method
Although Turkey has gone a long way in the 2000s in assuring the quality of statis-
tical data, there is still a long way to go in what may be called small area statistics.
Designation of functional urban areas and NUTS areas has yet to be completed. The
only spatial unit where data is available for cities is the ambiguous level of neigh-
bourhoods (mahalle).Mahalle does not have a clear definition in the administrative
system, nor are there any known limits to its population and size. In the case of
Istanbul, the population of neighbourhoods in 2017 varied between 50 and 93,000,
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with an average of 15,600. Furthermore, local governments may—and usually do—
change the number and boundaries of neighbourhoods without any restriction. This
generates problems concerning the comparability of datasets, an issue discussed
below in relation to dissimilarity indices.
Neighbourhood level data are gathered through the Address-Based Population
Registration System (ABPRS). The ABPRS provides only very basic information
about the population-merely the educational level and age distribution by gender. No
information is available on the occupational status of the population, or on working
conditions. With this very limited data, one has to be creative in analysing segrega-
tion patterns in Istanbul. With the purpose of finding out which of the few variables
available at the neighbourhood level are correlated with income and social status,
and thus drawing out the segregation map of Istanbul, 2016 household budget survey
microdata sets were used. This data from TurkStat is used for analysing the income
distribution and consumption, and information is available on households and indi-
viduals. If any of the available ABPRS data is correlated with income and/or socioe-
conomic status, we can use it as a proxy for socioeconomic status and use it to study
residential segregation.
Of the information accessible through the ABPRS, the most promising defines
education data, as there is a strong positive correlation between educational attain-
ment and income level. Figure 15.2 summarises the relationship between income
and other sets of variables to find out the extent to which they can be used as a
proxy for income. The top left figure shows the educational attainment of the adult
population (population over the age of 25) by income deciles. Here the educational
level is grouped into four categories: no formal education represents those who
Fig. 15.2 Selected variables and income groups by deciles, 2016. SourceCalculated fromTurkStat,
2016 Household Budget Survey microdata set
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have not completed any formal education; the second category represents those who
have completed only the compulsory 8-year elementary school; and the other two
categories of education are for those who have completed secondary school and
university. The figure shows a clear positive correlation between educational level
and income level. The share of university graduates is higher than 56% in the 10th
decile while it is as low as 1.2% at the lowest. The percentage of those who have
completed only compulsory education shows the opposite trend-high in low-income
groups and low in high-income groups (43% and 17% respectively). Of course, the
relationship between educational status and income or in general socio-economic
status is a complex one and is not as straightforward as this figure might imply. But
the analyses show that educational level can safely be used as a proxy for the level
of income as there is a clear tendency for income to rise with rising education level.
The other variables that can be used as a proxy for income and socio-economic
status are also shown in Fig. 15.2. The top right graph shows the relationship between
household size and disposable household income by deciles. The better-off house-
holds are usually smaller, while low-income groups tend to live in larger households.
One to three-person households make up two-thirds of the highest income decile, but
their share drops to one third in the lowest decile. The fact that well-to-do families are
smaller in sizemay be regarded as an indication of differences in fertility between low
and high-income households. The bottom right graph shows the relationship between
the child–woman ratio (CWR) and income level. CWR is defined as the number of
children under the age of 5 per 1000 women of reproductive age (ages 15–49) in
a population in a given year. It may be regarded as an indicator of recent fertility
net of child mortality. A crude and indirect measure of fertility easily obtainable
from census data, CWR is frequently used in fertility studies in the absence of such
specific measures as total or age-specific fertility rate. The graph shows that there is
a strong negative relationship between CWR and income; the lower the income, the
higher the level of fertility. As a matter of fact, CWR in the highest decile is smaller
than half its level in the lowest decile (519 vs 224, respectively).
The fertility indicator discussed above brings to the fore, though indirectly, the
problem of women’s position in Turkish society. Turkey’s performance has been very
poor in terms of gender equality, ranking 130 among the 149 countries for which
the 2018 Global Gender Gap Index is available (World Economic Forum 2018).
We know that the participation of woman in the labour force has been traditionally
low in Turkey (Göksel 2013) compared to countries of a similar income level and
female education in Turkey has lagged considerably behind that of men (Işık and
Pınarcıoğlu 2006). Not surprisingly, the participation rate of a woman in education
exhibits striking variations between income groups, with the percentage of 30+ aged
women with a university degree as high as 49% in the wealthiest decile and as low
as 0.1% in the poorest decile. Therefore, variables relating to education, especially
for women’s education, are adequate proxies to understand segregation along the
lines of income and socioeconomic status. For the analyses, university graduates are
compared to those without formal education to delve into divisions characterising




Figure 15.3 shows maps with the location quotients (LQ) for university graduates
and the population without formal education for 2000, 2010 and 2017. LQ maps
give a cursory idea about the segregation pattern of Istanbul. The wealthy segments
of the population have settled along the sea, while the lowest income groups (i.e.
those groups with low levels of educational attainment) seem to have found a place
for themselves at the periphery. These maps reveal that the proximity to the sea is
the basic determinant of the pattern of segregation. Here one can also see the impact
of city’s unique physical geography on segregation patterns, where both Asian and
European parts of Istanbul have their own rich, poor and middle-class areas. With
some exceptions, especially in the historic parts of the city, better-off groups have
settled in neighbourhoods along the sea coast, with low-status groups settling in areas
at the fringe. Although at first glance, the pattern of the well-to-do living along with
the coast, the poor at the periphery and a mixture of middle-class neighbourhoods
between the two does not seem to have changed very much between 2000 and 2017,




Fig. 15.3 LQ maps for university graduates and population with no formal education. Source
TurkStat, Address-Based Population Registration System
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there are some very important differences that need further attention. I turn to this
issue below when I discuss the segregation along the lines of socioeconomic status,
based on a grouping of neighbourhoods.
Table 15.1 shows the dissimilarity indices (DI) for selected education groups in
Istanbul for 2000, 2010 and 2017. The table reveals some crucially important features
of segregation. Of the groups considered, the ones that are most unevenly distributed
across the city are university graduates. The largest segregation is between university
graduates and people with no formal education (0.49 in 2000, rising to 0.52 in 2010
and then dropping to 0.44 in 2017), the main reason for which is the sharp decline
in the percentage of people with no formal education. As can be seen from the table,
groups with a low level of education tend to live close to each other in space, but they
live separated from those with a high level of education. What is also striking is that
the indices for upper-status groups are higher in all cases than those for lower status
groups, an indication of the stronger tendency on the part of the higher educated to
concentrate in areas where their percentage is already high. Another tendency that
the DI figures reveal is the fact that segregation along the lines of education seems to
have slightly dropped in the 17 years from 2000 to 2017 on both continents, probably
an indication that the neighbourhoods that are being gentrified get more mixed, a
tendency which is observed on both European and Asian sides of the city.
This conclusion must, however, be treated with caution. Although the dissimi-
larity index is argued to be compositionally invariant (i.e. not affected by the overall
composition of the population), Taylor et al. (2000) and Gorard and Taylor (2002)
have reported cases where DI cannot be considered fully composition invariant; there
are cases when the index is altered by changing composition of a population over
the years considered. We should note the fact that during the period under consider-
ation, the educational categories studied here recorded some great changes with, for
instance, the share of university graduates rising from 8% in 2000 to 19% in 2017
and that of people with no formal education falling from 35 to 11% in the same
period.
There are also sufficient grounds to claim that DI performs very poorly in making
temporal comparisons. It is very sensitive to changes in the number and sizes of areas
compared (Simpson 2007). We know that the number of neighbourhoods rose from
550 to 780, from 2000 to 2017, with the expansion of the city towards the unoccupied
and low-density areas. This rise in the number of neighbourhoods is not only due to
the expansion of the city towards the periphery but also to further division of existing
ones into smaller units; some made for gerrymandering in elections. Therefore, the
initial impression that one can get from falling DI might be somewhat misleading
since there is enough evidence that changing borders and the increasing number of
neighbourhoods do affect the measurement of segregation. In any case, however,
there is a considerable spatial division in Istanbul along the lines of educational
status. And wemust also note that this segregation is not a new phenomenon peculiar
to the 2000s, but something Istanbul obviously inherited from earlier periods (for
segregation in 1990 see Işık and Güvenç 2002; and for 2000 see Işık and Pınarcıoğlu
2008, 2009). There is, however, an important point that DI cannot reveal—the clear
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15.5.1 Classification and Mapping of Neighbourhoods
Given that neighbourhood level data is scarce for Istanbul, three variables are used
to classify neighbourhoods to gain a better understanding of how spatial segregation
patterns have changed between 2000 and 2017. (1) The percentage of those with a
university degree in the total adult population (population older than 25 years of age)
of each neighbourhood; (2) child–woman ratio (CWR) calculated as the number
of children under age 5 per 1000 women of ages between 15 and 49; and (3) the
percentage of women with a university degree in the female population of 30 years
and over in each neighbourhood.
Using these three variables, neighbourhoods were sorted for each variable from
the lowest to the highest value and then divided into quintiles. Each quintile was
then assigned a score from 1 to 5, depending on its ranking. In the case of university
graduates (both total and female), the lowest quintile was given a score of 1 and the
highest quintile a score of 5, since both are positively correlated with income. In the
case of CWR, the scoring was reversed (1 to the highest quintile and 5 to the lowest
quintile) as CWR is negatively correlated with income. Finally, the individual scores
were added up without assigning any weight to reach an overall score between 3
and 15, representing the socioeconomic status of each neighbourhood. Depending
on their scores, neighbourhoods were then divided into 5 categories named low, low-
middle, middle, middle-high and high-status neighbourhoods. The results are shown
in Fig. 15.4 for 2000, 2010 and 2017.
15.5.2 From 2000 to 2017: Exodus of the Poor
The segregation map for 2000 represents a typical pattern of segregation that could
be found not only in Istanbul but also in most other Turkish cities. The basic charac-
teristics of this segregation pattern can be summarised in a few words: concentration
of affluence in and around the prestigious areas of the city (in the case of Istanbul,
along the sea coast) and clustering of the poor at the fringe that is of no interest to the
better-off classes. It must be noted that in the case of Istanbul, these areas are mostly
unauthorised squatter housing areas built in the 1960s and 1970s. Another important
aspect of this segregation pattern is the existence of middle-income groups acting
as a buffer between low- and high-income groups. The lower and upper ends of the
social ladder do not seem to touch each other in residential neighbourhoods. In few
instances where they seem to have a direct contact, there is almost always a physical
barrier: D-100 highway on both the Asian and European side is a clear separator
between the rich and the poor (Işık and Güvenç 2002). There are very few examples
of the rich and the poor living in neighbouring areas. Poor areas next to rich areas
can be found on both sides of the Bosporus, but they are more visible on the Asian










Fig. 15.4 Socioeconomic classification of neighbourhoods
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were of little value to the wealthy, but their relative position in the city has changed
over time due to transformation in the late 1990s.
The 2000 segregation map shows the first signs of what we may call the flight of
the upper classes from their traditional residential neighbourhoods at the coastline.
This flight of the upper classes started in the 1990s but was until then of sporadic and
limited nature. The growing tendency on the part of high-income groups to settle at
the urban fringe, particularly in areas known as ‘gated communities’ (Geniş 2007;
Tanülkü 2012, 2013) is still invisible in the 2000map because neighbourhoods on the
fringe are too large for the impact of such scattered communities to be observable.
Such flight of high-income groups is only visible if it is large enough to make up a
significant portion of a neighbourhood.Themost notable example of suchmovements
is a new settlement known as Bahçeşehir (Garden City) on the far European edge of
the city (see the westernmost part of 2000 map). As a harbinger of what was to come
in the 2000s, this settlement was built in the late 1980s with generous credit support
from now-abolished state-owned real estate banks and became a symbolic example
of the flight of the middle and upper classes from the built-up areas of the city.
A pattern where the wealthy appropriated the privileged parts of the city, the poor
lived exclusively in clusters at the outskirts and the middle classes acted as a buffer
between the twowas almost a trademark of most Turkish cities in the 1990s and early
2000s (cf. Ataç 2017). But this pattern was subject to a brutal and abrupt change at
an unforeseen speed in the 2000s, with some disastrous results for the urban poor
and ruining everything we thought we knew about Turkish cities. A glimpse of the
changes that took place in the 2000s can be caught even with a cursory comparison
of the maps for 2000 and 2010. Although the basic pattern of the rich along the sea
coast and the poor at the outskirts still remains, there are important trends that shed
light to the defeat of the poor, the zeitgeist of the period. Here we can see the first and
undeniable traces of what we may refer to as the (a) displacement of the urban poor
from most of their previous locations and their exodus to even more remote parts of
the city; (b) consolidation of the urban elites in, around and along with the privileged
areas by cleansing the remnants of the poor that had settled there in earlier periods;
(c) large-scale gentrification of some inner-city areas with some conflicting results;
and (d) occupation by the poor or lower classes of some inner-city areas abandoned
by the wealthy, the so-called degradation of some parts of the city.
It is not surprising to see that some of the largest transformation projects took place
under the generous support of the state in areas with high accessibility between the
TEM and D-100 highways on both sides of the metropolis. Parts of these areas
had been subject to unauthorised housing development in the 1970s and 1980s.
They were the typical examples of pre-2000 type of unauthorised urban develop-
ment—built on occupied state land through ad hoc networks working along the
lines of ethnicity, religious affiliation and fellow-townsmanship, meaning that they
had some degree of heterogeneity within themselves before the onset of large-scale
projects of 2002. Though they had lost their initial characteristics and turned into
more heterogeneous settlements by time in terms of their inhabitants, they were
without exception on pieces of land that were far more valuable than their initial
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value. This ‘non-correspondence’ between their relative position within the city—
hence their soaring land values—and the characteristics of their inhabitants paved
the way for a large-scale and devastating intervention on the part of the state and
local authorities. Ayazma transformation project for about 20.000 inhabitants on the
European side (see Lovering and Türkmen 2011) and Maltepe-Başıbüyük projects
for about 15.000 inhabitants on the Asian side (Kuyucu and Ünsal 2010; Karaman
2013b) are among the best documented and best-known examples of such projects.
In all these projects, former residents were offered housing units at the outskirts and
thus forced to live in newly built residential areas on the far edges of the city. These
were, with no doubt, cleansing projects whereby the poor were pushed further away
from the city.
A similar process of sterilisation is also visible in areas close to the prestigious
areas inhabited by the upper classes, particularly on sites overlooking the Bosporus
on both continents. A comparison of 2000 and 2010 maps shows how the upper
classes expanded geographically and how pockets of the poor were eradicated along
with the areas between the two Bosporus bridges. These areas, too, had been subject
to extensive squatter development in earlier periods. The transformation projects in
the Beykoz district on the Asian side and the infamous Armutlu project are among
the many examples of such projects (Ergun 2004). It must be noted that the cleansing
of hills overlooking the Bosporus served more to the upper classes as opposed to
the ones described above, such as Ayazma, where middle and upper-middle-income
groups made the most use of.
In the historic parts of the city, several renewal projects took place and two
processes were at work there; large-scale projects launched by the state and projects
of a minor scale initiated by the nascent urban elite. As an example of the latter, we
can refer to the Cihangir area (Lovering and Türkmen 2011), a once degraded site,
opposite to the historic peninsula in an area known as Pera occupied in the nineteenth
and early twentieth century by non-Muslim minorities. This area became the focus
of culture-led regeneration (Günay and Dökmeci 2012). The gentrification of the
Cihangir area was a slow and self-paced process, while the ones instigated by the
state were brutal and devoid of any room for the residents to get their share of rising
values. Of these renewal projects, that in Sulukule, famous for being the first neigh-
bourhood in the world to be permanently settled by the Romani people, became the
stage of a widespread protest and was even mentioned in EU’s 2006 annual progress
report as an example of the displacement of Roma population (CEC 2006). All these
protests were in vain, and the neighbourhood was evacuated by police force, and
Sulukule residents found themselves exiled to a distant part of the metropolis where
they had not seen before (Uysal 2012; Schoon 2014).
Amidst this chaos, parts of the historic peninsula, once the home of middle and
upper-income groups, were reclaimed by low-income groups (Dinçer 2011). The part
played by Syrian refugees fleeing from the civil war must be stressed in this context.
According to official figures, Turkey is home to 3.6 million Syrian refugees living
mostly in big cities with many unsettling impacts not just for Istanbul but for many
other cities. Of these refugees, more than 15% (560,000) live in Istanbul, usually in
areas where rents and living costs are low and accessibility is high (Kılıç et al. 2019).
15 Residential Segregation in a Highly Unequal Society: Istanbul in the 2000s 307
Those parts of the historic peninsula for which the upper classes had no interest for
were thus appropriated by a mixture of low-income groups coalescing with Syrian
refugees.
All these huge projects of transformation at the periphery and gentrification
projects of various scales left behind a patchwork metropolis in some parts of the
city. Especially in the peri-urban areas where land is scarce and competition is high,
the transformation of the fringe was sporadic and remained incomplete, producing
a patchy pattern in some parts of the metropolis resembling the one emphasised by
Florida (2017) as an important component of the new urban crisis. An examination
of the 2017 segregation map in Fig. 15.4 would reveal that the tendencies that started
in the early years of the first decade of the 2000s produced a significantly different
pattern. Although the parts of the city close to the most valuable asset—namely, to
the sea coast—are still colonised by the wealthy, the new Istanbul at the end of the
second decade of the 2000s can be best described by the almost total absence of
the poor in inner-city areas close to or easily accessible from the city centre. The
poor have now been driven away to the edges of the city, with little contact to the
rest of Istanbulites. The heavy-handed attitude of the state and local governments in
most of the transformation projects and their determination to break any resistance
using even police force when they felt necessary must be regarded as an indication
of insatiable desire to redistribute urban rents, which in previous periods had been
a lifesaver for newcomers and the urban poor. It is to this issue of redistribution of
urban rents and consequences flowing out of it that I turn in the concluding remarks.
15.6 Concluding Remarks
Turkey was and still is a country of high inequality. Although the level of inequality
did not change significantly on the surface in the last few decades, the underlying
class equations and the mechanisms whereby society coped with these inequalities
did. Up until the 2000s, the urban poor found the means to appropriate soaring
property values in prospering metropoles and make use of these opportunities as
leverage for social climbing. It is this informal redistribution mechanism in both
urban labour and property markets that guaranteed that all social tensions related to
high levels of inequality were kept at bay and masses joining the ranks of the urban
poor maintained their hopes for reaching the upper echelons of social divisions. In
this game of inequality, the state acted as an accomplice, turning a blind eye to
the existence of markets in the undefined shady zone between the legal and illegal,
the formal and informal. The geography of inequality changed as well, with the
rich concentrating along the sea coast as they did in previous periods, plus air-tight
pockets in gated communities on the edges and creating spaces for themselves in
parts of the centre. The final pattern is a patchwork metropolis as opposed to the
previous one characterised by clear lines of demarcation in space between social
groups.
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The resulting pattern of segregation that we see for the year 2017 is the outcome
of several intertwined processes that had their origin in the late 1990s and culminated
in the 2000s:
(a) State-led eradication of former squatter areas especially in peripheral parts of
the city where accessibility and thus property values are high;
(b) Selective gentrification of inner-city areas, some under the auspices of the state,
others self-initiated and infiltration of the nascent urban elite into formermiddle-
class areas; and,
(c) In any case, apathy and even brutality on the part of the state toward the losers,
that is the former residents of project areas; and thus, the cleansing parts of the
periphery and the inner city from the urban poor, a process I referred to as the
exodus of the urban poor to the remote parts of the metropolis where they can
have little contact with the city.
The extent to which this change in segregation pattern can be attributed to income
inequality is a question for which I have no ready-made answer as high inequality
has been an integral aspect of Turkish society for a long time. It is, however, certain
that a metropolis where the poor have been driven out of sight, a process by which
the ability of the poor to use space as means of power has been castrated, is a new
phenomenon even for Turkey. This is something we all have to think about.
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Chapter 16
Segregation in London: A City of Choices
or Structures?
David Manley
Abstract This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the socio-economic
segregation in London. The cosmopolitan nature of the city means there is an inter-
woven complexity that prevents the separation of social, cultural and economic resi-
dential trajectories of the population.As a result, the chapter explores socio-economic
segregation within the context of the changing nature of the (sub)urban contexts. In
particular, the chapter documents not only the occupational segregation but also
introduces the often-used dimension of ethnicity and pairs it with the less commonly
explored age and tenure dimensions through which the social structure of the city is
inscribed. This enables a broader understanding of the rapid changes that have been
wrought on the micro-scale can be understood in the context of a city that has, in
terms of the overall composition, changed little.
Keywords Segregation · London · Housing · Ethnicity · Occupation
16.1 Introduction
Originally founded by the Romans as Londinium, the city has prospered over almost
two millennia growing from its initial roots as a trading port on the River Thames
to national capital and international finance hub. In terms of global reach, London
is on par with New York (GaWC 2020). Over this period, the functions of the city,
the relative population composition and the social, economic and ethnic population
distributions have changed, but London remains a city of contrasts. With almost 9
million people living in the Urban Core, it is the most populous of any European
Capital, a population that grows substantially when including the wider commuter
belt areas of over 14 million people (Eurostat 2018). It is also one of the most impor-
tant cities globally in terms of finance, business and industry as well as amajor tourist
destination on the international stage, and exerts considerable influence nationally
as the seat of Government for the United Kingdom. As one of the original Global
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1 City of London; 2 Lambeth; 3 Kensington and Chelsea; 4 Brent; 5 Redbridge; 6 Newham; 7 Ealing; 8 Camden; 
9 Tower Hamlets; 10 Chelmsford; 11 South Buckinghamshire; 12 Su on; 13 Hounslow; 14 Bexley; 15 Barking 
and Dagenham; 16 Harlow; 17 St Albans; 18 Elmbridge; 19 Reigate and Banstead; 20 Mole Valley; 21 Welwyn; 
22 Barnet;  23 Thurrock 24 Lewisham; 25 Southwark; 26 Hackney. (Note only those Boroughs and Local 
Authori es referred to in the chapter text are iden fied) 
Fig. 16.1 The Boroughs of London and surrounding Local Authorities that make up the OECD
area
Cities (Sassen 1991) it is set apart from the rest of the UK on almost all measures:
it has greater ethnic diversity, greater cultural breadth, multiple but interlinked and
highly varied housing markets, and with 32 Boroughs it represents multiple cities
within a city. This chapter presents an overview of multiple dimensions of segrega-
tion in London, starting by focusing on the occupational groups and then exploring
the socio-economic composition of the populationwithin thewider TheOrganisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) region. This region extends
far beyond the 32 Boroughs traditionally considered to be ‘London’ administratively
or culturally to crucially include the metropolitan hinterland (see Fig. 16.1 for a
mapped description).
16.1.1 Ethnicity
The diversity of the population in London has been built over many waves of internal
migration and international immigration. In terms of international immigration, until
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the end of the Second World War, entry into the UK was largely dominated by resi-
dents from countries in what became the Commonwealth. After the British Nation-
alityAct in 1948, the right to enter andwork in theUKwas granted to over 800million
residents in the former countries included in the British Empire. The resulting flows
were, of course, much smaller than this, but there was still a substantial number of
economically motivated migrants entering the UK, and especially London, to take up
positions in occupations with a deficit of labour supply—such as transportation and
the newly formed national health service. Within the Boroughs of London, the expe-
rience of migration has been highly varied. For instance, Lambeth and Kensington
and Chelsea were Boroughs where the Black Caribbean population first settled in the
city, and Brixton is still regarded as the Caribbean Capital of Britain. Other Boroughs
such as Hackney, Brent, Lewisham and Southwark also played important roles in
the initial years for these groups. By contrast, people belonging to the Bangladeshi
communities in London have tended to concentrate in theBorough of TowerHamlets.
Within the vast diversity of groups, the other two largest are the Pakistani (around
Redbridge and Newham) and the Indians (Ealing and Brent). There is, then, there is
the potential for substantial ethnic segregation at the macro (Borough) scale.
16.1.2 Economic
Economically, the residential history of London is just as varied as it is for ethnicity.
Meen and colleagues (2012) highlighted the potential for the social and economic
profile of neighbourhoods to steadfastly remain static within the wider urban system,
even in the presence of some substantial (e.g. regeneration or gentrification) shocks
in the longer term. London’s social mosaic was initially mapped out by Booth (1903)
using street by street observation to give classifications across the whole of the city.
It is notable in his classification that areas such as the present-day Kensington and
Chelsea were already identified as belonging to the ‘upper-middle and upper classes,
wealthy’ group, just as any modern-day classification would conclude. Similarly, the
neighbourhoods in the Belsize Park1 area (Camden) were similarly identified and
continue today to be areas of wealth and affluence. By contrast, neighbourhoods
located in the Borough of Tower Hamlets, especially those located in was known as
‘Stepney’ were classified in the ‘lowest class’, ‘very poor’ and ‘poor’, neighbour-
hoods. Tellingly, these correspond closely with those neighbourhoods identified as
being the poorest in London using modern deprivation measures such as the Index
of Multiple Deprivation (Smith et al. 2015). Although these are only a couple of
brief exemplars, they allude to the wider trend which despite London being a seat
of substantial gentrification (from the initial work by Ruth Glass (1964) to the more
recent Super Gentrification literature of Bulter and Lees 2006; Butler et al. 2013) the
structure of many neighbourhoods within London has been locked into the long term
1The name Bellsize is derived from the French ‘bel assis’ which translates into English as ‘well
situated’.
314 D. Manley
reproduction of spatial inequality. Investigating the change in spatial characteristics
of occupation and focusing particularly on the places of residence of the working
class and middle-class, Manley and Johnston (2014) revealed that substantial change
was a rare phenomenon over a relatively long (10 year) period.
16.1.3 Housing
In recent years London has attracted substantial investment from globally wealthy
investors and has become an international site of investment for the superrich major
housing developments, especially in interventions in the central areas (see Atkinson
2016). This process has fuelled the continuation of much longer-term trends within
the city where the residential infrastructure of the city is often highly sought after.
Many current property developments are targeted at the private market, often for
owner occupation or private rent. Where mixed tenure has been explored, the imple-
mentations have been sometimes controversial (see the development of gated play
spaces, Guardian 2019a) or highly exclusionary, such as the poor door2 access to
mixed tenure developments (see for instance Osborne 2014).
However, the British housing system was not always like this. The UK is tradi-
tionally viewed as a LiberalWelfare State with early moves into state provision in the
first part of the 1900s under the Liberal Government of Asquith. This state provision
of housing was substantially bolstered in the post-war period (1942 onwards) with
the introduction of the National Health Service. In terms of the development of the
city, the welfare state was critical in the organisation, access to and redevelopment of
slum areas across the UK. In particular, London was the setting for many of the early
‘council houses’ (herein referred to as social housing) under the instruction of the
Estates Department of the then London County Council (LCC). The creation over
much of the 1900s of large estates across the city provided the backdrop for a largely
mixed population at the city scale where all Boroughs provided some form of social
housing. Since inception, it has been possible for tenants to purchase the property
they rent from the council provider, but until the late 1970s, it was rare for tenants
to exercise their Right to buy (RTB). However, in 1980 the Housing Act passed by
the then Conservative government of Margret Thatcher formalised the policy and
in the decades that followed, over 4 million properties were sold across the UK,
leading to a substantial reduction in the availability of rental stock. Within London,
where to date, almost of 290,000 properties have been sold (DCLG 2019), the conse-
quences of RTB played out differentially in each borough. In some parts of the city,
former social housing stock is in private ownership and worth well over £1 million
while equivalent houses elsewhere are still valued at a 10th of that price. Regardless
2The term ‘poor door’ refers to the practice of putting separate entrances on multi-dwelling devel-
opments so that those residents in the cheaper (often denoted as affordable or rented) properties are
distanced from residents in the more expensive apartments by literally entering the building through
different entrances.
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of location, the RTB was a major element in the residualisation of social housing,
resulting in a reduced stock available to a smaller section of society. It was then also
a process that leads to social housing being increasingly viewed as a tenue of last
resort. The ultimate expression of this residualisation was seen in the early hours
of 14 June 2017 when the Grenfell Tower caught fire, and 72 lives were lost in the
ensuing blaze. Grenfell Tower, owned by Kensington and Chelsea London Borough
Council with the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation acting
as Landlord disaster, highlights the complexity of the two-tier housing system that
the RTB reinforced. Those tenants living in the apartments which remained owned by
the council would be managed as traditional social housing tenants with inspections
and the ultimate housing responsibility falling to the local authority, or the repre-
sentatives they appointed. By contrast, those flats bought under RTB but existing in
the same tower block would not be under scrutiny to the same degree. While the
leaseholder remains the same, the RTB either as a dwelling for the owners or as a
private market rental, the upkeep and maintenance is a private issue.
16.1.4 Chapter Outline
In the sections that follow, an in-depth assessment of segregation by occupation is
presented usingmultiplemeasures. This is followedby adiscussion about segregation
focusing on the characteristics of the city explored above—ethnicity, and housing
type—along with age as a further important demographic characteristic. Data are
drawn from the 2001 and 2011 UK Census, the largest source of data for the UK
population. UK Census data is not available at an individual level, so in order to
explore segregation, it is necessary to use aggregated areal units: in this chapter, the
Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) is used, representing ‘neighbourhoods’ which
have on average around 1400 people. By considering multiple characteristics, we
can explore the extent of different types of segregation in the metropolitan area and
develop a wider understanding of the social geography of the city.
16.2 Inequality and Occupational Segregation
The Gini Index for the United Kingdom since 1961 demonstrates a clear increase in
inequality. In 1961 the UK had a Gini coefficient of 0.25, which increased slightly
through the1970s and1980s.After 1980 theGini increased to0.35by1991 increasing
again in the middle of the 2000s to about 0.36. By 2011 the figure had begun to
fall and there is evidence, post-2008, that the trend is in decline; however, whilst
this might be regarded positively and suggest a decline in inequality, the reduction
should be interpreted with the Global Financial Crisis in mind. Gini reduction can
occur through a number of processes that result in the gap between the richest and
poorest declining. It might be that the real incomes of the poorest increase, thus
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providing those most in need with greater financial security. However, it could also
be that the movement is the result of the richest seeing a decline in their incomes
and wealth while the poorest do not see any material gain in their circumstances. In
the moments after the financial crisis, there is evidence that it was the latter of these
processes that drove the decline, not the former, evidence supported by the slight but
clear increases in the Index value in recent years as the UK has left the recession
of the 2008 crisis behind. Looking forward towards a post-Covid-19 city, it is likely
that there will be substantial changes in the Gini coefficient again far beyond that of
the 2008 recession.
The Gini is a useful measure of inequality, but it only tells a small part of the
wider story and the details within the measure matter, as does the geography of
wealth distribution. In the UK, wealth is concentrated in the Southern part of the
country, with much of the financial activity around London. Moreover, even with a
stable or declining headline figure, the differences between the richest and poorest
are stark: the income of highest earners is estimated to be 6.8 times that of the lowest
earners while the overall wealth of the richest members of British society is estimated
at 316 times that of the poorest (according to ONS Wealth and Assets Survey July
2014 to June 2016). It is, then, against this backdrop of declining macro inequality
but with an expectation of a more complex micro picture that we explore the OECD
London area in more depth.
Figure 16.2 decomposes the population into occupational categories into three
groups as Top Middle and Bottom (Fig. 16.2a) or using the nine categories from the
NS-SEC (Fig. 16.2b). The overall trend in the wider London OECD region has been
one of professionalization. Although the Bottom group has not declined (recording
14% in both periods), the Top group has grown, increasing from 32 to 38%. Using
the more detailed NS-SEC groups, it is clear that this growth has occurred in the
Professional group at the expense of the Managerial class, which has shrunk slightly,
as well as decreasing the size of the Middle group. The composition of the NS-SEC
groups which make up the Middle group are largely similar in size over the 10-year
period, the notable exception being the Administrative class, which has declined by
a third, and which accounts for the majority of the Middle decline.
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Table 16.1 Index of dissimilarity (multiplied by 100) for occupational groups in OECD London,
2001 (lower part of the table) and 2011 (upper part of the chart). Bold denotes the greater ID pair
value, italics indicate identical ID value
  MAN PRO APR ADM SKI SER SAL MAC ELE TOP MID BOT 
MAN 15 14 23 30 32 33 38 40 
PRO 13 10 22 32 29 30 38 37 
APR 12 12 20 30 28 29 37 36 
ADM 19 24 18 17 18 18 22 25 
SKI 28 34 28 15 20 20 15 23 
SER 23 28 21 13 15 15 21 16 
SAL 26 31 24 13 14 13 20 16 
MAC 34 40 33 21 14 19 16 20 
ELE 32 36 29 20 17 15 14 14 
TOP 18 36 
MID 18 20 
BOT 34 18 
MANManagers; PROProfessionals; APRAssociate professionals; ADMAdministrative Jobs; SKI
Skilled workers; SER Service; SAL Sales; MAC PlantMachineWorkers; ELE ElementaryWorkers
Of course, the occupational composition charts do not consider the neighbourhood
distribution of the occupational groups. To address this, the index of dissimilarity
(Table 16.1) is used to reveal some clear occupational segregation patterns. Whilst
the overall conclusion is that segregation has increased3 between 2001 and 2011,
this is not the case for all occupational pairs. For example, comparing the Profes-
sional category against the Associated Professionals, those in Administrative Jobs,
the Skilled Jobs group, the Sales workers and the Machine Workers segregation
has declined. However, these represent the exceptions to the general increase. The
greatest increases in occupational segregation are observed between groups at either
end of the table, for example, between the Managerial group and both the Sales and
Elementary occupations. Focusing on the disaggregated occupational groups in the
table, it is clear that the increases all involve either the Managerial, Service or the
Elementary groups suggesting that there is a distinct trend for those in the lowest
(Elementary) or the highest group (the Managers) to increasingly live apart from
the other occupational groups in residential space. The other group noted, Service
workers, is one that is very diverse in composition with some members being similar
in characteristics to the higher groups and others to members of the lower groups. As
such, this is not an unreasonable, or unexpected, conclusion to reach in the context of
the changes in the residential structure of neighbourhoods an idea we revisit later on:
the changes in housing provision and the increasing house prices in central city areas
lead us to conclude that the Manager’s segregation is likely the result of a process
3Note, increase refers only to a numerical change in the value of the index and is therefore being
used descriptively rather than denoting a process of change as revealed by a statistical significance
test, see Manley et al. (2019) for more discussion.
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of residential choices being expressed in their home locations, while for those in
Elementary occupations is more likely to be the result of being residualised housing
or neighbourhoods that are less attractive to those with greater spending power or
forced out of the areas they previously lived in as a result of gentrification processes.
In the right-hand part of Table 16.1, IDvalues for the aggregated groups are presented.
They confirm that the greatest segregation is between the Top and Bottom groups in
both time periods, and that there has been an increase in segregation between 2001
and 2011. The segregation between the Bottom and Middle group, and Middle and
Top is largely static over time. This supports the idea of greater spatial inequality.
16.3 Location Quotient Maps
The location quotientmaps report the concentration for the TopGroup (Fig. 16.3) and
the Bottom Group (Fig. 16.4). For the Top Group the LQ measure reports expansion
and a spreading out of the distribution across the city. Kensington and Chelsea are the
key concentration areas of the Top groups in the central city in both 2001 and 2011,
as is the far northern reach of the OECDmetropolitan area. On the eastern side, there
is a smaller pocket of concentration in the Chelmsford area (referencing area 10 on
Fig. 16.1), which disappears during the decade between the Censuses (the transfor-
mation is from the highest category in 2001 to the lightest in 2011). By contrast,
there is a relative lack of individuals in the Top group running along the central area,
which maps on the Thames and as then moves eastwards, through more traditionally
working-class areas. In terms of the expansion, there are clearly areas which have
seen either an increase in concentration or now represent concentrations of workers
in the Top group. This is especially true for the northern reaches of the OECD area,
but there is also evidence of the same outcome in the south. Without a decrease in the
Top group elsewhere, this suggests an increase in the absolute number of workers in
these occupational positions. Using these trends, it is reasonable to conclude that over
Fig. 16.3 Location quotient maps of the ‘top’ occupation groups
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Fig. 16.4 Location quotient maps of the ‘bottom’ occupation groups
the 10-year period, more people have entered these neighbourhoods in top positions,
expanding the Top group.
InFig. 16.4, theLQof the bottomgroup is reported. The separation of occupational
groups is clear when these maps are compared to the previous set. To the western
side of London, the concentration is to the north of the professional cluster, focusing
on Spelthorne, Hillingdon and Hounslow, and on the far eastern side in Bexley and
Barking and Dagenham. Between 2001 and 2011, there was little overall change in
the occupational structure of the workforce in London, but there was a substantial
increase in size of around 30% (see Manley and Johnston 2014). However, the way
that the expansion in population has played out in the residential housing market
has not been consistent between groups. Whereas the professional occupations have
experienced a spreading out, occupying new neighbourhoods across the city, the
people in bottom occupations have remained spatially constrained. In fact, rather
than spreading their growth has been through intensification in those areas where
they were already concentrated. Together these changes hint at a polarisation at the
bottom end. The final point to note for the bottom group is the cluster in the northeast
of the city focused strongly on Harlow. Here there is a strong and persistent cluster
in both time periods, which is spatially distinct to the borough and exhibits a sharp
decline as soon as you move beyond the immediate boundaries of Harlow.
16.4 Maps of Typologies
For the typology, as with other chapters, eachmajor group (Top,Middle and, Bottom)
were split into four categories (using the share of each group as: 0–29%; 30–49%;
50–59%, or; over 60%). For this chapter, neighbourhoods, where one group repre-
sented over 60% are identified as being dominated by that group. The Polarized
neighbourhoods are those where any of the groups fall between 50 and 59% and
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Polarized top 6.4 14.1
Polarized middle 67.6 45.6
Polarized bottom – 0.1
Mixed 14.5 35.0
Middle dominate 11.3 1.0
Top dominate 0.3 4.2
Total number of LSOAs 6643 6729
the Mixed neighbourhoods are those with the combinations of the two lower cate-
gories for all three groups (in other words, there is no dominant group or polarisation
occurring). Not all potential combinations of neighbourhood types and groupings are
realised in the maps, although all are, theoretically, possible. A summary of group
membership is provided in Table 16.2.
Fig. 16.5 The typologies for LSOAs in the London OECD area in a 2001 and b 2011 along with
the concentration of the top socio-economic group in London during c 2001 and d 2011
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In 2001 the Polarised Bottom Group did not exist, yet by 2011 it has appeared.
However, the creation of a newgroup is not as substantial a change is it appears at first,
because of all the LSOAs in London the Polarized Bottom (that is, a neighbourhood
where the occupational groups of Manufacturing and Elementary dominate) applies
only to a single neighbourhood located in Ealing (see back to Fig. 16.1). Thus, whilst
the addition of a new grouping is, in reality, a relatively small change, the increase in
Polarized Top neighbourhoods is not (growing from 6.4% of LSOAs to 14.1%, see
Table 16.2). This is partially a reinforcing of the polarized top areas that were already
present in Kensington and Chelsea in filling large parts of the North to North West
of the City extending as far as the Local Authorities of St Albans and Chiltern (in
the county of South Buckinghamshire). Where more areas are Polarized for the top
group, an equivalent increase has occurred in the Top Dominates group such (from
0.3 to 4.2%). Many of the areas classified into this group about the Polarized Top
areas largely south of the River Thames (including Elmbridge) which is also South
of HeathrowAirport) and into the Local Authorities for Reigate and Banstead as well
as Mole Valley (both of which are beyond the traditional boundary of London and in
the county of Surrey). There are also pockets of Top Dominated neighbourhoods in
the north of the Metropolitan area, including the commuter towns in the Chilterns,
St Albans, as well as the more traditional London Boroughs of Welwyn and Barnet
and the town of Hatfield (in Welwyn). This suggests at least two processes may be
at play in the changing structure: for the commuter areas, there may be a movement
into these areas either from the more centrally located areas of the City or choosing
to locate here as an entry point to the rest of the Metropolitan area.
In terms of the multicultural and multifaceted city, the growth in mixed areas is
substantial (from 14.5 to 35%). In the north-eastern side of London, running from
Thurrock (25) on the Thames Estuary and Chelmsford in Essex (10) to Welwyn
(24). In these areas, there are individuals working in occupations that are classified
in all three of the groups (Top, Middle and Bottom groups) such that each group
is presented. Whereas the mixing was largely a peripheral issue in 2001 with some
central areas having no (or very few) mixed areas, it is the case now that, with the
exception of the City of London Borough (which is a special case area anyway),
there are no Boroughs without mixed areas. Many of the new Mixed areas were
previously Polarised Middle areas (and to a much lesser extent Middle Dominated
areas), suggesting that members of both the Top and Bottom are moving into areas in
place of residents in theMiddle—in other words, neighbourhoods are both upgrading
and downgrading.
16.4.1 Location of the Top Occupational Group
The concentration of managers and professionals has remained relatively static over
the 10-year period between 2001 and 2011. In 2001 and 2011, 20% of the top
group population could be found in 10% of the neighbourhoods. Figure 16.5c, d
demonstrates that the location of the 10% of places has also stayed static with top
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quintile locations in the north of the OECD region beyond the bounds of the core
of London, a clear concentration in the Central part of the city and a few areas in
the southern reaches. By contrast, the least concentrated neighbourhoods for the Top
group cut a clear slice through the middle area of the map extending from the west
to the east, interrupted only by the central concertation. It is also notable that there
are no LSOAs without at least a couple of Top residents at both Census points.
16.5 Contrasting Dimensions of Segregation
Occupational segregation represents an important dimension by which the divisions
of the urban residential space can be explored and there are other equally as important
dimensions that can be considered. To develop amore rounded picture of segregation
in London, the Index of Dissimilarity is recalculated for ethnicity, age and tenure.
Starting with ethnicity, to allow a similar comparison to the occupational groups, the
ethnic diversity of the London Metropolitan area was coded into Majority (all White
British) and Minority (all other ethnic groups) to provide a binary classification. The
message that is apparent here is that there has been a small decline in segregation
as measured by the Index of Dissimilarity over the 10-year period (from 0.46 to
0.44). By comparison to the occupational segregation above, both of these figures
are higher, suggesting that ethnic segregation is greater than occupational in the
wider London area.4 This concurs with the literature for the rest of the UK, which
in general suggests that there has been a decline in ethnic segregation and whilst the
geographical extent of this study is different to the usual definition of London, it is
unsurprising that it reflects the wider trend (see Catney 2016) for the UK in general
and Harris (2012) for London in particular, although note the use of school pupil
data in the latter which necessarily focuses on the younger age groups only, not the
Population Census) (Table 16.3).
Of course, the dichotomisation of ethnicity into two categories provides an
overview, but it does obscure much of the detail between groups: the minority groups
are, as highlighted in the introduction, comprised of many different ethnicities. To
provide greater depth, we decompose the majority versus minority comparison into
the major ethnic subgroups used across the UK Census. Using these five groups that
are largely comparable over time, the picture of segregation for the major ethnic
groups is not as clear cut as it was when dichotomised. Nor is it as clear cut as
it was for occupation. There has been both increase and decline over the decade;
this data reports on, with no clear single message. For instance, the White/Mixed,
White/Other and Mixed/Other pairings have higher D values in 2011 than in 2001.
By contrast, theWhite/Asian,Mixed/Asian,Mixed/Black, Asian/Black, Asian/Other
and Black/Other have lower values, while the White/Black shows no change. This
suggests that overall the trend has been for ethnic deconcentration. Of the increases,
4Although as above, direct comparisons between ID values and across groups are to be made very
cautiously see Manley et al. (2019).
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Table 16.3 Index of dissimilarity (multiplied by 100) for major ethnic groups in 2001 (below the
diagonal) and 2011 (above the diagonal)
WHITE  MIXED  ASIAN BLACK OTHER MAJORITY MINORITY 
WHITE  22 4 43 37 
MIXED  2 33 23 27 
ASIAN  41 36 4 32 
BLACK  43 25 43 32 
OTHER  29 26 37 36 
MAJORITY 44 
MINORITY 46 
The white category includes the White European, White Irish and White other groups. The Asian
includes Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi. The Black represents the Black Caribbean and Black
African. Other is all other groups in the Census. For the dichotomised comparisons, the majority is
only the White British. All other groups fall under the Minority heading
the greatest is in the ‘Other’ category (from 0.29 to 0.37), but caution should be exer-
cised when interpreting this change simply because of the heterogeneous nature of
the ‘Other’ grouping. The other changes in segregation are smaller, all in the second
decimal place.
The next dimension of segregation that we present refers to age. Age has recently
been the focus of increased attention in the segregation literature (see Sabter et al.
2017). The processes around ethnic and, to a certain extent, occupational are different
to age. The previous dimensions, to a certain extent, focus on separation and discrim-
ination as drivers. Within the residential landscape, there are further reasons why
people may experience segregation by age. These include the presence of institutions
that cater specifically to certain age groups (for the older individuals, these could be
care homes, while for younger residents could include university halls of residence)
and will therefore imprint segregation into the landscape. Away from the extremes of
age, the older someone is, themore likely they are to have resources to purchasemore
exclusive housing or have already entered more exclusive neighbourhoods before
they increased in price. It is worth noting that, also unlike the categories around
ethnicity and occupation, which have clear social construction, age is something that
all individuals experience over time and regardless of ethnicity, occupation, class
or gender. Moreover, the age profile of an area can change without any residential
mobility taking place—again, as people age, the group to whom an area is identified
against will change and the demographic processes of birth and death further alter
the composition. As such, it represents a different type of segregation—one with
alternative process-driven causes—but one which is important nevertheless.
In terms of the degree of segregation (Table 16.4), it is worth highlighting that
the levels of segregation as measured by the Index of Dissimilarity are lower than
they were for ethnicity (Table 16.3) and many of the occupational groups (Table
16.1). Note that we do not group the age categories together into supergroups as
was done for occupation or ethnicity because it does not make sense to reduce the
detail here. The greatest segregation is between the youngest and oldest groups (0.26)
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Table 16.4 Age segregation for 2001 (below the diagonal) and 2011 (above the diagonal)
Age 18-24 Age 25-44 Age 45-64 Age 65 Over
Age 18-24 15 2 26 
Age 25-44 13 17 25 
Age 45-64 2 16 12 
Age 65 Over 24 21 12 
Table 16.5 Tenure segregation for 2001 (below the diagonal) and 2011 (above the diagonal)
Outright Own Mortgage Own Social Ren ng* Private Ren ng 
Outright Own 15 55 38 
Mortgage Own 15 49 35 
Social Ren ng 55 5 43 
Private Ren ng 41 38 47 
*Social Renting includes both renting from a Housing Association and renting from Council
and the younger middle group (0.25). By contrast, the two middle groups and the
youngest and middle groups are less segregated. This reinforces the idea suggested
above that both the structures of institutional living—for both age groups—and the
finance required to purchase (or rent) property is likely to push the extremes in age
apart. However, as noted above as well, the continuous nature of ageing means that
the segregation observed here may not be stationary through the life course. Finally,
it is important to note that, unlike the previous measures where some groups have
observed an increase while others have experienced a decrease in segregation for the
age groups, there are no pairs that have experienced a decrease.
The overall message for housing tenure segregation (Table 16.5) is one of little
change in terms of the intensity of segregation, which inmany senses is not surprising
(recall the work of Meen et al. 2012 discussed in the introduction). The development
of housing is a long-term investment and so a substantial change in the tenure profile
of neighbourhoods is not expected. However, there are, as was highlighted in the
introduction, few ways through which tenure can change—for social renting,5 it is
through the right to buy moving from renting to owning. The change from owned to
private renting is a simpler move, as is the reverse.
An issue that has become increasingly important inLondon, andmanyother global
cities, has been the increase in households that are very wealthy. For the purposes
of identifying these groups and to highlight the segregation of the wealthier groups,
owner-occupation is sub-divided into owned with a mortgage (the most common
5In this discussion, we have combined two forms of social renting—renting from the council
and renting from Housing Association—because although we acknowledge that they are different
tenures the numbers in some of the Boroughs are very small and therefore would be difficult to
estimate. Moreover, in the wider societal discourse, the distinction around the origin of the property
is not often made and the catch all label social renting applied.
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route to house purchase where the money is borrowed from a lender such as a bank
or building society) and owned outright which in the context of much of the London
market is an expression of high wealth. The segregation between the owning (mort-
gage) and the owning (outright) and social renting have remained static. There has
been a slight fall in segregation between social renting and owning with a mortgage
(the right to buy is likely to be an explanation here, with the right to buy tenants
accessing their purchase via a mortgage, although some redevelopment and inclu-
sion of mixed tenure developments may also provide an insight). The main feature
of interest here, however, is the magnitude of the Index of Dissimilarity. Compared
with the other dimensions of segregation we have considered (age, ethnicity and
occupation), the pairwise comparison between social renting and other tenure forms
are the highest of all the comparisons (up to 0.55).6 What this suggests is that segre-
gation in London is very much driven by the location of the housing that a household
accesses: housing is built in clusters and those smaller clusters of tenure types often
are co-located in broader neighbourhoods with similar housing. Although there has
been a push towards creating a greater mixing of tenures (see, for instance, Bridge
et al. 2011), the fixity of housing—it takes large financial investments and time—
spread over substantially large areas of the city to fundamentally alter the urban
spatial structure. As a result, the underlying housing stock does not change very
much from year to year, or even over a ten-year period, and so the neighbourhoods
reproduce themselves. In terms of the changes in segregation, the biggest has been
for private renters. Here there has been a decrease for all pairwise combinations. As
the period 2001 to 2011 saw an increase in the prevalence of private renting, this is
not a surprising outcome.
16.6 Conclusions
Segregation is and always has been a complex and multi-faceted issue, and with
increasing diversity and concern around the mixing of populations (on many dimen-
sions), it is not an issue that is going to be solved anytime soon. What is clear
from this chapter is that there are many dimensions along which segregation can be
measured. Some, such as ethnicity, refer to (historical) discriminatory practices and
have exclusionary outcomes which have been linked to further societal problems
6Although tenure is the largest it is important to note that the measures of segregation are not net of
each other. Therefore, the tenure segregation outcomes do not take into account the distribution of
age, ethnicity or occupational all ofwhich are likely to be conflatedwith access to and the distribution
of individuals in the tenures (seeManley et al. 2019) for a discussion about the issue of conflation and
net measures of segregation). Regardless of this critique, however, this is an instructive exploration
of the multiple dimensions and as housing tenure is the one issue that is considered in this chapter
that has a spatial fixity to it—you can only living in social renting housing if there is a socially
rented property available in the neighbourhood, with similar restrictions for the private renters and
owners as well—it is reasonable to consider that tenure distribution is the greatest determinant of
segregation in the city.
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and unrest (see Home Office 2001). Other dimensions like occupational segregation
whilst still reflecting separation and potential social tensions also represent spatial
expressions of wider social inequalities and difference as well as the outcomes of
social power expressions: those with higher occupational status and greater wealth
are able to access much more of the capital than those in the lower occupational
categories. Real housing choice is a luxury and choice requires the ability to pay.
Age segregation, by contrast, presents a different conceptualisation of social
processes. Individuals, and their households, require and desire different facilities
and amenities over the life course: whatworkswell for people in their early adulthood
(18–24) does not necessarily reflect the needs of those in the middle of the traditional
family rearing ages (25–44) or those who are moving into the later stages of their
working life (45–64) and retirement (65+). Unlike ethnic groupings, and to a lesser
extent, the occupational groups, people will experience all the categories through the
ageing process. The question, which we cannot address here, then becomes one of
whether or not cohorts are segregating and ageing in situ thus reinforcing segrega-
tion over time, or are neighbourhoods providing shelter for people at various points
through their life course, and people then pick up and move on as they age? There
is evidence that the transmissions of wealth between generations may exacerbate
intra-generation segregation. It has been reported that up to 25% of first-time buyers
in the UK are accessing property thanks to the bank of Mum and Dad (Guardian
2019b). Those with housing wealth will be further enabled to choose where to live
compared to those without it (see Galster andWessel 2019). However, although there
is some evidence in the literature (see, for instance, Willetts 2010; McKee 2019),
this is not a debate that has, yet, been fully explored in the wider literature.
Ultimately, this leaves tenure segregation. Whilst the previous three dimensions
all related to characteristics of people, the final dimension refers to a characteristic
of the property. As a result, it is a different type of segregation and one which
refers to the spatial structure of the city. Some groups are excluded from some
tenures: higher earners cannot access social renting. Those with low incomes will
not be able to buy outright, or possibly even buy with the mortgage. Often the
younger households will be in private renting because they lack the means for a
deposit to access owner-occupation. However, we know that different groups within
the previous dimensions—often ethnic minority groups, often individuals in lower
occupational groups—are overrepresented in some of the tenures. As a result, we
propose that the housing structure of the city serves as a key driver of the spatial
expression of inequality—segregation—and to reduce this inequality requires long
term investment and oversight in terms of planning, the production of housing, and
the types of housing and its locations.
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Chapter 17
Income Inequality and Segregation
in the Paris Metro Area (1990–2015)
Haley McAvay and Gregory Verdugo
Abstract In the last decades, the Paris metro area has experienced important struc-
tural changes linked to rising income inequality and a rapidly growing immigrant
population. Using census data from 1990, 1999 to 2015, this chapter explores these
transformations and how they have shaped trends in residential segregation. We find
that the occupational structure of the area shifted upwards in the recent decade with a
substantial increase in the share of the top occupational groups. This trend, however,
did not primarily concern the immigrant population, which nonetheless experienced
a growth in the middle class. These trends were further accompanied by an increase
in income inequality driven by rising wages among the top 1% earners. Despite these
changes, dissimilarity indexes between socioeconomic groups and between natives
and immigrants have remained quite stable over the period. However, interaction
indexes suggest that neighbourhoods are becoming more homogenous over time,
both in terms of socioeconomic and ethnic diversity. Finally, the findings shed light on
the correlation between socioeconomic and immigrant segregation. Socioeconomic
disadvantage and the presence of immigrants within neighbourhoods, especially of
non-European origin, are tightly correlated, and that correlation became stronger
over time.
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17.1 Introduction
In the last decade, the population of the Paris metro area grew rapidly, and with
more than 12 million inhabitants in 2015, it is one of the largest urban centres in
Europe. As a major economic and political capital, the composition of its population
is more polarised than the French or European average, with a smaller proportion
of the middle classes and strong income inequality (Labrador 2013). Moreover, like
other major cities in Western Europe, the Paris area has seen a rise in immigration
in recent decades, particularly from non-European countries.
Despite these broad structural changes, relatively little evidence is available on
how these transformations affected residential segregation in the Paris metro area.
Since the 1980s, substantial urban renewal and social mix policies have been imple-
mented in Francewith the aim of combating segregation. Policymaking has primarily
targeted the poor peripheral urban areas known as the banlieues, where many immi-
grants from France’s former colonies settled in public housing projects. Hit by
deindustrialisation and economic hardship, these areas have become synonymous
with high unemployment, poor-quality schools, crime and are even symbolic of the
failure of immigrant integration. Recent assessments of French urban policy docu-
ment that urban renewal and social mix initiatives have been largely unsuccessful and
have even had the unintended consequence of reinforcing segregation (Epstein 2011;
Fol 2013). Meanwhile, an increasing number of studies suggest negative effects of
living in disadvantaged and segregated neighbourhoods on employment (Gobillon
et al. 2011; Petit et al. 2016).
This chapter uses French census data from 1990, 1999 and 2015 to investigate
changes in occupational structure, inequality and residential segregation in the Paris
metro area. We add to prior literature on segregation in Paris by using the most
recent available data on the entire metropolitan area, comparing three census dates
using small spatial scales comparable to census tracts (IRIS),1 and by articulating
socioeconomic and immigrant segregation. The chapter has three broad objectives:
(1) to document structural changes in the urban population linked to occupation,
income inequality and immigration; (2) to analyse the residential distribution of
socioeconomic groups and (3) to describe trends in socioeconomic and immigrant
segregation over time and the ways in which they are correlated.
1We use the entire Ile de France region and census tracts of about 2,500 inhabitants, whereas the
major prior study on socioeconomic segregation focused on the city of Paris only using larger tracts
(Préteceille 2006) due to data availability constraints.
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17.2 Background
Since the 1980s, residential segregation has been a predominant target of policy-
making and has received pervasive media attention in France (Lelévrier and Melic
2018). Yet, it is only recently that systematic empirical research based on represen-
tative data has shed light on spatial inequalities. Unlike the U.S. or other European
contexts, which have long been concerned with the unequal spatial distribution of
minorities, in France, the earliest studies tackled segregation from the angle of social
class using occupational groups (Tabard 1993;Maurin 2004; Préceteille 2006). Préte-
ceille (2006) offers one of the first studies of socioeconomic segregation in the Paris
region, measuring changes in dissimilarity indexes between occupational groups in
neighbourhoods between 1990 and 1999. He finds that the strongest indices are
observed for upper-status occupations and are increasing over time, whereas inter-
mediary groups are becoming less segregated. He further points out that residents
of Paris still predominately live in middle-class and mixed neighbourhoods. More
recent studies have weighed in on this debate using tax and administrative employee
data, allowing analysis by income groups rather than occupational categories. Gode-
chot (2013) focuses on the spatial concentration of the wealthiest households (top
1% and 0.1% of earners) and documents that the level of segregation for top earners
is the strongest in Paris compared to other French cities and is on the rise. Most
recently, using tax data at the communal level, Ribardière (2019) also points to an
increase in residential segregation by income in the Paris area between 1999 and
2015.
Overall, despite methodological differences between these studies, the evidence
indicates increasing socioeconomic segregation, owing to the strong spatial isola-
tion of upper-status groups in particular. Below we discuss three potential mecha-
nisms underpinning socioeconomic segregation in the Paris area: the segregation of
immigrants, urban policy and public housing, and rising income inequality.
17.2.1 The Role of Immigrant Residential Segregation
While residential segregation in France is primarily viewed as an issue of class, that is,
relating to the unequal distribution of socioeconomic groups, urban disadvantage and
immigration have been historically tightly intertwined in the French context.2 During
the 1980s, post-colonial immigrants found accommodation primarily in the large
public housing projects embedded in the suburbs of large urban areas (banlieues)
2This framing of segregation as predominately a problem of class can be at least partly understood
in light of the Republican colorblind model and the Marxist tradition in the French social sciences.
France considers distinctions on the basis of race/ethnicity to be illegitimate and therefore does not
collect ethnic/racial statistics, creating significant barriers tomeasuring racial residential segregation
or other inequalities. At the same time, the predominance of Marxism within French sociology
hindered enquiry into the ethnoracial dimensions of stratification beyond social class mechanisms
(Safi 2013).
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near industrial sites where jobs were available. In the wake of deindustrialisation and
rising unemployment, the banlieues became explicitly synonymous with socioeco-
nomic disadvantage and implicitly associated with racial minorities. These neigh-
bourhoods drew public attention following the highly mediatised urban riots during
the 1980s and early 2000s involving minorities and contributed to the construction
of segregation as a social problem.
It is not until the mid-2000s that research began to quantify the extent of residen-
tial segregation between immigrants and French natives (Préteceille 2009; Safi 2009;
Verdugo 2011; Pan Ké Shon and Verdugo 2015). These studies analyse segregation
at the municipality level from consecutive censuses. Their results show high segre-
gation in Paris between natives and immigrants from North Africa, Sub-Saharan
Africa and Turkey, which increased moderately between 1968 and 1999. Verdugo
(2011) was the first to study the long-term evolution of immigrant segregation at
the level of the census tract. He documented higher levels of segregation for non-
European immigrants, which were rising largely due to the increased concentration
of immigrants living in public housing. Although less is known about segregation
beyond the first generation, due to restrictions in census data, a few studies indicate
that spatial inequalities are largely transmitted to the second generation, particularly
among non-Europeans (McAvay 2018a, b;McAvay and Safi 2018). Immigrant segre-
gation appears to be in part maintained by discrimination on the Parisian housing
market (Bonnet et al. 2016; Bunel et al. 2017) as well as native flight dynamics out
of immigrant areas (Rathelot and Safi 2014; McAvay 2018a, b), particularly in areas
near large public housing projects (Verdugo and Toma 2018).
These findings from France align with lessons from the U.S. about racial resi-
dential segregation. Massey and Denton (1993) emphasise how discrimination and
race-based residential preferences create a segmented housing market that channel
minorities into poor areas. They further make the argument that racial segregation
and racial inequalities may more broadly operate as a mechanism of socioeconomic
segregation and the concentration of poverty. If racial minorities have lower income
on average, the spatial separation of racial groups would automatically result in
segregation along class lines, separating high-income racial groups from low-income
racial groups (Massey and Denton 1993; Reardon and Bischoff 2011). Quillian and
Lagrange (2016) show that racial segregation and income segregation are correlated
to a similar degree in France and the U.S., while McAvay and Safi (2018) show
an overlap between ethnoracial and socioeconomic segregation at the individual
level. Hence, it is possible that the rise in non-European immigrants and their spatial
separation from natives may contribute to socioeconomic segregation in the French
context.
17.2.2 The Role of Urban Policy and Public Housing
French urban policy emerges formally in the 1980s with the aim of reducing social
inequalities, targeting specifically the so-called quartiers sensibles with large shares
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of public housing. The main locus of state intervention in urban areas is the public
housing sector, which provides low-rent government-owned or -subsidised units
(habitation à loyer modéré, or HLM). Built in the post-war period to improve living
conditions and resettle slum residents, public housing projects are now associated
with socioeconomic disadvantage and the concentration ofminorities in thebanlieues
(Lelévrier 2010). With the creation of ‘priority zones,3’ France implemented its first
spatial affirmative action (Epstein 2011; Fol 2013). The most ambitious national-
level urban policy plan was introduced in 2003, the Loi Borloo, with the aim of
creating a social mix in priority zones through urban renewal and redistributive poli-
cies. The policies aimed to achieve a social mix by first demolishing public housing
to create new real estate opportunities on the private market in these areas, with the
aim of attracting the middle class; and second, by building new public housing units
in areas where it is under-represented, in order to relocate poor households to more
mixed spaces. While these policies are explicitly about class, many argue that they
are implicitly concerned with the concentration of minorities (Epstein 2011).
More than a decade later, the social mix sought by the 2003 reform is largely
considered a failure. Research even suggests that urban renewal and social mix
policies had unintended consequences that contributed to reinforcing segregation.
Studying these effects in the Paris area, Lelévrier (2010) shows that these policies
triggered upper-class mobility out of the targeted areas, while poor households were
relocated in disadvantaged areas, primarily in other sensitive urban zones. Thus, in
contradiction with their stated aim, these policies actually resulted in a reconcen-
tration of poverty by channelling similar SES households to similar areas. Further,
despite the substantial resources invested in the targeted areas, Epstein (2011) empha-
sises the failure of spatial affirmative action as unemployment is still two times higher
in sensitive urban zones compared to the national average.
Other unintended consequences of urban policy have unfolded in the public
housing sector, revealing its ambiguous role in maintaining segregation. The urban
policy has used public housing as a tool for maintaining social mix. The 2000 Urban
Solidarity andRenewal law (SRU)made itmandatory for all cities to have at least 20%
social housing. This would allow poor populations to live in more affluent munic-
ipalities and prevent them from being forced out of gentrifying areas with rising
housing prices (Ribardière 2019). Yet evidence shows that the sector is strongly
segregated along class lines. As income eligibility requirements are broad enough
to include middle-class households, the public housing sector is not reserved for the
poor (Whitehead and Scanlon 2007). However, the poorest residents tend to live in
low-quality housing in poor areas, while high and middle-income households have
access to higher-quality buildings in more attractive, central locations (Whitehead
andScanlon 2007; Lelévrier andMelic 2018). Public housing has also had ambiguous
effects on the segregation of immigrants. A number of French urban studies have
shown that social mix policies used in attributing public housing have resulted in
informal racial profiling, by which the housing demand of non-European origin
3Specifically, the creation of priority educational zones (‘ZEP’) in 1981, followed by sensitive urban
zones (‘ZUS’) in 1996.
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immigrants is channelled towards lower quality units in deprived areas (Kirszbaum
and Simon 2001; Sala Pala 2013; Bourgeois 2013). Cases of institutional discrimina-
tion have been brought in front of the French courts against public housing authorities
in the name of social mix policies.
17.2.3 The Role of Rising Income Inequality
Like other Western societies, France has experienced rising income inequality
since the end of the twentieth century. Research has sought to assess how growth
in inequality impacts residential segregation. Evidence from the U.S. shows that
rising income inequality spurred socioeconomic segregation between 1970 and 2000
(Watson 2009; Reardon and Bischoff 2011). Reardon and Bischoff (2011) specifi-
cally demonstrate that one of the main mechanisms underlying this link is the exac-
erbated concentration of affluent households, whereas the concentration of poverty
is unaffected by rising inequality. A similar hypothesis has been tested in France
regarding the role of financialisation of the economy in spatial inequalities. Using a
wide-scale administrative dataset, Godechot (2013) shows that the increase of finance
jobs and high wages in the sector has intensified the segregation of top incomes in
Paris. Godechot (2013) attributes this rise in spatial segregation among the wealth-
iest to the development of financial districts in the Western areas of Paris as well as
residential avoidance strategies among the upper classes.
17.3 Data and Methods
We use individual-level census data from 1990, 1999 and 2015 to document changes
in occupational structure, immigration and residential segregation over the period.
As the census does not collect household income, we also draw on administra-
tive employee files linked to the Permanent Demographic Sample4 (EDP-DADS) to
measure trends in income inequality in Paris and in France.
The Paris Metro Area, displayed in Fig. 17.1, is defined according to the bound-
aries of the Ile-de-France region.5 Ile-de-France is the most populous of all French
regions, with a population of over 12 million residents. The region encompasses
4L’échantillon démographique permanent in French. EDP is a large scale panel that has been
conducted by the FrenchNational Institute of Statistics since 1968 on the basis of census declarations
and civil registries.
5An alternativewould have been to use the urban area (aire urbaine) of Paris estimated by the French
statistical institute andwhich is based on daily commuting patterns. Because it is revised periodically
and has changed over the period, we preferred using the region that has stable boundaries. In
practice, using either definition would have little effect on the results as the region includes 97% of
the population of the urban area in 2013 and 99.9% of the population of the region is included in
the urban area.
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Fig. 17.1 Geography of the Paris metro area
1,276 municipalities and 8 departments: the city of Paris (about 2 million people),
Essonne, Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis, Seine-et-Marne, Val-de-Marne, Val-
d’Oise, and Yvelines. The area is divided between the city of Paris at its core and
the surrounding suburbs: the inner outskirts called the petite couronne and the outer
suburbs known as the grande couronne. These zones have approximately the same
number of inhabitants, but they differ widely in terms of housing prices, which are
much higher in the municipality of Paris, and the type of housing, as only the grande
couronne is composed of a significant share of single household units. While the
share of social housing varies widely within each zone, it also tends to be lower in
the outskirts. On the other hand, the Seine-Saint-Denis department in the northeast
bordering the city of Paris iswell-known for concentrating high shares of immigrants,
public housing projects and the poorest population of the Paris metro area.
The neighbourhood scale used is IRIS (“aggregated units for statistical informa-
tion”). IRIS are infra-municipality units of about 2,500 inhabitants for all munici-
palities of more than 10,000 inhabitants. IRIS was not implemented until 1999, prior
to which a smaller division, the îlot was used. For the sake of comparability, INSEE
provides a correspondence table to match the 1990 îlots with the 1999 IRIS code so
that IRIS can be used at all dates.
We measure occupation using the French socioprofessional classification (caté-
gorie socio-professionelle) of individuals reported in the census. We recode these
categories into three socioeconomic status groups: top, middle, and bottom. The top
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group includes managers and professionals. The middle group includes associate
professionals, clerks, service workers, and craft workers. The bottom group includes
machine operators and other skilled workers and unskilled workers.6
Immigrants are categorised using the double criteria of birth nationality and
country of birth and are defined as persons born abroad without French citizen-
ship at birth. We use the country of birth of immigrants to create a broad ‘non-
European immigrant’ category. French natives are persons who are born French citi-
zens, regardless of country of birth. Because they are French-born citizens, descen-
dants of immigrants cannot be identified in the census and are thus counted as French
natives.
We use maps to visualise changes in the distribution of various socioeconomic
groups in the Paris metro region. In addition, we use dissimilarity and interac-
tion indexes to measure socioeconomic and immigrant segregation (Reardon and
O’Sullivan 2004). In all analyses, the sample is restricted to the employed7 popula-
tion of the Paris Metro area living in ordinary non-institutional households. Income
inequality measures using EDP-DADS are calculated for full-time male employees
aged 25–55.8
17.4 Results
17.4.1 Changes in Occupational Structure and Inequality
Three important changes have occurred in the composition of the Paris Metro area
population since 1990: a sharp increase in top occupational groups, a growing number
of immigrants, and rising income inequality. Figure 17.2 shows the change in the
occupational structure of the area over time. While the middle class has remained
relatively stable, the top occupational group climbed from20 to 29%of the population
while the bottom group declined by 8 pp. Compared to the national average, in 2015,
the Paris region stands out with markedly more top occupational groups (29 vs
17% nationally) and fewer lower status groups (22 vs 14% nationally). Overall,
this evidence of an upward socioeconomic shift with an increased share of top and
top-middle occupational groups is consistent with the process of professionalisation
described for the previous decades by Préteceille (1995) for Paris and by Hamnett
6In French, the categories are as follows: top (chefs d’entreprise, professions libérales, cadres);
middle (professions intermédiaires, techniciens, contremaîtres, agents de maîtrise, employées,
personnels des services, artisans, commerçants et assimilés); bottom (ouvriers qualifiés, ouvriers
non qualifiés).
7This excludes inactive, retired and unemployed persons. Agricultural workers are further excluded
given the small N for this category.
8We focus onmale employees in order to avoid the comparisons of the evolution of income inequality
affected by the increase in the labor force participation of women, which was substantial over the
period.
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Fig. 17.2 Distribution of occupational groups (1990,1999, 2015). Source French Census (1990,
1999, 2015)
(1994, 2001) for London. As we do not find increases both at the top and bottom
of the distribution, our results are inconsistent with the thesis of social polarisation
(Sassen 1991).
The Parismetro area has also experienced an increase in the immigrant population.
Between 1990 and 2015, the share of immigrants grew by 5 pp., reaching 23% in
2015, while the share of non-European immigrants increased from 9% in 1990 to
17% in 2015, which was more than twice the national average. However, changes
in the occupational structure of the immigrant population differ strongly from the
overall population. Immigrants, unlike natives, did not experience a strong increase
at the top of the occupational distribution. Rather, the middle group grew from 42 to
59% between 1990 and 2015while the bottom group declined. This trend seems to be
driven primarily by the entry of immigrants into the service sector, which increased
by 7% between 1990 and 2015.
Income inequality dynamics have also evolved in relation to these compositional
changes. According to the GINI index, levels of inequality appear to be quite stable
at 0.36, consistent with prior findings (Verdugo 2014). However, wage percentile
ratios indicate rising inequality. In 2015, the top 1% earned 11 times the wages of the
first decile, which is an increase of one point since 1990 and 4 points higher than the
national average. Changes in income inequality thus appear to reflect rising wages
among top earners.
Finally, it is of note that the increasing presence of the upper classes in the Paris
metro area resonates with changes in housing tenure. Homeownership rates in the
area, though lower than the national average, grew by 4 pp. reaching 47% in 2015,
while renting on the private market dropped to 31%. Social housing occupancy
remained relatively stable at 22%.
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17.4.2 Residential Patterns of Occupational Groups
in the Paris Metro Area
We now turn to explore the spatial distribution of occupational groups in Figs. 17.3,
17.4 and 17.5. All maps show a concentration of the top occupational groups in the
western neighbourhoods of the city of Paris as well as the western suburban depart-
ments of Hauts-de-Seine and Yvelines. In contrast, the upper classes are largely
under-represented in the northern neighbourhoods of Paris and the northern and
eastern departments of Seine-Saint-Denis and Val de Marne, areas where a strong
presence of bottomoccupational groups is found (Fig. 17.3). Yet despite this evidence
of spatial polarisation between the top and bottom groups, the Paris metro area is still
largely composed of middle or mixed neighbourhoods, as illustrated by Fig. 17.4.
Further, neighbourhoods in theParismetro area are characterisedmore by the concen-
tration of affluence than the concentration of disadvantage. While there are indeed
places where the bottom occupational groups are overrepresented (Fig. 17.3), there
are almost no neighbourhoods where the share of this group exceeds 60% (Fig. 17.4).
Fig. 17.3 Location quotient maps for the top and bottom occupational groups. Source French
Census (1999, 2015)
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Fig. 17.4 Classification of neighbourhoods by socio-economic composition. SourceFrenchCensus
(1999, 2015). Note the socio-economic classification coding scheme here is identical to that used
in the London chapter
Fig. 17.5 Location of the top occupational groups. Source French Census (1999, 2015)
On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 17.4, neighbourhoods where the top dominate
are more frequent.
Further, comparing themaps overtime points to a clear intensification of the spatial
divide between the top and bottom groups between 1999 and 2015. As Fig. 17.4 best
illustrates, the number of top and polarised top neighbourhoods in Paris and its
western suburbs increased substantially over time. This process of gentrification is
clearly visible in the city of Paris, which in 2015wasmostly composed of upper-class
neighbourhoods,with the exception of the northern and somewestern parts of the city.
Top occupational groups have also expanded their presence in the Eastern department
of Seine etMarne and the southern department of Essonne, which, although relatively
middle class, have more upper-class neighbourhoods in 2015 compared to 1999
(Fig. 17.5). The increase of top occupational groups in the Paris metro area was
thus accompanied by spatial transformations linked to gentrification and a greater
concentration of affluence.
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17.4.3 Occupational and Immigrant Segregation
These structural and spatial trends suggest that socioeconomic segregation may be
on the rise in the Paris metro area. Dissimilarity indexes for occupational groups
are presented in Tables 17.1 and 17.2. First, no matter the year, the highest levels of
segregation are observed between the top and bottomoccupational groups.Moreover,
the index for these groups increased slightly over the period from0.47 to0.49.Thus, in
2015, about half of the topoccupational groupswouldhave to changeneighbourhoods
for the population distribution to match that of the broader metro area. This level of
segregation between the top and bottom groups is higher than the national average
of 0.45. Further, looking at the more detailed occupational categories, the highest
indexes are found between managers and professionals versus unskilled workers,
machine operators but also middle-status groups such as clerks. Indexes for the top
versus middle and middle versus bottom groups are, in contrast, lower and relatively
stable over time. The index between the top and middle grew from 0.31 to 0.32
between 1990 and 1999, while the index between the middle and bottom declined
from 0.22 to 0.21 between 1999 and 2015.
We further calculated interaction indexes to measure exposure or the degree to
which occupational groups share the same residential spaces. While the dissimilarity
indexes are relatively stable, changes in the interaction indexes point to the increasing
isolation of the top occupational groups over time. In 1990, for an individual working
in a bottom occupation, the average share of high-status individuals within the same
neighbourhood was 37%; in 2015, it fell to 23%. Exposure also dropped by 8 pp.
between the top andmiddle groups. Hence, as suggested earlier by themaps, changes
Table 17.1 Dissimilarity indexes (multiplied by 100) for occupational groups
MAN PRO APR CLE SER CRA MAC UNS UNE MAN PRO APR CLE SER CRA MAC UNS UNE
25 27 38 36 28 47 53 39 MAN
29 42 51 48 39 59 63 50 PRO 23
26 44 16 21 20 26 35 24 APR 26 40
37 53 16 17 26 17 26 19 CLE 40 52 18
33 47 22 20 24 18 24 13 SER 37 48 20 15
30 42 24 30 27 30 37 27 CRA 28 37 19 26 24
45 59 26 17 21 33 16 18 MAC 47 58 26 15 16 30
51 63 35 28 27 39 19 20 UNS 52 61 32 21 21 35 15







Source French Census (1990, 1999, 2015)
Table 17.2 Dissimilarity Indexes (multiplied by 100) between Top, Middle and Bottom groups
1990 1999 2015
TOP - MID 31 32 32
TOP - BOT 47 49 49
MID - BOT 22 22 21
Source French Census (1990, 1999, 2015)
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in socioeconomic segregation are linked to an intensified concentration of the most
affluent groups within specific neighbourhoods.
Turning to immigrant segregation, levels of segregation between immigrants and
French natives are lower overall than occupational segregation and quite stable over-
time at 0.26.Betweennon-European immigrants andnatives, the index ismuchhigher
and more comparable to the separation of top versus bottom occupational groups, at
0.37 in 1990. Yet, the data suggest that non-Europeans are becoming less segregated
from natives over time, as dissimilarity indexes for this group fell by 5 pp. over the
period. This trend may be spurred by the shift upward from bottom to middle occu-
pations among immigrants discussed earlier. Again, however, the interaction indexes
nuance this picture. Indexes for natives versus immigrants and non-Europeans are
high, indicating a relatively strong degree of contact within neighbourhoods, due
to the large share of natives. However, the probability of interaction also declines
significantly over time, by 6 p.p. for the exposure of immigrants to natives and 8
p.p. for non-Europeans versus natives. In 2015, interaction indexes are 0.73 and 0.71
for Non-Europeans and immigrants, respectively. Thus, the immigrant population
appears to be residing more and more in areas with fewer natives.
Our final analysis aims to assess the extent to which socioeconomic and immi-
grant segregation are correlated in the Paris metro area. Do lower-class, disadvan-
taged neighbourhoods have higher concentrations of immigrants, and if so, has this
correlation weakened or intensified over time? Panel A in Table 17.3 shows cross-
sectional correlations between the share of occupational groups, unemployment rates
Table 17.3 Correlations between occupational groups, unemployment and immigration within
neighborhoods
A. Cross-sectional correlations
Immigrant Share Non-European Immigrant Share
1999 2015 1999 2015
Share of Bottom SES 0.46* 0.50* 0.47* 0.55*
Share of Middle SES -0.18* 0.14* -0.10* 0.22*
Share Top SES -0.24* -0.36* -0.29* -0.43*
Unemployment Rate 0.70* 0.73* 0.72* 0.78*
B. Correlations of changes in Census-tract Composition
Delta Immigrant Share 1999–2015 Delta Non-European
Immigrant Share
1999–2015
Delta Bottom 0.29* 0.21*
Delta Middle 0.01 0.08*




Source French Census (1999, 2015). Table shows Pearson correlation coefficients* p < 0.05
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and immigrant shares of neighbourhoods in the area. In both 1999 and 2015, greater
shares of immigrants are strongly positively correlated with the share of bottom
occupational groups and high unemployment rates in neighbourhoods. On the other
hand, the presence of immigrants—especially of non-European origin—is negatively
linked with the share of top occupational groups. Interestingly, however, while the
share of immigrants in neighbourhoods was negatively correlated with the presence
of middle groups in 1999, this correlation turned positive—if still weak—in 2015.
All in all, the correlation between immigrant-dense and low-SES neighbourhoods
become markedly stronger between 1999 and 2015. This is confirmed in panel B in
which we report the correlations between the changes in shares of immigrants, low
and high-status groups and unemployment rates in neighbourhoods between 1999
and 2015. Clearly, neighbourhoods that experienced an influx of immigrants or non-
European immigrants saw a significant reduction in the shares of high-status groups,
an increase in unemployment and a rise in the share of low-status occupations. While
not causal, these patterns suggest that immigrant neighbourhoods tend to increasingly
concentrate disadvantage alongwith a “flight” of the upper classes from these spaces.
17.5 Conclusion
This chapter explored changes in occupational structure, income inequality and
immigration in the Paris metro area between 1990 and 2015 and ways in which
these changes shaped the spatial divide between socioeconomic groups and immi-
grants and natives. We find that a shift to the top of the occupational distribution
occurred in recent decades with a substantial increase in the share of top occupations
and a drop in low-status groups. Income inequality also grew over the period, driven
by rising wages among the top 1% earners.
At first glance, residential segregation between occupational groups appeared to
change only marginally in conjunction with these evolutions. Dissimilarity indexes
remained quite stable, with only a small increase observed between the bottom and
top occupational groups. Segregation further appeared to decrease slightly between
middle and bottom occupations. However, the dissimilarity indexes mask increasing
spatial homogeneity over the period, as interaction indexes reveal that the upper
classes have become substantially less likely to share the same neighbourhoods with
other groups. In line with this lower degree of contact between SES groups, the maps
showed an expansion of high-status neighbourhoods in the Western suburbs of Paris
and the city centre. These trends alignwith evidence of gentrification and the growing
spatial isolation of the upper classes highlighted in previous studies (Préteceille 2006;
Godechot 2013; Ribardière 2019), and lend support to the hypothesis that income
inequality, likely related to the expanding financial sector (Godechot 2013), has
contributed to the intensification of socioeconomic residential segregation in the
Paris area.
We further investigated changes in the residential segregation of immigrants and
its relation to socioeconomic segregation. The findings show that segregation is
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highest between Non-Europeans and natives, much stronger than levels of segre-
gation for immigrants overall and for most occupational groups. Further, although
dissimilarity indexes remained stable or dropped somewhat between immigrants
and natives, interaction indexes again revealed decreasing contact between these
groups within neighbourhoods over time. Moreover, while immigrants have entered
the middle occupational groups over the period, the correlation in neighbourhoods
between low socioeconomic status, high unemployment and the presence of immi-
grants is strong and growing. These trends may reflect the effects of discrimination
or native flight processes—especially among the upper classes—which consolidate
disadvantage within neighbourhoods that have high shares of immigrants. Overall,
socioeconomic and immigrant segregation are tightly correlated, and increasingly so
over time.
A limitation of our analysis is that we do not observe second-generation immi-
grants.Descendants of immigrantswho are not livingwith their parents are not identi-
fied as such in the census and are thus counted as French natives. It is possible that the
stability and even decline in the dissimilarity indexes between Non-European immi-
grants and natives masks an increase in the share of second-generation immigrants in
the neighbourhood. This would coincide with prior research that shows similar levels
of residential segregation and disadvantage for second generations compared to their
parents (McAvay 2018a, b; McAvay and Safi 2018). While plausible, this claim
should be nuanced by the fact that second generations of non-European origin living
independently from their parents accounted for about 3% of the French population
in 2015 (Brutel 2017).
All in all, it is notable that, as prior research has highlighted, the intensification of
spatial inequalities documented here is at oddswith recent French urban policy initia-
tives that have explicitly sought to curtail socioeconomic segregation, particularly
by renewing disadvantaged urban areas to attract middle and upper-class house-
holds (Lelévrier 2010; Epstein 2011; Fol 2013). As the Paris area becomes more
gentrified and wages are rising among the wealthiest households, the upper classes
are better able to implement strategies to avoid poor or ethnoracially diverse areas,
while prohibitive housing prices and discrimination keep poor households and immi-
grants out of upper-class neighbourhoods. It also seems likely that the conjunction
of socioeconomic disadvantage and the presence of immigrants within neighbour-
hoods will reinforce white flight and avoidance processes as these areas become
stigmatised both due to their class and ethnic composition. At the same time, the
reduced social and residential mobility prospects of people living in poor areas,
particularly minorities, compounds socio-spatial inequalities. Rather than investing
in costly transformations of targeted urban neighbourhoods, more effective redis-
tributive policymaking might aim at favouring social mobility opportunities among
minorities and disadvantaged groups.
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Abstract Income inequality in the United States has been growing since the 1980s
and is particularly noticeable in large urban areas like the Chicago metro region.
While not as high as New York or Los Angeles, the Gini Coefficient for the Chicago
metro area (.48) was the same as the United States in 2015 but rising at a faster
rate, suggesting it will surpass the US national level in 2020. This chapter examines
the Chicago region’s growing income inequality since 1980 using US Census data
collected in 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2015, focusing on where people live based on
occupation aswell as income.Whenmapped out, the data shows a city and region that
is becomingmore segregated by occupation and income as it becomes both richer and
poorer. A result is a shrinking number of middle-class and mixed neighbourhoods.
The resulting patterns of socioeconomic spatial segregation also align with patterns
of racial/ethnic segregation attributed to historical housing development and market
segmentation, as well as recent efforts to advance Chicago as a global city through
tourism and real estate development.
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18.1 Introduction
In the United States, changes in the relative size and wages of different occupa-
tional groups (i.e., occupational structure) are central to understanding socioeco-
nomic segregation (Mouw and Kalleberg 2010). By socioeconomic segregation,
we mean ‘residential segregation of population groups based on occupation and
income’ (Tammaru et al. 2016). It is empirically shown that there is a strong relation-
ship between occupations, socioeconomic status, and resulting income distribution
in American cities. Mouw and Kalleberg note that ‘Between-occupation changes
explain 66% of the increase in inequality from 1992/1994 to 2007/2008, and the
explanatory power of occupations (the proportion of inequality explained by occu-
pation codes) has risen from 0.382 in 1983 to 0.433 in 2008 (2010: 427). Similarly,
Glaeser et al. (2009) show that occupations are a better indicator than conventional
measures of human capital (i.e., the share of adults with college degrees and the share
of adults who are high school graduates) in explaining income inequality. The same
study also notes that ‘not only do contemporaneous skill levels predict inequality,
but inequality of skills in 1980 predicts an increase in income inequality since then’
(2009: 630). This research supports using occupations as a proxy for determining
residents’ socioeconomic status.
In this chapter, we examine socioeconomic segregation in the Chicago region
through the lens of occupations as well as income. The region is an interesting
case given Chicago’s industrial history and its evolution to become a post-industrial
global city, growing as a ‘command and control’ centre for finance and banking
as well as the commodities market (Abu-Lughod 2000). However, it has not been
a straight path to social polarization as Sassen (1991) would predict, and likely
because, as Hamnett (1994) might suggest: Chicago’s economic trendlines did not
align with Los Angeles and NewYork in the 1970s and 1980s. In contrast, the region
experienced a more prolonged decline in manufacturing, primarily because of the
diversity within the industry. Further, while it is consistently in the top ten in the
United States for receiving immigrants, the net gain in population has not offset out-
migration and shrinking family size (Pletz 2019). Finally, a relatively large African
American population in the City is often competing with immigrants for lower-paid
jobs.
Still, Chicago has worked hard to make itself a global city by building upon
its assets. This includes its location, which is a major crossroad for the move-
ment of goods to and from national and international destinations through different
modes of freight transportation (rail, truck, air and water). Large scale public works
helped transform Chicago’s downtown, its river and lakefront, and its public housing
(Bennett 2012). At the same time, the city ‘incentivized’ private investment through
tax-increment financing and other tax breaks. This includes the addition of more than
40,000 new units of higher-end housing since 2010 (about 3% of the total housing
stock), with more than half in the city centre and nearby neighbourhoods (Real-
page.com 2018). While these efforts have attracted higher-income people to live in
the region, tourism has attracted nearly 58 million visitors in 2018 (Rackl 2019). To
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Fig. 18.1 Chicago metropolitan region
accommodate these newcomers, there has been a significant expansion of the retail,
entertainment, accommodation and personal services sectors, which generally pay
lower wages and offer limited benefits.
18.2 The Chicago Region
The Chicago metro region is comprised of the 14-county Chicago-Naperville-Elgin
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) that includes three states (Fig. 18.1).1 Approx-
imately 9.5 million people live in the MSA, with more than 90% in nine north-
eastern counties in the state of Illinois and the remainder in the states of Indiana and
1Metropolitan statistical areas consist of the county or counties (or equivalent entities) associated
with at least one urbanized area of at least 50,000 people, plus adjacent counties having a high
degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured through commuting ties. A
micropolitan statistical area consists of the county or counties associated with at least one urban
cluster of at least 10,000 but less than 50,000 people, plus adjacent counties having a high degree of
social and economic integration with the core as measured through commuting ties. The Chicago
MSA contains 2,215 census tracts, which are bounded areas used by the US Census Bureau to
collect data and to allow statistical comparisons over time. Based on the population size of between
1,200 and 8,000 people (the optimum size is 4,000 people), census tracts are often equated with
neighbourhoods.
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Wisconsin; four counties in northwestern Indiana and one county in southeastern
Wisconsin.2 The Chicago region is the third most populous MSA in the United
States after Los Angeles and New York, and it is the tenth-largest among the OECD
metro-regions. It is approximately 7,196 square miles (18,638 km2) with a popula-
tion density of about 1,325 people per square mile. While now considered one nearly
continuous urbanized area, the region began as a collection of settlements, which
at the time were mostly farm centres or industrial towns (Keating 2005). Today, the
region has very little land that is classified as rural and most of the industrial towns
are now suburbs of the City of Chicago, which is the largest settlement in the region
with 2.7 million people. The next largest is the suburb of Aurora, which has about
200,000 people.
18.2.1 The Economy
The Chicago region is a major employment centre with about 4.7 million people
employed in the region in 2015, which was a 9.3% increase from 2000. As with
many older urban areas, there has been a shift in the location of work as new employ-
ment centres have formed outside the city centre in suburban locations. However,
the City of Chicago remains the home to many corporate headquarters and has
been aggressively recruiting new firms with attention to technology. The region’s
top 10 employment clusters based on employment size are: Business Services
(383,000), Distribution and Electronic Commerce (250,000), Education and Knowl-
edge Creation (135,000), Financial Services (90,000), Transportation and Logis-
tics (85,000), Hospitality and Tourism (79,000), Marketing, Design and Publishing
(78,000), Insurance Services (53,000), Food Processing andManufacturing (36,000),
and Production Technology and Heavy Machinery (35,000).3
About 63% of the population is of working age (18–64 years old; the median age
is 37.4 years). A significant concern for the region and generally in the United States
is that the average age of workers in manufacturing is much higher (around 55 years
old). While employment in this segment is declining, there still is a demand for
workers, but fewer younger people are filling job openings in this industry.Workforce
development efforts are focused on closing the growing skills gap needed to fill
manufacturing jobs and other tech-related sectors. While unemployment is relatively
low at around 5% for the region, it varies by race/ethnicity, with unemployment
among working-age African Americans about three times higher than Whites and
two times higher than Latinos (CMAP 2018). In addition, about 20% of working-age
people do not participate in the labour force at all. This includes people who have
2The source of socio-economic data in this section, unless noted otherwise, is the USCensus Bureau
(2017) American Community Survey 1-year estimates for the Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI
Metro Area.
3These data are from The U.S. Cluster Mapping Project https://www.clustermapping.us/.
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been unemployed for more than two years, people with disabilities and others who
may be at-home caregivers.
A draw for employers to the Chicago region is a relatively well-educated work-
force.About 89%of all adultswho are 25 or older have a high school degree or higher,
which is about the same as theUS rate; however, for those holding a bachelor’s degree
or higher (38%), the region is above the US average (32%).
18.2.2 The Welfare System
The United States is a mix of centralized and decentralized welfare policies and
programs administered through state and local governments. Most public support
programs for households are means-tested regardless of source, while federal funds
aimed at community improvement and economic development are based on entitle-
ment formulas determined by the level of poverty and other conditions indicative of
need (e.g. housing quality) in a city or county. Income support is based on household
needs and income level. Only about 2% of the households in the Chicago region
receive some form of public assistance or welfare and an additional 4% get supple-
mental income due to having a disability. In addition, about 9% of households receive
monthly public assistance for food (i.e. food stamps). Generally, income support does
not move most people out of poverty, which means they usually live in lower-income
communities where they can find affordable housing.
18.2.3 Demographics
With an average of 2.7 persons per household, there are 3,488,312 households in
the region with 30% living in the City of Chicago. Of this total, 60% are couples
(with and without children), which is about the same as the US ratio. The remaining
portion is split into households of non-related people (e.g., roommates, unmarried
couples), and single adults with or without children. The racial makeup of the region
is 53% Non-Latino White (White), 22% Latino (any race), 16% Non-Latino African
Americans, and 7% Asian. The remaining population is either Native American or
Pacific Islander or people who identified as more than one race. In comparison to
the United States, the region is more diverse, with higher rates of Latino, African
Americans and Asians, and slightly lower rates of Non-LatinoWhites. This diversity
overall in the region is expected to continue as the Asian and Latino population is
projected to grow.
Residentially, however, the region is highly segregated by race and ethnicity, and
especially divided by large concentrations ofWhites that live in the region’s suburban
neighbourhoods as Fig. 18.2 illustrates. The greatest rate of segregation is between
Whites and Blacks with a Dissimilarity Index of 0.753 followed by 0.524 for Latinos
and Non-Latinos (Governing Magazine 2018). While this is an improvement from
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Fig. 18.2 Spatial distribution of Non-Latino White population, 2000, 2010, 2015
previous decades, the current data suggests there has been no change since 2010 in
the Black-White score. One reason may be the increase in the White population in
the City of Chicago that is concentrating on the north side and in the city centre.
Most are in the 25- to 34-year-old age group and often single, without children. At
the same time, there has been a decline in the Black population, mostly families with
children on the south and west sides of the city. When combined, it appears that
young White people are replacing but not necessarily displacing African American
families from Chicago. This is important to keep in mind when looking at changes
in socioeconomic patterns.
18.2.4 The Housing System
Housing in the United States is primarily privately owned property, purchased with
a mortgage from a financial institution (the typical length of the loan is 30 years).
Currently, nearly 64% of households in the Chicago region are homeowners, with
most living in single-family homes (detached and attached). Ownership is generally
higher in suburban and exurban areas (75–80%) and lower in the City of Chicago
(45%). The median value of a single-family home in the region is about $240,000,
which while slightly higher than the United States, is still below pre-recession values
for the region. In contrast, median rents are at their highest at nearly $1,100 a month,
which is about the same as a median mortgage payment. As a result, more than
half of the renters in the region are ‘burdened’ because of their low incomes (i.e.,
paying more than 30% of income for housing costs) and most are very low income.
In comparison, only 34% of owners are burdened, and most of them earn higher
incomes.
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The region does have public housing and other forms of subsidized housing via
rental assistance programs and funding for development; however, it only benefits
about 17% of renters. Public housing has also contributed to economic and racial
segregation sincemost of it was built in the City of Chicago in the 1950s and 1960s in
predominantly AfricanAmerican communities.While housing choice vouchers have
given families the opportunity to use their rental assistance anywhere in the region,
most voucher holders live in lower-income areas where there is more affordable
rental housing available.
As the following analysis illustrates, there are clear patterns of socioeconomic
concentration and segregation. While tied historically to uneven development, most
is attributed to long-standing lending and real estate practices coupled with discrim-
ination based on race and ethnicity (MPC 2017). Despite it being illegal since the
1960s in the United States to discriminate based on race or ethnicity in both the
housing and labour market, changing the racial, spatial patterns has been slow, espe-
cially in suburban areas where Whites have historically had higher income levels,
better access to capital and more personal wealth than non-Whites. This divide is
evident in the rates of ownership and home values by the three major population
groups in the region: Blacks are at 41% ownership with a median housing value of
$140,000, Latinos have a 53% ownership rate and median home value of $160,000,
andWhites have a 76% ownership rate andmedian home value of $225,000 (Institute
for Research on Race and Public Policy 2018).4
18.3 Analysis and Results
18.3.1 Income Inequality
Income inequality has increased considerably in theChicago region since 1980 and at
a faster rate than in the United States (see Table 18.1).5 The region’s Gini coefficient
increased nearly 36% from 0.35 in 1980 to 0.48 in 2015, while it increased only
19% in the country. This trend is important considering that in 1980, Chicago’s Gini
coefficient was well below the United States, and how it has grown at a much faster
rate in the last 15 years (13.3% compared to 3.7%).
This pattern is consistent with the global city literature, which posits that cities
such as Chicago, which serve as command and control centres in the world economy
and help sustain a polarized labour force in terms of skill and wage levels (Sassen
1991; Zhong et al. 2007). Faster growing inequality in Chicago also suggests that
4This report used data from the US Census, American Community Survey, 2010–2014.
5TheGini indexwas constructedwith data from the Integrated Public-UseMicro-Samples (IPUMS)
for the 1980, 1990, and 2000 US Censuses and 2013–2017 American Community Survey. We use
household income, which means that single households and households with children are evaluated
the same. Using household income instead of per capita income is consistent with most studies
conducted in the US (Glaeser et al. 2009; Florida and Mellander 2016).
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MAN ENG LEG PHY EDU OFC HLT PRO NTR SLS SER PRD AGR
Fig. 18.3 Distribution of occupational groups 2000, 2010 and 2015. Note Please see Appendix for
occupational description
drivers of income inequality such as disparities in educational attainment and returns
to human capital, and changes in occupational structure, are more pronounced at the
regional level than at the national level. Projections for employment by occupation
groups in 2026 support this trend continuing and the middle occupational groups
continuing to shrink faster in Illinois than the nation.6
18.3.2 Occupational Structure
The following data suggests that the period preceding the 2008 recession and the
recovery after affected growth in occupations unevenly. Figure 18.3 shows themiddle
groups shrinking before and after the recession, decreasing 3.5% points between
2000 and 2015, while the top and bottom groups grew by more than 2 and 1%
points, respectively. Looking more closely at the distribution of occupations within
6Based on data from the Illinois Department of Economic Security, Illinois will change its distri-
bution of occupations by 2026 as follows: Top (+0.6), Middle (−1.1), Bottom (+0.5), while the
US will change: Top (+0.8), Middle (−0.7), Bottom (−0.1). The Chicago region population is
approximately 70% of the state.
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these three categories, we see that themiddle group has not decreased proportionately
across occupations and nor have the top and bottom groups increased proportionately
between 2000 and 2015.
18.3.3 Dissimilarity Index
Looking at the segregation of top and bottomoccupation groups, theChicago region’s
Dissimilarity Index appears to also be rising, increasing from 0.31 in 2000 to 0.32
in 2010 to 0.33 in 2015. This trend suggests a high degree of residential segregation
based on occupations, where nearly a third of the employed population with top
occupations (or bottom occupations) would have to move from one neighborhood to
another in order to produce a completely even distribution of the two occupational
groups in the region.7 There are several potential explanations for the change in the
DI during this time period. An important factor to consider is the recession caused
by the financial and housing market crash in 2008, which contributed to a significant
increase in unemployment by 2010 (10.6%, up from 4.3% in 2000) that has nearly
returned to post-recession rates by 2015 (5.9%) (FRED 2019). The increase in the
DI scores since 2000 suggests that new employees that joined the region’s labour
force in the top and bottom categories disproportionally lived in—or chose to move
to—neighbourhoods with an already high concentration of these respective groups,
therefore exacerbating rather than reducing existing occupational spatial segregation.
Tables 18.2 and 18.3 provide evidence of the degree to which residents with
different occupations live in the same neighborhood by computing DI for every
occupation pair. Dissimilarity Index values between occupations provide a more
detailed measure of evenness in residential distribution based on occupations in the
region. Several patterns emerge. First, DI values are relatively stable between 2000
and 2015, indicating that the overall residential pattern based on occupations has not
changed significantly in the last 15 years. Second, DI values between top occupa-
tions (e.g. MAN and ENG) or middle occupations (e.g. PRD and SER) are relatively
small, suggesting that residents with similar socioeconomic status tend to live in
the same neighbourhoods. Third, the highest DI values are observed between top
and bottom occupations.8 This suggests that residents in top and bottom occupations
7In order to check the robustness of the results to differences in how top and bottom occupations
are defined, we constructed two alternatives DIs using different definitions, first restricting the
top occupational category to the top three paying occupations while holding the bottom constant,
and then we kept the top occupational category the same and expanded the bottom category to
include a middle occupation (i.e. Office and administrative support occupations). The results are
not significantly different from those presented in the text.
8Dissimilarity between Agriculture (AGR) and top occupations (MAN, ENG, LEG, PHY) is the
highest, but we do not want to emphasize this pattern as AGR exhibits high DI value with all
occupations in general. Also, AGR occupations account for a very small share of the regional total
(around 0.1%) in any given year, and located in isolated, rural parts of the region.
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Table 18.2 Dissimilarity indexes (multiplied by 100) by occupation, 2000 and 2010
MAN ENG LEG PHY EDU OFC HLT PRO NTR SLS SER PRD AGR UNE TOP MID BOT
MAN 22 39 24 22 29 44 46 40 20 38 43 86 39
ENG 18 45 30 26 32 46 49 44 26 40 46 87 42
LEG 35 41 42 43 53 60 61 61 46 57 63 89 58
PHY 21 27 37 28 34 44 48 43 27 41 46 86 43
EDU 20 24 37 23 26 41 41 38 23 32 39 85 33
OFC 26 29 49 29 23 36 35 25 21 22 25 84 23
HLT 37 38 54 35 32 27 45 39 39 40 41 84 39
PRO 42 45 57 42 36 28 35 40 40 38 40 85 35
NTR 37 40 57 38 35 21 32 34 32 27 24 80 30
SLS 16 22 41 22 19 18 31 36 27 28 33 85 30
SER 36 38 53 38 29 19 31 31 23 26 21 83 21
PRD 42 44 60 43 37 23 34 34 20 31 17 81 25
AGR 79 78 85 78 78 75 76 78 68 76 72 69 85




Note The lower quadrant presents DI values for 2000 while the upper quadrant presents DI values
for 2010
Table 18.3 Dissimilarity indexes (multiplied by 100) by occupation, 2010 and 2015
MAN ENG LEG PHY EDU OFC HLT PRO NTR SLS SER PRD AGR UNE TOP MID BOT
MAN 20 37 22 20 28 40 44 41 20 37 43 85 51
ENG 22 43 27 24 31 42 47 44 26 39 46 85 53
LEG 39 45 42 41 52 59 61 62 46 57 63 90 63
PHY 24 30 42 26 32 41 46 43 27 41 46 86 54
EDU 22 26 43 28 25 38 39 38 21 31 39 84 45
OFC 29 32 53 34 26 32 33 25 19 21 25 81 39
HLT 44 46 60 44 41 36 43 37 36 36 39 81 50
PRO 46 49 61 48 41 35 45 40 38 36 39 84 45
NTR 40 44 61 43 38 25 39 40 31 26 23 78 46
SLS 20 26 46 27 23 21 39 40 32 26 32 83 43
SER 38 40 57 41 32 22 40 38 27 28 19 81 34
PRD 43 46 63 46 39 25 41 40 24 33 21 79 39
AGR 86 87 89 86 85 84 84 85 80 85 83 81 85




Note The lower quadrant presents DI values for 2010, while the upper quadrant presents DI values
for 2015
are more segregated from each other than each is with residents in middle occu-
pations. However, it is notable that education (EDU) and sales (SLS) occupations
exhibit relatively small DIs with three top occupations (MAN, ENG, PHY). In fact,
EDU and SLS exhibit DI values as small as the ones observed among top occupa-
tions, suggesting that a significant number of teachers and sales associates are living
in the same neighbourhoods as managers, engineers, and physicians. Finally, very
low DI values between unemployed and service occupations suggest that either the
unemployment rate is high for people in service occupations or that unemployed
people, in general, tend to live in same neighbourhoods as people working in service
occupations.
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Fig. 18.4 Location of the top occupational group, 2000, 2010, 2015
18.3.4 Location of Top Occupational Groups
Our top occupational category consists ofmanagement occupations ($104,570); legal
occupations ($92,290); computer andmathematical occupations ($85,820); architec-
ture and engineering occupations ($78,790); health diagnosing and treating practi-
tioners and other technical occupations ($69,240); business and financial operations
occupations, ($71,420); and life, physical, and social science occupations ($63,870).
Consistent with previous studies, the bottom occupational category includes health-
care support occupations ($29,440); food preparation and serving-related occu-
pations ($22,220); building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations
($29,140); personal care and service occupations ($23,800); sales and related occu-
pations ($29,500); farming, fishing, and forestry occupations ($28,130); production
occupations ($34,390); transportation and material moving occupations ($31,760).
According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the annual median wage in
the Chicago MSAwas $41,210 in 2018.9 The top occupational category, on average,
earns nearly twice as much as the regional average. In comparison, the lowest-paid
occupations in the region earn on average 30% less than the regional median annual
wage. As Fig. 18.4 illustrates, there is a clear pattern of spatial distribution and
concentration by quintiles in the top occupational group. The top quintile (Q1) is
largely concentrated in the northern part of Chicago along the Lake Michigan and
the western and northwestern part of the region. Since 2000, the concentration of
the top groups has increased in the northern part of Chicago and in its centre. At the
same time, some neighbourhoods in the southwest side, which had been a concen-
tration of Q2 and Q3 groups, are now Q4 and Q5. With the exception of a few rural
neighbourhoods, suburban neighbourhoods remained a mix of Q1 and Q2.
9Wages and salaries are before tax and do not include nonproduction bonuses or employer costs of
nonwage benefits, such as health insurance or employer contributions to retirement plans.
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18.3.5 Location Quotients (LQs)
LQs allow us to examine the concentration of the top and bottom occupation cate-
gories in relative terms as they make neighbourhoods comparable (see Fig. 18.5).
Overall, the percentile distribution andmin/max of values alignwith the pattern found
for the region by the dissimilarity index. First, the LQs for the top socioeconomic
group are consistently larger than its equivalents for the bottom socioeconomic group,
indicating that overall, the residential concentration for managers and professionals
is more extreme than it is for unskilled workers. This spatial pattern is evident at
the 99, 95 and 90 percentile levels. Second, higher mean and median values for the
bottom socioeconomic group (1.04 and 1.0 respectively) than for the top socioeco-
nomic group (both less than 1.00) suggests that there are more neighbourhoods in the
Chicago region with a high concentration of unskilled workers than neighbourhoods
with a high concentration of managers and professionals. Third, LQs for both groups
are relatively stable across the time periods, suggesting that most neighbourhoods
have sustained their character in terms of their occupation composition.
A closer look at the figures shows that growth in the Chicago region’s DI since
2000 is likely driven by the neighbourhood choice of residents with top occupations,
which has expanded in Chicago on the north side of the city and in some northern
and western suburbs. This conclusion is based on finding that residents with top
Fig. 18.5 Location quotient maps for the top and bottom occupational groups, 2000, 2010, 2015
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occupations disproportionally added to those neighbourhoods with an already high
concentration of top occupations (LQ > 1 for top occupations). Neighbourhoods with
LQs larger than 1.00 in both 2000 and 2010 for the top occupational group gained a
disproportionate share of the net increase in the top occupations (80% of total). At
the same time, neighbourhoods with LQs less than 1.00 in both 2000 and 2010 for
top occupations gained only 3% of the net increase in the top occupations. These
numbers confirmour hypothesis that neighbourhoodswith a high concentration of the
top occupational group gained disproportionally more people in the top occupations
than neighbourhoods with a low concentration of this group, thereby pushing the DI
up.
Since the change inDI is driven by two components (residential changes of top and
bottomoccupational groups), we alsomust examinewhat happened to those residents
in the bottom occupations during the same period. The large increase in bottom occu-
pations (relative to the regional average) could be indicative of the regional economy,
creating more low-paid/skilled jobs during the recession period. It is also possible
that some of the existing residents in 2000 working in middle occupations lost their
jobs during this period and transitioned to low-paid jobs, thus being re-classified in
the bottom occupational group. For this type of change to push up the DI, at least
one of two processes must have happened. First, residents working in low occupa-
tions would have to be disproportionally added to those neighbourhoods with an
already high concentration of bottom occupations (LQ > 1.00 for bottom occupa-
tions). Second, residents with bottom occupations in low concentration neighbour-
hoods (LQ < 1.00 for bottom occupations) would have to lose their jobs at a faster
rate than the regional average or relocate to high concentration neighbourhoods or
leave the region.
While data limitations prevent us from providing a definitive answer to the latter
process, it is possible to determine the net gains of neighbourhoods in the bottom
occupational group (the former process). A closer look at the change in the location
of residents with bottom occupations from 2000 to 2010 shows that 59,384 people,
or 41% of the total net new people employed in the bottom occupations, were added
to those neighbourhoods that have LQs larger than 1.00 in both 2000 and 2010. As
the maps illustrate, these neighbourhoods are both in the City of Chicago and in the
suburbs.NeighbourhoodswithLQs less than 1.00 in both years gained approximately
the same number of bottom occupations from 2000 to 2010 (61,422 or 42% of
the total). These figures suggest that the location choice of residents with bottom
occupations played a relatively small role in pushing DI in upward direction.
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Fig. 18.6 Classification of neighbourhoods by socioeconomic composition, 2000, 2010, 2015
18.3.6 Residential Segregation Based on Socioeconomic
Status
Using the aggregated occupational categories, we computed the percentage of the
employed labour force in each census tract that falls into the top, middle, and
bottom groups. Then, based on the local representation of those groups at different
thresholds, we assigned neighbourhoods into a socioeconomic status (SES) typology
(Marcinczak et al. 2015) and mapped them to show change over time (see Fig. 18.6).
Overall, three SES neighbourhood types account for more than 80% of all neigh-
bourhoods in theChicago region between 2000 and 2015:Mixed, Low toMiddle, and
Low.There is somevariation in the share of each type during this period. For example,
while Low-to-Middle neighbourhoods are the largest share in 2000 (37.5%) and 2010
(29.3%), Mixed neighbourhoods are the largest share in 2015 (29.5%). One pattern
is consistent. The share of Middle and Low-to-Middle neighbourhoods is decreasing
while the share ofHigh, Low and Polarized neighbourhoods is increasing. The largest
absolute increase from 2000 to 2015 was Low neighbourhoods with 181 neighbour-
hoods added in 15 years, increasing the share of this SES group from 18.7% in 2000
to 26.8% in 2015 (43.4% increase). Similarly, the share of High neighbourhoods
increased significantly as well (81% increase), growing from 97 to 176 neighbour-
hoods. And while there were only 33 Polarized neighbourhoods in 2000, there are
72 of them in 2015 (nearly 118% increase).
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18.4 Conclusion
These results suggest two trends in the Chicago region. First, an occupational shift
is ‘shrinking the middle’ while also increasing the number of people in the bottom
and top occupational groups. This is consistent with the global city literature on
the social polarization of the workforce. Second, holding the occupation structure
constant, residents with similar occupations at the top and bottom appear to be sorting
themselves into neighbourhoods with people in similar occupations; for example, as
discussed in the LQ section, residents with top occupations overwhelmingly choose
to live in neighbourhoods with already high LQs for the top occupational group. The
classification of neighbourhoods by socioeconomic composition reflects these trends,
showing that the share of middle neighbourhoods is decreasing while the share of top
and bottom neighbourhoods is increasing. This implies that social polarization has
led to residential polarization between the top and bottomoccupational groups.While
we did not include race and ethnicity in the DI analysis, the spatial patterns suggest
that the long history of racial segregation may be contributing to those residential
patterns as well.
Looking ahead, given the large increase in the region’s Gini score since 2000, the
Chicago region appears to be on a trajectory toward greater income inequality in 2020
than the United States on average. We also expect that factors that have sustained
racial and ethnic segregation (e.g. housing discrimination, unequal access to capital)
will continue to contribute to this trend, but also that inequality will reinforce racial
and ethnic segregation since most of the White population are currently in the top
occupations while most African American and Latino people are in bottom occu-
pations. Still, there are many variables that can affect these patterns of segregation
and inequality in the future. This includes investment and development decisions
in the region by both the private and public sector, which are somewhat hard to
predict under current national economic policies (i.e. fluctuating tariffs and global
trade wars, especially between United States and China). Furthermore, local policies
can also shape the future, including efforts by the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for
Planning to address segregation (CMAP 2018) and Chicago’s new mayor elected in
Spring of 2019, who ran on a platform of inclusion and equity, which may change
where development occurs and who benefits in decades to come.
Appendix
See Tables 18.4, 18.5, 18.6, 18.7 and 18.8.
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Table 18.4 Occupations included in the dissimilarity index
LABEL Occupation Group
MAN Management, business, and financial occupations Top
ENG Computer, engineering, and science occupations Top
LEG Legal occupations Top
PHY Health diagnosing and treating practitioners and other technical occupations Top
EDU Education, community service, arts, and media occupations Middle
OFC Office and administrative support occupations Middle
HLT Health technologists and technicians Middle
PRO Protective service occupations Middle
NTR Natural resources, construction, and maintenance occupations Bottom
SLS Sales and-related occupations Bottom
SER Service occupations Bottom
PRD Production, transportation, and material moving occupations Bottom
AGR Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations Bottom
Note The same set of occupations and groupings (top-middle-bottom) is used for DI, LQ, SES
analyses. 2000 Census has an occupation class called “Farmers and farm managers” which did not
exist in 2010 and 2015 datasets. To be able to present consistent DIs across years, this occupation
is not included in the calculation of DI
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Table 18.5 Socioprofessional grouping of occupations
Occupation Group
Management occupations Top
Business and financial operations occupations Top
Computer and mathematical occupations Top
Architecture and engineering occupations Top
Life, physical, and social science occupations Top
Legal occupations Top
Health diagnosing and treating practitioners and other technical occupations Top
Community and social services occupations Middle
Education, training, and library occupations Middle
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations Middle
Health technologists and technicians Middle
Protective service occupations: Middle
Office and administrative support occupations Middle
Construction and extraction occupations Middle
Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations Middle
Healthcare support occupations Bottom
Food preparation and serving-related occupations Bottom
Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations Bottom
Personal care and service occupations Bottom
Sales and related occupations Bottom
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations Bottom
Production occupations Bottom
Transportation occupations Bottom
Material moving occupations Bottom
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Table 18.6 Cumulative percentile distribution of LQs for the top and bottom socioeconomic groups
2000 2010 2015
Top SES Bottom SES Top SES Bottom SES Top SES Bottom SES
MAX 2.54 2.01 2.67 2.19 3.61 2.05
99% 2.25 1.85 2.26 1.86 2.22 1.82
95% 1.90 1.60 1.91 1.67 1.92 1.65
90% 1.69 1.47 1.71 1.51 1.70 1.53
75% 1.27 1.23 1.30 1.26 1.29 1.29
MEAN 0.93 1.03 0.93 1.04 0.93 1.04
MEDIAN 0.85 1.00 0.84 0.99 0.85 1.00
25% 0.53 0.80 0.50 0.79 0.51 0.77
10% 0.34 0.68 0.30 0.63 0.30 0.61
5% 0.24 0.60 0.19 0.55 0.21 0.53
1% 0.14 0.44 0.05 0.40 0.11 0.39
MIN 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00
Table 18.7 Classification of neighbourhoods by the share of socioprofessional groups




50% ≤ ≤ 25% ≤ 25%
50% ≤ ≤ 25% 25–49%
50% ≤ 25–49% ≤ 25%
SES2 Middle to High SES
Neighbourhoods
25–49% 25–49% ≤ 25%




SES4 Low to middle SES
Neighbourhoods
≤ 25% 25–49% 25–49%
SES5 Low SES
Neighbourhoods
≤ 25% 25–49% 50% ≤
≤ 25% ≤ 25% 50% ≤
SES6 Polarized SES
Neighbourhoods
25–49% ≤ 25% 25–49%
25–49% ≤ 25% 50% ≤
SES7 Middle SES
Neighbourhoods
≤ 25% 50% ≤ ≤ 25%
≤ 25% 50% ≤ 25–49%
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Table 18.8 Neighbourhood types according to socioeconomic status composition, 2000–2015




# % # % # % # % # %
SES1 97 4.4 135 6.1 176 7.9 38.0 39.2 79 81.4
SES2 100 4.5 116 5.2 103 4.7 16.0 16.0 3 3.0
SES3 657 29.7 601 27.1 655 29.6 -56.0 -8.5 -2 -0.3
SES4 831 37.5 648 29.3 553 25.0 -183.0 -22.0 -278 -33.5
SES5 414 18.7 542 24.5 595 26.9 128.0 30.9 181 43.7
SES6 33 1.5 75 3.4 72 3.3 42.0 127.3 39 118.2
SES7 71 3.2 85 3.8 49 2.2 14.0 19.7 -22 -31.0
NA 12 0.5 13 0.6 12 0.7 1.0 8.3 3 25.0
Total 2,215 100.0 2,215 100.0 2,215 100.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0
Note: NA refers to neighbourhoods with zero population
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Chapter 19
Income Inequality and Economic
Segregation in Los Angeles from 1980
to 2010
John R. Hipp and Jae Hong Kim
Abstract Rising income inequality is a critical problem in both the global North
and South. In the United States, the Gini coefficient measuring nationwide income
inequality rose from 0.403 in 1980 to 0.480 in 2014 (US Census), and residential
segregation by income has increasingly occurred in many metropolitan regions and
is particularly reflected in the spatial separation of the wealthiest households. This
chapter focuses on the change in the level of income inequality in the Los Angeles
region since 1980 and how it is related to changes in residential segregation between
economic groups over that same time period. We use data from the US Census
collected in 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010.Wemeasure residential segregation between
economic groups based on occupational structure, and measure ‘neighbourhoods’
using Census tracts: these are units defined by the US Census and typically average
about 4,000 residents. The overall level of inequality in the region is measured at
each decade point using theGini coefficient for household income.Maps demonstrate
where different socioeconomic status groups have tended to locate and howeconomic
segregation has changed in Los Angeles over this time period. We also assess the
extent to which changes in inequality are related to changes in economic segregation
over the last four and a half decades.
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19.1 Introduction
An upward trajectory of economic inequality has been quite apparent around the
world, although what has caused this trend would vary widely across countries,
and so does the response chosen to address it. In the United States, the Gini coef-
ficient measuring income inequality had begun to rise rapidly since the 1980s and
increased every decade, despite yearly ups and downs.1 Nationwide, this (uncom-
fortable) reality has received extensive media coverage, often highlighting what
percentage of the aggregated income growth has been taken by the top 1% and how
the income (or wealth) concentration has been accelerated in recent decades. Much
attention has also been paid in academic and policy circles to ways to curb this trend
of ‘the fading American Dream’ (Chetty et al. 2017) and promote intergenerational
economic mobility.
The rising economic inequality is not an aspatial phenomenon. There is substan-
tial variation across regions, and it has been reported that ‘[t]he rise in inequality
experienced in the United States over the past four-plus decades is not just a story
of those on Wall Street, in Hollywood, or in the Silicon Valley reaping outsized
rewards, … [and that] rising inequality and increases in top 1 percent incomes affect
every part of the U.S.’ (Sommeiller and Price 2018: p. 16). Furthermore, some recent
studies have suggested that the rising inequality can take the form of a higher level
of residential segregation between economic groups (economic segregation from
hereafter) within a region, especially the separation of wealthier household groups
from the remainder, which would further reinforce the increasing trend of inequality
(see, e.g., Reardon and Bischoff 2011; Scarpa 2016). Such a reciprocal interaction
between inequality and segregationwould be particularly problematic when resource
allocation and land-use decisions are not made in favour of disadvantaged groups
or communities. In such circumstances, the vicious cycle can persist and create a
significant disparity in access to jobs or other essential amenities/opportunities.
Yet, our understanding of these critical mechanisms is far from complete. As
mentioned above, increasing inequality is an indisputable reality in the United States
(or even worldwide). However, a question is whether this apparent macro change has
played out differently across various metropolitan areas in the US. Little is known
about the various ways in which economic groups are residentially segregated in
contemporary cities or larger metropolitan areas along with rising inequality. More-
over, there has been a dearth of comparative work that would enable us to identify
commonalities or capture (subtle) differences between cities or regions around the
world.
This chapter, combined with other contributions in the book, attempts to fill this
gap. More specifically, here consideration is given to Los Angeles (and its vicinity),
which is unique inmanyways but presents some important representative qualities of
post-industrial large metropolises. Materials presented in this chapter were produced
1For more detailed information, see US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality, avail-
able at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-income-
inequality.html.
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using an occupational classification scheme to make the analysis comparable to
other case studies in the volume. The present occupation-oriented analysis was also
expected to provide some fresh insights into the complex process that underlies the
study region’s segregation dynamics that would not be fully captured by traditional
income-oriented approaches.
19.2 Background
The Los Angeles region provides an interesting case to study the spatial dynamics of
inequality and segregation, given that studies have frequently pointed to its spatial
layout as differing from the traditional monocentric development. Instead, it has
been described as a polycentric region where an increasing number of employment
subcenters have emerged (Kane et al. 2018). This region is the quintessential example
of what is referred to as a member of the Sunbelt part of the country, and as such,
exemplifies much of the post-World War II development in the United States in that
it is a car culture built around roadways and highways, along with a relative lack of
public transportation.
These characteristics of the Los Angeles region have been constructed through
multiple waves of population and employment decentralisation over the history of
its growth. While the City of Los Angeles grew most rapidly in the late nineteenth
century through the 1930s, the entire metropolitan region has continued to expand
dramatically. An early form of the suburban expansion occurred partly in the form
of upper and middle-class flight from the core city, as observed in many other US
metropolises, resulting in massive development in Orange County during the mid-
twentieth century (Note: Orange County’s population increased more than ten times
from 130 thousand to 1.42 million between 1940 and 1970. Currently, it is the
sixth-most populous county in the nation with a population of over 3 million). In
the late-twentieth century, the growth was headed toward inland areas, specifically
Riverside and San Bernardino counties, where new housing units were provided at
much more affordable rates, although job opportunities were relatively scarce there.
More recently, there has been increasing evidence of inner-city gentrification and
associated poverty suburbanisation (Tong and Kim 2019), but new development in
remote locations has continued (Hipp et al. 2014). We display key features of the
region in Fig. 19.1.
Much of the new development has taken place in the form of single-family
housing construction. While the housing stock has diversified in the region, low-
density residential development remains common, particularly in remote locations.
The percentage of owner-occupied housing units, however, has not increased substan-
tially over the last three decades. Despite the growing decentralisation of households,
the overall percentage has remained around 54%, while the level of homeownership
varies across counties, ranging from 47% (Los Angeles County) to 68% (Riverside
County) in 2010.
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Fig. 19.1 Study region
Along with the expansion, there has been a proliferation of newly incorporated
cities in the region, making it politically fragmented, since the 1950s. Most notably,
in the state of California, ‘[t]he Lakewood Plan made incorporation cheaper and
easier by allowing cities to contract for services with county governments. The
Bradley Burns Act created fiscal incentives for incorporation by permitting Cali-
fornia cities to capture a portion of the state sales tax. Local Agency Formation
Commissions (LAFCOs) established the first statewide standards for incorporation.
Finally, Proposition 13 incentivised municipal incorporation by allowing commu-
nities to capture sales tax and other revenue without fear of higher property taxes.
Together, these reforms created fiscal incentives for incorporation that were hard for
many communities to resist’ (Hogen-Esch 2011: p. 7).
The newly incorporated places have surrounded existing localities, limiting their
ability to expand geographically and achieve a critical mass for fiscal efficiency and
other goals (Kim et al. 2018). Furthermore, this fragmented structure of governance
has profound implications for the working of the metropolitan region, shaping the
behaviour of both public and private sectors (Kim and Jurey 2013). Political fragmen-
tation has been viewed as a cause of sprawl (Byun andEsparza 2005;Carruthers 2003;
Ulfarsson and Carruthers 2006), although no single factor can fully explain the Los
Angeles region’s complex spatial structure. Fragmented local growth controls have
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pushed development out and made it particularly difficult to construct higher-density
affordable housing units where the demand has arisen (Levine 1999).
In this light, it is not surprising that common interest developments (CIDs),
including gated communities and condominiums, are prevalent in the Los Angeles
metropolitan region. According to Sanchez et al. (2005), providing useful estimates
based on the 2001 American Housing Survey data, a considerable percentage of
households in the region reported that they lived in walled (18.2%) or access-
controlled (11.7%) communities. Such types of housing developments are evenmore
popular in new development projects, producing increased social segregation (Le
Goix 2005). Fragmented local governments have been in favour of CIDs, which
would allow them to ‘acquire new property tax payers without having to extend
to them the full panoply of municipal services, … [and] some municipal govern-
ments have begun to virtually require that new housing construction consist of CIDs’
(McKenzie 2003: p. 207).
These structural characteristics have also created various forms of isolation, even
though there have been growing efforts to promote mixing in multiple dimensions
(Hipp et al. 2017b). While the conventional spatial mismatch hypothesis does not
fit well in the case of Los Angeles (Blumenberg and Manville 2004), a recent study
has shown that job accessibility of inner-city residents has declined significantly in
the region (Hu 2015). Other forms of barriers have also existed, making it difficult
to connect job opportunities to welfare recipients who are supposed to move from
welfare to work in the post-1996 welfare reform era in the United States (Ong and
Blumenberg 1998). It is not uncommon that workers commute across city or county
borders in this large metropolitan area. The following empirical analysis shows how
different groups of workers were spatially distributed and in what ways the spatial
distributions have changed over time, based on their place of residence, as opposed
to where their jobs were located.
Thus, although this is a single region, there are differences across the five coun-
ties in the region in various ways. These counties have different spatial patterns of
amenities and jobs. The density of LosAngeles County can be seen in that its housing
units have many more amenities within one mile of them (measuring various types
of amenities such as retail, restaurants, parks, etc.) than the other counties; housing
units in Orange County have the next most amenities nearby, with the other three
counties having far fewer (Kane et al. 2017: 25). There is also more job density in
Los Angeles county compared to the others: the downtown of Los Angeles city has
long been a business hub (Kane et al. 2016), and the west side of Los Angeles also
has a high jobs/housing relationship (Hipp et al. 2017a). In Orange County, the Irvine
area serves as a high jobs/housing location, whereas the Inland Empire counties have
less evidence of such jobs/housing locations (Hipp et al. 2017a).
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19.3 Data and Methods
19.3.1 Data
Our study area is the Los Angeles area, which is defined as the five-county Southern
California metropolitan region, including Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San
Bernardino and Ventura counties. For this large metropolitan region, we used census
tracts as the unit of analysis to construct a temporally comparable neighbourhood-
level dataset. We harmonised the tracts to 2010 boundaries based on population-
weighted apportioning as defined by the US Census Master Area Reference Files.
We used US Census data for the earlier waves, and used the American Community
Survey 5-year estimates for the most recent decade (we used the 2008–12 data given
that it is centred on 2010) to construct our dataset of 3,892 tracts with at least 100
population in 2010.
To assess the socioeconomic status of the neighbourhoods in the region, in addition
to the occupation measures, we created two other measures. One is a measure of the
average household income of residents in the tract. The second is a measure of
education level in the tract, and is captured by the percent of residents with at least
a bachelor’s degree.
19.3.2 Methods
A challenge is to define consistent categories of occupations over time. We used the
ISO definitions for defining categories. We, therefore, classified nine categories of
occupations, one of which—agriculture, forestry, and fishery workers—we excluded
from analyses given the small proportion constituted by this group in this urban area.
The categories are: (1) managers; (2) professionals; (3) technicians and associated
professionals; (4) clerical support workers; (5) service and sales workers; (6) agricul-
ture, forestry, and fishery workers; (7) craft and related trades workers; (8) plant and
machine operators and assemblers; (9) elementary occupations. We describe howwe
classified the occupation codes defined by the US Census for each decade into each
of these categories in Appendix Table A1 (available online).
We also constructed a measure of the degree of occupation mixing in neighbour-
hoods with a Herfindahl Index of the nine occupation codes just described. The
measure is a sum of squares of the proportion of residents in a tract in each of
the occupation categories, and then is subtracted from 1 to make it a measure of
heterogeneity. The theoretical range is from 0 to 0.8742.
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19.4 Results
19.4.1 General Trends in Occupation Groups Over Time
We begin by describing the socioeconomic status of the five counties in this region.
Orange and Ventura Counties are the two wealthiest counties in the region with the
highest average income and education levels, whereas Riverside and San Bernardino
Counties are the two counties from the Inland Empire (IE)—which tends to be
blue-collar—and consistently show the lowest average income and lowest levels of
education. Los Angeles County, the largest county in the region, is between these
two extremes based on socioeconomic status. Although Ventura County is closer to
Los Angeles County for average education level, they are close to Orange County
for average household income.
We next describe the change in household income inequality in the region overall,
as well as across the five counties in the region, for our study period.2 The general
upward trend in the level of inequality in the region has closely tracked the trend
for Los Angeles County, the largest county in the region. The Gini coefficient for
household income in the region has gone from 0.415 in 1980 to 0.43 in 1990 to 0.455
in 2000 before slightly falling to 0.449 by 2010. Los Angeles County has paralleled
this with systematically higher Gini values, and peaked at 0.474 in 2000. The two
Inland Empire (IE) Counties of Riverside and San Bernardino have very similar
income inequality levels in 2010, but took very different paths to that point. Whereas
Riverside County had the second-highest level of income inequality in the region
in 1980, inequality has only slightly increased over the time period in this County.
In contrast, San Bernardino County has gone from relatively low-income inequality
in 1980 (0.382) to steadily increasing such that they have nearly caught Riverside
County by 2010 (0.421). Finally, the two more wealthy counties are Orange and
Ventura, and although they started with the lowest levels of inequality in the region
in 1980 (0.37 and 0.38), they have both experienced quite steady increases over the
entire study period such that Orange County has slightly higher income inequality
than the two IE counties by 2010.
Turning to the occupation structure of the region, Fig. 19.2 provides this informa-
tion for the tracts in the region. We see that the percentage of professional employees
in the region has increased dramatically since 1990. Whereas 12% of employees
were in professional occupations in 1980, this increased slightly to 13% in 1990,
and then jumped to 22% in 2000 and 28% in 2010. This trend is clearly reflected in
Fig. 19.3, which shows seven distinct types of neighbourhoods using a classification
2We computed the Gini coefficient for the region, as well as for each of the five counties, based on
binned income data. Thus, we summed up the number of persons in each of the income bins for a
particular decade, and then used the RPME ado package for Stata created by Paul T. von Hippel
and Daniel A. Powers. It adjusts for the binned nature of the data, and uses an assumed Pareto
distribution to handle the top-coded bin. There were 17 income bins in 1980, 25 bins in 1990, and
16 bins in 2000 and 2010.
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Fig. 19.2 Percentages of occupation classes in tracts in Southern California from 1980 to 2010
scheme provided by (Marcińczak et al. 2015).3 As demonstrated in the map, High
SES neighbourhoods have expanded over time along with the rise of professional
occupations in the region. The number of High SES neighbourhoods (having over
50% of managers or professional occupations) increased from 121 in 1980 to 1150
3Given that the original classification scheme does not cover all possibilities, we have expanded the
definitions of the following three categories: High SES neighborhoods, Low SES neighborhoods,
and Middle SES neighborhoods. Specifically, if one of the three groups accounted for over 50% of
the total workers living in a neighborhood, the neighborhood was classified into one of the three
categories.
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Fig. 19.3 Neighbourhood types in the Los Angeles region, 1980–2010
in 2010, although it has not surpassed that of the most dominant category in the
region: Low SES neighbourhoods. In contrast, our study area turned out to have
a much smaller number of Middle to high SES neighbourhoods and Middle SES
neighbourhoods.
The percentage of workers classified as craft or related trades has shown a modest
increase over this period, going from 13% in 1980 to 18% in 2000 before declining in
recent years. The percentage of service and sales workers, clerical support workers,
and plant and machine operators have all shown declines over the study period. It
is also notable that the measure of occupational heterogeneity at the neighbourhood
level has consistently declined over the study period, which is indirect evidence of
increasing occupational segregation during this time period.
We also broke down the change in occupation structure across counties in the
region over this study period. For several of the occupation categories, the counties
followed similar trajectories. However, we highlight three particularly interesting
patterns. First, whereas professional occupations have shown a general growth across
all counties in the region, such jobs were relatively less present in the Inland Empire
counties in 1980, and their growth has lagged behind that of the rest of the region since
then. Whereas in 1980, about 10% of the jobs were constituted by professional occu-
pations in the Inland Empire counties, the percentage was 14% in relatively wealthy
Orange County. But by 2010, whereas the Inland Empire counties had increased to
23%professional occupations, in Orange County this had grown to 31%.Ventura and
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Los Angeles Counties also exhibited greater growth in professional jobs compared
to the IE counties. Second, there is also a notable change in the distribution of tech-
nicians, as the IE counties had the lowest percentage of such workers in 1980, but
have experienced a steady relative increase at the same time that the proportion of
such workers has stagnated in the other counties. By the 2000s, the IE counties had a
much larger percentage of technicians compared to the other counties in the region.
Third, although the relative presence of plant and machine operators has decreased
across the region, the decrease was sharpest in Los Angeles County. Whereas in LA
County, plant andmachine operators constituted almost 15% of workers in 1980, this
had been more than cut in half by the 2000s. The IE counties experienced a smaller
decrease, and by the 2000s have a larger presence of plant and machine operators
compared to LA County.
We also wished to assess the types of neighbourhoods that members of these
different occupation groups live in. Note that this is different than focusing on the
socioeconomic status of individual members of these occupations; rather, we are
interested in characterising the socioeconomic status of the neighbourhoods that
members of these occupation groups tend to live in. We did this by computing
the correlation between the percentage of a tract that is composed of a particular
occupation category and twokeymeasures: the average household income in the tract,
and the occupational heterogeneity in the tract. Table 19.1 displays the results, and
the top panel shows the correlationswith average household income.As expected, the
strongest positive correlations with average household income in the tract occur for
tracts with a higher proportion of manager or professional occupation workers. The
third highest correlation in 1980 was with technicians and associated professionals,
though this correlation weakened by 2010 and became similar to that for service and
sales workers. Whereas in 1980, plant and machine operators lived in tracts with the
lowest average household income, by 2010, this had shifted and craft and related
trades workers lived in tracts with the lowest average household income.
In the bottom panel of Table 19.1, we show the correlation of the percent of
various occupation groups in a tract with the occupational heterogeneity, which
gives a sense of the extent to which members of various occupation groups live in
neighbourhoods with a high degree of occupation mixing. In 1980, craft and related
trades workers lived in neighbourhoods with the highest level of occupation mixing,
and this level ofmixing has remained relatively constant over the study period. On the
other hand, whereas plant and machine operators in 1980 and 1990 tended to live in
neighbourhoodswith average levels of occupationmixing since 2000, they have lived
in neighbourhoodswith the highest levels of occupationmixing.At the other extreme,
whereas service and sales workers lived in themost homogeneous occupationmixing
neighbourhoods in 1980 and 1990, they have been in neighbourhoods with average
levels of mixing since 2000. The level of mixing in the neighbourhoods of the highest
occupation groups has consistently declined over the study period, especially for
professional workers and especially since 2010.
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Table 19.1 Correlation of percent in occupations with income and occupational heterogeneity
Correlation with average household income
1980 1990 2000 2010
Managers 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.71
Professionals 0.68 0.71 0.67 0.62
Technicians and associate
professionals
0.12 0.14 −0.29 −0.17
Clerical support workers −0.18 −0.19 −0.28 −0.33
Service and sales workers −0.02 −0.09 −0.05 −0.16
Craft and related trades
workers
−0.39 −0.53 −0.58 −0.55
Plant and machine
operators and assemblers
−0.56 −0.58 −0.55 −0.50
Elementary occupations −0.50 −0.57 −0.46 −0.43
Correlation with occupational heterogeneity
1980 1990 2000 2010
Managers −0.08 −0.24 −0.28 −0.39
Professionals −0.12 −0.23 −0.45 −0.67
Technicians and associate
professionals
0.32 0.16 0.36 0.34
Clerical support workers 0.23 0.36 0.34 0.38
Service and sales workers −0.25 −0.27 0.04 0.08
Craft and related trades
workers
0.41 0.46 0.17 0.42
Plant and machine
operators and assemblers
−0.11 0.08 0.39 0.47
Elementary occupations −0.05 0.19 0.26 0.31
19.4.2 Residential Segregation Between Economic Groups
We next focus on the degree of segregation between economic groups, as measured
by occupation categories. We assessed this by computing the index of dissimilarity
between various groups in each of the decades of the study. The complete results are
presented in Tables 19.2 and 19.3. We also visually present some results to illustrate
the extent to which segregation between the most prestigious occupations (managers
and professionals) and other occupation groups have changed over time. As shown
in Fig. 19.4, these higher status occupations were most segregated from plant and
machine operators in 1980 and 1990, but the level of segregation between these
groups has not changed much over this time period.
On the other hand, the degree of segregation between these higher status occupa-
tion groups and elementary occupations has shown a steady increase over the study
period, and since 2000 have shown the highest degree of segregation among the
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Table 19.3 Dissimilarity
Index (multiplied by 100)
between Top, Middle and
Bottom groups
1980 1990 2000 2010 
TOP - MID 21 21 25 29 
TOP - BOT 29 31 34 36 
MID - BOT 15 16 15 20 








1980 1990 2000 2010
Technicians and associate professionals Clerical support workers
Service and sales workers Cra  and related trades workers
Plant and machine operators and assemblers Elementary occupa ons
Fig. 19.4 Index of dissimilarity between managers/professionals and specific classes
groups shown in Fig. 19.1; the index of dissimilarity has increased from 0.41 to
0.57 over these 30 years. This finding is well illustrated in Fig. 19.5, juxtaposing the
tract-level location quotients (LQ) of the higher status occupation groups and those
of elementary occupations. Managers and professionals are concentrated in some
affluent areas, including the northwestern parts of Los Angeles County and southern
Orange County, where elementary occupations’ LQ has remained extremely low.
Figure 19.6 also highlights these locations in the region appearing largely stable
over time, while some temporal changes are noticeable.
Other occupation groups have also shown an increasing trend of the dissimilarity
index, suggesting that the overall level of occupational segregation has strengthened
quite noticeably in the Los Angeles metropolitan region. For instance, whereas in
1980 and 1990 there were relatively low levels of segregation between these higher
status occupations and technicians and associate professionals, this has jumped from
0.20 in 1980 to 0.37 in 2010. The lowest levels of segregation for these higher status
occupations are with those in clerical support or sales and service occupations.
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Fig. 19.5 Managers and professionals versus elementary occupations
We also explored the change over time in segregation between workers classified
into high, middle, or low-status occupations. FollowingMarcinczak et al. (2015), we
defined these as: high status is managers and professional occupations; middle status
is technicians and associate professionals and clerical support workers; low status
is service and sales workers, craft and related trades workers, plant and machine
operators and assemblers, and elementary occupations. The segregation between the
highest and lowest occupation workers has steadily increased over the study period,
rising from 0.29 in 1980 to 0.36 in 2010 as seen in Table 19.3. The segregation
between high and middle occupation workers has also risen since 1990, going from
0.21 in 1990 to 0.29 in 2010. The level of segregation between middle and lower-
status occupations has not increased as dramatically, as the segregation between these
groups remained flat between 1980 and 2000, and has only risen in the last decade
from 0.15 to 0.20.
Finally, although we have seen a rise in occupational segregation in the region
over this time period, there is less evidence of a rise in racial/ethnic segregation.
We assessed this by computing the Theil index across tracts in each of the counties
based on five racial/ethnic categories (Asian, Black, White, Latino, and other race).
Whereas Los Angeles County has consistently experienced the highest racial/ethnic
segregation in the region, the values have actually drifted downward over these thirty
years (from 0.37 to 0.315). Riverside and San Bernardino counties have consistently
had the lowest levels of racial/ethnic segregation over this period, with values around
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Fig. 19.6 Distribution of managers and professionals, 1980–2010
0.16. Ventura is slightly higher (0.22), although it has remained stable. Only Orange
County has experienced a modest increase over the study period from 0.16 to 0.23.
Thus, the increasing occupational segregation in the region appears to not be related
to racial/ethnic segregation processes.
19.5 Conclusion
This study has focused on how levels of inequality in the Los Angeles area have
changed from 1980 to 2010. Whereas we observed notable increases in inequality
over the time period, as measured by the Gini coefficient based on household income
levels, we also observed substantial changes in the region’s occupation structure. The
region has experienced a large increase in the proportion of professional workers over
the study period. At the same time, there has been a large drop in the relative propor-
tion of plant and machine operators. This pattern is consistent with the restructuring
of jobs from blue collar towards white collar work, especially in this region.
Importantly,we also detected evidence of increasing residential segregation across
the economic groups over time. Among others, we found that the highest status occu-
pations (managers and professional workers) are becomingmore spatially segregated
from other occupations over the study period, while the rates of segregation increase
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varied by group and decade. There was also evidence that these highest status occu-
pation workers tend to live in areas with the most economical resources to which
other groups have limited access.
Admittedly, the traditional dissimilarity index and other metrics employed in this
study would not allow us to capture the full extent and details of the segregation
dynamics underway in the Los Angeles metropolitan region. It is also known that
the census tracts used here, as done in numerous other studies, have a limited ability
to represent the true neighbourhood boundaries in reality. There is also concern that
the lower sampling rate of the ACS in 2010 can bias segregation estimates; indeed,
studies have shown such an effect when measuring economic segregation based on
binned income data (Reardon et al. 2018). However, the fact that our occupation
categories are less extensive than the income bins (and therefore not as subject to
small counts) suggests that our results may be less impacted by this issue. Also,
other limitations would not invalidate the strong evidence of increasing occupational
segregation patterns and should not undermine the implications of the evidence that
deserves further attention.
How these patterns might change as Los Angeles County—the central county in
the region—continues to build out its light rail public transportation system, remains
to be seen. In the short-term, these new light rail lines seem to engender gentrifica-
tion processes in the adjacent neighbourhoods. In the long-term, the question arises
whether this public investment can change some of the current patterns observed
in this more sprawling, car-centric, development. One can be optimistic about the
future, given that there have been numerous state-level efforts to promote affordable
housing provision in various locations, including transit-rich areas, but we should
not underestimate the obstacles that will have to be overcome in order to make a
meaningful difference in the next decades.
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Chapter 20
Socioeconomic Segregation in Mexico
City: Scale, Social Classes,
and the Primate City
Paavo Monkkonen, M. Paloma Giottonini, and Andre Comandon
Abstract Mexico City is known as one of the largest cities in the world and thought
bymany to be one of themost unequal.Not surprisingly, it has receivedmore attention
than other Mexican urban areas. However, the city’s internal social organization is
often misunderstood. Mexico City stands out as a city where segregation is relatively
low, and levels of inequality are actually lower than perceptions. Moreover, between
1990 and 2010, both segregation and inequality have declined. This chapter exam-
ines these changes. We report on changes in occupational structure and patterns of
segregation by educational level. Educational level is different from income or occu-
pation, but these three dimensions of socioeconomic conditions are closely linked.
While the overall level of segregation between educational groups in the city has
slightly decreased, residential patterns of educational groups have changed signifi-
cantly. The number of neighborhoods with high concentrations of highly educated
people increased significantly and expanded geographically. At the same time, the
prevalence of neighborhoods with residents with low and middle educational attain-
ment has diminished and neighborhoods that house people of all educational cate-
gories or high and middle categories are more numerous. This chapter illustrates the
complexity of segregation patterns in such a large metropolitan area, as well as the
challenges of determining why patterns have changed.
Keywords Segregation · Inequality · Education · Neighborhood ·Mexico City
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20.1 Introduction
Mexico City is one of the largest cities in the world and by far the largest in Mexico.
One in six Mexicans live in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA). It also has
one of the longest histories of large-scale urbanization in the Americas, giving the
sprawling metropolis multiple personalities. The patchwork of neighborhoods that
have developed over centuries form the economic hub of the country, the center of
the federal government, and a concentrated cultural repository. Cities that dominate
their national urban system—primate cities like Mexico City—tend to be richer but
also more unequal. Yet, the MCMA is not as unequal as one might expect. More
surprisingly, given the popular understanding of the city, levels of social segregation
are relatively low in the MCMA when measured using available data.
The perception of Mexico as an extremely unequal country is widespread. It does
have a high rate of inequality compared to OECD countries, with a Gini coefficient1
in 2016 of 0.43 being 25% higher than the OECD average. Yet it is less unequal
than most other Latin American and many middle-income countries. For example,
its Gini coefficient was lower than Brazil, Colombia, and South Africa, which all had
GINI coefficients over 0.5 (OECD 2019b; World Bank 2019). Income inequality in
Mexico increased in the 1990s before declining after 2000 to levels below those of
1990 (Cortés 2013). Though income inequalitymay be lower than expected, there are
multiple aspects of social inequality in Mexican society, with dramatic differences
in access to education, health services, housing, safety, and overall quality of life.
In this chapter, we assess income inequality and the levels and patterns of residen-
tial segregation in the MCMA.We focus on segregation by educational achievement
because it is the only variable for which data are available. Education is also a proxy
for socioeconomic status and a critical aspect of social inequality. One distinction is
that unlike income, educational attainment of a person cannot go down. In Mexico,
educational achievement has increased over time, while incomes have remained rela-
tively stagnant. Nonetheless, they are strongly linked. Our central research question
fits within the questions of socioeconomic segregation this book deals with. We ask
how and to what extent levels of segregation by education and the residential patterns
of educational groups have changed In the MCMA during the last two decades.
The answer to that question addresses a debate over the relationship between
inequality and spatial segregation. Researchers in high-income countries have found
a correlation between socioeconomic inequality and residential segregation (Reardon
and Bischoff 2011), but evidence for this relationship in Mexico is mixed. This
chapter details this connection by first describing the complex spatial and economic
structures of the region. The next section provides an overview of inequality and its
connection to segregation in the context of Mexico City. The fourth section presents
the empirical results and illustrates the main patterns visually. The final two sections
provide a discussion of the results and possible futures for the city.
1All GINI estimates presented in this chapter are calculated using after tax income.
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20.2 Background: The Great Tenochtitlan
Mexico City has long been the site of one of the most populous cities in the world.
WhenHernanCortés and his soldiers reachedTenochtitlán in 1519, theywere amazed
about its size, infrastructure, and cleanliness. Estimates of its population are around
250,000, larger than any other European city at that time, except for Paris or Istanbul
(then Constantinople) at that time.
The growth of Mexico City and its metropolitan region has been a continuous
process since the founding of Tenochtilán in the fourteenth century. However,
the rural-to-urban migration of the second half of the twentieth century and the
subsequent acceleration of suburbanization are the most consequential urbanization
periods for the region. They led the MCMA to be one of the most populated and
largest urban areas in the world. It currently has a population of about 22 million
in a territory covering 7,866 km2 (INEGI 2011), making it the largest urban area in
Latin America.
The MCMA is composed of dozens of local jurisdictions spanning three states.
At the core is Mexico City (formerly known as the Federal District and currently as
CDMX), which is divided into 16 Delegaciones (similar to municipalities). Mexico
City is the urban core of the region and for the remainder of the paper, we useMCMA
to denote the region and Mexico City to refer to the core area. The remainder of
the MCMA spills into two adjacent states—nearly 60 municipalities in the State
of Mexico and one in the State of Hidalgo (SEDESOL et al. 2012). Figure 20.1
illustrates the location of the MCMA in the national context, as well as its political
jurisdictions.
Fig. 20.1 Geography of
Mexico City Metropolitan
Area (MCMA)
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The population of the metropolitan area used to be more concentrated in Mexico
City itself, but after it urbanized most available land, Mexico City has had a lower
growth rate than the adjacent municipalities of State ofMexico andHidalgo. In 1990,
over 50% of the population of the MCMA was in Mexico City (about eight million
people), whereas in 2015 Mexico City’s nine million residents are only 40% of
the larger metropolitan region (INEGI 2015a, b). The government officially defined
the current MCMA (also known as Zona Metropolitana del Valle de Mexico) in
2004 (SEDESOL et al. 2012). At this time, 36 additional municipalities were added,
practically doubling the metropolitan region’s territory.
Most of the population growth of the metropolitan area is the result of this
territorial annexation and of the high population growth rates in the municipali-
ties belonging to State of Mexico, rather than population growth within Mexico
City. Nonetheless, the MCMA stands out for its slower rate of population growth as
compared to the national average. Between 2000 and 2010, the MCMA had one of
the slowest urban growth rates (0.9%) in the country. The national average was 1.4%
and other metropolitan areas grew at 2.0%. However, given the size of the region,
this lower rate still means large population changes in absolute numbers. Mexico
City is also the densest urban area in the country with about 6,000 inhabitants per
square kilometer (INEGI 2015a, b).Many peripheral areas have also become densely
populated (see Figure in supplementary material online).
The urban primacy of the MCMA is unquestionable: it is the most populated and
economically competitive city in Mexico. In 2009, the MCMA housed about 19% of
the country’s population, 25% of national gross domestic product (GDP), and 23% of
jobs (Trejo Nieto 2016). Mexico City is not only an important global financial center,
it is also widely recognized as the cultural capital of Latin America. Mexico City has
the oldest university in the continent, two world heritage sites, and more museums
than any other city in the world. This status, combined with the continued internal
migration of people moving from rural-to-urban areas in search of better economic
opportunity, has privileged low-skilled manufacturing and (informal) service jobs
in the city’s occupational makeup (García et al. 1978; Zenteno and Solís 2006).
Thus, despite its slowing growth rate, the city continues to attract people fromwithin
Mexico and the rest of the world.
20.2.1 Occupational Characteristics of the Metropolitan Area
Compared to the other large metropolitan areas in Mexico, the MCMA has a more
specialized occupational profile. It has a large share of jobs in the service sector—
45% compared to 30% in the average city (Montejano et al. 2019). Its population
has among the highest educational attainment and a high level of productivity per
capita, though perhaps not as high as one might expect. The MCMA is home to
the country’s largest corporate headquarters but has such a large labor force that the
average statistics overwhelm these high-level jobs.
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Fig. 20.2 Distribution of occupational groups in the MCMA and change over time. The Top cate-
gory is comprised of Professionals, technicians, and art workers (PRO), Education workers (EDU)
and Public officials and managers (POM). The Middle category includes Clerks (CLE), Industrial
workers, craftsmen and assistants (IND), and Merchants (COM). The Bottom category consists of
Transport operators (TRANS), Workers in personal services (SERV), Workers in protection and
security surveillance (PROT), Agricultural workers (AGRO), and the Unemployed (UNE). Source
INEGI (n.d.). Notes The occupation categories are derived from the standard North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) whose classifications are used in the Mexican National
Occupation and Employment Survey (ENOE) conducted by INEGI. We used sample data for the
fourth trimester of years 2005, 2010, and 2015 for the States of Mexico, Hidalgo, and Mexico City
(which in censual terms functions as a state)
This productivity lag connects to the slow rate of change in the occupational
compositionof theMCMA.Figure 20.2 shows thedistributionof occupational groups
in 2005, 2010, and 2015. About 30% of the employees are in the bottom occupation
groups and less than 20 percent are in the top category. As a node of attraction for both
firms andworkers, theMCMAhosts both a highly skilled labor force and a large group
of low-skilled workers. However, the stable share of occupations reflects a stagnation
in the specialization of the region—all sectors are expanding at similar rates. Greater
productivity growthwould be consistent with a shift toward a concentration in certain
industries or at least an expansion of people in the top occupational category, which
has not been the case in the MCMA.
The stability of the occupational profile stems from the rigid occupational strati-
fication in Mexico. Intergenerational occupational mobility is lower in Mexico than
in the rest of Latin America (Zenteno and Solís 2006), especially in the upper classes
(Torche 2014). Occupational mobility is limited in spite of significant improvements
in educational outcomes. It would seem that educational attainment in Mexico is
not a determining factor in facilitating upward occupational mobility or preventing
downward occupational mobility, i.e., higher levels of education do not ensure the
entry or stay in the highest occupational groups (Zenteno and Solís 2006).
Additionally, educational reforms have mostly improved the intergenerational
educational attainment at the lower levels (switch from primary to secondary) where
there is a bigger increase in years of education compared to switch from secondary to
tertiary education. Reforms have not improved positive effects in terms of employ-
ment. In otherwords, amove in average completion fromgrade three to grade nine has
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a greater numerical impact when it comes to years-in-education than a move from
grade nine to grade 12, but the latter has stronger positive effects on individuals’
labor market outcomes. This greatly limits the impact of reforms when high-wage
jobs require a college degree or graduate diploma.
The link between education and occupation is also visible across neighborhoods.
Residents of Mexico City have higher education and are more likely to be in the
top occupational category (23%) than residents of the States of Mexico and Hidalgo
(only 13%). This concentration also translates to local clustering. The clustering
of high-skilled jobs in and around the central business district of Mexico City is
mismatched with the location of workers (Trejo Nieto 2016). Spatial mismatch of
high-status jobs results partly because people with greater resources also have greater
ability to commute longer distances.
20.2.2 The Mexican Housing System and Segregation
Housing occupies an uneasy position in relation to the welfare system (Malpass
2008). The state tends to intervene systematically in the housing sector, espe-
cially in middle-income countries. Like other Latin American countries, Mexico
has embarked on an ambitious policy agenda to increase access to formal housing.
TheMexican program has shaped cities perhaps evenmore than in its southern neigh-
bors. Until recently, Mexican cities have had a spatial structure similar to that of the
rest of Latin America. This structure has three elements: (1) low-income households
mostly clustered to low-density peripheral areas, usually with limited or no urban
services; (2) high-income households concentrated in certain areas of the city, usually
starting near the historic center and move outward in one direction; and (3) a greater
socioeconomic homogeneity in low-income neighborhoods (Griffin and Ford 1980;
Sabatini 2003).
During recent decades, however, the peripheral areas of cities inMexico, including
the MCMA, have changed dramatically. Numerous large, homogeneous housing
developments for the working class were built in cities across the country, driven
by the reform and expansion of a federal housing fund (named INFONAVIT for its
initials in Spanish) beginning in the early 1990s. The boom in financing transformed
theway housing is produced and acquired (Monkkonen 2011). Prior to the year 2000,
individuals built the majority of housing in an incremental, self-help manner on plots
of land they purchased. Since then, federal mortgages enabled private developers to
build large tracts of formal housing for purchase and now a majority of housing is
built by developers and purchased with a mortgage. The federal mortgage fund is
generated through a 5% payroll tax and has greater resources than other welfare
sectors in Mexico. The share of public expenditure is still relatively low, at around
1% of GDP.
Housing provision through this fund has some significant shortcomings. First,
workers in the informal sector, whose housing need is often most severe (OECD
2006), cannot access this government program which is available only to salaried
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employees. Second, the housing offered is of a very small size, low quality and gener-
ally has a peripheral location often far from jobs. The changes to the government’s
housing fund without concurrent changes in municipal planning practice meant that
developers also became de facto urban planners, with certain freedoms in deciding
where, what, and how to build (Libertun de Duren 2018). New housing develop-
ments are homogenous, whichmeans potential buyers are of a similar socioeconomic
status. This has exacerbated residential segregation between socioeconomic groups
(Monkkonen 2012a) and is connected to problems of housing vacancy (Monkkonen
2019).
20.3 Socioeconomic Segregation and Income Inequality
in Mexico City
Recent work on segregation in Mexico shows that larger and higher cost cities are
more segregated, though there are some regional differences across the country
(Monkkonen 2012b, 2018). Cities in the northern region of Mexico have a larger
presence of formal workers and high-income households, while the cities in the
south have a much higher proportion of lower-income households and indigenous
population. These two findings align with the general regional development trends
in Mexico, i.e. the industrialization of northern cities and the persistent poverty in
the south (Garza 1999; Trejo Nieto 2019). Nonetheless, the median city in the south
is roughly 10% less segregated than the median city in the north.
The MCMA, located in the central region of Mexico, has the highest proportion
of workers in the informal sector (54%) in the country. At the same time that it
houses the most affluent households in the country, the federal government, and the
nation’s most prominent cultural institutions, the MCMA also has a high proportion
of low-income households (38%), a share only surpassed by the Southern region
(Monkkonen 2012b). The MCMA also has a disproportionate share of high-income
households—using a separate dataset from 2015 (INEGI 2015a, b), we find roughly
18% of the households in Mexico City fall into the top decile of earners nationwide.
This number is only 15% for the entire MCMA.
The MCMA is relatively unequal but not socially segregated. In 2014, compared
to the country’s states, Mexico City had the fifth highest GINI coefficient (0.48),
and the states of Hidalgo and Mexico State had GINI coefficients of 0.48 and 0.44,
respectively (OECD 2019a). Apart from income inequality and occupational profile,
city size and urban growth are fundamental drivers of socioeconomic segregation
(Monkkonen 2012a; Rubalcava and Schteingart 2000; Ariza and Solis 2009). As
cities expand their territories, commuting distances and disparities in land values
increase, which leads to more differentiated neighborhoods (Mills and Hamilton
1994).
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The rapid population growth of the MCMA took place in the form of densifi-
cation of the existing urban area as well as expansion into neighboring municipal-
ities by both migrants moving from other states as well as from Mexico City to
the metropolitan periphery. The horizontal expansion is consistent with patterns of
spatial differentiation as new neighborhoods are developed.
20.4 Measuring the Relationship Between Income
and Socioeconomic Composition
The decennial census of Mexico does not inquire about occupation. Data on occupa-
tion is, therefore, only partially available through the Mexican National Occupation
and Employment Survey (ENOE). The statistical design of the ENOE produces
precise estimates at the national level and by state, but not for municipalities and
the smaller geographical units required for analyzing segregation. Therefore, we use
educational groupings as a proxy for socioeconomic status. Education correlateswith
income and socioeconomic status (Caragliu et al. 2012), and residential segregation
by income correlates with residential segregation by education (Monkkonen et al.
2018). We are, therefore, confident that our measures capture the main underlying
spatial patterns of inequality. However, education differs from income or occupation
in that education is not asmuch a product of market forces and does not determine the
residential choice of people directly. Therefore, it does have a different relationship
to spatial residential patterns.
Using education as the main variable changes the comparison of segregation
patterns over time. For example, the education reform of 1993 established compul-
sory secondary education.2 As such, children in school in the 1990s will automat-
ically have on average higher educational achievement than people who finished
school before the reform. Additionally, educational achievement is more permanent
than income. Most people do not go back to school later in life, but their income
can change every year, increasing or decreasing. This has different implications for
changes in social mix.
Throughout this analysis, we use education attainment at the level of the basic
geo-statistical area (known as AGEB for its initials in Spanish), which is equivalent
to a census tract. We use data from the census of 1990, 2000 and 2010 carried out
by the National Institute of Geography, Informatics and Statistics (INEGI). We use
all urban AGEBs in the 76 municipalities of the MCMA in the year 2010.3 That is,
we apply the 2004 MCMA boundaries to the years 2000 and 1990. A large share of
tracts outside Mexico city itself do not have data in 1990 because they had not been
urbanized yet.
2In Mexico, secondary education refers to secundaria, which is equivalent to years 7, 8 and 9 of
schooling.
3The MCMA has 5,605 AGEBs. They have mean and median population of 3,485 and 3,171.
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Table 20.1 Indices of
dissimilarity (DI) for the
MCMA
Low to middle Middle to high Low to high
1990 0.12 0.25 0.34
2000 0.14 0.32 0.45
2010 0.07 0.27 0.31
We categorize educational attainment in three levels: Low (complete or partial
elementary education only, i.e. primaria, up to six years of schooling); Middle
(complete or partial middle school education, i.e. secundaria, or seven to nine years
of schooling); and High (complete or partial high school, college, or a higher degree,
from 10 to more years of schooling).4 In some cases, we discuss the differences
betweenMexico City and theMCMA because its 16 municipalities are more consol-
idated and its population characteristics are different. We calculate the dissimilarity
index (DI) using the three pairings of educational categories (Low-Middle Middle-
High, and Low-High) for each year. Following the study byMarcińczak et al. (2015),
we interpret DI values below 20 as low, and DI values above 40 as high. Table 20.1
presents the results.
Two patterns stand out. First, in parallel with income inequality, the DI increased
from 1990 to 2000 and then dropped, to levels lower than 1990 in 2010. The second
striking result is that in no year and category is the segregation level higher than
0.4, except for the low to high segregation in 2000. The DI for the low to high
category is always the highest, and the Low-to-Middle category is the lowest. This is
consistent with theories of segregation that predict growth in residential separation
with increasing social distance (e.g. Caldeira 2012).
In order to depict the concentration of these groups across the MCMA, we calcu-
lated the location quotient (LQ) using the High and Low educational categories.
Figure 20.3 presents these maps. For the three points in time, Mexico City has an
above average concentration of people with higher education, while the surrounding
municipalities in Mexico State and Hidalgo State have a lower than average concen-
tration. We find an above average concentration of groups with a lower educational
attainment outside of Mexico City, and this concentration tends to increase as we
move further away from the center.
We then classified neighborhoods in seven categories using the composition
criteria laid out by Marcińczak et al. (2015). A significant share of tracts (over 40
percent in some years) remained unclassified using their exact criteria, which limited
the comparative power of this calculation. Therefore, we modified the formula used
by Marcińczak and his colleagues. Table 20.2 summarizes the categories after these
changes.
Using the modified formula, we categorized all but a handful of tracts. Table 20.3
presents the percent of tracts in each of the categories. Themajority of neighborhoods
fall into the Low-to-Middle category until 2010 when the second largest category,
4Unfortunately, because of changes in the classification of education, we cannot distinguish beyond
high school as a group consistently over the three decades.
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Fig. 20.3 Location quotient maps for the High and Low educational groups in the MCMA
Table 20.2 Criteria used for
the classification of
neighborhood types using to
educational attainment
Type Percentage of educated population by
AGEB
High (%) Middle (%) Low (%)
High >50 <30 <30
Middle to high 25–55 25–60 <25
Middle <30 >50 <30
Low to middle <25 25–60 25–55
Low <30 <30 >50
Mixed 25–50 25–50 25–50
Polarized 25–60 <25 25–60
Table 20.3 Percent of tracts
categorized by neighborhood
type, 1990–2010
Type 1990 2000 2010
High 0.1 1.3 7.5
Middle to high 21.7 17.6 30.2
Middle 16.7 14.4 1.7
Low to middle 59.5 64.8 44.2
Low 0.1 1.2 0.5
Mixed 1.9 0.7 15.8
Polarized 0.1 0.0 0.1
20 Socioeconomic Segregation in Mexico City: Scale, Social … 399
Middle to High, converges. The small share of the Low category areas sheds light on
the larger pattern of segregation. Inmany parts of theworld the lowest socioeconomic
group is the most isolated and, along with the highest category, drives overall levels
of segregation. This is not the case of the MCMA. Very few areas of concentrated
Low education neighborhoods exist.
Although the 1993 education reform, which established secondary education as
compulsory, may have contributed to the absence of concentrated areas of low educa-
tion, it is unlikely to be the main factor. The reform only affected children attending
school in the years after 1993 thus had no effect on the adult population. A bigger
influence could be the continued migration from rural areas. However, there is no
clear evidence on the relationship between in-migration and segregation.
The share of High education neighborhoods was very small in the years 1990
and 2000, but increased to 8% by 2010. At the same time, the Middle education
neighborhoods nearly disappeared. The concurrent changes in the paired category
(Middle-High and Low-Middle) and Mixed category reflect a dramatic shift in the
neigbourhoods’ educational structure. The most common neighborhood groups are
Low-to-Middle (decreasing) and Middle-to-High (increasing) neighborhoods.
We cannot identify the role of the residential mobility of different educational
groups (e.g. people with high education entering High education neighborhoods) in
segregation from our data. However, the role of residential mobility is likely to be
modest in these neighborhood changes since the mobility ofMexican families is low,
and family members tend to remain together until children are older. Rather, as each
new generation is better educated compared to their parents, neighborhoods become
educationally more mixed as a result of in situ intergenerational improvements in
education.
We also found significant changes in the spatial distribution of neighborhood
types given the educational composition of their residents. Figure 20.4 shows the
distribution of each type of neighborhood in the MCMA. Mexico City consistently
has more higher attainment neighborhoods than the rest of the metropolitan region.
In 1990, the vast majority of High neighborhoods in the MCMA were in Mexico
City, along with about 81% of the Middle-to-High neighborhoods, but only 32%
of the Middle neighborhoods. In 2010, 84% of High neighborhoods and 55% of
Middle-to-High neighborhoods were located in Mexico City.
Between 1990 and 2010, the number ofMiddle, Low-to-Middle andMixed neigh-
borhoods decreased significantly inMexicoCity. The share ofMiddle neighborhoods
decreased from 32 to 5%, the share of Mixed neighborhoods from 92 to 46%, and
the share of Low-to-Middle neighborhoods from 52 to 29%. It also had all of the few
polarized neighborhoods.
Mexico City has an over-representation at the higher end of the neighborhood
distribution by education, but the trend points to an equalization with the rest of the
region. The share of Middle-to-High and Middle neighborhoods decreased signif-
icantly in the urban core, while the north and northwestern areas directly adjacent
to Mexico City saw an increment in Middle-to-High and Mixed neighborhoods in
2010.
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Fig. 20.4 Classification of neighborhoods by educational attainment in the MCMA
To determine whether the population with the highest educational attainment
clustered in specific areas, we first sort neighborhoods by the absolute number of
High category households, and then group neighborhoods into quintiles. Figure 20.5
showsneighborhoods basedon the quintles they belonged to. The topquintile remains
concentrated in the core of Mexico City through time, with a few newer clusters
appearing in the North and Northwestern areas outside the Mexico City limits. This
may be caused partly by the dispersion of the MCMA: in 1990 the urban core of
Mexico City had about 55% of the AGEBs of the metropolitan area, while in 2010
it had only 43% of the AGEBs. Even so, the location of the top quintile (Q1) has
changed significantly through time. In 1990, 41% of the Q1 neighborhoods were
concentrated in Mexico City. By 2010 that share dropped to 28%.
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Fig. 20.5 Location of the highest educational group in the MCMA
The distribution of the lowest quintile (Q5) also changed, but not as drastically
(from 65% in 1990 to 60% in 2010). While urban expansion is sometimes thought to
be fueling the displacement of specific groups, a large proportion of the expansion
is actually the appearance of Middle and Low-to-Middle income neighborhoods in
the periphery (due to the social housing finance program that started in the 1990s).
Thenewclusters ofQ5 located to the north andnorthwest areas outside of the urban
core (Mexico City) signals a reorganization of the urban hierarchies of the past. The
National Population Council [CONAPO] categorized these areas with a much lower
degree of marginalization (measured by level of education, access to health, housing
characteristics, and availability of household goods); the eastern and southeastern
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areaswhere older incremental housing developments ofNeza andChalco are located,
remain poor and with a higher degree of marginalization (CONAPO 2012).
20.5 An Uncertain Trajectory
Inequality is a necessary condition for socioeconomic segregation, but decreases in
inequality do not always lead to lower levels of residential segregation, i.e., to higher
levels of residential integration. When assessing social segregation using education
levels, it is important to consider that a more systematic link between educational
improvements andwage improvementswould have likely led to greater segregationist
pressures at the same time that it reduced inequality in the short term. According to
theMexican National Evaluation Council [CONEVAL], all municipalities within the
MCMA experienced a reduction in inequality between 1990 and 2010—the average
GINI coefficient dropped from 0.44 in 1990 to 0.40 in 2010. Mexico City had a Gini
coefficient of 0.49 in 1990, 0.48 in 2000, and 0.42 in 2010. At the metropolitan level,
inequality increased slightly between 1990 and 2000 for the municipalities outside
of Mexico City (GINI coefficients of 0.41–0.44 for Mexico State and of 0.42–0.45
for Hidalgo5), but then dropped to below 0.40 in 2010 (CONEVAL 2017).
The decrease in segregation between 2000 and 2010 points to other factors influ-
encing the spatial structure of the MCMA. The economic structure of the MCMA
is stable and incomes have gone up. The number (though not the share) of people
in high-wage occupations has increased. The large-scale provision of housing has
likely contributed to the sorting of people and a selection process that affects segre-
gation. Many of the people moving to the peripheries are doing so because of the
government’s housing fund, available only to formally employed, salaried workers.
This leaves different types of people in the core city, including those with informal
employment (and likely lower levels of educational achievement), as well as high
income but non-salaried workers, and salaried workers who do not want to commute
to jobs in the core city.
MexicoCity is changing. LargerMiddle andHigh-income enclaves and secondary
business districts have emerged in the peripheries, especially at the edge of the
urban core of Mexico City. The city’s development is more fragmented and there
5These GINI coefficients are only for those municipalities that are part of the MCMA, not for the
State of Mexico and Hidalgo.
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are more differentiated spaces: gated communities of different income levels and
internationally oriented districts. This is likely to accelerate the process of residential
segregation yet it has not, at least in the way we can measure it.
20.6 Conclusion
The spatial complexity of the Mexico City Metropolitan Area, the vast amalgam of
neighborhoods that make up its dozens of municipalities, does not translate to high
levels of segregation. This fact contrasts with Mexico’s rigid economic and social
structures and underlying inequalities, which are likely why many observers—and
experts—assume the city and the country are highly segregated. In this analysis, we
find that the spatial distribution of people of different educational levels is relatively
even across the city. Most neighborhoods have at least two groups (usually Low
and Middle or Middle and High educational attainment), with an increasing number
having representation of all educational groups.
There is an increase in the number of neighborhoods where one group dominates,
most notably in neighborhoods where people with high education are clearly over-
represented. This suggests distinct processes shaping economic returns to education
and residence. Despite localized changes, citywide changes in education outcomes
have not translated to increased segregation as measured by the dissimilarity index.
The improved education of people living in Mexico City has not improved labor
market outcomes, however. This, we hypothesize, has led to a city where people stay
in place (including children with improved education still staying in parental home)
to maintain access to family members, community, and jobs.
With the improvement of education but modest residential mobility, in situ educa-
tion change in neighborhoods has been important, andwe assume drive the decease of
city-wide levels of segregation between 1990 and 2010. Separation ismost systematic
between those with the highest level of education and those with low educational
attainment. This separation has translated into a rapid increase in the number of
neighborhoods dominated by highly educated individuals. At the same time, mixed
neighborhoods and areas where people withmiddle and high levels of education have
become the norm, replacing the long dominant mix of low and middle educational
attainment.
These shifts, while not increasing segregation, are reshaping the spatial structure
of the MCMA. Newly built neighborhoods in the peripheries are receiving large
numbers of residents, who risk being locked in places that lack access to quality
education and jobs. People with high educational attainment are moving into newer
developments that might afford them greater opportunities to isolate themselves from
the rest of population compared to the traditional core areas that used to be the home
of most highly educated residents. These changes were clearly visible in 2010.
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Mexico City’s new administration has already proposed new approaches to
housing, including the idea of inclusionary housing6 that may allow it to counter
tendencies of social segregation in the core of the metropolitan area. Concurrent
improvements in social services and educational opportunities in the State ofMexico
and Hidalgo will reduce the disadvantage of the metropolitan periphery, but the
tendency of employment centralization will be more difficult to change. The 2020
census will shed important light on which trajectory the city is following.
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Chapter 21
Reordering Occupation, Race, and Place
in Metropolitan New York
Kasey Zapatka, John Mollenkopf, and Steven Romalewski
Abstract The New York metropolitan area is one of the oldest, largest, and perhaps
most complex urban region in the United States (U.S.). Its 23.7 million residents
live across four states, produce a GDP of more than $1.7 trillion, are governed by a
fragmented political system, and experience persistently high degrees of geographic
and racial/ethnic inequality and segregation. This chapter investigates the evolving
spatial organization of occupation and race across themetropolitan area.While white
professionals have traditionally lived in an outer ring of suburbs and blue-collar
immigrant and minority groups have lived closer to the city center, our research
shows that the forces of gentrification and minority and immigrant suburbaniza-
tion have been turning the metropolitan area inside out. Specifically, young, usually
white, professionals are increasingly located in and around the central city whereas
many working-class minorities have shifted away from it. At the heart of this spatial
reordering lie the diminishingplurality of native-bornwhiteswithin the region and the
increasing share of immigrantminority groups, especially for foreign-bornHispanics
and Asians. This trend has lessened the share of white males in better occupations
even as the region’s occupational structure slowly but inexorably tilts towardmanage-
rial and professional occupations. Technology is transforming white-collar work as
blue-collar work continues to disappear. Dramatic shifts are thus afoot, yet inequality
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and segregation remain high. We argue that these changes in the spatial organization
of the metropolitan area challenge us to see these inequalities from a new vantage
point. As elites are now more likely to live among less advantaged groups, this may
provide the social basis for new thinking.
Keywords New York metropolitan area · Demographic change · Spatial
inequality · Immigrant suburbanization · Segregation
21.1 Introduction
The New York metropolitan region is old, large, and complex. Settlers sent by the
Dutch West India Company founded the colony on Lenape Native American land in
1624 at the southernmost tip of present-day Manhattan. The great protected harbor
at the confluence of the Hudson River and the East River provided water access not
only along the East Coast of the U.S., but also north and west to the Great Lakes
and the inland U.S. (especially after the Erie Canal was completed in 1825). New
York City firms made the most of these advantages, achieving dominance over the
U.S. and the trans-Atlantic trading systems in the mid-nineteenth century. Building
on these initial advantages, a vast regional system of work, residence, and recreation
grew up around the city over time.
Today, the broadest official definition of the metropolitan region is the U.S.
Census-defined Combined Statistical Area (CSA). The border of the New York CSA
stretches from Atlantic City on the southern New Jersey coast northwest to Allen-
town, Pennsylvania, eastward across the Hudson River valley to Connecticut, and
then southeast across the Long Island Sound to include the length of Long Island.
This broad definition encompasses 23.7 million residents and more than 10 million
workers producing a $1.7 trillion GDP—ten percent of the U.S. total. More than a
third of these residents live in or just outside New York City at high-density levels
(656 people per square kilometer or more). Narrower definitions of the metropolitan
area include the U.S. Census-defined Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA) and the
OECD Functional Urban Area (FUA). The CBSA contains almost 20 million people
and 9.8 million workers but excludes Connecticut and distant subordinate metro
areas. This chapter analyzes patterns in the even smaller FUA delineation, pictured
in Fig. 21.1. It consists of 16 New York and New Jersey counties accounting for 17
million people and 8.3 million workers. The denser, inner FUA thus contains almost
three-quarters of the broader CSA population and four-fifths of its labor force.
The FUA’s metropolitan hierarchy centers on one large, dense city (New York)
surrounded by other smaller but still substantial cities (New Brunswick, Newark,
JerseyCity,Yonkers,White Plains, and themajorLong Island towns) and an extensive
network of suburbs.At present,NewYorkCity contains half of the FUApopulation—
8.6 million residents, 4.1 million workers, and 4.6 million jobs, four-fifths of which
are held by city residents. The FUA’s satellite cities and suburbs contain the other half
of the FUA’s residents, with 8.4million dwellers, 4.2millionworkers, and 3.6million
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Fig. 21.1 Geography of New York metropolitan area (OECD Functional Urban Area)
jobs, which are overwhelmingly held by people living outside the city. About 790,000
suburban workers commute into the central city, while approximately 300,000 city
residents work outside its boundaries.1
Amulti-nodal, radial system ofmass transit, highways, bridges, tunnels, and roads
knits together the regional patterns of residence and work. While the core city is
governed by a cohesive and centralized municipal government, the rest of the region
is fragmented into several states andmore than a thousandmunicipal jurisdictions, all
of which have developed distinct social fabrics and identities. Patterns of defensive
incorporation hardened these jurisdictional boundaries by the end of the nineteenth
century, with some suburban towns using zoning and housing regulations to attract
and serve better-off residents and leaving other places to house and serve the working
classes.
These arrangements produced and reinforced a persistently high, if gradually
declining, level of racial segregation, indeed currently the second highest of any
1As described below, sources include the 2000U.S. Census STF3 tract file and PublicUseMicrodata
Sample (PUMS) File and the American Community Survey (ACS) combined tract and public use
microdata files for 2008–2012 and 2013–2017. Since the ACS is a rolling five-year average, we
refer to 2008–2012 and 2013–2017 by their end year, 2012 and 2017, respectively, for simplicity.
Employment by place figures come from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The numbers here
were calculated from the PUMs File using the person weight and excluding all people not living
in households (i.e., group quarters).
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U.S. metro area (Frey 2018). As it does elsewhere in the United States, class has
a color in New York, since racial and ethnic groups cluster in specific occupations
and industries. Whites are strongly represented in top occupations in the higher
value-added industries while minority groups cluster in less rewarding occupations
and industries (Waldinger 1996).2 The residential segregation of different racial and
ethnic groups is thus intimately intertwined with patterns of socioeconomic segre-
gation and inequality. As the remainder of this analysis specifically discusses the
regional occupational and socioeconomic patterns of FUA, readers should keep the
patterns of the larger metropolitan region in mind.
21.2 Background: Changing Occupational Structures
and Patterns of Inequality and Segregation
New York exemplifies the post-World War II American metropolis. From the 1950s
through the 1980s, the decline of population and employment in inner cities with
growing minority populations was a key feature of this regional mosaic. By contrast,
growing suburbs attracted the white middle-class residents and workers with new
housing, shoppingmalls, and corporate office parks. Since then, however, three potent
forces have gradually begun to erode and alter this pattern. The first is demographic
(declining native and rising immigrant-origin populations), the second involves occu-
pational restructuring (the shift from production to services with a new ethno-racial
and gender division of labor), and the third concerns the shifting geography of
population concentrations (a shift in residential locations).
21.2.1 The Decline of the Native-Born and the Rise
of Immigrant-Origin Populations
The twin patterns of declining native-born and rising immigrant-origin populations
are reshaping the metropolitan region. The number and share of people living in
households headed by native-born non-Hispanic whites have declined relatively and
absolutely not just in the older central cities like New York City or Newark, but also
in the whole region, falling from 6.4 to 5.9 million between 2000 and 2017 and from
52.1 to 47.9% of the FUA total. This story of the native white population decline
2The U.S. Census collects information separately on race and Hispanic origin. In analyzing census
data, social scientists almost always group all Hispanics together as a distinct group, leaving non-
Hispanic whites, blacks, Asians, and other races as the other categories. When we use the terms
white, black, and Asian, we mean the non-Hispanic portions of those populations. Since “Hispanic”
is the official Census term, we use it here, although sometimes preferred alternatives are “Latino/a”
or “Latinx”. The census PUMS also ask respondents about their ethnic ancestries, places of birth,
and citizenship status, allowing researchers to identify specific ethnic groups (e.g.‚ Irish‚ Italian‚
Jamaican‚ or Dominican).
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is relatively old, but the pattern now also extends to native African American and
Puerto Rican households (For most of the period between 1950 and 1980, Puerto
Ricans contributed to the vast majority of Hispanic households). Membership in
African American households declined by 129,000 and Puerto Rican households by
59,000. If this had been the only trend, the region would have shrunk greatly, just as
it did on other rustbelt areas, but native out-migration was not the only force at work.
The number of people living in immigrant-origin households grew within all the
racial categories, more than offsetting the native declines.3 The immigrant-headed
household population surged by 1.34 million to 43.5% of the FUA total. As a result,
the FUA’s total population rose 6.5% between 2000 and 2017.
Ever since AfricanAmericans and Puerto Ricans became substantial groups in the
region, high levels of white-black segregation and lower but still high levels of white-
Hispanic segregation have characterized metropolitan residential patterns. Occupa-
tional segregation was lower, yet still considerable. Over time, however, deindustri-
alization and the shift to services have altered the types of industries and occupations
in the regional economy. As new immigrant-origin racial and ethnic groups entered
the metropolitan labor market, they tended to cluster in specific industry-occupation
niches thatwere open to thembecause native groupswere departing them, these occu-
pations were less desirable to native workers, job growth outstripped the supply of
native-born workers, or immigrant entrepreneurs found ways to enter them. Entering
groups competed with each other to access the available niches that offered higher
wages and more opportunity and achieve ethnic closure within them (Waldinger
1996). While workers from every ethnic or racial group span every occupation and
industry, they do so unevenly, achieving significant clustering in some niches and
remaining relatively sparse in others. To give one example, native-born whites make
up 41.6% of the workers in the FUA, yet they hold 65% of the chief executive and
only 6.9% of the dishwasher positions. Conversely, foreign-born Hispanics (12.6%
of all workers) hold only 2.7% of chief executive positions but are 61.4% of the dish-
washers. Racial and occupational segregation thus intertwine to create distinctive
patterns in the geography of the labor force.
21.2.2 New Ethno-Racial and Gender Divisions of Labor
The interaction between economic and demographic change between 2000 and 2017
has gradually reshaped the ethno-racial and gender division of labor in the region.
The dominance of suburban white males in the top occupations has diminished and
inner-city minorities have slowly shifted away from low-paid service jobs. Women,
minorities, and immigrants now hold increasing shares of higher-paying jobs.4 Of
3We group people by the characteristics of the household head because this identifies the immigrant
origin of native-born children with foreign born parents.
4Gender and family patterns are a critical part of this story, as more women enter the labor force and
more families rely on two earners. Ideally, our analyses would not only take race and nativity into
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course, dominant groups may still try to ensure that members of their own or other
favored groups will succeed them by maintaining barriers to immigrant and minority
upward occupational mobility. However, the declining number and share of workers
from native-born groups, especially whites, and the rising shares of workers from
minority immigrant households make it impossible for them to do so fully. White
males are aging out of the Top occupations and younger cohorts do not contain
enough white males to replace them. This has opened paths for what Richard Alba
(2009, p. 15) has called “non-zero sum upward mobility.”
21.2.3 A Shift in Residential Locations
Another important force reshaping the metropolitan area has been the shift in the
residential preferences of younger native-born, non-Hispanic white managers and
professionals away from their former distant suburban strongholds toward racially
diverse neighborhoods in and around the central city (see Ley 1996; Smith 1996
for competing theories as to why and how this occurs). This has been paired with
the outward movement of minority and immigrant workers. The period from 2000
to 2017 has been one of changing places: native white professionals and managers
shifting into increasingly white, inner-city neighborhoods and minority and immi-
grant workers in the middle and lower occupations shifting into decreasingly white,
inner suburban areas.
“Given the strong correlation between income and race in the United States”
(Reardon and Bischoff 2011, p. 1093), it is hardly surprising that racial succession
has resulted in declining real median household incomes in many inner suburbs.
For example, between 2000 and 2017, the blue-collar city of Bayonne, New Jersey,
suffered a net loss of 20,000 people living in white native-born households and
5,000 living in black native-born households, yet it gained 6,000 people living
in black immigrant households, 11,000 in native Hispanic households, 15,000 in
immigrant Hispanic households, 1,800 in native Asian households, and 11,000 in
immigrant Asian households, thus more than offsetting native-born losses. At the
same time, Bayonne’s real median household income per capita declined by 5.5%.
Reciprocally, the increasing movement of white, middle-class residents into many
low-income inner-city neighborhoods has raised their median incomes. The gentri-
fying Brooklyn neighborhoods of Greenpoint,Williamsburg, EastWilliamsburg, and
Bushwick collectively attracted 85,700 more people living in native white house-
holds while losing 19,300 members of native black households and 12,200 members
of native Hispanic households. Real median household income per capita rose to
68%, erasing many of the previous effects of deindustrialization, disinvestment, and
depopulation on these neighborhoods.
account, but gender as well in terms of how groups are sorted across industry-occupation niches.
We refrain from exploring that here because adding gender to the analysis would increase the eight
major racial-nativity categories to sixteen.
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More broadly, people with good jobs and high incomes have been recentralizing
in recent years after diffusing away from their central cities in previous decades
(Shearer et al. 2019). Although white managers and professionals and their families
still live mainly in affluent suburbs located 30 to 40 miles away fromManhattan, the
center of gravity of the net shift in this population has moved strongly toward neigh-
borhoods surrounding the Manhattan central business district, including Harlem,
the East River communities in Queens and Brooklyn, and Hoboken and Jersey City
across the Hudson River. Simultaneously, the poor, minorities, and immigrants previ-
ously concentrated in central cities are shifting toward the inner suburbs beyond this
gentrifying ring. While the overall spatial patterns of economic and social difference
still bear many marks of the post-World War II period, they are clearly changing. If
suburbanization of the white middle class and the growth of the central city minority
poor defined the metropolitan form between 1950 and 1980, the recentralization of
young professional households (primarily but not exclusively white) and the gradual
dispersal of native and immigrant minority group members mark the period between
1980 and the present. A complicatedmix of factors is shaping this dynamic, including
changing preferences among those who have a choice of where to live, rising central
city housing costs that directly or indirectly displace some former residents, and the
fading of a post-World War II generation of suburban housing and family formation
choices.
Economic restructuring has changed themix of occupations; demographic change
has altered themake-up of theirworkers; and altered location patterns have shifted the
mosaic of jobs, residences, and commutes in the metropolitan area. This is particu-
larly evident between the Manhattan central business district and the distant affluent,
white suburbs. The predominantly black and Hispanic inner-city communities that
experienced the largest gains in white residents were all in Brooklyn areas with
good transit connections to Manhattan (Bed-Stuy, Crown Heights, Fort Greene, East
Williamsburg, andBushwick), or inNorthernManhattan (Harlem,WestHarlem, East
Harlem, and Washington Heights). Collectively, these communities gained 248,000
employed workers, doubled their number of managers and professionals, and lost
office and factory workers. The overall drop in the FUA’s white population reduced
their standing in many communities, especially the inner suburbs on Long Island and
in New Jersey. Arriving minorities (especially immigrant Asian and Hispanic house-
holds) more than offset the white population’s departure. While these communities
slowly gained employed workers, managers, and professionals, these communities’
biggest gains were in health support occupations, food preparation, home, child and
healthcare aides, and other service jobs.
WhileNewYork remains one of the country’smost racially segregatedmetro areas
(Logan and Stults 2011, p. 6), its core white and black neighborhoods are not as white
or black today as they were in 2000. Hispanic and Asian immigrant households have
settled in and between them, blurring their boundaries; new kinds of “global neigh-
borhoods” have emerged in the process (Zhang and Logan 2016). The subsequent
analysis investigates how the spatial redistribution and repositioning of racial and
occupational groups have created new occupational mixtures and juxtapositions.
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21.2.4 The Influence of the Welfare System
The U.S. has a comparatively fragmented welfare state that relies heavily on private
provision (e.g., employer-sponsored healthcare and retirement systems) (Lynch
2014). The welfare system is largely funded by the federal government, but some
states minimize or maximize the variety and quantity of services provided. In that
context, New York and New Jersey have relatively extensive welfare systems, with
New York City being one of the most social-democratic jurisdictions in the U.S. Its
current Fiscal Year 2020 budget is $92.8 billion, spending large amounts on housing,
social services, and other redistributive programs. The Department of Homeless
Services alone will spend $2.1 billion. The City finances this high level of spending
with the highest level of municipal taxation in the U.S. (Independent Budget Office
2007). While government spending levels are somewhat lower elsewhere in the
region, the entire FUA is a relatively high tax, high public spending environment.
Public employment is thus an important part of the labor market, with government
contracts also sustaining high levels of employment in nonprofit organizations. New
York City may be the business capital of the United States, but it also has the largest
municipal hospital system; a huge municipal elementary, high school and univer-
sity educational system; and a vast array of nonprofit organizations. Together, these
systems help to sustain a substantial set of middle-income occupations held by City
residents.
21.2.5 The Influence of Housing and Land Tenure
Before World War II, the vast majority of American households rented their homes;
after the war, U.S. housing policy dramatically shifted in favor of homeownership
(Schwartz 2015). As the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) instituted 30-year
self-amortizing mortgages, insured mortgages issued by qualified lenders, instituted
construction standards, and required housing inspections before sale, the Federal
Housing National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) also purchased and securi-
tized FHA-issued mortgages to provide capital so banks could issue more loans.
Additionally, homeowners began deducting mortgage interest from their federal
taxes, significantly subsidizing homeownership and making it more affordable than
renting. As a result, the national homeownership rate grew from 44% in the 1940s
to 62% in the 1960s. (Schwartz 2015). As of April 2019, it hovers at 64.2% (U.S.
Census Bureau 2019).
Although these policies benefited many homeowners, systematic racial discrimi-
nation in lending and home sales preventedmanyminority groups from sharing in the
gains. Restrictive covenants—private agreements preventing owners from selling to
non-whites—were legal until 1948. FHAguidelines initially enshrined banking prac-
tices of refusing to lend in certain neighborhoods and did little to alter these practices
even after Congress passed the Fair Housing Act in 1968 (Schwartz 2015). Failure
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to aggressively enforce the Fair Housing Act has left informal but systematic racial
discrimination in place,maintaining segregation and limitingminority groups’ ability
to leverage homeownership to generate wealth and transfer it between generations.
While homeownership predominates in the suburban areas of metropolitan New
York, approximately 65% of City residents rent their homes, since high housing costs
limit access to homeownership. Compared to other cities, New York City has strong
rent regulation laws and a substantial stock of public housing. While 43% of New
York City renters live in market-rate housing, 45% are protected by rent regulation
and another 12% live in other types of regulated units, which is largely public housing
(New York City Rent Guidelines Board 2018, p. 4).5 Recently strengthened, these
laws provide a degree of affordability and stability to renters in New York City
(Paybarah 2019). As a result, median gross rent for all New York City renters was
reported to be $1,830 in 2017, but $1,375 for rent-stabilized units (Gaumer 2018).
It is against this backdrop that our analysis examines shifting patterns of residential
segregation, growing income inequality, and a changing occupational structure over
time.
21.3 Data and Methods
We created two datasets for our analysis: one spatial and the other individual. The
first uses tract-level data from three time periods: the 2000 Decennial Census and
the 2008–2012 and 2013–2017 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year Esti-
mates.6 The second dataset is an individual-level dataset drawn from University of
Minnesota’s Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).7 These data include
two time periods that mirror the start and end of the spatial dataset; we used the
5% public use microdata sample from the 2000 Census as well as the public use
microdata sample from the 2013–2017 ACS 5-year estimates (hereafter referred to
as 2017). The census tract dataset provides a spatial analysis of small neighborhood
areas called census tracts, which are small geographic areas that contain on average
about 4,000 people. The second dataset provides a repeated cross-sectional analysis
of individual and household data for geographic areas called Public Use Microdata
Areas (PUMAs) that hold at least 100,000 people. The first dataset allows us to
5“Other types of regulatedunits” largely consists of public housing, but also inclduesMitchell-Lama,
In Rem, HUD-regulated, Article 4, and Loft Board units.
6U.S. Census data can be found at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs. We used the
2008–2012 ACS 5-Year Estimates instead of the 2010 Decennial Census since the ACS 5-Year
Estimates are meant to give a better sense of what is happening over five-year periods than the
snapshot the Decennial Census offers. Additionally, the ACS 5-Year Estimates provides much
greater demographic and economic detail than does the Decennial Census, which counts population
only by age, sex, race, and housing tenure. Since the ACS is a rolling five-year average, we refer to
2008–2012 and 2013–2017 by their end year, 2012 and 2017, respectively.
7IPUMS has received several federal grants to harmonize and integrate U.S. Census microdata,
which can be accessed on their website: https://usa.ipums.org/usa/.
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analyze occupational trends by a neighborhood of residence within the FUA while
the second allows us to analyze any combination of factors (including race, age, sex,
education, and detailed occupation) for individuals and households within the larger
PUMA areas.8 (The FUA contains 4,652 census tracts nested within 151 PUMAs.)
We use the terms census tract and neighborhood interchangeably and refer to PUMAs
as communities.
Since census tract boundaries change over time, we used the Longitudinal Tract
Database (Logan et al. 2014) to harmonize data from 2000 into 2010 boundaries,
the same boundaries used in the subsequent ACS data panels. All monetary values
in both databases were inflation adjusted to 2018 dollars using the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) for New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics 2019a).We inflation-adjusted housing-related variables using the all-items-
less-shelter CPI so as to not control away variation in housing costs across years (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019b).9
21.3.1 Measures of Inequality
The most widely used measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient (Hoque
andClarke 2015; Peñaloza 2016).Although these coefficients are typically calculated
for individual or household incomes, we use them to examine the spatial patterns of
inequality over time in the metropolitan area. The U.S. Census Bureau calculated
tract-level Gini coefficients of income inequality for the two panels of tract data in
our analysis but not for the 2000 Decennial Census. To create consistent measures
across our data, we therefore used the von Hippel and colleagues’ (2017) method
of the cumulative distribution function and mean matching to approximate Gini
coefficients with ordinal categorical data on household income from each of the
three Census periods (see Peñaloza 2016; Reardon and Bischoff 2011; von Hippel
et al. 2016, 2017). When we compare our results with the Census estimates from
the two ACS tract data panels, they slightly underestimate the Gini’s reported by the
Census Bureau. This gives a slight conservative bias to our analysis of the changing
spatial patterns of inequality compared to what we would find if we had Census
Bureau-calculated Gini coefficients for all three periods.
8While both datasets are repeated cross-sectional, we refer to the first dataset that uses census tracts
as the spatial dataset and the second that uses individual data as the cross-sectional dataset.
9The all-items-less-shelter CPI is similar to the all-items CPI; however, it does not include housing
in its calculations of the overall CPI.
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21.3.2 Measures of Residential and Socioeconomic
Segregation
Weused theU.S.Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor StatisticsO*NETResource
Center to condense census occupational categories into their appropriate ISCO cate-
gories (O*NET 2019 and Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019c). Similarly, we calculated
location quotients and dissimilarity indices according to the methodology described
in Chap. 1. However, we slightly departed from these methods in two ways. Since
the socioeconomic distribution in the NewYork City metropolitan area skews toward
the high end, we altered the socioeconomic classification of neighborhoods used in
Fig. 21.4 to be exhaustive of all neighborhoods (Appendix reports our alternative
classification scheme.) Second, we used the SEG package in Stata developed by
Reardon and Townsend (1999) to calculate dissimilarity indices.
21.4 Spatial Analysis
21.4.1 Changes in Income Inequality
According to theWorldBank, between 1979 and 2016 theGini coefficient for income
inequality in the U.S. increased by one-fifth, from 34.6 to 41.5 (World Bank 2019).
The largest increases happened between 1979 and 1986, rising from 34.6 to 37.5,
rising again to 38.8 between 1991 and 1994 and then increasingmore slowly, by 2.7%
points, from 2000 to 2016. In short, income inequality grew dramatically across the
United States in the early 1980s and early 1990s, but then grewmore slowly between
2000 and the present, in part because of major recessions.
Metropolitan New York has a slightly different story. We calculated Gini coeffi-
cients separately for each neighborhood and the entire FUA. The average Gini across
all FUA neighborhoods started at 42.6 in 2000, dropped slightly to 41.6 in 2012 (as
the regional economy experienced recession), and then rebounded to 42.6 in 2017 (as
the region recovered). The index fell primarily because the financial crisis reduced
the highest incomes. While this level of inequality is high by international standards,
this average neighborhood inequality rests just above U.S. levels as reported by the
World Bank. In contrast, the Gini index for the overall FUA is higher, beginning at
47.8 in 2000, rising to 48.0 in 2012, and rising again to 48.8 in the 2017 period.
The inequality of the overall metropolitan area is thus higher than that of the average
neighborhood—as much as 6.2 points higher in 2017.
21.4.2 Changes in Occupational Structure
Figure 21.2 reports how the Top, Middle, and Bottom occupational shares have
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Fig. 21.2 Distribution of occupational groups and change over time
evolved slowly over the study period, gradually becoming more polarized. The share
of Top occupations increased three percentage points from 2000 to 2017, the Bottom
increased two percentage points, and the Middle decreased five percentage points.
The increases in Top occupational groups were evenly distributed among managers
and professionals, while the increases in the share of Bottom occupational groups
were concentrated in unskilled workers. This reflects not only New York City’s role
as a national node in commercial and investment banking and the advanced corporate
services as well as higher education and hospitals, but also the important role of low-
skilled personal services of various types. The losses for the Middle occupational
groups were concentrated in the shares of clerks and craft workers. Our research
shows that in 2000, these occupations were concentrated around central cities like
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New Brunswick and Newark in New Jersey, as well as in the Bronx, Queens, and
along the central strip of Long Island. However, by 2017, these concentrations had
begun to erode and diffuse across the urban area.
21.4.3 Changes in Residential Segregation Between
Occupational Groups
Rising new immigrant Asian, Hispanic, and Caribbean minority groups have tended
to locate between the traditional core areas of non-Hispanic whites and blacks, blur-
ring the boundaries between them and making their cores less homogeneous. Simul-
taneously, native and immigrant minority groups have been moving out toward the
suburbs, making the suburbs more diverse as well. As a result, new spatial constella-
tions of group locations have been emergingwithin the historic patterns of high levels
of white-black residential segregation. Since these groups also tend to be concen-
trated in specific occupational niches, this has affected the residential segregation
between occupational groups.
Dissimilarity indices report the level of segregation between two groups, with
values above 0.6 being considered high (Massey et al. 2009, p. 77). Table 21.1
reports the indices of dissimilarity for all the occupational groups, revealing their
residential concentration relative to each other at the FUAmetropolitan level.Overall,
the dissimilarity between occupational groups is relatively low and has changed
only slightly between 2000 and 2017. The dissimilarity between the Top–Bottom
occupational groups changed themost—increasing from0.35 in 2000 to 0.38 in 2017,
approaching a moderate level of segregation. Middle-Bottom segregation remains
low at 0.15 and 0.19 for 2000 and 2017, while Top-Middle remains nearly the same
at 0.25 and 0.26, respectively.





  MAN PRO APR CLE SER CRA MAC UNS UNE TOP MID BOT 
MAN 16 54 30 27 47 42 44 39 
PRO 13 48 25 22 44 37 39 34 
APR 53 49 37 37 44 40 33 32 
CLE 28 25 35 17 33 26 26 24 
SER 21 20 39 14 35 27 26 24 
CRA 44 42 40 28 32 33 29 37 
MAC 36 34 39 20 23 28 26 32 
UNS 41 38 32 21 25 20 22 26 
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Greater variation and levels of segregation emerge when we look at the dissimi-
larity indices between specific occupational groups. Reflecting the increasing resi-
dential concentration of Top occupations, the level of segregation between Top occu-
pations like Managers and Professionals and both Middle and Bottom occupations
like Service Workers or Unskilled Workers has generally increased. Interestingly,
unemployed people have become less segregated from Top and Bottom occupa-
tions. Unsurprisingly, Managers-Professionals and Service Workers-Clerks have the
lowest reported levels of segregation, likely because these are broad and overlapping
white-collar occupational statuses. As already noted, the highest levels of segrega-
tion are between Top occupations and Middle or Low occupations; the dissimilarity
indices between Middle and Low occupations are lower overall. Finally, Managers-
Associated Professionals are approaching what is considered to be high levels of
segregation (0.53 in 2000 and 0.54 in 2017).
Location quotients describe a group’s share in a given neighborhood relative to
its share of the overall metropolitan population. We computed location quotients
for all the occupational groups at the tract level. Figure 21.3 above maps the Top
and Bottom location quotients across all the FUA’s census tracts for 2000 and 2017.
They show strikingly inverse patterns and provide strong evidence of increasing
residential segregation between occupational groups over time. Bottom occupations
disproportionately cluster in a ring around Manhattan, as well as the eastern end of
Fig. 21.3 Location quotient maps for the top and bottom occupational groups in New York
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Long Island, and around Newark and New Jersey. Between 2000 and 2017, the ring
aroundManhattanmoves out asBottomoccupations no longer cluster inBrooklynbut
grow in the areas to the north and the east ofManhattan. Conversely, Top occupational
concentrations parallel those of Bottom occupations, increasingly clustering in the
core of Manhattan and Brooklyn. However, what were strong concentrations of Top
occupational groups in pockets stretching out from New York City along northern
Long Island, in Westchester north of the City, and to suburban areas west of Newark
are becoming less concentrated, presumably as other occupations move in. In short,
between2000 and2017,Bottomoccupations have generallymaintained their patterns
of residential concentration yet become less concentrated in the core, while Top
occupations have become more concentrated in the core of Manhattan and Brooklyn
and declined in their formerly suburban strongholds.
Figure 21.4 allows us to see how theTop,Middle, andBottomoccupational groups
mix within and across neighborhoods. Unsurprisingly, the pattern resembles that of
Fig. 21.3: High Socioeconomic Status (SES) neighborhoods cluster in an “outer ring”
around the central city while Middle and Low SES neighborhoods form a barrier
between that outer ring and the increasing cluster of High SES neighborhoods in
the heart of the metropolitan area, New York City. Mixed SES census tracts nearly
doubled in number between 2000 and 2017 and are most common on the periphery
of the outer ring or in the central city where High SES neighborhoods are replacing
Fig. 21.4 Classification of neighborhoods by socioeconomic composition in New York
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Fig. 21.5 Location of the top occupational group in New York
Low ones (i.e., parts of Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, and areas around Newark, NJ).
This is most evident in Westchester County in New York, around Newark and New
Brunswick in New Jersey, and in areas of Brooklyn and Queens with good access to
the city center. A large share of neighborhoods across the metro area with High SES
concentrations became more uniformly High and less Middle-High or Middle.
Figure 21.5 provides a final way to examine socioeconomic segregation by
mapping the quintile distribution ofTopoccupational groups in neighborhoods across
the metropolitan area. The neighborhoods in quantile 1 represent the top fifth of
incomes for all Top occupational groups. This approach reveals an increasing concen-
tration of top-earning neighborhoods. Between 2000 and 2017, all of the losses of Top
occupational groups were from neighborhoods in quintile 5; neighborhoods gaining
Top occupational groups were distributed evenly across the other quantiles. Gains at
the top are most apparent in quintile 1. Looking closely, Fig. 21.5 reflects the trends
discussed at the outset of the chapter: Brooklyn and Queens neighborhoods near
Manhattan have moved into the top 1 or 2 quintiles from the bottom 4 or 5 over the
study period, offering further evidence of the re-concentration of Top occupations
and income in the core.
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Fig. 21.6 Percentage point change in the racial and native make-up of occupational categories,
New York CBSA, 2000 and 2017
21.5 Repeated Cross-Sectional Analysis
The following analysis uses census microdata to look at shifts in the residential
location of job holders by race and occupation across the communities with at least
100,000 inhabitants (PUMAs). For each period, we cross-classified job holders by
their occupational category, race, and community of residence (for example, we
identified the number of black professionals living in each PUMA). This allows us
to study both the changing occupational of each racial group and how the changing
residential distribution of each racial-occupational group.We summarize the general
patterns between 2000 and 2017 for each racial group at the community (PUMA)
and aggregate New York metropolitan area (FUA) level.10 At the outset, we noted
that although the adult labor force and occupational employment grew, the growth
of Hispanic and non-Hispanic Asians, along with the stability of the non-Hispanic
black populationmasked the significant decline in non-Hispanic whites in the region.
Figure 21.6 clearly reflects these trends.
21.5.1 Non-Hispanic Whites
The total, working-age, and employed populations of non-Hispanic whites (both
native-born and immigrant) all declined significantly in the FUA over the study
10Remember that PUMAs are too large to be neighborhoods–and in some cases represent one or
more counties–so we refer to them as communities. A PUMA contains at least 100,000 persons. In
New York City, they correspond roughly with city-established Community Districts.
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period. This reflects net outflows of native-born groups to other parts of theU.S., their
comparatively low fertility, and their aging populations. While the overall growth in
employment drew more whites into the workforce, the non-Hispanic white share
still declined across all occupational groups in a way that left non-Hispanic whites
slightly redistributed toward Top occupations.11 According to our analysis, the drop
in the white share of Top occupations was as large as 9% points, and even larger
in Bottom occupations like services and sales (13% points) or plant and machine
operators (14% points).
Interestingly, the net loss of non-Hispanic whites in Top occupations was concen-
trated in the distant upper-middle-class suburbs. As discussed in the introduction,
the number of whites in Top occupations actually rose in gentrifying areas close to
the Manhattan central business districts. White managerial losses were particularly
large (above 20% points) in the New Jersey suburbs of Elizabeth, Englewood-Fort
Lee, and New Brunswick, as well as the Bayside-Little Neck area of Queens and
Bensonhurst in Brooklyn. By contrast, older and more centrally located neighbor-
hoods like Prospect Lefferts Gardens, CrownHeights, EastWilliamsburg-Bushwick,
and Bedford Stuyvesant in Brooklyn and Central Harlem in Manhattan had substan-
tial gains (20% points or more) in white managers. In short, non-Hispanic whites in
Top occupations decreased their share in their long-term suburban strongholds but
gained in gentrifying neighborhoods close to the urban core.
21.5.2 Non-Hispanic Blacks
Non-Hispanic black managers and professionals presented a mirror image of the
white pattern.While the occupational distribution among blackswas relatively stable,
the number and share of non-Hispanic black managers and professionals decreased
in the central city neighborhoods where non-Hispanic whites saw large increases,
including central city black strongholds like Bedford-Stuyvesant, Central Harlem,
East Harlem, East Williamsburg-Bushwick, Crown Heights, and Prospect Lefferts
Gardens. On a net basis, black managers and professionals moved away from these
central city areas and deeper into Long Island or New Jersey suburbs. Despite sharing
an occupation, black managers and professionals earned substantially less than their
white counterparts, which further limited their residential choices.
11Small occupational categories of Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery as well as Military were excluded
from all cross-sectional analyses.
21 Reordering Occupation, Race, and Place in Metropolitan New York 425
21.5.3 Hispanics
In direct contrast to non-Hispanic whites, Hispanics gained numbers and shares in all
ISCO occupations. They made the smallest gains in Top occupations like managers
and professionals and the largest in Bottom ocupations like machine operators and
elementary occupations. Since just under 60% of Hispanic workers are immigrants,
this positioning in the labor market reflects both their low levels of educational
attainment upon arrival as well as constraints on achieving further education in
greater New York. It appears that the growth of the Hispanic working class has
also supplanted the loss of non-Hispanic whites in Middle and Bottom occupations
in certain communities. For example, the non-Hispanic white share of machine oper-
ators in the northern New York suburb of Ossining-Peekskill, where this occupation
was relatively common, dropped from 64% to just under 39%, while the Hispanic
share in this occupation grew from30 to 54%. This is a continuation of a phenomenon
noted byWaldinger (1996) in which immigrant groups find a place even in declining
industries and occupations if whites were exiting them even faster than they declined.
This was also true of other suburban areas like North Fork-Hamptons, White Plains,
and West Milford-Wayne as well as satellite city areas like Bayonne-Kearny and
Newark. As Top occupations and non-Hispanic whites shifted toward the central
city area, minorities and Bottom occupations moved from the central city areas and
into the inner suburbs—a literal turning inside out of the urban socioeconomic fabric
of the New York metropolitan area.
21.5.4 Non-Hispanic Asians
The Asian story differs from that of the other groups. Like whites, they have become
more concentrated in Top occupations (specifically managerial and professional
occupations), but their immigrant origins initially clustered them in Middle and
Bottom occupations. This represents great progress; the share of Asian workers who
are managers rose from 14 to 19%, while the Asian share of all managers rose from
9 to 15%. In general, Asians are now more likely than other minority groups to hold
Top and Middle occupations, with managerial, professional, technical, and clerical
positions accounting for over 60% of all Asian employment in the New York FUA.
Since almost 90% of Asians in the labor force are foreign born, this reflects both
significant upwardmobility for them aswell as the higher levels of educational attain-
ment among Asian immigrant groups compared to other immigrant groups (Kasinitz
et al. 2009).
The rate of occupational change was relatively stable across communities, with
larger shifts among Top occupations and smaller ones for Bottom occupations.
In 2000, Asian managers and professionals were concentrated either in central
Manhattan, Brownstone Brooklyn, Northeast Queens, or the ring of upper-income
suburbs 30–40miles distant fromManhattan. The single largest number of managers
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lived in and around Saddle River, New Jersey, while the Upper East Side in
Manhattan had the highest share of managers. Because employment in the manage-
rial and professional occupations grew substantially over the period, their numbers
increased in almost every community, with only the Upper East and Upper West
Sides and Kingsbridge losing numbers and share. Some large gains in the numbers
of managers and professionals occurred as expected in well-established upper-
middle-class communities, but they also took place in the neighborhoods closely
ringing Manhattan, such as Jersey City (sometimes called New York City’s sixth
borough), and Brooklyn Heights, Fort Greene, Bedford-Stuyvesant, Williamsburg,
and Greenpoint, just across the East River from Manhattan.
A few communities that gained managers and professionals also attracted those
with craft and trade occupations (Englewood-Fort Lee andBayside-LittleNeck). This
out-migration ofmanagers and professionals is consistentwith the generalmovement
of minority groups that have achieved higher socioeconomic levels out of central city
areas, while Bottom occupations like craft and trade production saw a reshuffling
within the city core, with neighboring areas often seeing some of the greatest gains
and losses. As Asian managers and professionals moved out and away from the
central city and toward more suburban and wealthier areas, Bottom occupations
reshuffled within the urban core.
21.6 Conclusion
For many years, European scholars worried that the cities of Western Europe might
be moving toward an American model, with the middle class moving to suburban
jurisdictions in a way that would undermine the high levels of social provision in
the big cities. The continued commitment of the professional and managerial occu-
pations to dense central city locations often sustained these high levels of social
provision (Häussermann 2005; LeGales 2002; Tammaru et al. 2015). Ironically, as
European metropolitan areas get less dense and more spread out, the New York
metropolitan area may be moving in a more (traditional) European direction, where
Top occupations are becoming more concentrated in and around the center and the
post-industrial working classes are being repositioned in the inner suburbs (Ehrenhalt
2013).
At the same time, the New York region has undergone a racial, ethnic, nativity,
and gender transition that is just beginning to be widely felt in West European cities.
Not only do native-born, non-Hispanic whites make up a fairly small minority of the
central city population (with less than afifth of the city’s residents living in households
headed by native-born, non-Hispanicwhites), but this group accounts for only 35%of
the total FUApopulation.While they remain the single largest race andnativity group,
they are a diminishing plurality. No other single group has risen to supplant them.
The region’s next largest groups live in foreign-born Hispanic households (16.2%),
foreign-born non-Hispanic Asian households (10.9%), native-born black households
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(10.1%), native-born Hispanic households (9.5%), and foreign-born non-Hispanic
white households (8.3%).
Given that the occupational structure of the regional labor market is slowly tilting
toward managerial and professional occupations that require higher levels of educa-
tion, that whitemales hold a diminishing share of those occupations, and that younger
cohorts of white males are too small to replace aging white males, new patterns of
opportunity and constraint are opening up in the regional labor market. The educa-
tional attainment of many minority and immigrant groups is rising across genera-
tions. Whether and how the growing racial-ethnic-gender-nativity groups get access
to opportunities for career advancementwill be the key towhether the region becomes
less or more equitable. Many informal and formal factors shape which groups can
access what employment opportunities. As recent work by Chetty and colleagues
(2018) shows, New York City and its surrounding region have done a slightly better
job in promoting upward mobility from the lowest income quintile than might be
expected, given their finding that high levels of segregation and poverty generally
hinder upwardmobility. Thismay reflect how institutions of higher education, partic-
ularly the City University of New York, can play a critical role in opening pathways
of career advancement. In our view, however, the public and private elites of the
city as well as the region have not put nearly enough effort into making sure these
pathways are open to disadvantaged groups.We hope that the increase of elites living
among less advantaged groups in central neighborhoods will provide a social basis
for new thinking in this regard, even as it raises inequality within them.
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and Income Inequality in Bogotá:
An Analysis Based on Census Data
of 2005
Alexandra López Martínez and Owen Eli Ceballos Mina
Abstract Residential segregation is both a cause and consequence of socioeco-
nomic inequalities. Since the 1990s, segregation patterns in Latin American cities
have changed significantly. This is related to major urban transformations caused
by privatization policies related to urban development, commercialization, and real
estate activity. Themain purpose of this chapter is to study residential socioeconomic
segregation in the city of Bogotá, Colombia in 2005, using educational attainment
as an indicator of socioeconomic status while considering the drivers of segregation
during the 1990s. We also introduce a brief analysis of the relationship between
residential segregation and inequality based on a model that allows replicating the
income distribution of the population using census variables. This chapter shows that
residential segregation in Bogotá is related to per capita income inequality, however,
segregation may be caused by the dynamics of land and housing markets rather than
inequality.
Keywords Socioeconomic residential segregation · Income inequality · Bogotá
22.1 Introduction
Residential segregation has become relevant in recent decades due to the economic,
social, and cultural effects of urban development which depend on the capitalist
accumulation model (De Mattos 2002, 2012). Territories are not homogeneous in
their material or symbolic components and Latin American cities are no exception.
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Segregation patterns may change according to the characteristics of each city which,
while adjusting under a neoliberalism logic, reveal the differential distribution of
population groups, both at a macro- and micro-scale (Sabatini 2003). Distribution of
population groups is determined by government, market, and population interactions
in the social production of space, the actions of these actors that territorializes,
sectorizes, and segregates people as a result of the social and economic relationships
developed in their territories.
This chapter focuses on residential segregation of educational groups, and how
it is related to income inequality. Addressing this relation is supported by literature
that indicates that inequalities and segregation tend to reproduce each other (Elorza
2013). This happens because economic inequality is attributed to the labor market,
which creates varied living conditions for different demographic groups, including
differences in access to land and housing, which causes diverse residential location
patters, i.e., segregation between groups with different economic resources. Also,
belonging to a certain social group allows or constrains access to opportunities to
improve one’s welfare (Kaztman 2003) which occurs depending on the role different
groups play in the social division of labor.
In this chapter, two dimensions of residential segregation between educational
groups are considered. First, at the urban scale, characterized through the analysis of
location quotients of themain demographic groups with high educational attainment;
second, block scale level analysis is used for obtaining the socio-spatial distribution
of population groups. The proceeding two sections address the theoretical back-
ground and changes in socio-spatial segregation patterns in the city of Bogotá. The
methodology is presented in the third section, including data sources and variables
used formeasuring segregation and inequality. The fourth section presents the results.
Finally, conclusions are drawn from the main findings.
22.2 Changes in Socio-spatial Segregation Patterns
When communities are socially segregated or intentionally separated from other
social groups, we are referring to the phenomenon of socio-spatial segregation
(Kaztman 2003). This phenomenon is often produced and reproduced through the
institutional control of resources which allow barriers that restrict the physical and
social contact of internally homogeneous groups with other groups which have
different characteristics based on income, education, or any other characteristic (De
Queiroz 2003).
Segregation as a concept has been approached from differences in residential
location and unequal access to land and housing. In the first case, within the frame-
work of classic social ecology theory from the Chicago School in the early twentieth
century, the concept of segregation was developed by Robert Ezra Park and Ernest
Burgess as a means to analyze the “natural concentration” of certain groups in an
urban population. Thereafter, segregation was considered as a neutral topic of urban
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ecology for characterizing spatial differentiation of population groups in the cities
(Salas 2008).
With the arrival of Modern Social Ecology in the 1950s, quantitative studies
of the urban social structure and socio-spatial segregation were carried out. The
precursors were Shevky and Williams (1949) and Shevky and Bell (1955) who,
under a deductive analysis of homogeneous social areas in the urban environment,
categorized demographic groups by their social rank, that is, by their socioeconomic
situation, by variable urbanizationwhich is related to the family situation, and by their
ethnic characteristics (Buzai 2003, p. 43). Thus, it was possible to analyze the social
differentiation and stratification of a specific group, by means of several variable
techniques. Since the 1970s, segregation has been analyzedwithin the unequal access
framework by the classic urban theorists—Lefebvre, Lojkine, and Castells—1who
agree that residential segregation is revealed by the organizational form of space in
capitalist societies.
However, segregation is a phenomenon that has been present since the time when
cities emerged and is not only present in capitalist societies. Urban segregation is
expressed differently depending on the age in which it is studied. Until the 1980s, the
traditional pattern of socio-spatial segregation in Latin America was characterized
by the residential localization of high-income population groups near the historical
downtown in a concentrated way, while low-income populations were concentrated
in suburbs and dangerous areas of the city (Sabatini 2003; Sabatini and Cáceres
2005). There are additional layers that make segregation patterns more complex,
including (a) the demographic diversity of middle-income populations in the histor-
ical downtown, (b) a duality of the city with stigmatized areas related to poverty
conditions, and (c) other zones that have emerged in the modern city.
On its own, patterns of segregation are expressed in the urban structure where
(a) high-income population groups are becoming increasingly scattered throughout
the city and not concentrated in a high rent area in the city center, (b) construction
of new commercial and service sub-centers are located outside the traditional center
with the aim of gaining new markets, (c) a rise in land prices that isolate low-income
groups into suburban zones with low-cost housing, and (d) urban renovation in the
deteriorated downtown areas in the form of gentrification (Sabatini 2003).
This new spatial expression emerged in the 1990s, at the beginning of the neolib-
eral era when land started to be treated like merchandise since. It was at this point
when the government downgraded its role to that of a regulator by means of laws
and norms, and real estate and other market actors obtained a stronger role in the
housing market, especially when it came to the supply of new housing (Janoschka
and Glasze 2003; Moura 2003; Sabatini and Cáceres 2005; Torres et al. 2009). Such
dynamics have allowed the extension of existing affluent neighborhoods and the
1Lefebvre (1976, 1978a, b) pointed out that segregation was an implicit analytical category in
the space’s production and appropriation, while the sociologist Lojkine (1979) considered that
the concept guided an investigative work and Castells (2008) established a definition of urban
segregation based upon dimensions, intra homogeneous status and different from others, and as a
process because such inequalities tend to perpetuate through time.
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dispersion of the concentrated elites to the suburbs due to capital concentration and
the liberalization of land markets (Sabatini and Cáceres 2005).
In this context, it can be said that housing access in Bogotá is determined by the
laws of: “(…) housing distribution and therefore, produces re-grouping in function
of the social capability of people in the capitalist system” (cf. Castells 2008, p. 203),
in which a user-client-consumer relationship develops (Aprile and Mosquera 1984).
Then, it is possible to state that socio-spatial segregation appears when there is a
contradiction between the production of space in the city and private appropriation
(Alessandri 2013), where land and housing become a trade value rather than a usage
asset.
To be more specific, three main agents intervene in the segregation process, the
government, the real estate market, and the population (Ábramo 2003). These agents
are related to the three relevant causes that produce such process: the economic
inequality between people generated in the labor market, land valorization through
the real estate market, and the urban legislation regulated by the state (Torres et al.
2003).
The living conditions of different social groups are attributable to the labor market
since it is partly responsible for economic inequality, which leads to unequal access
to land and housing and, therefore, residential segregation between different demo-
graphic groups. Members of different social groups may or may not have access to
opportunities for improving their welfare (Kaztman 2003) and, as a consequence,
are differentially positioned across urban socio-spatial dividing lines.
On its part, the geography of opportunity theory suggests that the physical prox-
imity between varied population groups (based on their socioeconomic level, race,
religion, etc.) could overcome social problems by means of opportunity structures
and positive socialization (Howell-Moroney 2005). However, this approach presents
a neoliberal bias since it indicates that the proximity between poor and rich areas
encourages social mixing, which is needed in order to improve the standard of living
of the poor (Ruiz-Tagle and López 2014). This approach ignores the fact that behind
such an “opportunity” is an implicit market-oriented assumption (Ruiz-Tagle 2016),
which does not take into account the role that institutions must carry on to secure
a just redistribution of resources and opportunities that mitigate the formation of
enclaves. In this way, the activities of the three main urban agents and the conse-
quent spatial order of cities also contribute to the reproduction of urban socio-spatial
inequalities.
22.3 Residential Segregation in Bogotá
The phenomenon of residential segregation in Bogotá is not new, and some studies
have corroborated that from the colonial model to the fragmentarymodel that charac-
terizes the city today (Bäbr and Borsdorf 2005), the city has shifted from amacro to a
micro-scale of segregation (SecretaríaDistrital de Planeación 2011). Since the 1950s,
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Bogotá has been characterized by urban expansion driven by population displace-
ment due to the search for better opportunities and by migration caused by political
violence in rural areas (Aliaga and Álvarez 2010).
In the colonial era, the city (until 1920), maintained its spatial configuration
around themain square, whichmatches a concentric residential differentiationmodel
(Cardeño 2007) characterized by the fact that high-income population resided near
the administrative, commercial, and political zone. It can be said that segregation at
that time was low. Later, technological advancements in transport, road networks,
and the increase of cars in the city paved the way to the growth of industry in the city.
In the late 1930s, Bogotá shifted from an economy based on commercial capitalism
to an industrial one, with its spatial model characterized by sectoral differentiation
focused on growth around and along main roads and to areas with sufficient work-
force, following a north–south expansion and leading to a mixed commercial and
residential land use (Salas 2008). In other words, industrial activities were located
along the main roads and to areas with a sufficient workforce, leading to a mixed
commercial and residential land use. It is important to stress that the city’s expan-
sion in this era was not continuous since working-class neighborhoods were built in
a scattered way over the Bogotá savanna. High-income residential neighborhoods
consolidated to the north of the city with the aim of ratifying its economic and
social power, while neighborhoods in the southern zone provided shelter to lower
socioeconomic groups (Cardeño 2007).
Around the mid-twentieth century, due to the rural in-migration to the city caused
by the civil war,2 population growth intensified, shaping the segregation at a macro-
scale because the newly arrived people did not have sufficient income to buy a
house. The construction of houses for those displaced from violence took place in
peripheral areas and at the same time, the high-income population was more worried
about its social status—from the center to the northeast—as it happened in other
Latin American countries (Aliaga and Álvarez 2010). The high-income population
had low a population density, residing near green areas such as the Oriental Hills,
and in neighborhoods with quality infrastructure, aspects that commonly determine
higher land and housing values (Salas 2008). So, low-income populations clustered
in the formal and informal settlements in the peripheral zone, generating irregular
urbanization patterns in the form of neighborhoods that lacked basic public services
(Aliaga and Álvarez 2010). In this manner, a dual city was developed, with a rich
north and a poor south.
As a consequence of this duality, some zones grew in value and other urban
zones lost value, and the functioning of a private market for the production and
construction of new housing sorted people into those neighborhoods according to
the buyer’s payment capacity. However, since the 1980s, due to the promotion of
gated housing complexes for the upper middle class, fitted with private security
and high-end equipment to, the center welcomed again such a population. As a
result, a mixture of rich and poor people with different characteristics and population
2The population of the city of Bogotá increased from 330,000 to 1,130,000, between 1938 and
1958, the urbanized area went from 2,514 to 8,084 m2 in the said years (Salas 2008).
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densities emerged. Nevertheless, thismicro-scale segregation is embeddedwithin the
persistent macro-scale segregation in Bogotá (Aliaga and Álvarez 2010).
In relation with land and house prices in different localities, Amézquita et al.
(2017) discovered that higher housing prices were found in Usaquen in the Nort-
hand Chapinero in the Northeast, while lower prices were found in Bosa, Ciudad
Bolívar, Usme, and San Cristóbal in the Southwest. This situation again reinforces
the link between land and housing prices, and segregation, especially related to the
broader socioeconomic stratification3 of the city. For example, there is diversified
stratification in the neighborhoods of Usaquen and Suba in the North and Chapinero
in the Northeast. However, higher social classes (4 and 5) predominate in the north
area, while in the South there is less stratification (1 and 2) and are located in the
localities Bosa, Ciudad Bolívar, Usme, and San Cristóbal (Amézquita et al. 2017).
This shows an important correlation between the price of land and housing, and the
socioeconomic stratification of the city (Fig. 22.1). It must be noted that Bogotá is
the capital of Colombia, with an approximate population of 6 840 116 habitants in
2005 (Rubiano, 2017). The city has an administrative political division of 19 locali-
ties. Among the most notable locality is Chapinero, where the city’s historic core is
located (Annex 1).
Educational level is another factor related to segregation. Dureau et al. (2012)
found a positive relationship between the level of education and the social status
index (SSI).4 Table 22.1 shows a relationship between educational level and social
class in 1993 and 2005. Households heads with a higher level of education mainly
belong to the higher SSI classes (5 and 6), and household heads with lower levels of
education mainly belong to the lower social SSI classes (Dureau et al. 2012).
Furthermore, while it is true that in Colombia, residential segregation has been
studied more from an economic view via the dimensions proposed by Massey and
Denton (1988), it is also true that this phenomenon has been addressed from the
perspective of land prices in Bogotá (Fuentes 2010), social housing in Medellín
(Velasquez 2011), and urban development and segregation in the Municipality of
Barrancabermeja (Molina 2008). The main findings for segregation in Bogotá from
a socioeconomic view are the following. According to the residential segregation
index, housing prices are a key factor that increases segregation. The socioeconomic
segregation index shows that the segregation is high. We used large spatial units to
measure segregation, using smaller spatial units would show even higher levels of
segregation (Sabatini et al. 2008, pp. 24–25). Therefore, some authors (Secretaría
Distrital de Planeación 2007, 2013) propose that public policies must be oriented to
diminish both exclusionary and discriminatory practices in order to reduce the gap
between the rich and the poor.
3It is a classification that seeks differentially to grant subsidies in the payment of domiciliary public
services.
4SSI = Average years of education of household members over 15 years of age/Overcrowding of
housing. This is a proxy variable of the social class in which every home in the city is located (Salas
2008).
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Fig. 22.1 Square meter housing prices in Bogotá, 2012. Source Amézquita et al. (2017, pp. 275–
276)
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For its part, the analyses of residential segregation indexes (spatial autocorrelation)
reveal spatial dependence, that is, higher valuations of property or land are linked
with their residents and that in turn have high neighborhood values of said variable
(Secretaría Distrital de Planeación 2013). Another investigation renders that educa-
tional level is a key determinant for a higher residential segregation in both Bogotá
and Medellín (Aliaga and Álvarez 2010; Medina et al. 2008), which means that
population groups are spatially localized and segregated according to their human
capital.
22.4 Methodology
In order to be able to determine segregation levels and their relationship with income
inequality for the city of Bogotá, we rely on two data sources. The 2005 Population
Census which covers nearly 6.8 million persons living in more than 35 thousand
blocks of the city, and the 2007LifeQuality Survey-Bogotá that provides information
on the income of people. Both data sources are published by the Statistics National
Administrative Department (DANE, by its Spanish acronym). The census data was
made compatible with the census codes of the National Geostatistics Framework
established by the DANE, so that it was possible to form a harmonized data set for
analyzing the spatial differentiation of the variables studied. We used educational
attainment of the household head as the variable to analyze segregation because
in the Colombian census, income is not available. However, education level also
differentiates, separates, and segregates population. Education levels may also have
a positive effect on segregation as it is “themainway of socialmobility and privileged
scope for the social integration of new generations” (Kaztman 2001).
Table 22.2 shows an increase of people with the highest level of education (higher
and postgraduate), while the proportion of people with basic levels of education
(preschool and primary) decreased during the period between the two censuses of
1993 and 2005 in Bogotá. Since there is no income variable in the 2005 census, we
Table 22.2 Variation of population groups by education level in Bogotá, 1993–2005
Education level 1993 2005 Intercensal variation
1993–2005
N % N % N %
Higher and postgraduate 507.064 24.9 1003.857 32.5 496.793 98.0
High school 962.309 47.2 1429.509 46.2 467.200 48.5
Preschool and primary 547.770 26.8 624.484 20.2 76.714 14.0
None 23.165 1.1 35.349 1.1 12.184 52.6
Total 2.040.308 100 3093.199 100 1052.891 51.6
Source Fuentes (2012, p. 283)
442 A. López Martínez and O. E. Ceballos Mina
constructed a representative variable for average income distribution at the block-
level based on the 2007LifeQuality Survey-Bogotá. It is harmonizedwith theColom-
bian population and housing census and it provides and an additional perspective for
analyzing the relationship between residential segregation and inequality.
Dissimilarity index (DI) was used5 to determine city-wide levels of segregation.
TheDI compares levels of segregation between specific groups (Massey and Denton
1988), and we express it in an unitary interval where values near zero imply low
segregation and one indicates high segregation. Its interpretation suggests that the
group’s proportion in focus must change its spatial unit with respect to the rest
of the population in the same area, in order to accomplish an equal distribution
(Martori et al. 2006). However, spatial indexes such as the DI don’t reveal statistical
significance (Garrocho andCampos-Alanís 2013). For this reason,weused the spatial
autocorrelation index in order to determine the existence of a random distribution
between adjacent units for the samevariable, aswell as theMoránGlobal Index (IGM,
by its Spanish acronym)6 (Reardon and O’Sullivan 2004) which allows researchers
to determine the existence of clustered population groups in a given geographical
space.
In order to measure inequality in light of the non-available information regarding
income and employment structure, we built a representative variable of average
income distribution at the block scale using microdata from the 2007 Bogotá Quality
of Life Survey and the exercise was replicated with the 2005 census. We estimated a
linear regression model with the 2007 Bogotá Quality of Life Survey data to identify
the weight or factors of population and housing characteristics regarding the average
income distribution at the block level. Then the obtained weights were applied to the
census variables in order to estimate a measure for average income distribution for
the 2005 census.7
This exercise was initiated with an estimation, adjustment, and aggregation at
the block level (geographical scale) for the variable of the 2007 Bogotá Quality
5D = 12
∑n
i=1 | xiX − yiY
where: xi= group’s population in the spatial unit i;
X= group’s population in the whole city;
yi= reference group’s population in the spatial unit i; and.
Y = reference group’s population in the whole city.












where: yi = variable or attribute value en each spatial unit i;
y j = variable or attribute value in each adjacent spatial unit i;
wi j = proximity between spatial units i and j; and
n= number of spatial units.
7This exercise has its empiric background in the estimation of socio-economic levels (NSE, by its
Spanish acronym) carried on by theMexicanAssociation ofMarket Intelligence and Public Opinion
Agencies (AMAI, by its Spanish acronym) in order to classify households by socio-economic groups
highly correlated with income levels (AMAI 2018).
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of Life Survey in order to make them equivalent with those in the 2005 census.8
The response variable selected in the model was the per capita income logarithm
per block. A correlation analysis was made between the available variables and the
response variable in order to identify those variables with higher explanatory power.
Themodel considered 17 variables grouped in three analytical dimensions in order to
explain the income: (i) human capital and employment, (ii) demographic structure,
and (iii) housing and services. Table 22.3 presents an estimation of all variables.With
this set of determinants, the least weighted squares regression model was estimated
for the average per capita current income, in order to consider the expansion factor
associated with each household in the 2007 Bogotá Quality of Life Survey (see
Annexes 2 and 3). The weights estimated by the model are used in the estimation of
per capita income with the 2005 census data in order to map the spatial distribution
of income in the neighborhoods of Bogotá (Fig. 22.4) and compares the income map
with the educational attainment map (Fig. 22.3).9
22.5 Inequality and Socio-spatial Segregation in Bogotá
Before establishing the relationship between income inequality and residential segre-
gation inBogotá, a brief review ismade of the evolution of theGini Index at a national
level and forBogotá in the last twenty years. Figure 22.2 shows that income inequality
has decreased both in Bogotá and in the country, but to different degrees. The index
has changed in a range between 59 points in the second half of 2000s (Colombia’s
highest Gini level was in 2008) and 49 towards the end of the analysis period (lowest
level in 2017 both for country and Bogotá). Bogotá shows less inequality than the
whole country except in the period between 2002 and 2006. However, Sanchez-
Torres (2017) and Hoyos (2016) state that Bogotá always was in the top 5 of the
most unequal cities in Colombia. Bogotá shows a remarkable decrease in inequality
between 2006 and 2012, and since then the Gini Index value indicated no significant
variations. By 2017, the city’s index value was almost equal to the national average.
Nevertheless, in 2018 the level of national inequality showed a rebound in contrast
with a decreasing tendency between 2008 and 2017.
When considering the location quotient (see Fig. 22.3), household heads with a
high education level are concentrated in the Northeast of the city, where there is
a medium to high socioeconomic stratification (Secretaría Distrital de Planeación
2007). It is very unlikely to find households heads with low education level in this
8Even though income information is asked and recollected in tables at individual level, ECV-B2007
is a representative survey with micro data available at household level. On other hand, the access
to census’ information has block as maximum disaggregation level given the confidentiality and
information protection parameters.
9In Bogotá, the population density in 2005 was 175.4 people per hectare and the population density
of household head was 50 per hectare (AlcaldiaMayor de Bogotá; Secretaria Distrital de Planeación
2010). However, the population density of the head of household may change depending on his
geographical location.
444 A. López Martínez and O. E. Ceballos Mina
Table 22.3 Estimated weights of variables for per capita income















4. Persons with high
school
−0.007* (1.79)
5. Persons with higher
education
0.073*** (18.0)





7. Persons under 15 years
old
0.015*** (4.18)
8. Persons over 65 years
old
−0.015*** (3.14)
9. Number of domestic
employees
0.128*** (8.85)
10. Size of average
household
−0.013* (1.68)
11. Total population −0.339*** (4.75)
Housing and services 12. Telephone availability 0.031*** (6.57)
13. No sewage system
availability
−0.128*** (11.52)
14. House −0.060*** (2.67)
15. Apartment −0.049** (2.19)




Absolute value of t-statistic in parenthesis. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
Source Elaboration by the authors based on ECV-B2007 (DANE 2007)
urban zone. Block-level segregation, as indicated by the DI, between household
heads with a high education level is 0.57, while block-level segregation household
heads with a low educational level is 0.67. These results are as expected, considering
previous research which used the same index for Bogotá (cf. Salas 2008; Aliaga and
Álvarez 2010).
The previous results contrast with those of the Morán Global Index (see Annex
4), which shows that the probability for each group to be distributed randomly in the
city is low and household heads with a high education level are the most residentially
segregated (0.44), clustering in Bogotá’s northeast neighborhoods (See Fig. 22.4).






















Fig. 22.2 Evolution of inequality in Colombia and Bogotá 1998–2018. Source Elaboration by
the authors base on National Planning Department (DNP) report with data from Continuous
Employment Surveys
Fig. 22.3 Location quotient for household leader by high, medium, and low education level in
Bogotá, 2005. Source Elaboration by the authors based on Population Census DANE (2005)
These findings are similar with discovered those of census sector geographic scale
for the average years of education of the household head which in 2005 rendered a
higher value (0.72) in relation with the other variables, such as poor households and
households by socioeconomic class (Aliaga and Álvarez 2010).
Regarding the inequality index, income inequality in Bogotá is 56%, which coin-
cides with other works for the same year and a different source (DANE 2012). This
result, in addition to suggesting that inequality is related to segregation, shows which
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Fig. 22.4 Estimation of per capita current income in Bogotá, 2005. Source Elaboration by the
authors based on ECV-B2007 (DANE 2007) and Population Census DANE (2005)
the neighborhoods with a higher concentration of high and low-income populations
when considering the spatial distribution of the current estimation of income at block
scale (see Fig. 22.4). Nevertheless, to claim that inequality is a direct cause of segre-
gation may be an arbitrary statement when taking into account that it is possible that
land and housing markets are responsible for socio-spatial segregation in Bogotá
(Aliaga and Álvarez 2010; Almonacid 2014; Salas 2008). The latter is due to the
strong relationship between public and private agents in shaping which individuals
have access to certain types of housing andwhich individuals don’t (Salas 2008). The
former is due to the relegated role of the State in housing provision and promotion,
mainly through subsidies and norm setting, i.e., the state’s ability to influence the land
and housing markets is not relevant. Rather, private agents are the key players who
develop real estate projects andwho provide housing for those population groups that
want to and are able to buy homes at a higher price point in order to obtain maximum
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gains. This is achieved by private agents localizing medium–high socioeconomic
groups in a differential and fragmentary way. This is the way in which residential
segregation plays a role in the functioning of land and housing markets.
22.6 Conclusions
The socio-spatial segregation analysis for Bogotá presented new insights into the
segregation dynamics of the city. Bogotá is commonly referred to as the city with
a rich north and a poor south, when considering the education levels of the heads
of the households and average per capita income. Despite these two differentiated
macro areas of Bogotá, it is clear that small concentrations of individuals with a
low level of education and a low income can be found across the entire city. This
is not evident in the case of individuals with higher educational levels. This group
mainly resides in the Northeast of the city. It is important to mention that despite the
fact that segregation exists between the North and South in terms of social status,
segregation is also amplified at a small scale. The fact that education level segregates
the population in a similar way to per capita income implies that it is possible that
these two variables have an effect on social capital due to the fact that when education
segregates it may affect mobility and social integration (Kaztman 2001).
Accordingly, it can be said that land value may be a more significant determinant
of land concentration for a few individuals rather than income, due to the fact that
land policies may be able to counteract such concentration. This is because there
are housing and territorial organization policies, as well as norms and laws, which
egulate the pursuit for ran urban equality in order to eliminate privileges in the
distribution of urban equipment (of education, sport, culture, others) independently
of the localization of a certain population group.
This is how the actions of social agents, such as urbanists, have changed the
way in which segregation manifests, because they have intervened in the city under
the logic of land and housing market liberalization. This liberalization manifests as
the differentiation of segregated residential areas that have an effect on the social
structure of class by making it more complex. In turn, this complexity reproduces
certain production relations (between capitalist and the proletariat) and at the same
time reinforces class diversity, which may stress the symbolic value that individuals
give to the territory by means of their behavior and in the choice of different types of
housing, a consideration that has been scarcely studied and that would be important
to address in future investigations about the subjective dimensions of segregation.
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in Greater Buenos Aires: Evidence
of Persistent Territorial Fragmentation
Processes
Florencia Molinatti
Abstract Socio-economic residential segregation is a common feature of almost
all Argentinean cities, neatly divided into poor, middle-class, and affluent neigh-
borhoods. At the end of the 1980s, and especially over the 1990s, the process of
suburbanization for affluent and upper middle-class groups was consolidated as a
generalized model. This study concentrates on the trends and the patterns of socio-
economic segregation in Buenos Aires and focuses on two major dimensions of
segregation: the spatial concentration patterns of a given social group in specific areas
and the degree of social homogeneity within such areas. Socio-economic segregation
is described using the highest level of education that a householder has completed as
a proxy for socio-economic status. The indices of segregation and dissimilarity are
used as the main measure to compare the level and changes of residential segrega-
tion but other metrics—such as location quotient index—are also used to estimate
the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity in neighboring areas. This study uses
population and household census data from 1991, 2001, and 2010 provided by the
National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), and the data are presented at
the spatial disaggregation level of block groups called ‘radios censales’.
Keywords Fragmentation · Residential polarization · Suburbanization of elites ·
Educational inequality
23.1 Introduction
Residential segregation accounts for the degree of inequality acquired by the spatial
distribution of the population. Over the last decades, social sciences have shown
renewed interest in the study of this phenomenon in theUnited States and inEurope as
well as in Latin America. Although these studies share the objective of evaluating the
magnitude and effects of certain spatially concentrated population groups on people’s
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living conditions, they differ in relation to the criteria used for social differentiation.
While in the United States and Europe, the research was, to a large extent, focused
on racial and ethnic segregation and migration, in Latin America the analyses that
focus on territorial relations among socio-economic groups were favored (Groisman
2009; Molinatti 2013; Sabatini 2006).
In the latter group of countries, the emphasis on the socio-economic dimension
of residential segregation is understandable considering that the rigidity of the social
structure and substantial social, income, and class inequalities represent perhaps the
most outstanding characteristics of the social structure of Latin American countries
(Groisman 2010; Sabatini 2006). In this context, the functioning of labor markets
is a key element to understand the fluctuations in the well-being of the vulnerable
populations, mainly because, due to the absence of generalized credit markets, lower
social classes’ homes obtain most of their income from the labor insertion of their
members, usually in unsteady and low-paid jobs (Groisman 2009).
The interrelationship between the social structure and the urban spatial structure
is multifaceted. Residential segregation takes place when the existing inequalities
of a community are made visible in a territorial or geographical manner. However,
residential segregation is not a simple reflection of social reality, since space is consid-
ered a dimension that composes the processes that structure social reality. Likewise,
there are other intermediate processes or mechanisms that encourage segregation or
counteract its outcomes, including, among others, land markets, housing policy, and
the labor market (Molinatti 2013; Sabatini 2006; Torres et al. 2003).
Since the end of the twentieth century, Latin America has witnessed a prolifera-
tion of theoretical investigations and, to a greater extent, empirical research related to
residential segregation, especially in large metropolises of the most urbanized coun-
tries in the region. The emergence of this line of research is linked to the processes
of impoverishment of Latin American societies during the 1990s pertaining to the
implementation of the neoliberal development model. The opening of the regional
economies, in conjunction with policies aimed at reducing state intervention in the
economy, caused a rapid increase in unemployment and a resulting decrease in the
income of households belonging to lower social class.
Other phenomena also influenced the revitalization of residential segregation
studies in the region. In particular, an increase in the concentration of elites and the
affluent middle classes was a process reflected in the proliferation of gated commu-
nities and in the resulting suburbanization of these social groups (Caldeira 2007;
Svampa 2004; Torres 2001). Both phenomena led to the reorganization of the Latin
American cities, mainly represented
…. as the displacement of an “open city” model, basically European, focused on the notion
of public space and on values, such as political citizenship and social integration, towards
a “closed city” regime, more associated with the North American type, marked by the
affirmation of patrimonial citizenship centered on the figure of the taxpayer (Svampa 2004:
16).
The impact of these changes on socio-economic residential segregation shows
opposite trends in Latin American cities. A trend would indicate a reduction in
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the level of residential segregation as a result of the relative dispersion of closed
condominiums, shopping centers, offices, and services located outside the city center
and the high-income area leading to physical proximity between popular and elite
groups. As signaled by various authors, it is important to mention that this greater
physical proximity does not produce social integration or mixture per se. Another
trend, however, corresponds to the increase in the level of segregation of new groups
of lower class housing that have access—by formal or informal means—to urban
lands located far away from the city, as a result of real estate speculation and its
impact on land prices (Sabatini 2006).
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there was a positive growth in
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Latin American economies, although there
remained variations in social indicators. In the regional context, Argentina is a partic-
ular example as this change took place dramatically. After the great economic crisis
of 2001–2002 (when the GDP shrank significantly and poverty spread to more than
50% of the population), the Argentinian economy had seven years of sustained GDP
growth at average annual rates of 8–9% (Groisman 2009). In 2009, despite the inter-
national economic crisis, the country registered an annual GDP variation rate of 0.9%
above the average of the region that showed−1.8% (ECLAC 2010). After that crisis,
Argentina returned to a vigorous growth rate with average annual increases of 7–9%
between 2010 and 2011.
In this context, it is necessary to investigate how social inequalities and socio-
economic residential segregation indicators evolved in Greater Buenos Aires, the
main urban agglomeration of the country, and whether these political, social, and
economic transformations produced consistent changes in the spatial distribution of
the population.
23.2 The Functioning of the Labor Market
and the Concentration of Income
At the beginning of the 1970s, the Argentinean labor market was characterized by
being relatively integrated, with a high presence of salaried work and low levels of
underemployment. However, as a consequence of the poor macroeconomic perfor-
mance experienced by the Argentinean economy during the mid-1970s and early
1990s, this trend was overturned and the period was marked by stagnation and
instability (Altimir and Beccaria 1999, Arceo et al. 2008).
Labor regulations were key elements in the structural reforms of the so-called
“neoliberal decade” (1989–2001).1 These measures were aimed at the convenience
of adapting legislation concerning individual and collective relations in order to
providemoreflexibility and, basically, to reduce non-wage labor costs (social security
1This “neoliberal decade” comprises two governments: the one of Carlos SaúlMenem (1989–1999)
and the one of Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001). The latter resigned in the context of the major
Argentinean crisis at the end of 2001.
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contributions and costs related to events, such as dismissal or accidents, or making
the distribution of work time more flexible and the decentralization of negotiation)
(Altimir and Beccaria 1999; Arceo et al. 2008).
Flexibility in the labormarket, combinedwith the process of foreign trade opening
for foreign trade in the context of an increasingly overvalued exchange rate that led
to a significant loss of competitiveness in the goods and services production areas,
resulted in a significant reduction in workforce demand, a rise in unemployment,
and it created instability, insecurity, and low productivity. This phenomenon, typical
of the informal side of the economy, caused a progressive gap between workers
with lower qualifications and those with higher ones (Arceo et al. 2008). One of the
most severe consequences of the subsequent changes introduced in labor legislation
during this period was job insecurity, characterized by an increase in time-related
underemployment and unreported employment, which, together with unemployment
and wage stagnation, negatively affected the living conditions of the population. The
profound economic recession that the Argentinean economy suffered between 1998
and 2002 significantly worsened the current problems in the local labor market,
resulting in the great economic and political crisis at the end of 2001 and 2002,
which caused a shrinking of approximately 20% of the GDP (Basualdo 2008).
After this great economic crisis, there was a change in the macroeconomic system
that led to a period of sustained and long-lasting economic recovery between 2003
and 2006. This period was characterized by a strong increase in employment and
purchasing power, an increase in the number of registered workers, and a decrease
in unemployment and time-related underemployment (Arceo et al. 2008). Likewise,
there was a substantial reduction in absolute poverty even though some authors claim
that at the level of redistribution, the evolution was not so satisfactory (Groisman
2010). Although income distribution has a tendency to reduce in concentration, the
distribution of wealth remained highly unequal (Báez 2017).
This process of expansion and growth was fuelled by an increase in payroll as a
result of a decrease in the unemployment rate (from 16.3% in the third quarter of
2003 to 7.5% in the third quarter of 2010), the increase in the average real wage of
35% between 2003 and 2010, the increase in the adjustable minimum living wage,
the increase in minimum retirement benefits, and so on.2 This was also due to the
implementation of new social policies: the incorporation of three million people into
the Social Security System through the Provisional Inclusion Plan (2004–2007), the
execution of the Universal Child Allowance (Asignación Universal por hijo, AUH)
in October 2009, among others (For further information about new social policies
applied, consult Alonso and Di Costa 2012).
Regarding income distribution,3 during the so-called “neoliberal decade,” there
was a deepening of income inequality and regressive income distribution. Between
1991 and 2002, the Gini index rose from 0.468 to 0.538. The reversal of this trend
2The main changes in labor legislation between 2003 and 2007 can be consulted in: Centro de
Estudios para el Desarrollo Argentino (2007).
3Values corresponding to the estimates conducted by: World Bank, Development Research Group
(2019).
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started in 2002/2003 when the former President Néstor Kirchner took office, with a
Gini index decreasing to 0.507 by 2003. From thismoment on, there is an unquestion-
able reduction in income inequality—the index decreased to 0.483 in 2004 and further
to 0.410 in 2013. However, some authors show that the slight improvement in equity
at the beginning of the expansive phase diminished from 2004 (e.g., Groisman 2010).
At the same time, a view of greater global scope shows that this relative improve-
ment is significantlyworse duringmost of the 1980swhen the indexfluctuated around
0.400.
23.3 Characterization of Greater Buenos Aires
Greater Buenos Aires (Gran Buenos Aires, GBA)4 is the main urban agglomeration
of Argentina and the most important economic and industrial center of the republic.
This agglomeration constitutes an urban entity both from the functional point of
view—since it is an area that many people commute to for work on a daily basis—
and from the physical point of view—an urban sprawl (“mancha urbana”) without
any important solutions for continuity.
According to the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (Instituto Nacional
de Estadística y Censos, INDEC) of 2003, this agglomeration is formed by the City of
BuenosAires (central area and federal capital city of theArgentineRepublic) together
with a group of 24 municipalities, also called “partidos”—of the Province of Buenos
Aires. The 24 municipalities formed the first and second regions of the Buenos
Aires Conurbation (Conurbano Bonaerense). Whereas the first one is a semi-circular
crown that extends up to approximately 25 km from the center and involves those
municipalities adjacent to the capital, the second one is a subsequent semi-circular
crown that extends up to 40 or 50 km from the center (Fig. 23.1).
Buenos Aires, compared with other Latin American metropolises, displays an
extended process of metropolization and had earlier access to a process of indus-
trialization. Though, paradoxically, it least resembles the ideal ‘industrial’ model
according to the tendency of the high socio-economic strata to move from the center
to the suburbs, while the lower strata increasingly occupy the central area abandoned
by the ‘elite.’ In this regard, the density structure in Buenos Aires did not advance
regularly from condensed to scattered forms accompanying the technological devel-
opment of transport, urban growth, and economic development, as proposed byClark
(1977). On the contrary, the alternation between the periods of concentration and
dispersion are not only accounted for by transport technology (the transition from
tram to public transport) but also by the organization and funding of the transport
4According to the latest National Census of Population and Housing (2010), Greater Buenos Aires
has 12,806,886 inhabitants, of whom 2,890,151 people live within the border of the City of Buenos
Aires. While the population of the main urban area decreased to an annual rate of 0.14% during the
period analyzed (between 1991 and 2010), the population of Buenos Aires conurbation increased
to an average annual rate of 1.16%.
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Fig. 23.1 Geography of greater Buenos Aires. Source Based on INDEC 2003 and http://mapas-
lsig.ungs.edu.ar/visor/map.phtml
system as a factor in the creation of the urban space (Torres 1975). These specifica-
tions have resulted in a complex territory, highly influenced by a tendency toward
fragmentation and polarization. This can be summarized as follows:
• The process of suburbanization during the period of 1940–1960 took place
earlier and was much more significant in comparison with other Latin Amer-
ican metropolises. This displacement of the population was motivated by the sale
of parcels of land in the urban periphery and by large subsidies that radically
reduced the costs of suburban transportation, which facilitated daily commuting.
• The suburbanization of groups with higher incomes—the elite—took place with
high intensity in the 1990s in Buenos Aires, but at a slower pace in comparison
with American and many of the Latin American metropolises. The new real estate
developments respond to the type of gated community and are inserted into the
urban fabric establishing a clear contrast with the open ones that characterized
the early development of Buenos Aires metropolitan area.
• The polarization of the main urban center—the City of Buenos Aires—during the
1990s was characterized by a significant increase in construction activity in the
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conventional market directed mainly toward the luxury homes and by a consider-
able increase in the number of people living in shantytowns (“villas miserias”).
Likewise, the central area remained pre-eminent in the City of Buenos Aires
regarding its political and administrative functions as well as the location of
higher, middle and upper classes, despite the process of deterioration that took
place in central regions during the 1980s. Since the 1990s, the local government
of Buenos Aires has been promoting an intense process of urban transformation
in the central area and the neighborhoods in the Southeast (Puerto Madero, La
Boca, Barracas, Parque Patricios, and Nueva Pompeya). However, gentrification
processes took place to a very limited extent and its impact has been marginal due
to the fragmentation of the urban structure, the weight of negative environmental
factors, as well as the presence of a high proportion of low-income populations
(Di Virgilio and Guevara 2014; Suárez 2011; Torres 2001).
23.4 Data Collection and Methods
23.4.1 Data Collection and Study Period
The sources used were the census micro databases from the 1991, 2001, and 2010
population and housing censuses available in Redatam format (INDEC 1991, 2001,
2010). These census data provide representative estimates for small geographical
areas. The spatial units chosen for segregation analysis were block groups called
‘radios censales’, the smallest geographical area available to the public (c. 300
dwellings and around 800 people per unit on average, regardless of its geographic
size).
To analyze the patterns of socio-economic segregation in Greater Buenos Aires,
we used an educational attainment indicator5: the highest level of education that
a household member6 has completed. Four categories are distinguished from each
other:
• Low educational level (lower than primary education, including people who never
attended an education program),
• Middle-low educational level (completed primary education, including people
with some secondary education),
5No data available on the occupational structure for smaller geographic areas for the censuses
of 1991 and 2010. We used as a proxy variable the highest level of completed education under
the assumption that there is a strong correlation between the education of the householders, the
occupation, and the probability of obtaining higher income and a better quality of life in general.
Detailed information about the relationship between income, education, and occupation can be
found in Tammaru et al. (2016).
6In order to avoid a distorting effect of the age structure on the education of a population, and trying
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Fig. 23.2 Distribution of educational groups and change over time. Source Population and housing
censuses 1991, 2001, and 2010, INDEC, author’s maps
• Middle-high educational level (completed secondary education, including people
with some tertiary or university education), and
• High educational level (completed tertiary or university education).
Between 1991 and 2010, in the City of Buenos Aires as well as in Buenos Aires
conurbation, a substantial improvement was observed in the educational profile of
households. The relative weight of the categories that put together the householders
with low educationwith thosewho did not finish secondary school diminished signif-
icantly in the period analyzed (from 67.1% in 1991 to 49.0% in 2010); although the
absolute increase in the middle-low group stood out during the years 2001–2010.7
Consequently, there was an increase in the absolute and relative presence of house-
holders with complete secondary education or more, especially, among those who
had access to higher education and completed their studies, the absolute number
doubled between 1991 and 2010, and its relative participation rose from 11 to 19%
during the same period (Fig. 23.2).
This apparent improvement in educational level is a phenomenon that can respond
to different factors, and it should not be automatically understood as the upward social
mobility of householders that improved their education. Rather, it is likely to respond
to other factors, such as the generational change due to the constitution of new homes
with householders younger and better educated than their parents and grandparents,
and help by the progressive democratization of access to secondary school, despite
the substantial social inequalities that still prevail.
7Between 1991 and 2001, the absolute number of householders with middle-low educational level
decreased by just over 58 thousand people. However, between 2001 and 2010, that same group
increased by little more than 56 thousand people, showing between 1991 and 2010 a decrease of
1.800 people in the number of householders with middle-low educational level.
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23.4.2 Data Analyses
This study consists of two stages. In the first stage, we use the traditional indicators
of segregation to compare levels and changes of socio-economic segregation. We
calculate indices of segregation (IS) and dissimilarity (D) for all four educational
categories of householders. Given that socio-economic segregation is usually lower
than ethnic and racial segregation, we interpret values below 20 and above 40 as low
and high, respectively (Tammaru et al. 2016).
In the second stage, we investigate the patterns and local geographies of socio-
economic residential intermixing, using:
• Local segregation indices, specifically the Location Quotient (LQ). The LQ is a
ratio between the share of a given group in a given spatial unit and the city-wide
share of this group. If the ratio is less than 1, the group is underrepresented in
the given neighborhood, and if it is more than 1, the group is overrepresented in
the given neighborhood. We use LQ maps for the highest and lowest educational
attainment categories to visualize the relative spatial concentration or dispersion
of educational groups in the neighborhoods of the city.
• Classification of neighborhoods, in this paper ‘radios censales’, based on the
socio-economic composition of residents. Having divided the householders into
three general educational categories (higher, middle, and lower educational
groups),wemerge different threshold combinations to capture the socio-economic
status (SES) of the neighborhoods. Consequently, we distinguish seven types of
socio-economic intermixing, based on Marcińczak et al. (2015): high SES neigh-
borhoods, high to middle SES neighborhoods, mixed neighborhoods, middle SES
neighborhoods, low to middle SES neighborhoods, and low SES neighborhoods.
The typology is then illustrated in choropleth maps to revel the local geography
of socio-economic intermixing in GBA.
• Location of the top socio-economic status groups, based on the distribution of
householders with a high educational level in ‘radios censales’ by quintiles. The
spatial units in the first quintile (Q1) will be the spatial units that house 20% of
householders with the best educational levels in GBA.
23.5 Results
23.5.1 Socio-Economic Segregation According to Global
Indices
According to Musterd et al. (2015), previous studies on socio-economic residential
segregation in theUnited States ofAmerica andEuropean countries reveal that higher
socio-economic groups are generally more segregated than lower socio-economic
ones. Such patterns have also been found in cities of Latin America (Agostini et al.
2016; Becceneri et al. 2019; Molinatti 2013; Sabatini et al. 2009, among others). The
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Table 23.1 Indices of segregation for educational attainment of the householders
1991 2001 2010
High 53.1 51.8 50.3
Middle-high 36.4 32.3 25.4
Middle-low 25.3 32.9 38.1
Low 46.0 46.5 45.2
Source Population and Housing Censuses 1991, 2001, and 2010. INDEC. author’s maps
Table 23.2 Indices of dissimilarity for educational attainment of the householders
High Middle-high Middle-low Low Low Middle-low Middle-high High
28.9 61.6 78.0 High 76.7 61.6 31.0
27.0 40.3 63.1 Middle-high 57.3 38.6
59.1 39.1 29.7 Middle-low 25.7
27.8 65.5 33.0 Low
Source Population and housing censuses 1991, 2001, and 2010. INDEC. author’s maps
results for Greater Buenos Aires are presented in Tables 23.1 and 23.2 and support
these findings. Householders with a high education level are the ones who are more
segregated than householders with a lower educational level, with IS above 50% in
the last three years analyzed. The least segregated, by contrast, correspond with the
group of householderswithmiddle-high educationwith values that can be interpreted
as intermediate (Tables 23.1 and 23.2).
If we analyze the variations between 1991 and 2010, taking into account the
economic fluctuations that occurred during the period analyzed, it can be observed
that the levels of socio-economic residential segregation showed a little variation for
the extreme socio-economic groups, defined according to the highest educational
level attained. For the intermediate groups, which include slightly more than 70% of
householders, there are clear trends although segregation levels can be interpreted
as intermediate in the 3 years of census data. Whereas the lower middle class raised
its segregation level by 50%, reaching values close to 40 by 2010, the segregation in
the higher middle class diminished from 36 in 1991 to 25 in 20108 (Table 23.1).
Given the strong increase in the educational level of household heads between
1991 and 2001, the small decrease in the indices of educational segregation are
indicative of the persistence of segregation. However, as Tammaru et al. (2019)
showed for eight European urban areas, the relationship between inequality and
spatial segregation can lag and changes in inequality can take, for example, 10 years
to produce different levels of residential segregation between educational groups.
8However, these indices can be affected by the difference in the number of minorities in the total
population. In the period analyzed, the lower middle class diminished 11 percentage points in
size and the higher middle group increased 10 percentage points. These variations can be linked to
significant improvements in the educational level in the Argentinean population due to the increased
schooling in the middle level during the 1990s.
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Regarding the degree of residential segregation among the social categories
analyzed, especially between the opposite ends of the social hierarchy, the D between
the groups shows a narrow correlation between the educational level of the house-
holders and their residential localization, suggesting a high correspondence between
the spatial distribution of the groups and the present education gap between them.
The index reaches lower values when it is calculated between contiguous educational
groups and higher values between the opposite ends (Table 23.2).
Among the variations observed between 1991 and 2010, it can be highlighted,
on the one hand, the high values of residential segregation between low and high
educated householders with D over 70, despite a minor setback during the period
analyzed. On the other hand, the increase in residential segregation of the heads of
household with higher education in relation to those with medium-low education
and, especially, medium-high education. For example, among the social categories
with greater educational achievements, the index increased almost 15 percentage
points, signaling a progressive differentiation in the residential localization of the
educational elites (those householders that completed higher education) in relation
to those that only finished compulsory education (Table 23.2).
23.5.2 Changing Local Patterns of Segregation
In the previous section, it was established, in a generalway, that themost concentrated
and segregated educational group in relation to the remaining groups was the one
composed of the most educated householders (complete higher education), followed
by the group of householders with lower educational level. In order to analyze the
local patterns of segregation, we used LQ maps, which show how concentrated a
specific group is in a particular area in comparison to the concentration in the city as
a whole.
Figure 23.3 shows that the concentration of educational elites is higher in the City
of Buenos Aires, mainly in the spatial units located in the communities of the center
and the north, and in the northern localities of Buenos Aires conurbation (San Isidro
and Vicente López). Additionally, the householders with a low educational level are
concentrated mostly in the periphery of GBA—forming a ring—especially in the
localities of GBA not adjacent to the capital city, which belong to the second crown
of Buenos Aires conurbation (Florencio Varela at the south-east and José C. Paz,
Malvinas Argentinas, Merlo, Moreno and San Miguel at the northwest and west).
Between the period between 1991 and 2001, this pattern of territorial organization
remains, generally speaking, but it has an in-depth increment of urban fragmenta-
tion and residential polarization. On the one hand, the householders who belong
to the educational elite are over-represented and growing over time in the central
and northern regions of the City of Buenos Aires (high-rise buildings of very good
quality). Similarly, in the districts of San Isidro and Vicente López (both with very
high average purchasing power and characterized by a large percentage of perma-
nent housing in gated communities, and particularly, in Vicente López with high-rise
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Fig. 23.3 Greater Buenos Aires: location quotient maps for selected educational attainment cate-
gories, 1991–2001–2010 (on the level of discrete territorial units). Source Population and housing
censuses 1991, 2001, and 2010, INDEC, author’s maps
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condominiums with amenities, due to its proximity to the capital city). On the other
hand, the least educated householders keep concentrating in the periphery of GBA,
which highlights a growing over-representation in time of this group in the locality
of La Matanza.9
The typology of the ‘radios censales’ based on the SES revealed additional infor-
mation about the local patterns of socio-economic mixture (Fig. 23.4), among which
it stands out that
• Most “radio censales” fall under the Middle category and, in the three census
years, above 55%.
• There is a greater absolute and relative presence of ‘radios censales’ classified into
the higher categories of SES over time. Whereas, in 1991, about two out of every
ten spatial units corresponded to residential spaces with a high concentration of
householders with high educational level and low presence of householders with
low educational level, in 2010 that relation increased to about four out of ten.
• An absolute and relative decrease in ‘radios censales’ classified as low-middle,
mainly between the census of 2001 and 2010, since their reclassification inmiddle.
• The absence of polarized ‘radios censales ’probably occurred due to the traditional
high presence of middle segments in Argentinean society and to the increase in
the universalization of middle education.
Figure 23.5 shows the localization of the socio-economic group situated in the
upper end of the social scale; for example, householderswith a high educational level.
Between 1991 and 2010, there was a spatial deconcentration of this group, which
coincides with a trend of constant growth, the suburbanization of the elites. The first
quintile of the distribution expands from the center of the City of Buenos Aires to the
North and toward the northern localities of GBA—areas that have the best services,
qualified workforce, fastest communication speed, and better resources, in general.
For example, during the 1990s, in that area, three-quarters of all building developers
in Buenos Aires were located here, as was almost all new business centers and
the international hotel industry, two-thirds of the industrial investment and highway
construction network, and more than half of the shopping centers and hypermarkets
(Marcos 2009).
9La Matanza is a locality of the first cordon of Buenos Aires conurbation—although due to its
extension, it is divided between the two of them—that experienced, in conjunction with José C. Paz,
Moreno and Florencio Varela, the greatest demographic growth between 1991 and 2001. Moreover,
in the same period the number of the population in shantytowns and settlements tripled. This trend
continues growing until 2010, and as a consequence of the growing difficulties of the popular
areas to access urban land, there is a huge densification of the current shantytowns and settlements
(Cravino, Del Río and Duarte 2008). This locality, as well as most of the other ones belonging to
the second cordon, presents significant deficits in infrastructure and urban and domiciliary services
at the beginning and end of the period analyzed.
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Fig. 23.4 Greater Buenos Aires: neighborhood types by socioeconomic composition, 1991–2001–
2010. Source Population and housing censuses 1991, 2001, and 2010, INDEC, author’s maps
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Fig. 23.5 Greater Buenos Aires: localization of top socioeconomic status group, 1991–2001–2010.
Source Population and housing censuses 1991, 2001, and 2010, INDEC, author’s maps
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23.6 Discussion and Conclusions
Buenos Aires is complex in many ways, with its jurisdictional complexity being a
characteristic that pushes the current trends toward urban fragmentation and residen-
tial polarization. GBA’s current structure crystallizes the historical north/south and
center/periphery contrasts. Moreover, new contrasts are added which delimit full and
inclusive access to the city for a part of its population (Marcos and Mera 2018).
During the study period, there were important structural economic changes in
Argentina (Groisman 2010; Marcos 2009; Suárez 2011; Torres 2001). On the one
hand, the establishment of an open accumulation model, which, although it was
implemented from the mid-1970s onward, the most drastic transformations occurred
in the 1990s—particularly the subsequent amendments in labor legislation aiming at
a higher labor flexibilization. On the other hand, after the great crisis of 2001, there
was a change in the macroeconomic regime that gave rise to a period of sustained
and long-lasting economic recovery. Simultaneously, there were changes in the way
of planning and management of the city, which can be summarized in a transference
of the management of urban development to private capital, and in the resulting
residential polarization.
The aim of this study was to investigate how the indicators related to socio-
economic residential segregation developed in a context characterized by major
social, economic, and political transformations. These results confirm some tenden-
cies probed by other researches in the process of urban spatial structuring and resi-
dential segregation in GBA (Groisman 2010; Rodriguez 2016; Suárez 2011; Torres
2001). First, the main trend of the 1990s was the residential polarization in the City
of Buenos Aires as well as in the conurbation, where the group of a greater socio-
economic level was the most significant actors of that period regarding the definition
of social spaces. Second, the process of suburbanization of the elites intensified; it
was a process that was parallel to the increase in closed urbanization (at the beginning
of the 1990s, there were around 90 undertakings and by 2007 there were nearly 550).
At the same time, there is a rise of precarious settlements, combinedwith the general-
ized deterioration in traditional neighborhoods where people from lower and middle
classes lived. Third, the sustained growth of the economy after the great economic
crisis of 2001 would not have had a sharp effect on the reduction of segregation, for
two main reasons: on the one hand, the values of the indices are still high, especially,
between the two opposite ends of the social scale, and on the other hand, because
local patterns were not substantially modified and in some areas of GBA, residential
polarization increased.
During the first period, 1991–2001, the growth—or the persistence of high
levels—of residential segregation, especially between the opposite ends of the social
scale, was the result of an ongoing trend of job insecurity and social exclusion of
certain individuals, despite significant increases in the educational levels of the popu-
lation. During the second period, 2001–2010, the educational improvement of the
population continued, but in a context of economic recovery and equity improvement.
Evidence suggests that economic growth would not have had a profound effect as
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the ones observed in labor indicators, especially during the first period of the expan-
sive phase (2002–2004) on socio-economic residential segregation. The levels of
residential segregation remain high and continue to assert themselves through new
forms of spatial separation, such as through gated communities. The arrival of elites
in traditionally popular residential areas would seem to reflect greater social hetero-
geneity of the conurbation and a reduction in residential segregation. However, the
characteristics of new neighborhoods intensify residential segregation on a reduced
geographical scale. Private fences, walls, and security checkpoints guarantee the
isolation of elites from the surrounding poor areas and split the territory.
All these characteristics highlight a trend toward an extremely segregated and
divided city, and the determination of the processes of territorial fragmentation and
residential polarization, in spite of substantial improvements in the educational attain-
ment of the population and the period of sustained economic growth that GBA and
a great number of Latin American countries went through at the beginning of the
twenty-first century. The results of this study confirm the findings of other research
that account for the great force of the processes of urban space development. There-
fore, it must be emphasized the need for active public policies that promote social
diversity space and full and inclusive access to the city, dismantling the areas of resi-
dential and socio-occupational marginalization that deteriorate the conditions for
urban integration and reproduce concentrated poverty.
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Chapter 24
Changes in Spatial Inequality
and Residential Segregation
in Metropolitan Lima
Graciela Fernández-de-Córdova, Paola Moschella,
and Ana María Fernández-Maldonado
Abstract Since the 2000s, Lima city shows important changes in its socio-spatial
structure, decreasing the long-established opposition between the centre and the
periphery, developing a more complex arrangement. Sustained national economic
growth has allowed better socio-economic conditions in different areas of the city.
However, high inequality still remains in the ways of production of urban space,
which affects residential segregation. To identify possible changes in the segregation
patterns of Metropolitan Lima, this study focuses on the spatial patterns of occupa-
tional groups, examining their causes and relation with income inequality. The anal-
ysis is based on the 1993 and 2007 census data, measuring residential segregation
by the Dissimilarity Index, comparing with the Diversity Index. The results confirm
trends towards increased segregation between occupational groups. Top occupa-
tional groups are concentrated in central areas, expanding into adjacent districts.
Bottom occupational groups are over-represented in distant neighbourhoods. In-
between, a new, more mixed, transitional zone has emerged in upgraded formerly
low-income neighbourhoods. Areas of lower occupational diversity coincide with
extreme income values, forming spaces of greater segregation. In the metropolitan
centre–periphery pattern, the centre has expanded, while the periphery has been
shifted to outer peripheral rings.
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24.1 Introduction
Inequality is a complex social condition with multiple dimensions that leads to
economic, social and environmental imbalances and generates spatial disparities
between andwithin different territories (ECLAC 2018; Jordán et al. 2017).Measured
by theGini index, LatinAmerican countries comprise themost unequal world region,
a position verified through analysis of tax data on personal income in selected coun-
tries (Barcena and Byanyima 2016). Inequality generates socio-spatial segregation
when the formation of residential areas of groups of people with similar socio-
economic status—be it voluntary or forced—limits the interactions between those
groups. The intensity of residential segregation will then depend on the degree of
income inequality (Chapin 1965; Sabatini 2006). Consequently, Latin American
cities are highly residentially segregated, which is illustrated by notorious examples
of gated communities and ‘fortified enclaves’ for the rich and upper middle class
(Caldeira 2000; Coy and Pöhler 2002).
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the recent changes in residential segre-
gation by socio-economic status in the city of Lima, the capital city of Peru. And
additionally, to explore the extent of the effects that national economic trends have
had on the conditions of socio-spatial segregation inMetropolitan Lima. In a country
as Peru, whose societal relationships are characterized by highly asymmetrical power
relations (Drinot 2006), socio-economic segregation has been a common and persis-
tent urban phenomenon. However, socio-spatial segregation only became a mark of
the city during the process of rapid urbanization that Lima experienced since themid-
1950s. The impact of the widespread emergence of peripheral informal settlements
on Lima was overwhelming. The process definitely modified the structure of the city
(Driant 1992), shaping it into a strongly segregated pattern of centre–periphery.
Sustained improvement of the national economy in the 2000s has led to a substan-
tial growth of purchasing power of population groups living in the older periphery,
at the intermediate zone of urban expansion in Metropolitan Lima. This process
promoted the expansion of public and (mostly) private investments in infrastructure,
services and housing towards this area (Chion 2002), contributing to social diver-
sification and the improvement of quality of life. These changes have led to trends
towards the reduction of the degree of socio-spatial segregation, observed in some
of these peripheral areas (Fernández-de-Córdova et al. 2011). Desegregation was
also observed in many other cities in Latin America (Sabatini 2015; Aguilar and
Escamilla 2015).
This study is carried out following Sabatini’s (2006) segregation scale approach,
which pays attention to the spatial scale in measuring inequality. Its main assump-
tion is that high levels of inequality are not necessarily negative, but the impact
of high inequality depends on the size and hierarchy of socio-economic groups. “If
segregation occurs within a reduced geographic scale, like a small city or through the
conformation of smaller, socially homogenous neighborhoods, the negative effects of
segregation can be less significant or non-existent.” (Sabatini 2006: 9). The analysis
is based on occupational categories, which are used as a proxy for socio-economic
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status. Residential segregation is measured by means of the Dissimilarity Index
and then compared with the Diversity Index to examine the utility of the different
indices and spatial units for understanding residential segregation between occupa-
tional groups. Residential segregation is related to income inequality. The study uses
data from the 1993 and 2007 national census of population and housing, and where
possible other census data.
The text is organized into five sections. The following describes the context of
Metropolitan Lima: the main features of its urban development; the welfare and
housing systems in the country, forms of income inequality in Peru, and the occupa-
tional structure in Lima. The third section presents the analysis of residential segre-
gation based on the index of dissimilarity, location quotient and the classification of
neighbourhoods according to the occupational composition. Section four presents
the analyses of occupational diversity by income level. The last section presents the
main findings and conclusion.
24.2 The Context: Metropolitan Lima
Metropolitan Lima is the largest Peruvian metropolis, and the fifth largest in Latin
America, housing 9.5 million out of the 31.25 million Peruvian inhabitants in 2017
(INEI 2018). The city is divided into 50 districts that belong to the two provinces
of Lima and its port, Callao (see Fig. 24.1). Lima faces the Pacific Ocean and has a
Fig. 24.1 Geography of metropolitan lima
474 G. Fernández-de-Córdova et al.
central position on both the Peruvian and the South American west coasts. Its urban
area is developed along two main axes, extending themselves more than 100 kms
from north to south, and 60 kms from east to west. Its urban structure has two main
zones, central and peripheral.
The central zone is composed of the historic centre surrounded by districts urban-
ized under formal patterns in the plain areas. It is extending from the historic centre of
Lima to the coastalMiraflores district in the South, concentrating commerce, employ-
ment and urban amenities. It also has a larger share of apartment buildings, although
the higher population density is located towards the east and north (Vega-Centeno
et al. 2019). The informal peripheral zone follows an urban continuum of radial and
irregular morphology that responds to the expanding of the self-built settlements on
the Andean slopes (Fernández-de-Córdova et al. 2016).
24.2.1 Metropolitan Lima’s Urban Development
Lima has experienced significant levels of residential segregation since its founda-
tion. The historical patterns of social and economic exclusion inherited from the
centuries-long Spanish rule have guided the processes of urban growth and develop-
ment since then (Fernández-de-Córdova et al. 2011). In the twentieth century, Lima’s
urban evolution has been strongly marked by the presence of informal self-built
neighbourhoods (Driant 1992). Between the 1940s and the 1970s, a demographic
transition process radically increased the size of the Peruvian population, attracting
people from over-populated rural areas to the cities, and especially to Lima, which
was initiating a process of industrialization by imports substitution. From 1940 to
1972, Lima’s population grewfive-fold, from0.64million to 3.3million (INEI 2007).
Most newcomers were unskilled rural migrants, who were unable to find a place in
the formal labour market. Without other possibilities, they built their own settle-
ments on the hillsides, during a period in which the state promoted the formation
of massive informal neighbourhoods in peripheral areas in order to solve the acute
housing problem in the city (Calderón 2012).
After the 1970s, Lima continued extending itself horizontally, mostly through
low-rise self-built housing in the urban periphery. In the 1981–1993 period, Lima’s
urban population increased by 37.3%, from 4.6 million to 6.3 million, while its urban
area increased by 51.4% in the same period. Likewise, in the 1993–2007 period, the
population grew by 33.6%, up to 8.4 million. while its urban area extended itself
by 74.5% to 69,033 hectares (INEI 2008). Since the 2000s, visible transformations
have been observed in Lima’s segregated urban structure, associated with the struc-
tural adjustment policies initiated in the 1990s. They prompted a significant growth
in the service, financial, telecommunications, construction and employment sectors
(Chion 2002). In spatial terms, they led to trends towards the formation of Lima’s
intermediate zone located between the historic core and more distant neighbour-
hoods. The recomposition brought along the diversification of social groups in this
intermediate zone according to income, occupation and migratory origin, as well
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as by greater complexity of functional relations, leading to the formation of new
sub-centres (Fernández-de-Córdova et al. 2016).
24.2.2 The Peruvian Welfare System
Peru clearly follows the liberal welfare model, shaped by the free-market ideology
that is dominant in the country’s political economy. In the liberal system, welfare
is the responsibility of each individual, according to their own ability to respond to
market conditions. The Peruvian state considers that social welfare will be gener-
ated by a competitive economy delivering high rates of economic growth. Studies
about the conditions of public welfare in Latin America consider that the region
has welfare states ‘in transition’ (Esping-Andersen 1996), as their efforts to spread
public welfare to all are still fragmentary. The Peruvian welfare system, therefore,
provides a relatively low coverage and exhibits a low level of social expenditure
even when compared to other Latin American countries. An OECD study on global
inequality (2015) verified this, noting that the Peruvian redistribution policies are
minor in comparison to other Latin American and emerging countries, leading to
lower redistributive effects.
Three priorities guide social interventions in Peru (El Peruano 2004): (1) the
development of human capabilities; (2) the promotion of employment and genera-
tion of economic opportunities; and (3) developing a network of social protection.
Following this, Peru has increased public spending in the education sector, especially
in basic education, in the last 10 years. However, in a comparative perspective these
spending levels aremuch below the average education expenditure inOECDmember
countries, below other countries of Latin America, and below countries with similar
GDP per capita (Guadalupe et al. 2017). Furthermore, the generation of considerable
tax revenues during the period of high economic growth (2004–2014) was helpful to
increase social investment and to expand assistance programmes for the most vulner-
able population. The total budget for social expenditure increased by 230% between
2004 and 2016 (Trivelli and Urrutia 2018). This contributed to important reductions
of child malnutrition; maternal mortality; and income poverty (from more than 50%
in 2004 to less than 23% in 2014); while the coverage of basic services was extended
(Mendoza Nava 2015).
The Peruvian Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion is in charge of social
programmes to tackle extreme poverty. These includeQaliWarma,Pensión 65, Cuna
Más, Juntos, Foncodes, Contigo y PAIS; executed through direct social assistance,
localized investments and income redistribution throughmonetary transfers. Pension
65 and Juntos, which deliver direct cash transfers to vulnerable households, are the
ones that havemore significantly contributed to socialwelfare. Together they received
1.3% of the 2016 national budget and greatly contributed to reducing inequality
(Trivelli and Urrutia 2018).
476 G. Fernández-de-Córdova et al.
24.2.3 Income Inequality in Peru
Peru has also experienced a period of high economic growth and macroeconomic
improvements in the 2000s, leading to one of the most significant poverty reductions
in Latin America. Poverty levels were reduced by 61% between 2004 and 2014
when economic growth reached an annual average of 6.4%, which also enabled the
reduction of inequality levels, although less significantly. This was more visible in
Lima, whose Gini index was reduced to 0.40, while the country’s index decreased to
0.46 in 2017 (ECLAC 2018). In the same period, 40% of lower income households in
Lima increased their per capita income by 6.8%, a proportion higher than the national
average (4.4%) (Grupo Banco Mundial 2015). In 2017, the average monthly income
per capita in Lima was US$ 581.6, widely exceeding the national average of US$
417.1 (Zucchetti and Freundt 2018).
Going into more detail when it comes to changes in income inequality in Peru
as measured by the Gini index between 1997 and 2016 with data from the World
Bank (2019), we find a switch from increase to decrease. The values of the Index
peaked in 1999 (56.3), decreasing during the period of high economic growth (2003–
2015), down to 43.5 in 2015. Despite the decrease during the ‘economic miracle
years’, income inequality is still high in Peru. From the total country income, the
share of the first quintile is 5%, while that of the fifth quintile is 43% (ECLAC
2018). Furthermore, the steep decrease of the Gini index in Peru has been questioned
because its values are based on national household surveys (Encuesta Nacional de
Hogares), which are focused on measuring the needs of lower income groups, and do
not properly include the highest income groups (Francke 2017; Alarco et al. 2019).
Corrected estimates give higher values than the official ones, although they also show
reduction trends as of 2005. Measures of economic inequality by means of the Gini
index of wealth and bank deposits, however, show upward trends in the last decade
(Alarco et al. 2019).
24.2.4 The Housing System in Peru
According to the results of the 2017 census (INEI 2018), 76% (5.8 million) homes
were owner-occupied, 16.3% (1.2million)were rented and 7.5%were homeswithout
ownership or rent exchange. Social housing is not considered as an apart category, so
it is included in owner-occupied. An unequal country as Peru carries a long-standing
housing shortage, which deepened during the period of rapid urbanization. Afford-
able housing has been a constant challenge. Laissez-faire political attitudes towards
informal housing, coupled with the inexistence of deliberate housing policies, have
led to a vast housing shortage. Furthermore, in the early 1990s, the Peruvian state
practically withdrew from the housing sector. In 1992, the Fujimori administration
closed the Ministry of Housing, the Central Mortgage Bank, the Housing Bank and
dismantled housing cooperatives and public programmes for land delivery. Housing
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finance lost all priority, and the right to adequate housing was removed from the
1993 constitution (Fernández-Maldonado 2010). According to census data, home
construction in the 1990s—amounting to 120,000 homes per year—was mostly
produced through informal urban processes.
In 2001, the new democratic government reorganized and rebuilt the housing
sector, establishing a deliberate social housing policy to tackle the huge housing
demand. As a typical neoliberal policy, it promotes access to ‘formal markets’ subsi-
dizing the housing demand and creating financial mechanisms to facilitate housing
affordability. The private construction sector is responsible for the production of
affordable housing, the financial sector provides the mortgage loans (in which in the
event of non-payment the state assumes the debt), while the state provides direct
subsidies to meet the demand. To encourage the private construction of affordable
homes, an effort was made to create favourable conditions for the builders, both in
terms of regulations and finance (Calderón 2012). The state had to take almost all
risks of the financial transactions (Calderón 2009).
The policy is implemented through two different programmes:Mivivienda (FMV)
and Techo Propio. FMV targets middle-income households to finance the purchase
of new homes valued less than 127,000 US$, providing a subsidy to contribute to
the down payment, which depends on the amount of credit requested and the type of
building materials (traditional or sustainable) of the new home. Techo Propio targets
lower income households to finance the improvement of substandard dwellings; the
building of a home in own land; or the purchase of new homes valued less than 15,500
US$. Its subsidy varies according to themodality to which the household is applying:
home improvement, building or buying a new house (Fernández-Maldonado and
Bredenoord 2010).
The housing policy had a rebound effect, pushing downward the property prices,
promoting a real estate push in the commercial housing market, which allowed the
redirection of construction capital to income sectors never previously considered
before (Calderón 2009), producing a real estate boom inMetropolitan Lima and other
large cities during the mid-2000s. On the other hand, the free market dynamics in
the social housing sector—in aspects of home construction, land market and finan-
cial market—gave the large construction companies almost free hands to decide
where to invest and for whom. In this context, the social housing system has mainly
benefitted middle- and low-middle-income groups, considered more profitable for
the construction sector (Fernández-Maldonado and Bredenoord 2010). The social
housing policies for low-income groups have had many problems, failing to meet
the policy goals. This is mainly due to limitations of these groups’ access to credit,
as they generally lack formal (stable) employment (Romero et al. 2005). Only 30%
of the national target—to build 100,000 houses between 2003 and 2012, 10,000 per
year—was met (Calderón 2014).
Despite the real estate boom, the total number of homes built has been very low
in relation to the enormous housing deficit. There was a slight reduction of the quan-
titative deficit in the 1993–2007 inter-census period, but the deficit coming from
informal housing increased by 135% in the same period. This led to an increase
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in the total housing shortage by 82%, to 1.86 million homes nationwide. Neigh-
bourhood improvement policies have been almost completely focused on the legal
regularization of land property, through an agency created in 1996, COFOPRI, the
Agency for the Formalization of Informal Property. Only granting land titles, and
without improving access to housing, education and employment, COFOPRI does
not help much to tackle the housing shortage (Calderón 2016). So far there are no
realistic proposals promoting a sufficient amount of affordable housing to counteract
informal urbanization processes.
24.2.5 Occupational Structure in Metropolitan Lima
Figure 24.2 shows the percentage of occupational categories in Metropolitan Lima
according to the 1993, 2007 and 2017 censuses, in terms of Top occupational cate-
gories (managers, professionals) Middle occupational categories (associate profes-
sionals, clerks, service workers, craft workers) and Bottom occupational categories
(machine operators, unskilledworkers). In the three census years, the trend is towards
professionalization, as the top occupational groups growandbottomgroups diminish.
The predominant are middle occupational categories: the highest proportion is in
services and sales (SER), which increased in each census year (16, 20 y 22%); while
crafts and related trades (CRA) tended to decrease. Associate professionals and
technicians (APR), and clerical support workers (CLE) also grew slightly. Elemen-
tary occupations/unskilled workers (UNS) conform the highest proportion among
the bottom occupational categories, although they decreased in the last inter-census
period (18, 19 and 15%). The population of migrant origin in Metropolitan Lima,
10% of the total number of occupied persons, is mostly engaged in elementary occu-
pations. In 1993, 34% of recent migrants (referred to the last 5 years prior to the















































MAN PRO APR CLE SER CRA MAC UNS UNE
Fig. 24.2 Distribution of occupational groups and change over time in Lima in 1993, 2007 and
2017. (Data source INEI 1993; 2007; 2018)
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24.3 Residential Segregation According to the Analysis
of Occupational Groups
24.3.1 Segregation Between Extreme Socio-Economic
Groups: Index of Dissimilarity
The dissimilarity index proposed by Duncan and Duncan (1955) allows comparing
the segregation between two groups across all spatial units in the city in order to
evaluate the degree of inequality of their spatial distribution. The dissimilarity index
between top and bottom occupational categories in Metropolitan Lima was 0.42 in
1993 and remained the same in 2007. This is an intermediate value, which indicates
that almost half of the people employed as managers and professionals groups would
have to be relocated to achieve a uniform residential distribution across the census
areas of the city (average population size 5,443 in 2017). In 2007, the dissimilarity
index at the district level (average population size 188,247 in 2017) indicates that
the districts of the central area are very uniform in the internal distribution of these
occupational groups, with values between 0 and 0.4 in the study period. On the
other hand, districts with greater dissimilarity are found in Lima’s south and east,
but without exceeding the 0.6 value.
Among occupational groups, the highest dissimilarity index was found between
managers and craft workers, which did not change over time (Table 24.1). Other
high index values correspond to managers and machine operators, as well as to
managers and unskilled workers. During the period under study, the dissimilarity
increased between the associate professionals, and some middle and bottom groups.
On the contrary, it decreased between the unskilled workers, and the middle and
bottom groups. It also declined among the managers, professionals and associate
professionals.
Table 24.1 Indices of dissimilarity in Lima (multiplied by 100)
2007
1993
MAN PRO APR CLE SER CRA MAC UNS TOP MID BOT
MAN 13 22 25 42 53 49 47
PRO 17 14 18 36 47 43 41
APR 28 18 8 25 37 33 31
CLE 25 15 9 24 36 32 31
SER 42 35 21 28 15 13 13
CRA 53 47 33 39 16 10 12
MAC 50 44 29 36 15 12 13
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24.3.2 Distribution of Extreme Occupational Categories
According to Location Quotient in 1993 and 2007
The distribution of the top and bottom occupational categories is analysed at the
urban area level (census tract), which corresponds to a census unit of an area of
approximately 60 blocks and with an average population of 5,443 people. The infor-
mation available at the census tract level makes it possible to compare data only from
1993 and 2007, as the results of the census of 2017 are not yet available at this level.
24.3.2.1 Spatial Distribution of Top Occupational Categories
In 1993, the analysis of the spatial distribution of managers and professionals reveals
a high concentration in the central area and some districts located at the eastern
periphery with a location quotient of 1.6–3.2. In contrast, in the peripheral districts,
the concentration of managers and professionals is lower than the city average (0.0–
0.8) and the values are shown in a scattered manner (Fig. 24.3). Analysis for 2007
shows that the highest residential concentrations of managers and professionals
changes, the special mix decreases and the distribution becomesmore homogeneous,
where older neighbourhoods have a greater presence of managers and professionals.
In the near periphery towards the north, north-west and south, the concentration of
managers increases (location quotient higher than 1.2) together with the expansion
of the higher income areas and the physical improvement of neighbourhoods there.
24.3.2.2 Spatial Distribution of Bottom Occupational Category
The location of machine operators and unskilled workers is less uneven than the top
category with a predominance of location quotient values between 0.4 and 1.6. In
1993, values similar to themetropolitan average predominate (0.8–1.2). Values above
average (1.2 or more) are scattered, especially in the periphery, while lower than
average values (0–0.8) are concentrated in the central area. In 2007, analysis shows
that the low concentration values of unskilled workers are maintained; however,
their distribution changes and a pattern of centre–periphery residential segregation
intensifies. The central area only has the lower intermediate value (0.4–0.8) and forms
a large homogenous area, while no average value groups are found, as it was in 1993.
In contrast, the periphery has a higher concentration of unskilled workers, mainly in
the more distant periphery. Only some groups at the northern and eastern periphery
close to the centre maintain the concentration of middle-low value (0.4–0.8).
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Fig. 24.3 Location quotientmaps for the top and bottomoccupational groups in Lima. (Data source
INEI 1993; 2007)
24.3.2.3 Relationship of the Residential Distribution of Top and Bottom
Occupational Categories
An opposite segregation pattern for the top and bottom occupational categories in the
study period. Top occupational groups are over-represented in the central area that
is very homogeneous, and the top group expands towards the east, incorporating the
district of La Molina. In the periphery, there are two axes with high presence of top
groups in the north and east (Chosica), which coincide with the roads and the earlier
settlement of the periphery (see Fig. 24.1). Otherwise, bottom occupational groups
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are over-represented in the urban periphery. The results indicate that the centre–
periphery residential divide between top and bottom occupational groups has been
reinforced. On the one hand, there is a greater homogeneity of concentration of top
occupational groups in the central area and first peripheral expansion; on the other
hand, bottom groups concentrate in the most recent peripheral expansions.
24.3.3 Classification of Neighbourhoods According
to Occupational Composition
According to the share of occupational categories, a typology of neighbourhoods
types can be built related to their socio-economic composition (Marcińczak et al.
2015). Considering the low share of top occupational categories inLima’s population,
there is no neighbourhood classified as High SES with more than 50% of employees
being Managers and Professionals. In most neighbourhoods, more than 50% of the
population belong to themiddle SES classification (Technicians and associate profes-
sionals, Clerks, Service workers and Craftworkers), while the bottom occupational
categories predominate in only a few dispersed neighbourhoods (Fig. 24.4).
In 1993, the distribution of middle-to-high groups was alternated with mixed
neighbourhoods. In 2007, many mixed neighbourhoods became middle to high, so
that an axis of upgrading SES neighbourhoods was formed. This concentration did
not spread across the entire central area, but included neighbourhoods from the south
of the historic centre (San Isidro and Miraflores) to the east (La Molina), forming a
Fig. 24.4 Classification of neighbourhoods by socio-economic composition in Lima. (Data source
INEI 2009; 2016)
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Fig. 24.5 Location of the top occupational group in Lima. (Data source INEI 1993; 2007)
new centre–east axis from the centre of the bay to the east. This new axis is located
at the south of the central–east foundational axis road linking the port with the
highlands. This new distribution shows the differences between the new central axis
and the rest of the city, which is remarkable when taking into account the previous
findings showing a traditional centre–periphery structure (Fig. 24.5).
The distribution of employees belonging to the top occupational group (Fig. 24.5)
shows their tendency to expand the central area with the highest proportion groups
(Q1 andQ2). GroupQ1, corresponding to neighbourhoods with 20%of the top group
employees, is dispersed and atomized throughout the central area. In 2007, neigh-
bourhoods in this category form small groups in the central area and the surrounding
east and north areas.
24.4 Differences in Occupational Diversity by Income Level
24.4.1 Occupational Mix in Neighbourhoods
The residential distribution of socio-economic groups can also be analysed with
diversity indices that allow to examine the mix of different groups or categories.
The diversity index of Simpson (1949) is one of the most often used measures of
spatial diversity. It has been widely used in ecology and also in social studies to
measure income diversity (Fernández-de-Córdova et al. 2011; Talen 2006; Miles
et al. 2010), race (Nguyen 2010), ethnicity (Laurence 2011; Walks and Maaranen
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2008), language (Greenberg 1956), family and housing type (Talen 2006), among
other variables. Simpson (1949) proposed an index of diversity independent of the
size of the sample that indicates the probability that two individuals chosen at random
belong to the same group. The inverse version of the formula of the Simpson index
is used, known as Simpson’s Diversity index D = 1-∑(n/N)2, where n is the total
number of individuals of one category and N is the total number of individuals of all
categories. The value ofD ranges from0 to 1,where 1 represents the greatest diversity,
in other words, the presence of individuals from a greater number of categories with
an even balance among categories.
The diversity of occupational groups in Lima’s neighbourhoods in 1993 shows
the predominance of high and similar values (between 0.8 and 0.88) in different
parts of the city (Fig. 24.6). Different degrees of reduction of the diversity index
and the conformation of clearer residential patterns are observed, compared with the
occupational diversity in 2007. The most salient is the greater homogenization of the
occupational groups in two specific parts of Lima where the values of diversity index
range between 0.6 and 0.8. One is located in the new centre–east axis, south of the
historic centre and belongs to the highest income districts. The second is located at the
north end of the city and belongs to the lowest income districts (Ventanilla). These are
recently formed low-income neighbourhoodswith poor accessibility to/long distance
fromcentral areas.All the neighbourhoods of greater diversity of occupational groups
are located outside the city’s central axis, in the north, east and south axes.
Fig. 24.6 Diversity index of socio-economic groups at census tract level in Lima. (Data source
INEI 1993; 2007)
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24.4.2 Changes in the Spatial Distribution of Income
Data about the estimated income at block level by the INEI (2009; 2016) indicates a
marked residential differentiation inMetropolitanLima. The central areas congregate
the population with medium and high incomes, while the lower income populations
are located in the periphery. The high-income population is concentrated in the new
centre–east axis. Conversely, the low-income population is scattered and located in
the urban periphery in the north, east and south. This pattern of income distribution
is clearly related to the phases of metropolitan growth, confirming the findings from
previous studies (Driant 1992; Piron et al. 2015) stating that the older neighbourhoods
present larger levels of consolidation and integration.
The analysis of the changes in income between 2007 and 2013 reveals a greater
polarization (Fig. 24.7). The high-income areas have remained at the centre–east
axis and have expanded to the east and west. In contrast, low-income areas have
spread to the extreme north and north-east of the city. This corresponds to a trend of
change of the high-income zone that was traditionally located between the historic
centre and its southern expansion (Miraflores), while in 2007, there is a greater
concentration from the centre of the bay to the east. In 2013, the high-income groups
had residentially spilled over to the new centre–east axis of the city, which includes
La Molina (Fernández-de-Córdova et al. 2011).
Fig. 24.7 Average income strata at census tract level in Lima. (Data source INEI 2009; 2016)
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Fig. 24.8 Relationship between occupational diversity and average income at census tract level in
Metropolitan Lima. (Data source INEI 2007; 2009)
24.4.3 Income and Spatial Relationship with Occupational
Diversity
Analysis of the spatial relationship between the residential distribution of income
groups (Fig. 24.7) and occupational diversity of neighbourhoods (Fig. 24.6) revealed
that the areas with lower occupational diversity coincide with extreme values of
income. As observed in the Scatter Plot (Fig. 24.8), there is a high curvilinear corre-
lation between these variables. This indicates that middle-income and lower middle-
income groups live in neighbourhoods with greater diversity of occupational groups.
In contrast, higher income groups tend towards self-segregation, living in areas with
less occupational diversity (between 0.72 and 0.8). At the opposite extreme, the
poorest populations live in less diverse neighbourhoods, too, with diversity values
around 0.75, and in some cases as low as 0.55. Furthermore, the gradient toward self-
segregation inmedium-income to high-incomepopulation is smooth.On the contrary,
the gradient of the exclusion of the low-income population is quite pronounced.
This means that, among the poor, a slightly different lower income level implies a
significant change in the occupational diversity in the neighbourhoods where they
reside.
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24.5 Conclusions
The objective of this chapter was to identify the conditions of socio-spatial segrega-
tion inMetropolitanLima, exploring the effects that recent economic trendsmay have
had in those conditions. The study relies on an analysis of the residential distribution
of occupational groups based on the Peruvian 1993 and 2007 national censuses data.
In general terms, a process of professionalization is taking place inMetropolitanLima
but middle occupational groups are still the largest occupational groups. The results
obtained from the analyses between 1993 and 2007, according to the different indices
indicate that, at the level of the metropolis, the dissimilarity between the extreme
categories has an intermediate level with little changes over time. The analysis of
the residential clustering of occupational categories and occupational diversity in
the neighbourhoods confirm the trends towards increased segregation. In the central
area, a high concentration of top groups and low levels of diversity remains, and these
characteristics expand into adjacent districts. Bottom groups are over-represented in
the more distant neighbourhoods. In -between the centre and periphery, a new transi-
tional zone has emerged where formerly low-income neighbourhoods have upgraded
and become more mixed.
In the bottom occupational groups, there is a clear segregation between the central
zone and the periphery in 2007. The areas of lower occupational diversity coincide
with extreme income values, forming spaces of greater segregation. The location
preferences of higher income groups are recent neighbourhoods in, or closer to, the
central area.While lower incomegroups live segregated in recently formedperipheral
neighbourhoods. Even when in the closer periphery the levels of inequality and
segregation have been reduced, between the more homogeneous urban spaces of the
central and periphery zones, the dual city effect is reproduced. It appears that in the
centre–periphery pattern, the centre has been expanded, while the periphery has been
shifted to the outer peripheral rings.
The decrease in income inequality is related to the positioning of Peru as a
middle-income country during the 2000s (Grupo Banco Mundial, undated), which
contributes to greater diversity in the middle sectors located in the periphery near the
centre. However, segregation is increased in the extreme groups, located downtown
(higher SES) and recent peripheries (low SES). These findings coincide with the
effects of the trends in the country’s economic growth in the two last decades. First,
a decline in socio-spatial segregation in the closer peripheries was observed, associ-
ated with a visible improvement of income inequality and decrease of poverty at the
country level and metropolitan level. However, the deceleration of economic growth
that has occurred in recent years has mostly affected the groups living in the more
distant periphery, which usually are the most exposed to such negative economic
trends (Jordán et al. 2017; Cohen and Debowixz 2001). Since the decisions guiding
(public and) private urban investments respond to market criteria, income inequality
is then translated into limited access to mobility, infrastructure, urban services and
employment.
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It is now widely recognized that the reduction of inequalities is critical for all
countries and regions (OECD 2015). The development priorities towards inclusive
and sustainable growth require to act frontally against income inequality and resi-
dential segregation, implementing public policies for the redistribution of income,
employment and social welfare (Barba Solano 2011).
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Chapter 25
Socio-economic and Ethnic Segregation
in the Greater Paramaribo Region,
Suriname
Kimberley Fung-Loy and Anton Van Rompaey
Abstract Income inequality has steadily increased in Suriname and it is considered
to be at one of the highest levels in the Caribbean. This chapter analyses socio-
economic and ethnic segregation between 2004 and 2012 in the Greater Paramaribo
Region in Suriname. To investigate the link between income inequality and socio-
economic segregation, occupation is used as a proxy for socio-economic status. The
Dissimilarity Index is used to evaluate the level of segregation between different
socio-economic and ethnic groups. The link between ethnicity and socio-economic
status is also analysed. Results show that the highest level of socio-economic segre-
gation exists between the higher socio-economic group (top occupational categories)
and the lower socio-economic group (bottom occupational categories). It was also
found that even though the Region is ethnically diverse, different ethnic groups tend
to concentrate in different neighbourhoods. These segregated ethnicities are in turn
linked to the higher and lower level socio-economic groups.
Keywords Socio-economic segregation · Ethnic segregation · Residential
segregation · Dissimilarity index · Suriname
25.1 Introduction
The Republic of Suriname lies at the northern coast of South America and is home to
541,638 people (General Bureau of Statistics Suriname 2013). Suriname is made up
of ten districts, with 62 ressorts (the smallest administrative unit established by law).
Around70%of the total population livewithin theGreater ParamariboRegion (GPR),
consisting of the three districts Paramaribo, Wanica and Commewijne (comprising
22 ressorts). The ressorts are indicated in Fig. 25.1 with bold letters. The capital
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Fig. 25.1 Geographical location of the GPR
Paramaribo can be considered a medium-sized urban core, with a population of
240,924 and population density of 1324 inhabitants/km2 (OECD 2012). Its popula-
tion has increased by 16% between 2000 and 2012. This, in turn, has resulted in an
increased demand for residential land. Consequently, the GPR has experienced urban
sprawl, with ribbon development occurring outward from Paramaribo into Wanica
and Commewijne (Fung-Loy et al. 2019). Uncontrolled urban sprawl can have nega-
tive consequences such as residential segregation, where specific groups end up in
specific locations.
The research presented in this chapter examines socio-economic and ethnic segre-
gation within the GPR. Socio-economic segregation is assessed by using ISCO occu-
pation groups as a proxy for socio-economic status. In addition, ethnic segregation
is also examined in this multi-ethnic country. Furthermore, the relationship between
ethnic group and occupation, and thus socio-economic class is analysed. This study
uses data from the 2004 and 2012 Censuses, which were obtained at ressort level. As
ressorts are relatively large and heterogeneous, ressort-level data was downscaled to
the neighbourhood-level, which is more suitable for segregation analysis. 106 neigh-
bourhoods were defined based on archival maps acquired from the National Planning
Office Suriname (Stichting Planbureau Suriname 1985), which were georeferenced
to the ressorts. In 2012, the average neighbourhood population size was 3611.
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25.1.1 Housing Composition
Land in Suriname can be acquired through two processes, namely government allo-
cation and private purchase. Every Surinamese citizen can apply for governmental
land; however, the process is bureaucratic, lengthy and often littered with corruption.
In addition, as most plots within Paramaribo itself are already allocated, govern-
ment land is mainly located far from the city, and is often deprived in terms of
water and electricity supply. Governmental allocation usually occurs in the form
of social housing projects. Nevertheless, many residents cannot afford buying these
plots and/or houses on their own; therefore the projects are subsidised (McHardy
and Donovan 2016). While waiting for governmental allocation, people usually rent
a house, stay in a family-owned house, or squat an unoccupied house or empty plot.
Squatter settlements consist of rural migrants, who do not have a social network in
place to assist them (Hoefte 2014).
Purchasing land and/or a house through private purchase is reserved for the better
off, due to highbuilding costs, high interest rates for loans andhighprices for privately
owned land. Therefore, who ownswhat piece of land is (in part) determined by socio-
economic status. Moreover, private real estate developers develop housing projects
for a specific socio-economic group in mind. Similarly, social housing projects are
also targeted towards a certain group. These processes can lead to spatial sorting
of the socio-economic groups into different neighbourhoods. In 2014, of 134,329
households, the shares of private owners, renters, people in social housing, as well
as people living in squatter settlements were 69%, 12%, 4% and 0.5%, respectively
(Namdar and Caupain 2015).
Residential area can be differentiated by socio-economic status. This was studied
for the GPR by Fung-Loy et al. (2019), where the authors used housing type as a
proxy for socio-economic status. Residences were differentiated based on spatial
characteristics. The residential urban area was divided into rich, middle, middle to
low and poor residences. Residences on plot sizes larger than 600 m2 and houses
bigger than 300 m2 were considered to be residences for the rich. The residences for
the poor consistedmainly of squatter settlements and social housing projects initiated
by the government. Based on this residential differentiation, Fung-Loy et al. (2019)
found that the GPR as a whole is fairly heterogeneous in terms of residence types
(indicated by multi-group dissimilarity indices ≈0.4). There was, however, a certain
level of segregation between rich and poor residences, both being concentrated in
specific areas. Rich residences were mostly located in the north of Paramaribo in
ressort Blauwgrond (BD in Fig. 25.1), while poor residences were concentrated in
the south (in ressorts Latour (LR) and Pontbuiten (PN)).
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25.1.2 Occupational Composition
As stated by Verrest (2010) and Hoefte (2014), residential segregation is linked to
socio-economic status and income inequality between different population groups in
Paramaribo. The correlation between income inequality and residential segregation
of socio-economic groups was also observed in European countries (Tammaru et al.
2019).
Income inequality and thus socio-economic status of individuals is linked to their
occupation, time of arrival into the city and the level of education (Verrest 2010;
Hoefte 2014). For the occupational categorisation, the census classification is based
on the ISCO-88 classification (International Labour Office 1990). This classification
divides occupations into ten major groups, ranging from Legislators, Senior officers
and Managers to Elementary occupations. These occupation groups were further
classified into three socio-economic groups, namely, Top, Middle and Bottom. The
Top socio-economic group consisted of Legislators, Senior officers and Managers
and Professionals. Research suggest that this group generally has the highest earnings
out of all groups and as such is linked to the Top socio-economic group (Leetmaa
et al. 2015). From the census data, a higher education was proven to correspond
with a higher income (Schalkwijk 2015), and thus a higher socio-economic status.
In Suriname, Legislators, Senior officers and Managers can have varying levels of
education (WorldEconomicForum2013), butmainly achieveTertiary andSecondary
education levels (General Bureau of Statistics Suriname 2014). The Middle socio-
economic group consists of Technicians and Associate Professionals, and Armed
Forces, Clerks, Service Workers and Shop and Market Sales Workers, Skilled Agri-
cultural and Fishery Workers, and Craft and Related Trade Workers. The Bottom
socio-economic group was made up of Plant and Machine Operators, and Elemen-
tary occupations. Figure 25.2 shows that the largest occupational groups in the GPR
in both census years were Service Workers and Shop and Market Sales Workers, as
well as Elementary occupations. Combined, these accounted for around 34% of all
workers in 2012. Meanwhile, Legislators, Senior officers and Managers accounted
for only 6% of all workers in the GPR in 2012. Between 2004 and 2012, the Top
group experienced an increase of 6%, while Service Workers and Shop and Market
Sales Workers and Elementary occupations combined increased by 41%.
Fig. 25.2 Distribution of occupational groups and change over time
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25.1.3 Ethnic Composition
In Suriname, occupation, time of arrival into the city and the level of education
of individuals are linked to ethnicity. As a result of colonisation, Suriname has a
very ethnically diverse population. The main ethnic groups are shown in Fig. 25.3.
The largest ethnic groups in the GPR, according to both the census of 2004 and of
2012, are the Hindustani (descendants of contract labourers from India), the Creoles
(descendants of former African slaves who stayed within the city) and the Javanese
(descendants of contract labourers from Indonesia). Other smaller ethnic groups
include Mixed (people of mixed ethnicity), Maroons (descendants of African slaves,
who escaped into the interior of the country), Caucasians, Chinese and Amerindians
(indigenous people of theAmericas).Maroonswere themost segregated ethnic group
within the GPR, specifically in Paramaribo. This uneven distribution of Maroons can
be seen in Fig. 25.3, wherewe see a concentration ofMaroons in the southern ressorts
of Paramaribo, mainly LR and PN.
The different ethnic groups arrived in Suriname at different times in history and for
different purposes. Consequently, they were historically located in different areas in
the country. For example, before the abolition of slavery in 1863 the Caucasian elite
were located in the city centre in Paramaribo, with their servants (mainly Creoles)
living in small servant quarters at the back of the plots. After 1863, other areas were
established for free Creoles migrating from the plantations to the city. These areas,
such as Frimangron (Free people’s land, established for emancipated slaves), were
the smaller, less affluent areas in the city centre. In 1921, almost 80% of Paramaribo
residents were Creole. In addition, mainly Asian contract labourers, the Hindus-
tani (first arriving from India in 1873) and the Javanese (first arriving from Java in
Fig. 25.3 Ethnic distribution per ressort for both census years
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1890), were found for the colony to work on the plantations. The Maroons settled
in tribal communities in the interior of Suriname, after escaping the plantations. The
Amerindians were also concentrated in the interior districts of Suriname and at the
coast.
As agriculture declined and many plantations closed in the 1930s, many inhab-
itants were given small-scale agricultural holdings in the districts of Commewijne
and Wanica. Thus, many Hindustani and Javanese settled in these districts. During
the Second World War, the demand for workers in the construction, bauxite and
service sector increased, thus attracting many Hindustani and Javanese to the city for
better occupational, and later educational opportunities (Hoefte 2014). TheMaroons
became a significant group in Paramaribo, after fleeing the civil war in the interior
between 1986 and 1992. TheMaroons settled in and around the former social housing
projects, predominantly in the south of Paramaribo. As these newcomers arrived in
the city, the previous rich inhabitants moved to the north and southwest of the city
centre, towards the newly built suburbs (de Brujine and Namdar 2013).
According to the census of 2012, the ressorts are generally ethnically mixed.
However, we can see that Creoles are still dominant in the centre, while Hindustani
dominate west Paramaribo and Wanica (see Fig. 25.3). District Commewijne has a
higher concentration of Javanese people. As certain ethnic groups arrived in the city
later than others, they lagged behind in educational and occupational opportunities.
Over time, a more equal distribution of ethnicities was achieved. As such, educa-
tional and occupational opportunities were also more equally distributed among the
different ethnicities. Nevertheless, as stated by Verrest (2010) and Hoefte (2014),
some occupational groups are still dominated by specific ethnic groups. Therefore,
ethnic and socio-economic segregation can be linked (Reardon and Bischoff 2011).
Such a link was also found in, for example, Belgium, where poorer neighbourhoods
had a higher concentration of non-European migrants (Costa and de Valk 2018).
25.2 Methods
25.2.1 Socio-economic Segregation
The dissimilarity index (DI) was used to measure segregation between the socio-
economic groups within the GPR. The DI describes the overall evenness of the
distribution between two groups. It also provides the ability to evaluate each group
and each area separately (Sakoda 1981). DI values range from zero to one, with
values below 0.3 indicating a low level of segregation, and values above 0.6 pointing
at a high level of segregation. However, the DI is scale dependent and thus can be
influenced by size of the areas analysed (Quillian and Lagrange 2016; Andersson
et al. 2018). In order to compare regions or countries, we also consider the change
in DI (Ismail 2013). The DI and the change in DI were calculated between each
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occupational group and between the aggregated socio-economic groups Top, Middle
and Bottom.
In addition to the DI, the location quotient (LQ) was calculated, to evaluate the
concentration of the Top and Bottom socio-economic groups in the neighbourhoods,
compared to the GPR as a whole. Location quotient values of less than one or
more than one mean that a socio-economic group is under- or overrepresented in a
neighbourhood, respectively. A value equal to one means that the neighbourhood’s
share of a group is equal to the share of the group within the GPR (Miller et al.
1991). Moreover, the neighbourhoods were classified by socio-economic composi-
tion, based on the Top, Middle and Bottom groups. The classification was applied
according toMarcińczak et al. (2015), which indicates the level of income inequality
within a neighbourhood. The three socio-economic groupsweremerged into different
neighbourhood types based on the typology provided by Marcińczak et al. (2015).
Finally, the location of the Top occupational group in Paramaribo was analysed.
Both the location quotients and the DI were calculated with the Geo-Segregation
Analyzer software (Apparicio et al. 2013). Further methodological details regarding
the calculations of the DI, LQ and other maps are described in the Introduction of
this Book.
25.2.2 Ethnic Segregation
We also investigated ethnic segregation. This was done at ressort level, as ethnicity
data was only available at this level. The proportion of each ethnic group within
a ressort was calculated. In addition, the multi-group DI was calculated per ethnic
group, to assess the overall level of evenness of distribution between the different
ethnic groups within the GPR. Finally, the link between socio-economic segregation
and ethnic segregation was analysed. To determine the correlation between ethnic
and socio-economic segregation, we examined the overlap of the results of the socio-
economic and ethnic segregation analysis (Leetmaa et al. 2015; Harris et al. 2017).
The correlation between ethnicity and socio-economic group was calculated for both
census years.
25.3 Results and Discussion
25.3.1 Socio-economic Segregation
In recent years, the average Gini index has decreased for the Latin America and the
Caribbean region (from 54 to 47.5 between 2002 and 2014), suggesting a decreasing
income inequality (Tornarolli et al. 2018). However, in Suriname income inequality
has increased between 1980 and 2004, with Gini indices increasing from 41 to 55
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(Menke et al. 2013). For the census year 2012, no Gini index was calculated due to
low response rates. As such, Suriname is considered to be one of the most unequal
countries of the Caribbean. In 2004, the poorest quintile received 3.9% of the total
income, while the richest quintile received 53.6% (PAHO Suriname 2012).
To analyse if the increasing income inequality is linked with an increasing spatial
segregation, the DI was calculated to quantify the level of segregation between the
different occupational groups (Table 25.1). For both years 2004 and2012,Elementary
occupations (ELE) were the most segregated when compared to the other occupa-
tional groups. The DIs > 0.50 between the Top and Bottom groups for 2004 and
2012, indicate a high level of segregation between these two groups. An increase of
0.7% per year in the DI is also noted, indicating an increasing segregation. When
analysing all socio-economic groups, a multi-group DI of 0.48 (in 2004) and 0.51
(in 2012) also indicate an increasing level of segregation.
As the DIs between the Top and Bottom groups indicate, these two groups are
highly residentially separated from each other. This can also be seen through the
location quotients for the Top and Bottom socio-economic groups in 2004 and 2012
(Fig. 25.4). In 2004, there was a higher concentration of the Top group in district
Paramaribo in ressort Blauwgrond (BD on the map). The ressorts on the fringe of the
city, especially ressorts Latour (LR) and Pontbuiten (PN), and district Commewijne,
are more associated with the Bottom socio-economic group.
As can be seen in Fig. 25.5, the Top socio-economic status (SES) neighbourhoods
were concentrated in north Paramaribo, mainly in ressort Blauwgrond (BD). The
Bottom group was largely concentrated in south Paramaribo, in Latour (LR) and
Pontbuiten (PN). Districts Wanica and Commewijne consisted mostly of Middle and
Bottom to Middle SES neighbourhoods. There were no Polarized neighbourhoods
in the Greater Paramaribo Region.
The Bottom and Bottom to Middle SES neighbourhoods were dominant
and located in central and southern Paramaribo and in the less urban districts
Commewijne and Wanica in both years. The Top and Middle to Top SES neigh-
bourhoods were mostly found in Paramaribo itself. This follows the trend mentioned
Table 25.1 Dissimilarity indices (multiplied by 100) between all occupational groups, as well as
the Top, Middle and Bottom groups in 2004 and 2012
LEG PRO TEC CLE SER SKI CRA PLA ELE TOP MID BOT
LEG 45 30 31 29 42 30 48 52
PRO 43 33 34 31 43 32 48 52
TEC 31 32 21 22 26 21 34 42
CLE 30 30 21 23 27 23 35 42
SER 28 29 21 21 26 23 31 38
SKI 41 41 28 26 25 26 47 52
CRA 29 29 21 21 21 26 33 40
PLA 46 45 33 31 30 43 30 55
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Fig. 25.4 Location quotient maps at neighbourhood level for Top and Bottom occupational groups
Fig. 25.5 Classification of neighbourhoods by socio-economic composition
in the introduction, where the rich, who formerly concentrated in the old city centre,
moved towards the suburbs of north andwest Paramaribo, leaving behind theworking
class in the city centre. A large elite neighbourhood emerged inCommewijne, namely
Palm Village. This area did not follow the historic pattern of socio-economic segre-
gation; it was a relatively new private real estate development, which turned a former
plantation into a high-end gated community. Overall, there was a fairly stable pattern
of socio-economic composition of the neighbourhoods in Paramaribo between 2004
and 2012. Of the 106 neighbourhoods, eight downgraded to a lower socio-economic
status and 13 upgraded.
To assess in which neighbourhoods the Top socio-economic group was concen-
trated, quintiles were calculated. Figure 25.6 shows that the neighbourhoods with the
highest 20% of Top (Q1) were mainly located within Paramaribo itself. Some were
the established suburban neighbourhoods in the 1950s, while the rest were newly
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Fig. 25.6 Location of the Top occupational group
established neighbourhoods, consisting mainly of gated communities targeted to the
very rich. Neighbourhoods with the lowest 20% of Top (Q5) were located predom-
inantly in district Wanica and in the centre of Paramaribo. Overall, Paramaribo had
the largest proportion of Top SES neighbourhoods, a remnant of the colonial past.
25.3.2 Ethnic Segregation
To assess the level of ethnic segregation in Paramaribo, first the proportion of each
ethnic group within a ressort was assessed for both census years. When comparing
2004 and 2012 (Fig. 25.3), one change which stands out, is the increase of the propor-
tion of Maroons concentrating mainly in and around social housing projects in the
ressorts Latour (LR) and Pontbuiten (PN) in Paramaribo. In 2012, the proportion
of Maroons also increased in ressorts Saramaccapolder (SR) and De Nieuwe Grond
(DD) in Wanica and Meerzorg (MG) in Commewijne 2012. This ethic group has
experienced the largest increase in the GPR, growing by 43% between 2004 and
2012. As mentioned, the migration of Maroons to the urban area started largely after
1986 (later than the other groups) and as the results show, this is still continuing.
Between 2004 and 2012, the Mixed group experienced the second largest growth,
18%. Interestingly, there is also a slight increase of the proportion of Chinese in
districts Wanica and Commewijne. As population increased in these districts, so did
the commercial activities, which are dominated by Chinese merchants. Neverthe-
less, Wanica and Commewijne were still dominated by Hindustani and Javanese,
following the historical pattern.
The level of ethnic segregation was also assessed via the DI. It was calculated
for each ethnic group per district and for the GPR as a whole. In addition, the
overall multi-group DI was measured (Table 25.2). In 2004, the Maroons and the
Javanese were the most segregated within the GPR. In Paramaribo, Maroons were
mainly concentrated in ressorts LR and PN, while Javanese were concentrated in
BD and RE (see Fig. 25.3). In Wanica, the Javanese were also the most segregated,
concentrating in ressort LP and DG. In 2012, Maroons and Javanese were still the
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Table 25.2 Dissimilarity indices (multiplied by 100) per ethnic group, per ressort and the GPR as
a whole
DAmerindian DMaroon DCreole DHindustani DJavanese DChinese DCaucasian DMixed Dall ethnic 
groups
Year 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012
Paramaribo 13 16 48 52 25 26 26 25 41 48 31 45 22 44 14 19 28 32
Wanica 20 19 29 30 26 22 22 18 42 39 14 17 30 18 15 12 27 24
Commewijne 30 8 20 13 10 3 16 7 13 8 9 24 26 21 8 5 13 7 
GPR 16 14 44 48 35 29 33 28 44 43 37 29 30 36 22 23 34 33
Paramaribo 3% 1% 1% 0% 2% 5% 12% 5% 2% 
Wanica -1% 1% -2% -2% -1% 3% -5% -2% -1% 
Commewijne -9% -4% -9% -7% -5% 20% -2% -4% -6% 
GPR -1% 1% -2% -2% 0% -3% 2% 1% -1% 
most segregated ethnicities within the GPR. In Paramaribo, next to higher levels
of segregation for Maroons and Javanese, we also see an increasing segregation of
Chinese and Caucasians. These two groups were mainly concentrated in the city
centre and the northern ressorts of Paramaribo. For both years, Maroons were the
most segregated ethnic group within the GPR.
Overall, all districts and the GPR as a whole have a low DI (<0.35), indicating a
low level of segregation among the different ethnic groups. In other words, overall
the GPR generally has a heterogeneous population with regards to ethnicity at district
level.
25.3.3 Link Between Socio-economic and Ethnic Segregation
In order to quantify these visually perceived relationships between the different
ethnicities and socio-economic groups, correlation coefficientswere calculated based
on the absolute number of population in the different groups (Fig. 25.7). Results
show that indeed Maroons were primarily negatively correlated with the Top socio-
economic group. Where in 2004, Amerindians were the most correlated with the
Bottom group, in 2012 the Maroons became the most correlated with the Bottom
occupational group. This indicates that as the proportion of Maroons grows, they are
mostly accessing occupations associated with the Bottom socio-economic group. As
they are the last ethnic group to arrive in the urban area, they have an educational and
thus occupational disadvantage. In 2012, Javanese were moderately correlated with
all socio-economic groups, while Hindustani were slightly more correlated with the
Bottom group and Creoles were more correlated with the Middle and Top groups.
The ethnicities most correlated with the Top socio-economic group were Mixed,
Caucasian and Chinese. Caucasians and Chinese were historically concentrated in
Paramaribo, allowing them better educational and occupational opportunities; thus,
they are strongly correlated with the Top socio-economic group. The same can be
said for the Mixed group; they were concentrated in Paramaribo, affording them
better development opportunities.
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Fig. 25.7 Correlation between ethnicity and socio-economic group
25.4 Conclusions
In this study, socio-economic segregation in the Greater Paramaribo Region in Suri-
name was examined. ISCO categories were used as a proxy for socio-economic
status. Results show that overall, there is a high level of socio-economic segregation
in the GPR. The segregation has also increased between 2004 and 2012. The level
of segregation is especially high between the Top and the Bottom groups (DI2012 ≈
0.56). European cities seem to be following this trend also (Musterd et al. 2016). The
rich and poor segregate in separate areas within the GPR, with the poor (Bottom)
being themost segregated socio-economic group. In addition, the overall multi-group
DI calculated in this study (DI2012 = 0.51) was higher than those found by Fung-
Loy et al. (2019) (DI2015 ≈ 0.3, which was based on the distribution of house type).
This indicates that there is some correspondence between socio-economic status and
housing type in this region. However, there can be a mismatch between the residen-
tial characteristics and the socio-economic group, for example, in neighbourhoods
in transition.
Furthermore, ethnic segregation in the GPR was also assessed. Overall, the DI
for ethnic segregation is relatively low in the GPR (DI2012 = 0.33). However, there
are some ressorts where certain ethic groups concentrate, such as ressorts LR and
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PN where Maroons concentrate; they experience segregation in district Paramaribo
according to a DI > 0.40. When comparing the multi-group DI for socio-economic
segregation (DI2012 = 0.51) with the multi-group DI for ethnic segregation (DI2012
= 0.33), we see that the GPR is less segregated by ethnicity, but more segregated by
socio-economic status. This was also found in other studies for Suriname and other
Latin American and Caribbean countries such as Brazil and Trinidad and Tobago
(Brathwaite 1980; Lichter et al. 2012; Verrest 2010). For the United States, it was
found that while ethnic segregation is still larger than socio-economic segregation,
ethnic segregation has decreased, while socio-economic segregation has increased
(Brady et al. 2017).
Assessing the link between ethnic and socio-economic segregation, we see that
for certain ethnicities there exists a high correlation with a specific socio-economic
statuses. Maroons are increasingly correlated with the Bottom, while Mixed and
Caucasians are highly correlated with the Top socio-economic group. This reflects
the history of Suriname; Caucasians were traditionally the rich colonists and, similar
to the Mixed, were concentrated in the urban centre while the Maroons fled into the
interior to escape slavery. Only after the mid-twentieth century Maroons migrated to
the city, experiencing a significant lag in education and consequently occupational
opportunities. As such, Maroons are far behind Mixed and Caucasians on the socio-
economic ladder.
In this research, the socio-economic and ethnic segregation, and the link between
the two was analysed. As certain ethnic groups are more strongly correlated with
certain socio-economic statuses, increasing socio-economic segregation can limit
the upward socio-economic mobility opportunities for specific marginalised ethnic
groups. As income inequality continues to increase, it is likely that socio-economic
segregation will increase as well.
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Chapter 26
Measuring Changes in Residential
Segregation in São Paulo in the 2000s
Flávia Feitosa, Joana Barros, Eduardo Marques, and Mariana Giannotti
Abstract Residential segregation is known as one of the most prevalent problems
of Latin American and Brazilian cities. This chapter looks into the changes in segre-
gation levels in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo between 2000 and 2010. This
period was marked by economic growth and decreasing social inequalities in Brazil
with consequent improvement to the quality of life of lower income classes. Despite
those improvements, general patterns of urban segregation in Brazilian cities showed
remarkable stability, albeit with important changes in the details of segregation
patterns. This chapter explores the spatial relationship between socio-occupational
groups using global and local segregation indices. The analysis confirmed a highly
segregated distribution of social groups in the Metropolitan Region and revealed
increased levels of segregation, with global indices figures for 2010 higher than
for 2000. Analysis demonstrated that peripheral areas of the Metropolitan Region
became more fragmented and heterogeneous in that period, and revealed that their
increased heterogeneity is mainly composed of classes with close social proximity,
rather than polarised ones. Results showed that while middle classes became more
integrated amongst themselves and with lower classes, the separation between lower
and upper classes was not only maintained but also increased during the period. All
these findings suggest a reconfiguration of the concentric pattern of segregation that
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maintained a spatial structure of strong social isolation during the period, although
with greater complexity.
Keywords Residential segregation patterns ·Metropolitan region of São Paulo ·
Global and local indices of segregation · Dissimilarity index · Isolation and
exposure indices
26.1 Introduction
Residential segregation is known as one of the most prevalent problems of Latin
American and Brazilian cities, together with poverty and precarious housing condi-
tions. It is also known that residential segregation is an urban feature that reduces
opportunities for the poor and contributes substantially to poverty reproduction
(Wilson 1987; Massey and Denton 1993; Briggs 2005).
Although the spatial pattern of Latin American cities often has roots in their colo-
nial formation, the case of São Paulo is peculiar since the city had no demographic nor
economic importance by the mid-nineteenth century. It was after the boom of coffee
plantations at the end of that century and the industrialisation of the first decades
of the twentieth century that São Paulo gradually became the most important city
in the country. São Paulo is rivalled with Rio de Janeiro, which was, for centuries,
the colonial and later imperial capital of Brazil. The largest proportion of the territo-
ries of metropolitan São Paulo were formed during the decades of intense migration
and fast urbanisation from the 1950s to the 1980s (Caldeira 2016). At that time, the
city became the primary metropolis of a highly urbanised Brazil, even though it has
never been the capital city. Since the 1930s, housing policies were mostly focused
on the construction of new units, although slum upgrading programmes were started
as well in the last 20 years. However, this double emphasis on property and on unit
construction left most of the populationwith no housing solutions except squatting or
buying an irregular plot, since buying or renting from the private sector was beyond
the reach of most urban dwellers. This historical process produced metropolitan
structures with clear core-periphery segregation patterns, with high-income groups
located in central and well-serviced areas and lower income groups in more distant
and less serviced areas intensely populated by precarious self-constructed houses in
favelas (squatted areas) and irregular settlements. Such patterns have been resilient
to long periods of fast urban growth and societal changes (Kowarick 1979; Bonduki
and Rolnik 1982).
Although most cities in Latin America have a similar concentric spatial pattern of
segregation, recent studies of Brazilian cities have highlighted changes to this macro-
segregation structure. While the overall spatial structure remains radial and concen-
tric, the spatial structure of segregation now also presents a number of sub-centralities
and peripheral areas that are increasinglymore heterogeneous (Marques 2016; Prete-
ceille and Cardoso 2008), echoing classical statements of territorial heterogeneity in
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Brazilian cities (Valladares and Preteceille 2000). Such fragmentation in the core-
periphery spatial pattern is understood to be a consequence of the combination of
changes in residential preferences of higher income groups for gated communities
(Caldeira 2000) and transformations in lower income residential regions caused by
the political and economic dynamics in the country since the return to democracy in
the 1980s (Arretche 2019).
In general terms, the recent democratic period that started in 1980s brought social
improvements as a product of a cycle of increasing political activism and electoral
accountability (since the 1980s), economic stability (since the 1990s) and better and
broader social policies (also in the 1990s but especially in the 2000s), integrated
in national federalist systems (Arretche 2019; Marques et al. 2012). In cities, this
involved a slow but continuous expansion of public policies and services in tradition-
ally under-serviced areas. Even areas of precarious housing conditions such as favelas
and irregular settlements have experienced substantial and systematic improvements
in recent decades with slum upgrading and infrastructure policies, although main-
taining levels of inequalities (Marques and Saraiva 2017). The presence of precarious
housing decreased relatively in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo from 15% in
2000 to 14.5% in 2010, reaching around 800,000 precarious households in favelas
and irregular settlements amongst a total of 6 million households in the region (CEM
2014). It is important to add that from 2009 to 2015, a federal housing programme
has built approximately 100,000 housing units in the Metropolitan Region of São
Paulo, possibly reducing the stock of precarious housing, but there are no recent
statistics yet that can measure this effect (Marques 2016).
In economic terms, the average income rose from R$630 to R$1283 between
1991 and 2014 (Jannuzzi 2016), although it has decreased more recently due to a
continuous economic and political crisis since 2016. Income inequality, as measured
by Gini Index, also declined from 0.606 in 1992 to 0.517 in 2014, while poverty
rates reduced from 31.1% in 1991 to 7% in 2014 due to the combination of economic
growth, strong social policies and the continuous increase of the minimum salary
during the 2000s (Jannuzzi 2016). Since 2014, however, Brazil has suffered from
increasing economic and political instability, which has strongly affected the social
conditions of the country. The Gini Index increased from 0.517 in 2014 to 0.533 in
2017, while poverty rates increased from 7% in 2014 to 10% in 2017 (IBGE 2019)
and unemployment jumped from 5.5 in 2014 to 13% in 2017 (Góes and Karpowicz
2017). Although the impacts of the country’s deteriorating social situation are visible
in our cities, they have not yet been systematically analysed.
Despite these improvements, general patterns of urban segregation in Brazilian
cities showed remarkable stability, as will be demonstrated throughout this chapter,
albeit with important changes in the details of segregation patterns. Compared with
other socio-economic changes, however, urban inequalities associated with spatial
segregation have changed little, highlighting the need for better financed and bolder
urban policies, especially concerning urban planning and land-use control.
The subject of this chapter—São Paulo—is the most important Metropolitan
Region of South America, with around 20million inhabitants in an area of 7,946km2.
It encompasses 39 municipalities across a continuous urban area, approximately
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Fig. 26.1 Map of the metropolitan region of São Paulo
2,200 km2, as shown in the map in Fig. 26.1. São Paulo Municipality, with about 12
million inhabitants, is the most populous Brazilian city and covers most of the occu-
pied area of the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo (MRSP). Its central area concen-
trates most of the jobs and amenities in the region. The municipality of Guarulhos,
located northeast of São Paulo (number 16 in Fig. 26.1), is the second most popu-
lous city in the MRSP, with about 1.3 million inhabitants. It is notable because this
is where the busiest airport in Brazil can be found. Santo André, São Bernardo do
Campo and São Caetano do Sul (numbers 33 to 35 in Fig. 26.1) are the most devel-
oped municipalities of a region known as the ‘ABC’1, which is traditionally known
for its industrial economic base and represents an important sub-centre of the region.
While São Paulo concentrates a significant portion of the wealth of the country,
with 17.7% of the BrazilianGDP in 2013, it also has a largeworking-class population
and high levels of poverty, precarious housing conditions and inequality. The low-
income population, mostly residents on the fringes of the metropolitan area, tend
to suffer from low-quality services, long-journeys to work, and low accessibility to
amenities and opportunities, all exacerbated by segregation.
Due to its importance in the country, there is a long tradition of segregation studies
on São Paulo (Kowarick 1979; Bonduki and Rolnik 1982; Caldeira 2000; Marques
2016). The present chapter builds on a series of studies developed by Marques
and colleagues which measured segregation using socio-occupational groups in the
1ABC stands for the initials of the three main municipalities of the region: Santo André, São
Bernardo do Campo and São Caetano do Sul. The region is composed by 7 municipalities: in
addition to the above-mentioned three, it includes Diadema (number 9 on the map in Fig. 26.1),
Maua (number 23), Ribeirão Pires (number 28) and Rio Grande da Serra (number 29).
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Metropolitan Region of São Paulo (MRSP) for the period of 1991–2000 (Marques
et al. 2012) and 2000–2010, each regarding class (Marques 2016) and race (França
2016). Their findings confirm that the greater the social distance between classes, the
greater the segregation. They also highlight that São Paulo is extremely hierarchical
in its socio-spatial structure. The results of previous studies make clear that the top
occupational groups are the most segregated, but also indicate changes in the struc-
ture of the middle and lower classes which have become more integrated between
2000 and 2010.
This chapter revisits the results from previous studies and expands on their
analysis by further exploring the spatial relationships between socio-occupational
groups during the period between 2000 and 2010. In addition to analysing group
relationships using the evenness/clustering dimension of segregation (Dissimilarity
Index), this chapter explores the exposure/isolation spatial dimension complementing
previous analyses. Using global exposure and isolation indices, changes in relation-
ships between socio-occupational groups during this period are revealed, contributing
to an in-depth understanding of the known changes in segregation patterns in the
MRSP. The spatial patterns of such changes are presented by maps of local expo-
sure and isolation indices, which allow for a detailed understanding of the effect of
changes in those relationships in the spatial dynamics of the metropolis.
The next section discusses the MRSP’s socio-occupational composition in 2000
and 2010 and introduces the occupational classification used in the following anal-
ysis. It also discusses the residential distribution of socio-occupational groups with
maps describing neighbourhood types by socio-occupation composition and the loca-
tion quotient of top and bottom socio-occupational groups. The following section
discusses the methodology employed and introduces the isolation and exposure
indices used to complement the analysis using the Dissimilarity Index. Results are
then presented and discussed, followed by the overall discussion and conclusions.
26.2 Socio-occupational Classes in the Metropolitan Region
of São Paulo
In the present study, occupational groups are used as a proxy to socio-economic
groups. This allows for consistency in the approach of analysis across different census
periods which would not be possible using income groups. As data for occupational
groups is not available in the Brazilian Census, the classification adopted here was
produced by the Centre for Metropolitan Studies (CEM) and was used in previous
studies (Marques 2016; França 2016). The classification is based on a social stratifi-
cationmethodology called EGP classification, following the initials of its proponents
(Erikson et al. 1979), and adapted to theBrazilian social structure by researchers since
the 1980s (Silva 1999). This classification differentiates employment types as rural or
urban; manual or non-manual; and routine or non-routine—where the second term in
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Table 26.1 EGP classes,
abbreviations and social
groups
EGP classes Abbreviation Social group
Owners and employers OE Top
High-level professionals HLP
Low-level professionals LLP Middle
High-level routine non-manual HL-RNM
Technicians and supervisors TS
Low-level routine non-manual LL-RNM
Skilled manual workers SMW Bottom
Unskilled manual workers UMW
each pair represents a higher socio-economic and occupational status. The classifica-
tion also includes information on occupational position and hierarchy, distinguishing
between employed workers, supervisors, the self-employed and employers. For the
present analysis, rural classes (employers, subsistence farmers and farmworkers) will
not be included due to their low representation within the MRSP. Table 26.1 lists
8 EGP classes used in this study, their abbreviations and the categorisation into the
top, middle and bottom.
The dataset provided by the Centre for Metropolitan Studies was built using
data from the sample questionnaire of the Brazilian National Census, distributed by
‘weighting areas’ (áreas de ponderação in Portuguese). Although there have been
changes in the boundaries of the MRSP’s weighting areas between 2000 and 2010,
the dataset used here is a consolidated dataset comprising 633 spatial units.Weighting
areas in the MRSP have an average population of 32,000 inhabitants, although there
is significant variation between them.
Figure 26.2 shows the distribution of EGP classes in the MRSP in 2000 and
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Fig. 26.2 Distribution of occupational (EGP) classes and change over time
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Fig. 26.3 Neighbourhood types distribution in the MRSP (years 2000 and 2010) according to
socio-occupational composition
are consistent with the social, political and economic changes in Brazil over this
period. The graph clearly shows that manual workers (skilled and unskilled) are the
largest EGP class, followed by low and high-level routine non-manual workers. The
third-largest class is the high- and low-level professionals. In terms of change over
the period, the graph shows that the proportion of professionals increased while the
proportion of unskilled manual workers decreased. Owners and employers seem to
have declined, but this might be due to sample variation since this is a small class.
It is interesting to note that while there has been an increase in the proportion of the
top group (12–14%) and a decrease in the bottom group (45–43%), the middle group
has remained stable during the period.
The maps in Fig. 26.3 show the distribution of neighbourhood types for both
2000 and 2010, using the following classes of neighbourhoods: top (proportion of
top group—ptop > 0.4),middle (proportion of middle group—pmiddle > 0.5), bottom
(proportion of bottom group—pbottom > 0.5), middle to top ( 0.2 < ptop < 0.4 and
0.2 < pmiddle < 0.5 and pbottom < 0.2), mixed (0.2 < ptop < 0.4 and 0.2 < pmiddle
< 0.5 and 0.2 < pbottom < 0.5) and bottom to middle (ptop < 0.2 and 0.3 < pmiddle
< 0.5 and 0.3 < pbottom < 0.5). Maps from both 2000 and 2010 clearly show the
concentric pattern of segregation, which is typical of Brazilian cities, with high-
status neighbourhoods in the centre surrounded by rings of middle-status/mixed
areas, and the lowest status neighbourhoods in the peripheral ring. Confirming the
known changes during this period, the map for 2010 shows a more fragmented and
heterogeneous spatial pattern in the peripheral areas, but a clearer predominance
of top groups at the centre. Despite the small increase in the overall proportion
of the top occupational groups in the MRSP, a significant expansion of high-status
neighbourhoods can be seen in the central area of theMRSP—known as the expanded
centre of São Paulo. Figure 26.3 also illustrates the emergence of top neighbourhood
types in more peripheral areas, which can be attributed to the gated communities
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Fig. 26.4 Location of top socio-occupational status group in the MRSP (years 2000 and 2010)
in those areas. In addition, the maps show a reduction of bottom neighbourhoods,
which are replaced by bottom tomiddle in 2010, and an apparent reduction of middle
neighbourhoods in 2010, mainly replaced bymixed or higher status neighbourhoods.
Figure 26.4 shows the location of the top socio-economic status groups, which
remained stable between 2000 and 2010. In 2000, 27 areal units (or 4%) housed
20% of the top group (Q1), while in 2010 there was only a small increase in this
number (29 areal units). Amongst the new areas classified as Q1, there are a few
located outside the central region, corroborating the pattern of neighbourhood types
distribution in Fig. 26.3.
Figure 26.5 presents location quotient (LQ)maps for top and bottom occupational
groups, which also shows relatively stable patterns during the period 2000–2010. Yet,
the LQ of top group shows interesting aspects, such as the fact that the share of top
groups in the dark green areas is more than four times higher than in the rest of the
MRSP. Figure 26.5b also shows an increase in the dark green areas (highest LQ-
top) outside of the expanded centre of São Paulo. Figure 26.5c, d show an increase
in the dark brown areas (lowest LQ-bottom) in the centre, which indicates that the
concentration of the low-status population has decreased in the central areas from
2000 to 2010.
26.3 Measuring Spatial Segregation in the Metropolitan
Region of São Paulo
The analysis presented here builds on previous studies measuring segregation in the
MRSP (Marques et al. 2012; Marques 2016; França 2016), which used Moran I and
the Dissimilarity Index (D). It partially replicates Marques and França’s analyses of
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Fig. 26.5 Location quotient maps for the years 2000 and 2010: top groups (a, b) and bottom (c, d)
occupational groups using D and complements it by exploring another spatial dimen-
sion of segregation using global and local Exposure and Isolation Indices (Feitosa
et al. 2007; Lieberson 1980). The use of complementary segregation indices depicting
different spatial dimensions of segregation is based on the understanding that distinct
segregation indices portray different aspects of segregation. Those dimensions are
directly linked with the conceptual definition of spatial segregation and the appro-
priateness of each concept for the case study in hand. The Dissimilarity Index (D),
which is themost popular segregation index, and its generalised (multi-group) version
captures the degree that social groups are evenly distributed within a region (Duncan
and Duncan 1955; Sakoda 1981). It assumes that a region is not segregated when
all socio-economic groups are evenly distributed across space. The index measures
the extent to which the distribution of social groups in the different spatial units of
the region replicates the overall population composition of the region, which can
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range from 1 (complete segregation) to 0 (complete integration). The index can be
computed for each pair of groups (D Index proposed byDuncan andDuncan in 1951),
which can include the evenness of each group in relation to all other groups, or for
all groups taken together (Generalised D Index proposed by Sakoda in 1981). The
global dissimilarity figure indicates the proportion of the population (of the relevant
group) that would have to relocate to a different neighbourhood in order to match
the distribution of reference groups (all others or paired group).
Following Reardon and O’Sullivan’s (2004) proposal for the two axes of spatial
segregation (the first axis measuring evenness to clustering dimension and the second
exposure to isolationdimension), this chapter employsExposure and Isolation indices
(Lieberson 1980) to complement the analysis using D. Unlike D, which focus on the
distribution of different groups across space, the Exposure Indexmeasures the poten-
tial interaction between groups or, in other words, the extent of which one group is
exposed to another based on spatial proximity. The Isolation Index is a special case of
the Exposure Index, which measures the exposure of a social group to itself. Those
indices range from 0 to 1 and are highly dependent on the city-wide proportion
of groups: the more people of class m, the more likely the exposure/isolation. This
dependency causes problems for comparative studies both across different geograph-
ical areas and same areas across different time periods. Thus, to aid interpretation
of the results across different time periods, this study uses normalised isolation and
exposure indices, where the original figures were divided by the city-wide percentage
of classm inMRSP. In this case, values closer to 1 indicate less segregation and values
higher and lower than 1 indicate an exposure superior and inferior, respectively, than
the one expected in an integrated region. The latter is understood as a region where
all exposure/isolation indices regarding one class are equal to its proportion in the
whole region. It should also be noted that while the traditional Exposure Index of
group m to n differs from the exposure of n to m, their normalised versions do not.
The spatial pattern of the exposure/isolation dimension is explored in this chapter
by maps of the local version of Exposure and Isolation indices, which indicate the
contribution of each area to the composition of the global index (Feitosa et al. 2007).
These local indices indicate the areas where exposure between groups (or from a
group to itself) is higher, allowing for areas of high and low segregation between
specific groups to be spatially identified. The advantage of the Exposure Index over
the Dissimilarity Index is that it directly measures the spatial relationship between
groups. While D compares levels of spatial distribution between two groups, the
Exposure Index allows for a detailed account of how those two groups potentially
interact based on their spatial locations. In the case of the MRSP, where residential
segregation has been extensively studied and measured over the years and its overall
pattern is well-known, the Exposure Index provides the opportunity to unfold the
spatial relationships between groups and investigate the increasing heterogeneity in
peripheral areas highlighted by previous studies.
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26.4 Dissimilarity and Exposure/Isolation Results
in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo
Table 26.2 presents the results for Dissimilarity (D) for MRSP in 2000 and 2010.
Results show an increase in segregation over the period, indicating that the distribu-
tion of EGP classes became less even in the region, with an increase of Generalised
D from 0.19 to 0.21. By calculating D not only in its generalised form (considering
all groups together) but also for each class (in relation to each other and to all other
EGP classes together), the analysis reveals the changes in segregation levels per
class. Results confirm findings of previous studies (Marques 2016; França 2016)
that segregation between EGP classes increases along with the social status distance
between groups—a trend that is more accentuated in 2010 than in 2000. Also consis-
tent with other studies that demonstrate that elites tend to be the most segregated
(Maloutas andFujita 2012), the classeswith highest segregation (and highest increase
inD levels from 2000 to 2010) belong to the top social group—owners and employers
(OE) and high-level professionals (HLP). D levels between top and bottom groups
increased from 0.48 in 2000 to 0.50 in 2010, mainly due to the increasing segregation
of OE. The classes with lowest segregation levels are those belonging to the middle
group—routine non-manual (RNM) and technicians and supervisors (TS). These
classes presented relative stability in the period 2000–2010, with the exception of
the low-level routine non-manual (LL-RNM) class which presented increasing levels
of dissimilarity towards OE and professionals (HLP and LLP).
While the OE and LL-RNM classes have shown the highest increase in D levels
in relation to all other classes (differences of 0.06 and 0.04, respectively, from 2000
to 2010), all other classes have presented stability or a slight increase in the index.
Such figures tend to change, however, when indices are computed for each pair of
classes. To further explore such changes, the spatial relationship between groups is
analysed using exposure and isolation indices.
Table 26.2 Dissimilarity indices (multiplied by 100), MRSP. Years 2000 (bottom-left) and 2010
(top-right)
OE HLP LLP HL-RNM TS LL-RNM SMW UMW ALL TOP MID BOT 
OE 18 27 41 48 51 56 57 44 
HLP 13 16 32 39 43 49 50 39 
LLP 21 17 19 28 30 38 39 25 
HL-RNM 33 31 16 15 16 22 25 12 
TS 40 38 23 12 16 17 21 14 
LL-RNM 41 39 24 12 13 13 15 13 
SMW 50 50 36 24 17 15 10 20 
UMW 48 46 34 23 19 14 9 21 




Generalized D (mul -group) 2010: 21 
Generalized D (mul -group) 2000: 19 
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Table 26.3 Normalised exposure/isolation indices, MRSP. Years 2000 (bottom-left) and 2010
(top-right)
OE HLP LLP HL-RNM TS 
LL-
RNM SMW UMW TOP MID BOT 
OE 
2.39 




1.43 1.04 0.9 0.84 0.69 0.7 
1.85 
LLP 1.41 1.43 
1.29 
1.06 0.96 0.92 0.81 0.8 
1.26 
HL-
RNM 1.06 1.07 1.07 
1.06 
1.01 1 0.97 0.94 
1.07 
TS 0.93 0.93 0.98 1.03 
1.12 
1.01 1.03 1.01 
1.08 
LL-



















BOT 0.72 0.96 
1.14 
1.11 
Table 26.3 shows the results for the normalised Exposure and Isolation indices.
Exposure was calculated for each pair of classes, with exposure of one class to itself
presented as the Isolation Index. As previously mentioned, in the case of normalised
Isolation and Exposure, values closer to 1 indicate less segregation and values higher
and lower than 1 indicate an exposure superior and inferior, respectively, than the
one expected in an integrated region. As expected, the normalised Exposure Index
values are lower than 1 for groups with greater social distance, and higher than 1 for
those with lower social distance. For instance, the normalised Exposure of HLP to
OE in 2010 is 1.91, which means that it is almost 2 times higher than the expected
in an integrated arrangement. Also, the highest normalised Isolation Index values
(exposure of a group to itself) were observed for top classes (OE and HLP, with
values from 1.79 to 2.39), while the lowest were observed for middle classes (RNM,
with values that are closer to 1, from 1.04 to 1.07), confirming that if the city is
highly segregated, it is the elite social groups who are really isolated. Furthermore,
we must add that previous studies such as the one by França (2016) showed that data
of self-classified skin colour (the Brazilian census category for race) demonstrates
that it is the white elite who are the most segregated.
By looking into how normalised Exposure and Isolation indices changed from
2000 and 2010, it is possible to establish how the spatial relationship between
classes has changed. Regarding broader groups—top, middle and bottom, results
show stability in most global indices. Nevertheless, a detailed analysis of the expo-
sure between EGP classes confirms that the avoidance between classes with greater
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social distance, which was already high, increased during the analysed period. The
analysis also shows a tendency of increase in integration between classes with lower
social distance. Such results lead to the conclusion that, although it is possible to
observe an increase in heterogeneity in certain areas of the MRSP, this is mainly
promoted by a higher exposure of classes with similar levels of status. To illustrate
such trends, some classes deserve special attention. The first is the OE, confirming
results from previous studies as well as analysis with D. The second is the lowest
status class (unskilled manual workers—UMW), which has also shown interesting
changes in this period.
OE have confirmed their position as the most segregated EGP class. It is also
the one with the highest increase in segregation levels from 2000 to 2010 (in both
Dissimilarity and Exposure/Isolation Indices), showing an increase in normalised
isolation from 1.93 to 2.39. OE’s levels of isolation are followed closely by HLP.
Results for 2000 and 2010 showan increase in exposure between occupational classes
with higher status (OE, HLP and LLP) and a decrease in their exposure to middle and
bottom groups, in particular to UMW. UMW presented a slight increase in isolation
levels from2000 to 2010.Meanwhile, results show a decrease in its exposure levels to
the three highest status occupational classes (OE,HLPandLLP), denoting an increase
in segregation between UMW and those classes. Nevertheless, UMW’s exposure
to bottom- and middle-status classes (except LLP) showed an increase, indicating
further integration between groups with lower social distance and, therefore, a higher
heterogeneity of peripheral areas.
The least segregated classes, with normalised isolation and exposure figures closer
to 1, are the middle ones, with the exception of low-level professionals (LLP), which
presented high levels of isolation. The LLP also became more exposed to OE and
less exposed to bottom classes (especially UMW).
Despite the relative stability of global indices computed for the broader groups
(top, middle and bottom), maps of the local exposure of the bottom group to others
(top, middle and bottom—the latter is an isolationmap) for 2000 and 2010 (Fig. 26.6)
indicates some changes in residential patterns. Themaps show evidence of a decrease
in exposure of top and middle groups to the bottom group in the central areas of the
MRSP, reinforcing the conclusion that bottom classes have decreased their presence
in central areas. Figure 26.6a, b show the local exposure of bottom to top group.
While the overall spatial pattern remains essentially the same, these maps show an
increase in exposure of bottom to top group in some peripheral areas of the map
(circled). In addition, the normalised global exposure value has decreased by 0.04
(Exposure 2000 = 0.72/2010 = 0.68) and the maps show a decrease in exposure
in the expanded centre of São Paulo. This suggests that although the top group has
clearly expanded residentially, this process did not promote further exposure with
the bottom group. This is mainly because the top group’s areas of expansion are not
characterised by the presence of the bottom group.
Figure 26.6c, d show the local exposure of bottom to middle group. Similarly
to Fig. 26.6a, b, the overall structure remains the same but it is possible to observe
a decrease in exposure in the central area (expanded centre) and new peripheral
areas of high exposure in the outskirts. It is important to note that the normalised
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Fig. 26.6 Local exposure maps of bottom to top (a, b), bottom to middle (c, d), and bottom to
bottom (Isolation—e, f)
exposure levels of bottom to middle group have remained stable (at 0.96) in the
period. Figure 26.6e, f show the isolation of bottom group (exposure to itself). While
global values increased by 0.03 in the period (from 1.11 to 1.14), changes in the
residential pattern can be observed in the eastern and south-eastern regions (circled),
26 Measuring Changes in Residential Segregation in São Paulo in the 2000s 521
where the most peripheral areas presented an increase in the levels of isolation, while
the opposite was observed in the areas located closer to the centre.
26.5 Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter is built on findings from previous studies regarding segregation in the
Metropolitan Region of São Paulo. It explores the spatial relationship between socio-
occupational groups using isolation and exposure indices. The analysis confirmed
a highly segregated distribution of social groups in the Metropolitan Region and
revealed increased levels of segregation, with global indices figures for 2010 higher
than for 2000. Following previous studies, higher status classes presented the highest
levels of segregation amongst all EGP classes. Spatially, there is evidence that the
expanded centre of São Paulo has become further appropriated by the elite, with a
reduced presence of bottom classes. The study also demonstrated that the highest
status classes are the most segregated in both 2000 and 2010 (OE, HLP and LLP,
with OE in the leading position) and revealed the following most segregated group
is the lowest status class (UMW).
It is clear from the results that the MRSP peripheral areas have become more
fragmented and heterogeneous in this period, confirming findings of previous studies.
The analysis revealed that the increased heterogeneity of MRSP’s peripheral areas is
mainly composed by classes with close social proximity, rather than polarised ones.
While there is evidence of an increase in exposure areas of bottom to top classes in
specific locations, those are not significant. This points to another important finding
that high-income gated communities located side by side of low-income informal
settlements are the exception, rather than the rule, in the peripheral areas of the
MRSP. In fact, results showed that while middle classes got more integrated amongst
themselves and with bottom classes, the separation between bottom and top classes
was not only maintained but also increased during the period. All these findings
suggest a reconfiguration of the concentric pattern of segregation that maintained a
spatial structure of strong social isolation during the period, although with greater
complexity.
It is important to reflect on the meaning of those findings and the fact that top
classes are more segregated than bottom classes, which is coincident with findings
in other cities. Results showed that the top groups have, indeed, a clear dynamic of
avoidance to the bottom group, although they are more segregated from other social
groups, but not from amenities and opportunities (an aspect not addressed by the
analysis). The bottom groups, in addition to being significantly segregated to other
groups, are also located in areas with poor services and at great distances of ameni-
ties, services and opportunities. This fact is at the heart of the segregation problem
in the MRSP, as well as Brazil and Latin America. While the lack of integration
between social groups is concerning, in more pragmatic terms the issue is how resi-
dential segregation matches the spatial pattern of urban opportunities; the locking-in
processes of the bottom groups into certain areas and their poor access to services
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reproduce urban inequality. As such, for the increasingly segregated elite, segrega-
tion means monopolizing opportunities, with important consequences to inequality
reproduction.
It is important to highlight that the period studied coincided with a phase of
economic growth and decreasing inequalities in Brazil, which since 2014 has been
substantially reverted. The heterogeneity of the peripheral areas is likely a product
of such economic growth with possible links to social mobility, but the structure
of segregation tends to remain the same. There have been no studies on segrega-
tion measurements looking beyond 2010, mainly due to lack of data availability.
Nevertheless, considering that residential location choices are deeply influenced by
economic power, it is expected that segregation will increase in the future.
This chapter has demonstrated that economic growth and decreasing inequali-
ties did not translate into the alleviation of segregation problems in the MRSP. As
such, further action is required to tackle residential segregation in Brazil. Segre-
gation is often understood as a mere spatial expression of social inequalities, but
it is actually produced by several processes related to space production, in which
public policies play an important role. There is a strong need for better financed and
bolder urban policies, particularly concerning housing policies and land-use regula-
tion. As demonstrated by this study, those are also required in periods of growth and
increasing equality. The effects of the current and future instability of the country
on segregation remain to be measured. It is clear that without active and continuous
policies, segregation will not only remain as one of the larger trends in Brazilian
cities, but might be further aggravated.
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